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co., et al. v. ConboI 
above case, on l;!etttion for cert to CA7, is 
The ca~e arises out of the corrugated cont~inera 
industry antitrust ,ca~~- that we have discusse~ before. 
,Respond.,.nt, Conboy, is a former executive of Wi9yerhause,r who 
was granted immunity for testimony before~ grand iury. ~he 
-P \llsbury. Company i; and other petitioners ar_e .•opt-out 
p J)Hn~lffs" who are- now suing Weyerhauser "~and other 
container manufaoturers.~- The question ls whether the use 
,i'!lmunity granted in the criminal proceedings protects ~the 
witness from use of that testimony in the civil H.t"igat_ion. 
CheBapea~e.t s· interest,- i'f any, ' seems quit 
tangential to me. we are told, however, that thin 
particular issue is being litlgat~~ in other civil suits. 
'Please .l~~j m,e know whether Chesapea~~ has any suJ:,stanti.al 
interest in the outcome of this c 
., On a pleasanter subject, I hope you have- 1iad some 
during the Christmas, season. In a conversation 
wtth Joe Carter thia morning/J,e sald that ho got his limit 
of IM Allen's friendly ducka ·1ri, ehort order and .. was back in 
hi R off,i ce _ by_ '}: 00 a·t m1• 
'Rugh V. Whit'e ·~; Jr., Esquire 
Hu~ton & Williarr.s 
. ~. o. Sox 1535 
Ychmond, ~V.irginia 23212 
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• 
The Honor able Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Justice, Supreme Court of the United States 
550 N Street, SW 
Washington, D.C. 20022 
81-825 Pillsbury Co., et al. v. Conboy 
Dear Justice Powell: 
Chesapeake has, I am glad to say, settled all of the 
"opt-out" cases arising from the Corrugated Container Cases. 
Therefore, Chesapeake has no direct or substantial interest 
in the outcome of the Conboy case. 
I was glad to hear from you, having heard indirectly of 
at least one of your recent hunting exploits . I talked with 
Jack McElroy a few days ago, reviewing highlights of a hunt 
that Carter Fox and I had with Jack at Fairhope Farm . We 
had a fine time, managed to get a few geese and a couple of 
ducks, and enjoyed Uncle Charlie's book concerning his 
exploits. I understand from Jack that you and young Lewis 
had a similar experience not long ago , in somewhat chilly 
weather. Fairhope Farm is, I think, a hunter's paradise at 
this time of year . 
With best regards , 
32/672 
' I Sincere ly 'l 
I I 
•rt 11 I 
4~gh J/1.. ~be, Jr. 
I 
r 
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Cert to CA7 (Sprecher for en bane 
court; Cummings dissenting) 
Timely 
SUMMARY: IPetrs contend that once a witness has been 
granted immunit~ in return for testimony under the use immunity 
statute, 18 U.S. ~ . §6001 et seq., he can be compelled to provide 
similar testimony\ in a subsequent civil proceeding; the 
subsequent , petrs argue, amounts to information 
G""""'""+., C.l~"'-r~ c_l,·c+ C>f Cfj5, J:ss4e. i5 ,'--,po.,.f-q_"1.f-
1o l-4?1~ <ss es 1 s e-~ a.s re~fovtcle., -I I C\..., ol lo /1 ./-., 'jq ...,_..Js 
t,b~ fefr, R.,f:: y I ·~,hJ( yo4. 'VY)e?\.Y k)e 11oufo 11 
Lhes&..t><?C\te. Co,(), of U, r':\ \V\.-·10\. , s o.. cA-e+e,,,,do, v,·f (()1}l'r~ 
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"derived" from the immunized testimony, and therefore cannot be 
used against the witness in a future criminal prosecution. 
FACTS and DECISIONS BELOW: Resp at one time was an 
executive of the Weyerhauser Company. He, along with many other 
witnesses, was granted immunity in return for testimony before a 
grand jury investigating price fixing and similar activities in 
the corrugated container industry. Prior to his appearance before 
the jury, Justice Dept attorneys quizzed resp extensively about 
price fixing in the industry, in exchange for a written promise 
of immunity. Resp subsequently appeared before the grand jury, 
and was granted formal use immunity for his testimony, pursuant 
to 18 U.S.C. §6001 et seq. The grand jury's investigation 
culminated in the indictment of 14 companies and 26 individuals 
for a conspiracy to fix prices. 
Following the criminal trial, a substantial number of civil 
antitrust suits were filed against corrugated container 
manufacturers. These were consolidated in the SD Tex (Singleton). ----While most plaintiffs proceeded as members of a class, 18 
companies -- petrs here -- opted out of the class in order to 
pursue their own claims. To prepare their case, petrs subpoenaed 
several previously immunized grand jury witnesses, including 
resp, and he accordingly appeared with his attorney for a 
deposition to be taken in Chicago. Rather than answer petrs' 
questions, however, resp asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination, refusing to confirm that he had 
previously testified, refusing to identify as "true and correct" 
his Justice Dept and grand jury testimony, and refusing to answer 
- -- 3 -
questions taken verbatim from the transcript of his grand jury 
testimony. Petrs then contacted Judge Singleton in SD Tex, asking 
him to compel resp's testimony. Judge Singleton, after 
determining that resp was not aware of any pending criminal 
investigation of his activities, ordered resp to answer petrs' 
questions. 1 When resp again refused, Judge Singleton found him to --be in civil contempt, though he suspended execution of the 
contempt order pending appeal. 
A panel of the CA7 (Cummings, Swygert; Sprecher dissenting) 
affirmed. It noted that the use immunity statute bars use of the 
compelled "testimony or other information •.• (or any 
information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or 
other information) ••• against the witness in any criminal 
case." 18 u.s.c. §6002. Because the questions asked here were 
taken from or closely tracked resp's grand jury testimony, his 
answers would be "derived from" that immunized testimony, and 
therefore would be unavailable for use in a subsequent 
prosecution. The CA relied on In re Corrugated Container 
Antitrust Litigation, Appeal of Fleishacker, 644 F.2d 70 (CA2 
1980), and Appeal of Starkey, 600 F.2d 1043 (CAB 1979), which had 
come to an identical conclusion. 
Th adopting as its opinion Judge 
Sprecher's dissenting panel opinion. The court began by noting 
that resp faced possible federal conspiracy charges growing out 
1 In issuing his order, Judge Singleton was exercising the 
powers of a district judge in the ND Ill. 28 U.S.C. §1407. 
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of his price fixing activities, and that he remained subject to 
state antitrust charges in Ohio. The CA then noted that there was 
a clear split in the CAs; on one side were Fleishacker and 
Starkey, and on the other was In re Corrugated Container 
Antitrust Litigation, Appeal of Franey, 620 F.2d 1086 (CAB 1980). 
The CA7 opted for the Franey approach, expressly rejecting the 
reasoning of the CA2 and CAB. 
In the CA7's view this followed from Kastigar v. United 
States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), which concluded that use immunity 
protects only the source and not the substance of immunized 
testimony. While petrs' questions here might have been derived 
from the previous grand jury testimony, resp's answers would be 
grounded in his current, independent memory of events; "those 
answers necessarily [would] create a new source of evidence." As 
a result, resp's answers would not be "derived from" the existing 
testimony, and therefore would not be shielded by §6002. Further, 
the DC's action here amounts to a de facto grant of immunity by 
the courts, because -- even if the DC is wrong in its view that 
resp's testimony would be "derived" from the immunized grand jury 
testimony -- the court's order compelling a response might 
operate to immunize the civil testimony. This approach gives the 
courts and private civil litigants a right to transform the 
prosecutor's narrow grant of use immunity into a broad 
transactional immunity. On the other hand, if resp is prosecuted 
in the future, and the court in that future case rejects the DC's 
view that resp's civil testimony is immunized, resp will have 
been forced to surrender his Fifth Amendment rights. 
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The CA also found several practical problems in the panel's 
approach. It places upon resp the heavy burden of making sure 
that he does not stray "even an inch beyond the four corners of 
the earlier transcripts." And the order compelling testimony may 
be unnecessary, because resp's grand jury testimony may be 
admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 804; resp's assertion of Fifth 
Amendment privilege apparently makes him unavailable as a 
witness. 
Chief Judge Cummings dissented, arguing that the majority's 
decision rested on "an arid distinction": "there seems to be an 
almost metaphysical notion that the mere repetiton or 
acknowledgment by [resp] of his earlier testimony constitutes new 
and independent evidence." In his view, the subsequent testimony 
would be derived from the grand jury testimony, and therefore 
would not be available for use against resp. 
CONTENTIONS: Petrs argue that there is a clear split in 
the CAs on whether a grant of use immunity in a criminal 
investigation would apply to civil testimony inspired by the 
immunized tetsimony. This case and Franey cannot be reconciled 
with Fleishacker and Starkey (which was reaffirmed in Little Rock 
School District v. Borden, Inc., 632 F.2d 700 (CAB 1980)). 
Fleishacker explicitly rejected Franey's reasoning; here, the CA7 
in turn explicitly rejected Fleishacker and Starkey. This 
conflict is particularly unseemly because the Fleishacker, 
Franey, and instant decisions all grew out of testimony given in 
connection with the corrugated container antitrust investigation. 
Petrs also suggest that the CA7's view is inconsistent with this 
• 
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Court's decision in Kastigar. There, the Court declared that the 
use immunity statute placed an "affirmative duty" upon the 
prosecutor to demonstrate that evidence "is derived from a 
legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled testimony." 
406 U.S. at 460. But the CA7 read out of the statute the bar to 
using information derived from immunized testimony. 
Resp apparently finds it impossible to argue with a straight 
face that there is no split in the CAs; instead, he suggests that 
the "opinion below has resolved whatever conflict exists among 
the circuits ••• in a persuasive and comprehensive manner." 
Resp also notes that the Starkey and Fleishacker courts did not 
address the subsidiary issues -- such as whether the grand jury 
testimony would itself be admissible -- and there is of course no 
conflict on these questions. Finally, resp argues that the CA7's 
analysis is consistent with Kastigar. That decision emphasized 
that use immunity protects only the source and not the substance 
of immunized testimony; it affords no protection to self-
incriminating teftie}imony offered prior or subsequent to the 
immunized trial or grand jury testimony. 
Petrs have filed a reply, which observes that the CA7's 
decision has exacerbated, rather than resolved, the conflict. 
DISCUSSION: The split in the CAs is irreconcilable. The 
CAB and CA2 have squarely held that a witness who has received 
use immunity in exchange for testimony in a criminal case can be 
compelled to provide testimony in subsequent civil proceedings. 
Starkey, 600 F.2d at 1046 ("the deposition testimony, as long as 
it is within the confines of the grand jury testimony, is 
.. ... 
• • .. 
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'tainted' by the grand jury testimony," and therefore cannot be 
used in a subsequent prosecution); Fleishacker, 644 F.2d at 77 
("where a transcript of a witness' immunized testimony 
constitutes the source of questions posed to the same witness in 
a civil proceeding, responsive answers to such questions are 
necessarily 'derived from' the immunized testimony, and thus 
unavailable for subsequent prosecutorial use"). The CAS, and now 
the CA7, have come to the opposite conclusion in factually 
indistinguishable cases. 
Kastigar does not resolve the issue. The Court there 
emphasized that the government, in any subsequent prosecution, 
would have to demonstrate that the evidence it used was derived 
from sources "independent" of previously compelled testimony. 406 
U.S. at 460. But it is impossible to tell from Kastigar whether 
subsequent civil testimony is derived from immunized criminal 
testimony. 
While the issue may not be an earth-shaking one, it appears 
to be of considerable practical importance. And the problem is 
compounded by the fact that each of the four CAs bases its 
decision, in large part, on Kastigar. 
I recommend a grant. 
There is a response and a reply. 
12/10/81 Rothfeld Opn in petn 
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PILLSBURY co., et al. 
v. 
~  
t-btion of Petitio ners to Schedule 
Oral Argument During April , 1982 
Session 
CONBOY CA 7 
SUMMARY : Petrs, woose case would not be scheduled for oral argument 
until October 1982, urge the Court to set argument for this month of April . 
FACTS AND CONTENTIONS: Cert was granted i n this case, concerning the 
propriety of usirg certain immunized testimony , on January 11, 1982 . 
subsequently the Clerk's Office advised petrs that oral argillTlent would be set 
for the October 1982 Term. 
Petrs note that the DC (SD Tex . , Sin3leton) has set this case for a 
Septerrber 7, 1982 tria l . Thus they aver that proceeding to trial prior to a 
favorable decision by this Court on the merits of their cert petn would deny 
them the opportunity to compel resp herein to testify . Therefore they urge 






DISCUSSION : Petrs have offered no reason why they have not urged the DC 
to stay the proceedings below pendill3 diEposition of cert . 
Deny . 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE LEWI S F. POWELL, JR. 
July 14, 1982 
No. 81825, Pillsbury v. Conboy 
Dear Ginny, 
I think you wrote the Clerk that I was out of this case, 
as the briefs indicate that Chesapeake Corporation of 
Virginia was a party in the original antitrust case. 
I have taken this up with Hunton & Williams, and I now 
have a letter dated July 13 from Hugh V. White, Jr. - the 
partner responsible for Chesapeake's representation - advising 
that Chesapeake has no interest in this case. 
Accordingly, I presently plan to take part in the considera-
tion and decision of the case. 
Please attach a copy of Mr. White's letter to the papers in 
our file and also put a copy of his letter and this letter in my 
disqualification file. 
Ms. Ginny Egelston 
c/o United States Supreme Court 
Mr. Justice Powell's Chambers 
1 First Street, N. E. 
Washington, D. C. 20543 r , 
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BY HAND 
TELEPHONE 804 - 788 - 8200 
July 13, 1982 
The Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Clerk's Office 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
U.S. Courthouse Building 
1100 East Main Street 
Richmond, Virginia 23219 
Pillsbury v. Conboy 
(Supreme Court Docket No. 81825) 
Dear Justice Powell: 
L-
1919 PENNSYLVANIA AVENIJE , N . W . 
P. 0 . BOX 19230 
WASHINGTON , D. C . 20036 
202 - 223 - 8650 
FILE NO. 22948 .1 
DIRECT DIAL NO. 804 788 - 8 2 8 3 
We have checked our files on this case. Chesapeake has 
settled the case and has no interest in the matter pending 
before the Supreme Court. Two of Chesapeake's former 
employees' depositions were taken in the case, but this does 
not, in our view, give Chesapeake any interest in the case 
at all. 
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BENCH MEMORANDUM 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Jim 
Re: The Pillsbury Co. et al. v. Conboy, No. 81-825 
Question Presented 
Under the use immunity statute, is a deponent's civil 
deposition testimony, which repeats verbatim or closely tracks his 
prior immunized testimony, "information directly or indirectly 
derived from such [immunized] testimony or other information" and 
therefore unavailable for use against him in any subsequent criminal 
prosecution? 
- - 2. 
Discussion 
I. The Immunity Statute and Derivative Use 
A. Language of §6002. Petrs' most powerful argument is based 
v -- --------1)/~ ~ on_~ e l~g~~~e of 18 u.s.c. §6002. Petrs argue that the questions 
~~formulated after review of immunized testimony are clearly "derived 
~pb'Vfrom" the prior testimony. Thus, answers to such questions, that 
~ 'lo repeat verbatim or closely track a deponent's immunized testimony, 
are necessarily also "derived from" such testimony. 
Resp, on the other hand, focuses on the concept 
~S use" presumably incorporated in §6002. Resp concedes that the 
~ /questions for the civil deposition are "derived from" 
~ testimony, but contends that the answers, unlike the 
~ .. Dnot. Answers are based only upon a witness' current 
_,.,i,o~ and even when resp's answers are identical, resp must tell 






d; s «•~ 
it. Thus, when a deponent answers questions, those answers ~ · 
necessarily create a new source of evidence. 1'-o~ '4 r,ooz_. 
Petrs contend that there is simply no basis in logic oq ~%.t_ 
this metaphysical distinction between questions derived fro~~k./«A 
immunized testimony and answers responsive to those same qut~~ 
An answer by its very nature is evoked by and responds to 
information contained in a question. Where the immunized 
~H4 
~~ 
serves as the source of the questions asked, responsive ans~~~. 
61-7,n>4c.c-s.. 
such questions necessarily will "derive from" the immunizedJ t:Jf f 
t imony. 
yt,? The lan,2u~ge 
ff ls neither. . compe 
~ . 
of the statute permits _e!:_ther interpretati~n and 
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suggests an expansive grant of immunity. Section 6002 is a 
, · p"sweeping proscription of any use, direct or indirect, of the 
}(~~ompelled testimony and any information derived therefrom." Kastigar 
~Av. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460 (1972) (POWELL, J.) (also stating 
~' that prosecution must prove that evidence was secured "wholly 
independent of the compelled testimony"). 
A much more profitable means of 
avoid the metaphysical discussion~ 
of "deprived from" and to focus on th/1 concept of use immunity ~/ 
- --------------- -------
B. Concept of Use Immunity. 
deciding th~s.Jle presented is to 
For the fifth amendment privilege to be supplanted and a 
witness ordered to testify under a grant of immunity, that grant 
must be co-extensive with the privilege. See Counselman v. 
Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 585 (1892). The immunity statute, 18 
u.s.c. §§6001-6005, in proscribing any use or derivative use of 
compelled testimony, affords such protection. It is clear, however, 
that Congress intended to limit the extent of the protection - --- ~ -
afforded by an immunity grant under §6002, stating specifically that 
"the proposed provision is not an immunity bath." H.R. Rep. No. 91-
1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in [1970] U.S. Code Cong. & 
II \-' 
~ Ad. News 4007, 4017. Kastigar made clear that it is only the source 
~ ~of the information, not the substance, which is protected under use 
~ imm~: "Both the statute and the Fifth Amendment allow the 
~\ ~ernment to prosecute using evidence from legitimate independent 
_,, ~- c,-., H "' 
~ sources." 406 U.S., at 461 (emphasis added). Use immunity was 
?·vv specifically designed to replace the much broader grant of • I I ,.• transactional immunity, which does protect the substance of what is 
J(M--&1~ ~~ ~ ''U4£-~--~~--
~ ~ ~ 
11 
~~ ~~ ... ~.~AM-t;{. 
.,, - -
4. 
said. In sum, the immunity statute does not prevent the prosecutor 
f r om prosecuting; it only limits his sources of evidence. 
Thus, the issue here is whether the civil deposition creates a ~ 
new source. For resps, this is easily answered: Each time a witness 
makes a statement or gives an answer, he creates a source. Thus, a 
witness cannot be incriminated by questions; he can only be 
incriminated by answers. 
C. Purpose of Use Immunity. Because the language of the 
statute and the concept embodied in the statute point in different 
directions, some gu~ principle is needed. One helpful inquiry 
would be to determine whether Congress intended the immunity statute 
to benefit prosecutors or possible criminal defts. The intent is ,,.. 
clear. Section 6003(b) indicates that only a U.S. Attorney can 
initiate a request to the DC that immunity be granted: a deft has no 
right to immunity under §6002. Indeed, it is fair to say that the 
immunity provisions of 18 u.s.c. §§6001-6005 are designed solely for 
the benefit of the government as a prosecutorial tool. Use immunity 
creates a framework within which a prosecutor can make a reasoned, 
strategic decision whether to compel testimony and suffer the 
resulting burdens on prosecution. See Kastigar, 406 U.S., at 471 
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting). 
D. Conclusion. Although the broadly written use immunity 
grant in §6002 permits petrs' interpretation, the concept of 
derivative use, and the whole purpose behind creating use immuni ----------------suggest that Congress intended to give prosecutors a strategic 
~ ------ ' -------- _____, 
The most critical test for petrs then is whether their 
interpretation is consistent with that congressional objective. 
y,'r--
- - 5. 
II. of the Scope of Immunit 
A. Verbatim questions could evoke 
several responses. Petrs argue that resp could: (1) repeat or adopt 
his immunized answer; (2) affirm that the transcript of his 
immunized answer accurately reflects his prior testimony; or (3) 
recall additional information responsive to the question but not 
disclosed in his immune testimony. Petr contends that all three 
responses would be "derived from" his immune testimony and therefore 
unavailable for use against him in any subsequent criminal 
prosecution. 
It is not clear, however, that petrs have exhausted the list of 
possible responses. The antitrust deft in this case also has a 
special interest in the scope of the questioning. Cross-examination 
t:: - -
is an essential safeguard of our judicial system. See Greene v. 
McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-497 (1959). Clearly, a ruling that a 
deponent is protected for only those answers to questions taken 
"verbatim or closely tracking" prior immunized testimony leaves no 
room for the antitrust deft to pursue cross-examination. If the 
I 
Court decides that a deponent may be compelled to answer questions 
covering the subject matter explored in earlier immunized testimony, 
it must further decide the scope of questioning permitted. 
~ral tests have been formulated. See Appeal of 
644 F.2d 70, 80 n.15 (CA2 1981) (requiring "answers 
onl questions •.• confined to the specific subject matter 
touched upon by questions in the ••• immunized testimony"); Appeal of 
Starkey, 600 F.2d 1043, 1048 (CA8 1979) (requiring answers only to 
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substantive framework as the grand jury testimony"). Amicus curiae 
suggests that the Court should also adopt a rule permitting 
deponents to be questioned concerning matters "covered" in their 
immunized testimony. 
B. How petrs' interpretation of §6002 would work. Taking 
their list of possible responses, petrs see their rule as working 
thusly: In deciding whether to uphold a witness' assertion of the ------
self-incrimination privilege in civil cases, the DC must first 
determine whether prior immunized testimony has served as the source 
of the questions being asked. Where the questions asked afford the 
deponent a choice of (1) repeating his originally immunized answer, 
(2) adopting his immunized answer when it is repeated to him, or (3) 
affirming that the transcript of his immunized answer is his prior 
testimony, any responsive answer by the witness to such questions 
necessarily will "derive from" the immunized testimony and thus be 
unavailable for use in prosecution against the witness. 
Resp's approach is simpler: a grant of statutory use immunity 
affords no protection to any self-incriminating information 
disclosed by the immunized witness on any other occasion prior or 
subsequent to the giving of the immunized testimony. Each 
proceeding is distinct and in each a witness has the right to claim 
the privilege or have it supplanted by a new grant of immunity. 
Not the least concern in a judicial decision is that the rule 
announced be susceptible to ~rincipled applicatio~ . In Kastigar, 
the Court made clear that a grant of use immunity under §6002 leaves 
the witness and the prosecutorial authorities in substantially the 
same position as if the witness had claimed the fifth amendment 
c----
• 
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privilege. Accordingly, it is also clear that a grant of statutory 
use immunity affords no protection to all self-incriminating 
information disclosed by the immunized witness on~ occasion prior 
or subsequent to the giving of the immunized testimony. Thus, 
petrs' task is to formulate a pri ry'cipled means of clearly - 11~~~ 
distinguishing protected and unprotected st~~eme~:s. ~
Tw~ s point up the difficulties petrs face: i  
1. Suppose resp repeated his previously immunized grand jury 
testimony to a reporter who had reviewed the grand jury testimony 
,-----_ 
and asked verbatim a prior question. Petrs argue that it is 
possible to distinguish this situation: in the example, the witness 
voluntarily repeated his prior immunized testimony, whereas in the 
present case, resp will be compelled to repeat his testimony. It is 
not clear, however, whether voluntariness should be dispositive 
here; voluntariness is more relevant to admissibility. In any case, 
to assume that the statements here are involuntary is to assume the 
answer to the question presented: The answers here are involuntary 
precisely because they are supposedly immune. The determinative 
factor for determining whether immunity attaches is whether immunity 
was given, not the witness' motivation for talking. 
2. Another example: petrs' counsel might ask resp a very 
obvious question: "Did you ever exchange prices with anyone at 
competitor XYZ Box Company?" If petrs' counsel asks this question 
in a civil deposition without reviewing the grand jury transcript, 
the witness faces the danger that his deposition answer could be 
used against him in a criminal prosecution. On the other hand, if 
the witness is asked the same question by counsel who has seen the 
• 
- -
grand jury transcript, the answer cannot be used against the 
deponent because the question was derived from the grand jury 
transcript. 
answer to the same question, should enjoy different immunities. 
It is not clear why the same deft, giving the same 1 
8 • 
C. Statutory Authority. Even assuming that the questioning 
can be limited and petrs' rule applied in a principled manner, it is 
still necessary to determine whether a DC may immunize a civil 
. \ e ~ nt's answers. Separation of powers dictates that prosecution 
-~ nd immunity be left solely to the executive, and there is no 
..r 
~~ dispute that it is beyond the authority of a DC unilaterally to 
~~ g~~nt immunity to compel de~ ny~ See 18 u.s.c. §6003. 
~~A reover, petrs concede that the U.S. Attorneys declined to 
~ · authorize immunity grants in connection with the civil depositions 
~ here . 
~ ~ etrs' interpretation of §6002, however, a judge, by the simple 
Vyv expedient of granting a motion for production of grand jury V transcripts, may himself grant immunity upon pltf's request. 
~ Petrs argue that the witness' protection derives from the 
Indeed, they did not have the power. Resp argues that, under 
original statutory immunity grant, not a second, unauthorized 
judicial grant. It has always been for the courts to determine 
' 
whether an assertion of the privilege is proper and whether evidence 
should be excluded as derivative of immunized testimony. See 
Zicarelli v. The New Jersey State Commission of Investigation, 406 
U.S. 472, 478-481 (1972) (POWELL, J.); Kastigar, 406 U.S., at 460; 
Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 79 n.18 (1964); 
Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951). Compelling a 
witness to answer questions a second time that were previously 
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answered under a grant of immunity does not result in an expansion 
of the original grant of immunity. In sum, there is no need for a 
new immunity or prospective exclusion of testimony because there is 
no privilege: resp's privilege has already been supplanted. 
In each one of the Court's cases cited by petr, however, the 
witness was compelled to testify over his fifth amendment assertions 
only after having been granted statutory immunity in the same 
proceeding in which his testimony was being compelled. Resp does 
not dispute that his fifth amendment rights can be supplanted by a 
new grant of statutory immunity by the government in this 
at, however, is not the posture of this case. In ts~ vv \ ~,'9ce in"i. 
~/,~ r to petrs' benign characterization of the DC's ruling as 
"j,,} e ~ the "scope" of the original immunity grant, the DC actually 
( determines that resp's previously granted immunity should continue l to protect him in a subsequent criminal prosecution if, in this 
civil proceeding, resp repeats his testimony. The proper judicial 
role in connection with grants of immunity is limited, however, to 
seeing that the the government's request complies with statutory 
procedure. A DC has no discretionary power to refuse the request of -----
the prosecutor, nor may it order immunity on its own initiative, 
-- ~ 
even when it believes immunity to be in the public's interest. 
III. Problems with Expanded Questioning, Answers, and Immunity 
A. Expanded questioning and answering. As noted before, 
however, it is unlikely that the questioning or answering at a civil 
~ deposition will stay strictly within the boundaries of the prior 
transcript. The CA7 panel {reversed in bane} upheld the order of 
civil contempt on the narrow basis that, because the questions asked 
- - 10. 
in the deposition were taken verbatim from or closely tracked the 
transcript, resp's answers at the deposition would be "derived from" 
prior immunized testimony. Even in this case, however, the 
interrogation fell into the following pattern: A question was asked 
from the transcript: then it was rephrased to include the transcript 
answer (i.e., "is it not the fact that ... "}: and resp would then be 
asked if he had "so testified" in his interview statement. More 
troublesome, the contempt order does not restrain petrs' counsel: 
the order would presumably allow petrs to ask questions that the 
government, perhaps intentionally, did not ask. 
B. Harm to government's interest. Even though petrs' ~ - --~ 
interpretation of §6002 may effectively grant DC's some doubtful 
authority, it does little harm to any government interest when the 
questions are taken verbatim from prior testimony and the answers 
closely track the prior answers, the situation assumed by the 
question presented. Any harm to prosecution comes only when the 
scope of the witness' testimony is enlarged because o~ new 
questions, new answers, or cross-examination. If all of the civil 
deponent's statements are immunized, immunity essentially would come 
at the pltf's request, not the government's. Pltis would be in the 
position of granting immunity, which is a result inconsistent with 
Congress' criminal antitrust policy. In United States v. Dunham 
Concrete Products, Inc., 475 F.2d 1241 (CA5}, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 
832 (1973} (old immunity statute} , the government argued that 
immunity may not be granted in non-governmental litigation because 
only the government may grant immunity. Although the courts have 
historically emphasized the private antitrust action as a means of 
- - 11. 
achieving the policy goals of the antitrust laws, private civil 
actions only supplement, not supplant, governmental enforcement of 
the criminal provisions of the antitrust laws. 
Indeed, petr's proposed construction of the immunity might 
hinder governmental enforcement of the criminal provisions of the 
antitrust laws. Once the bar of the privilege against self-
incrimination has been raised by a witness, the decision whether to 
confer immunity is the product of the balancing of the public need 
for the particular testimony or documentary information in question 
against the social costs of granting immunity and thereby precluding 
the possibility of criminally prosecuting an individual who has 
violated the criminal law. The relative importance of particular 
testimony, even specific questions and answers, to federal law 
enforcement interests is a judgmental rather than a legal 
determination, one remaining wholly within the competence of 
appropriate executive officials. Indeed, not only is the wrong 
branch of government making the balance, but the new policymaker is 
balancing new factors. The DC here must weigh the desires of 
economically motivated private pltfs for civil discovery against the 
interests of the civil deponent; the government presumably considers 
society's interest in the immediate use of testimony in current 
prosecutions against the need to use a witness' testimony in later 
criminal proceedings against the witness. 
C. Prospective exclusionary ruling. Suppose deft in his 
immunized testimony discloses that he recalls he exchanged prices 
with X and Y. At his deposition, he recalls he also discussed 
prices with z. Under resp's theory, z would be a possible source. -
- - 12. 
Under petrs' theory, however, if the government had no prior 
knowledge of z, the government could not use z as a source for a 
criminal prosecution against resp. Petrs apparently argue that 
there is no de facto grant of immunity here because the original 
immunity covers any "responsive" answers, and the exclusionary rule 
may be applied in later criminal proceeding in which the evidence at 
issue is sought to be used if the witness has been 
unconstitutionally deprived of his fifth amendment privilege. Cf. 
Patrick v. United States, 524 F.2d 1109, 1120 (CA7 1975) (Stevens, 
J.) (in dicta predicting that a civil pltf would be entitled to an 
"implied immunity" if compelled to incriminate himself in civil 
proceedings). It is not clear, however, that a DC can rely on a 
subsequent court's power to correct any harm to abrogate a 
constitutional privilege in a current proceeding. 
This Court has recognized that exclusion of evidence obtained 
in violation of an individual's constitutional rights does not 
rectify the initial violation. See Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 
461-463 (1975). It is important not to confuse the test for the 
proper invocation of the fifth amendment with the well-established 
rule that, if a DC errs in making a ruling on privilege, an after-
the-fact exclusionary rule will apply_ to pre~ent the introduction of 
that evidence against the witness. See Kastigar, 406 U.S., at 458 
(citing Murphy, 378 U.S., at 79); Maness, 419 U.S., at 474-475 
(WHITE, J., concurring in the result). These authorities, which 
support a retrospective exclusionary rule, were not intended and 
should not be used as a rationale to support a prospective judicial 
determination that, in mandating testimony, contravenes the 
'~ 
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protection given by the fifth amendment. A DC would be in error in 
requiring a witness to testify on the ground that the witness is 
protected against prejudice by virtue of Murphy. Cf. Kastigar, 406 
u.s., at 470 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting) ("An immunity statute ••• is 
much more ambitious than any exclusionary rule."). 
D. Harm to resp. Mere assurances that specific testimony 
commpelled in a civil action will not be used in subsequent criminal 
proceedings is inadequate. See id. at 471 (MARSHALL, J., 
dissenting) (government "must provide an absolute guarantee that it 
will not use the testimony in any way at all in aid of prosecution 
of the witness"). There is, however, no government prosecutor party 
to this litigation. No court can guarantee at this juncture that at 
a subsequent criminal trial the prosecution would not in fact be 
found to have met its burden to prove that "the evidence it proposes 
to use is derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of the 
compelled testimony." Kastigar, 406 u.s., at 460. 
Resp acknowledges that the federal use immunity statute 
contemplates that a DC will have the responsibility of determining 
what is "derived use" of previously immunized testimony. The 
authority to make that determination, however, is plainly restricted 
to the judge presiding over the criminal prosecution of the 
previously immunized witness where the prosecutor is before that 
judge seeking to introduce evidence to secure a criminal conviction. 
Because Kastigar held that it is the prosecution that must bear the 
burden of proof on the issue of "taint," it necessarily follows that 
the issue cannot properly be raised in this civil proceeding where 
no governmental body, i.e., the prosecution, is even a party. 
• 
• 
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IV. Balancing the Interests of the Parties 
Assuming that there are no statutory or constitutional 
obstacles to a DC ordering a deponent to testify, there still may be 
good reasons suggesting that a DC should not do so. 
( /'tu__,, ~ 
A. Resp's interests. 1. Perjury. The CA suggested that resp 
~----~--11 
could be subject to a prosecution for perjury or giving false 
statements if his deposition answers are inconsistent with his 
earlier government interview or grand jury transcripts. See 18 
u.s.c. §1623(a}. Section 6002 provides that the compelled 
testimony, or any information derived from such testimony, may not 
be used against the witness in any criminal case "except a 
..,i,11 -==--==-- -------
prosecution for perjury [or] giving a false statement." See United 
States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 123 (1980} (holding that a 
witness may be prosecuted for perjury in his prior immunized 
testimony and the entire immunized testimony, both truthful and 
false, may be introduced in the subsequent perjury trial}. Resp 
argues that he may quite innocently deviate from his prior 
testimony. A witness is generally entitled to claim the fifth 
amendment privilege if his testimony in a later proceeding might 
reveal perjury in a prior proceeding. 
Petrs contend that, if the concern is that resp is going to 
commit perjury in his civil deposition by repudiating his earlier 
immunized testimony, he has no fifth amendment privilege to assert. 
As this Court held in Apfelbaum, there is no doctrine of 
"anticipatory perjury" in our jurisprudence, and "a future intention 
to commit perjury or to make false statements" does not justify 
invocation of the fifth amendment. See id., at 131. 
• 
• 
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Resp argues that he should not be required to argue a 
possibility of self-incrimination resulting from truthful deposition 
testimony in this proceeding to retain his f i fth amendment right: To 
do so would require him to surrender the very protection that the 
fifth amendment privilege is designed to guarantee. See Hoffman, 
341 U.S., at 486-487 ("To sustain the privilege, it need only be 
evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in 
which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an 
explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because 
injurious disclosure could result."}. Any explanation by resp, 
beyond that already given, as to why or why not his deposition 
testimony could subject him to prosecution for false declarations 
under §1623, would itself involve a risk of "injurious disclosure." 
This "risk" should not alone prevent civil pltfs from securing 
resp's deposition. Resp's risk is not unlike those of any person 
testifying under a grant of immunity. 
2. Waiver. The CA7 also was concerned that the procedure 
authorized by the DC exposes resp to a waiver of his fifth amendment 
rights. The argument is that if resp's deposition testimony, either 
by t r ick or inadvertence, strays beyond the four corners or confines 
of his immunized grand jury testimony, such new testimony may 
constitute a wholly independent usable source of evidence, available 
for use against him in a later criminal prosecution. In Rogers v. 
United States, 340 U.S. 367, 373 (1951}, the Court stated that 
"[d]isclosure of a fact waives the privilege as to details." Resp 
argues that certain statements of fact, that repeat the grand jury 
testimony, may be found by another court to have waived privilege as 
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to the details of that fact to which he did not previously testify 
under immunity. Those details may, in turn, provide investigative 
leads to incriminating matters totally untouched in the prior 
immunized interrogations. See Maness, 419 U.S., at 461-462. 
Petrs argue that this waiver concern is unfounded. First, it 
is unlikely to happen. Petrs are probably correct: the cases that 
raise the issue presented typically involve securities, antitrust, 
or regulatory offenses, and thus usually involve wealthy criminal 
defts and the lawyers of their choice. There is little reason why a 
lawyer should allow his client to do more than repeat his prior 
testimony without a complete assurance of immunity. 
Second, petrs rely on their prior argument that slight 
deviations will be immune, too. Petrs contend that such information 
would be protected if responsive to the immunized questions. 
Similarly, details embraced within the immunized testimony would be 
protected as derivative of such testimony. In short, where the 
immunized testimony is the source of the questions appearing in the 
transcript of the immunized testimony, responsive answers would be 
"derived from" the immunized testimony and, therefore, unavailable 
for prosecutorial use. Cf. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 
(1977) (stating that a witness may not inadvertently, or without 
design, waive constitutional privileges); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 
U.S. 458, 464 (1938). If, however, resp were to volunteer 
incriminating information unrelated to his immunized testimony, no 
protection would or should extend to such testimony. This would be 
clear and intentional waiver, in no way compelled by the DC's order. 
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Although petrs' division is logical, it may be very difficult 
in practice to separate "responsive" answers from "volunteer" 
answers. In the perhaps rare case where a deft strays from his 
prior testimony, it is quite possible that he runs a risk of 
disclosing incriminating testimony. Petrs' interpretation of §6002 
imposes on DC's a difficult task of separating "responsive" answers 
from "volunteer" answers, with deft bearing the risk of prosecution 
for "volunteer" answers and prosecutors bearing the risk that it 
will lose admissible evidence if the answers are "responsive." If 
DC's are asked to use petr's interpretation of §6002, they will 
probably implicitly, if not expressly, balance those needs. The 
Court should consider whether the DC's should engage in such a task. 
c. The~ question 
in this case may be whether private petrs' need for evidence 
...,____-:-:---
overrides the government's prosecutorial interests, the courts' 
> 
concern for principled de~isions, the deft's concerns about self-
incrimination, and society's concern for the efficient use of 
judicial resources. If all petrs want is a reiteration from petr of 
his prior grand jury testimony, it might be possible to admit the 
transcripts at trial under rule 804 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence. If resp's assertion of privilege were upheld, he would be 
"unavailable" as a witness, thereby satisfying one of the conditions 
for admission under rule 804. 
Petrs argue, however, that the admissibility of the transcripts 
does not answer the question presented--namely, whether resp's civil 
deposition testimony that repeats verbatim or closely tracks his 
prior immunized testimony is constitutionally and statutorily 
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protected because derived from such immunized testimony. The answer 
to that question, resp contends, does not turn on whether the same 
or similar evidence is otherwise available. Petrs are entitled to 
proceed with the deposition and introduce the deposition testimony 
in evidence at trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 32 rather 
than risk an adverse ruling on admissibility of grand jury 
transcripts under rule 804 or a claim of error on appeal. 
The CA7 noted, however, that if the absence of opportunity to 
cross-examine would preclude admission of the government interview 
~
and grand jury transcripts under rule 804, it would also preclude 
admission of the deposition testimony. Indeed, if the questions are 
too limited, there is no basis for the deposition in the first 
place. See Fed. R. Ci v. P. 26 {b) (1) {deposition permissible "if the 
information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence"). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 30, 
32. In other words, whatever evidentiary obstacles petrs face with 
regard to the admissibility of resp's grand jury testimony will 
likewise confront the admissibility of resp's deposition. 
Petrs argue that this assumes defts would be blocked from 
conducting meaningful cross-examination at the deposition by resp's 
refusal to answer on fifth amendment grounds. Petrs concede that 
antitrust defts would be entitled to test the credibility of resp's 
repeated testimony and to compel answers, but apparently assume that 
the answers will not exceed the bounds of the prior testimony. Full 
cross-examination concerning the details of resp's direct testimony, 
however, is essential. Resp's deposition could very well be an 
effort to exculpate himself and his employer and to inculpate other 
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defts. Those other defts might attempt to impeach that testimony by 
showing that resp was indeed guilty. If resp can assert the fifth 
amendment privilege to these questions, defts would be denied 
meaningful cross-examination. 
Prior testimony is inadmissible when it is not subject to 
cross-examination. See Fed. R. Evid. 804 (b) (1). The~fect of 
~- . - . 
petrs' position is to circumvent that rule by transforming the 
transcript from "grand jury" to "deposition" testimony. When such 
deposition testimony would be based upon uncross-examined testimony, 
it should be equally inadmissible at trial. Petrs have not made a 
convincing case that the deposition that they seek will produce the 
evidence that they need. 
D. Cost-benefit analysis. There is clearly a risk that the 
- ------
grand jury transcripts will not be admissible in a civil trial. The 
issue presented is who should bear that risk. The immunity statute 
indicates that resp must bear the risk of waiver, not the 
government. Thus, the specific issue is whether resp or petrs 
should bear the risk of harm in this case. 
There are two variables that make up risk: (1) magnitude of 
harm; and (2) probability of harm. Because of our society's 
interest in liberty, the possible harm to resp is great if he 
guesses wrong; petrs' harm is monetary. Resp can, presumably, 
reduce the probability of harm considerably by tracking precisely 
the transcript of the prior proceedings, but petrs can also reduce 
their probability of harm by securing the admission of the prior 
transcripts. Although the probability of harm does not point in one 
- • 
direction, the greater potential harm to resp counsels that petrs 
should bear the risk of lack of testimony evidence in this case. 
Summary 
20. 
1. Petrs' most powerful arguments are: (1) the language of 
§6002 suggests a broad reading of "indirect" use of evidence 
"derived from"; (2) there is a low probability of any harm to resp; 
and (3) there is clearly a need for probative evidence in private 
actions that supplement the regulatory and statutory schemes. 
2. The language of the statute does not, however, compel 
petrs' interpretation, and its adoption is not recommended because: 
a. The concept of "derivative use" indicates that new answers 
from resp create~ sources of evidence, not derived evidence. 
b. Congress created use• immunity as a tool for prosecutors, 
and permitting petrs to use it usurps an executive function. 
c. If the questions and answers track the transcript (the 
question supposedly presented), there is little harm to society's 
? 
interests, but the deposition may not be admissible~· Thus, the 
~ -
pressures to expand the scope of questioning and testimony are 
inevitable, and the problems increase considerably. If deft strays ~--
from prior testimony, it is not clear that the DC compelling him to - ...... 
testify has the power to immunize or exclude prospectively his 
testimony, and if not, deft runs a risk that his statements will be 
used against him. The problems require DC's to make unnecessarily 
difficult decisions. 
3. I would affirm. 
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MEMORANDUM 
TO: Jim DATE: October 26, 1982 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
81-825 Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy 
I have reviewed your first draft, and find this 
case more difficult to write than I had anticipated. 
Although I have no disagreement with what you have 
written, I have genuine reservations as to whether the 
draft is not "overwritten". That is, it includes marginal 
or tangential discussions and results in an excessively 
long opinion. I would appreciate your undertaking a 
second draft that is leaner and more tightly written. 
I will now make some additional comments with 
respect to some of the Parts. 
- - 2. 
I 
The statement of the case seems fine. 
II 
The purpose of this Part is to identify the 
controlling principles. Before moving into the cases 
however, would it not be best to describe the statute and 
briefly state its background? I'd also quote in a 
footnote the relevant provisions {6001, 6002 and 6003). 
We could make clear the need for and purpose of use 
immunity, and summarize Kastigar which sustained the 
validity of the statute. We should make the point, as you 
have, that the immunity is coextensive with the Fifth 
Amendment privilege, but that the government intended use 
- rather than transactional - immunity to facilitate 
prosecution rather than hamper it. You have said 
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substantially all of this in present Part II. I am simply 
suggesting a rearrangement. This probably can be done 
somewhat more briefly than the present draft of Part II. 
I get a clearer picture of the sitaution from the first 
few pages of your bench memo than I do from Part II as 
presently written, though the bench memo does not commence 
with the statute itself. 
Jim, you will note lots of scribbling in the 
margin and text of your draft. I did this before 
concluding that substantial revisions seem desirable. 
III 
I have considerable difficulty with this Part. 
At the outset, you state that the question is one of 
statutory interpretation. This is true but only in a 
limited sense. Normally analysis in a statutory case 
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commences with the language, examines the legislative 
history, and then weighs policy considerations if doubt 
still remains as to congressional intent. Here, however, 
we have a combined statutory/constitutional question that 
- in the end - we resolve primarily on the basis of 
practical and policy considerations. If we relied solely 
on the statutory language, we would reverse. I know of no 
history directly relevant beyond that which emphasizes 
that use immunity was intended to facilitate prosecution. 
Although I think I understand why you devote a 
paragraph on the "fruits doctrine" (p. 13, 14), it seems 
to me this is a confusing way to move into Part III. 
I assume the basic purpose of Part III (at least 
the portion prior to subpart A, pp. 13, 18) is to identify 
the positions of the parties. 
- - 5. 
Although I understand what you say in A, your 
organization is not clear to me. You touch on the Court 
of Appeals cases that have produced the conflict, but 
dispose of them in a few sentences. CA7 followed Franey 
(CAS) and criticized Fleichacker. I am not suggesting 
that we need any elaborate exposition of these cases. 
Rather, that your use of them is a little puzzling. 
Subpart B 
I also have trouble with supart B (p. 21). 
Trying to "ascertain" the "amount of imprecision [that] is 
acceptable" seems to me to involve - as your cert memo 
suggested - the metaphysical. 
* * * 
Rather than continue this sort of commentary on 
your first draft, I wonder if it would not be better for 
- - 6. 
you to submit a second draft, with a target of writing it 
roughly in no more than 20 to 25 triple spaced pages. As 
Potter Stewart reminded me in my early months on the 
Court, this is the Supreme Court. We need not write 
opinions that explore every possible argument and address 
every tangential point. We decide the law. 
This is not to say, Jim, that I do not wish to 
address the major arguments of petitioner. Of course, I 
do. My impression, however, is that the first draft tends 
to confuse because of its detailed consideration of 
various possibilities. 
I can understand CA7's en bane opinion better 
than I can this draft, although I think CA7 also 
overargued the case - particularly in its point-by-point 
demonstration of the "errors" in Fleischacker. I also 
- - 7. 
find your bench memo easier to understand and follow than 
the draft, although the organization fo the bench memo -
of course - is not appropriate for a Court opinion. 
In thinking about a broad outline, we need {i) a 
statement of the case {already good); {ii) a Part II as 
described above; {iii) the petitioner's position and 
arguments; {iv) the answer to these arguments, 
analytically and practically; and {v) buttress our 
arguments with the policy considerations that, 
paradoxically, seem to support both the public interest in 
prosecutorial access, and the constitutional interest in 
protection against compelled incrimination. 
If the District Court in this case was correct 
in thinking it could grant continuing immunity to 
accommodate the plaintiff in a civil suit, the effect - if 
- - 8. 
I understand it correctly - could be the equivalent of 
transactional immunity that would handicap the government 
later in a possible criminal prosecution. The short 
answer to this, of course, is that the District Court had 
no authority to grant such immunity. This, as you have 
done is a point to emphasize. 
* * * 
Jim, I am sure this memorandum is unwelcome. 
You know more about this case than I do in terms of all of 
it ramifications, and it is quite possible therefore that 
your present draft would be applauded by the scholars. I 
have a more pragmatic approach. I would like a draft that 
focuses on the central issue, and argues as forcefully and 
directly as we can in support of the Court's judgment. We 
are "objective and detached" Justices until our judgment 
- - 9. 
is made. At the opinion writing stage, however, we must 
support the judgment strongly, and with the soundest 
possible reasoning and maximum clarify. 
Take as much time as you need to do a second 







To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Jim 
Re: Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, No. 81-825 
I tried to follow faithfully your suggestions, but was unsure 
about how to treat the cases with which the CA7's decision 
conflicts. On the draft, you seemed to suggest textual discussion 
of the facts of these cases, but in the memo, you indicated no -
elaborate exposition of the cases was necessary. In an effort to 
focus our rebuttal of petr's theory, I decided to concentrate on the 
problems of cross examination rather than also discussing the 
problems of direct examination. Thus, the need to comment in the 
text on the conflict on the cases supporting petr's position 
decreased considerably, and I have taken the liberty of disposing of 
this issue, which I understood to create some of the confusion and 
length in the first draft, in footnote 14. 
I hope this possible deviation from your instructions meets 
with your approval. 
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From: Justice Blackmon 
V " 1\f'' Circulated: r, v .L v ' 
Recirculated: _______ _ 
1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-825 
THE PILLSBURY COMPANY, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. 
JOHN CONBOY 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
[November-, 1982] 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring in the judgment. 
In this case, we are asked to decide whether a witness who 
has testified before a federal grand jury pursuant to a grant 
of use immunity, 18 U. S. C. §§ 6001-6005, may be forced to 
testify about the same events in a subsequent civil deposi-
tion, despite his assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination. I agree with the Court's conclu-
sion that he niay not be forced so to testify. Because I reach 
this conclusion only by a different route, I cannot join the 
Court's opinion. 
I 
The statute authorizing grants of use immunity, 18 
U. S. C. § 6002, provides that a witness may be ordered to 
testify despite his claim of a Fifth Amendment privilege, but 
"no testimony or other information compelled under the 
order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from 
such testimony or other information) may be used against the 
witness in any criminal case except. . . . " The Court recog-
nizes that the question before us is necessarily whether the 
respondent's deposition testimony in this case "is 'informa-
tion' so 'directly or indirectly derived from [the immunized 
testimony]' that it cannot be used against the witness in a 







PILLSBURY CO. v. CONBOY 
notes that the parties have differing interpretations of the 
phrase "directly or indirectly derived from," and concludes 
that "[t]he language of the statute permits either party's in-
terpretation and compels neither." Ante, at 8. Thus, the 
Court concludes, the issue before us should be resolved by 
"determin[ing] which of the two interpretations of § 6002 
more satisfactorily accommodates the Government's need for 
admissible evidence and the individual's interest in avoiding 
self-incrimination." Ibid. -,.c.,-I--
I do not believe that the w2,rds of the statute are to be dis-
missed so li,g!1tly. If we were forced to~ amine § 6002 with-
out reference to its background and legislative history, I 
might agree with the Court that the statute is subject to 
more than one interpretation. Under such circumstances, I 
might find it necessary to rely upon broad policy concerns 
such as those addressed by the Court. An examination of 
the legislative history, however, easily resolves for me any 
apparent ambiguity in 'the statute. I believe the .§_tatute's 
plain meaning provides the appropriate framework for decid-
mg this case. 
II 
A 
This Nation's first use immunity statute was passed by 
Congress in 1868. It provided that "no answer or other 
pleading of any party, and no discovery, or evidence obtained 
by means of any judicial proceeding from any party or wit-
ness ... , shall be given in evidence, or in any manner used 
against such party or witness . . . , in any court of the 
United States ... , in respect to any crime." Act of Feb. 
25, 1868, ch. 13, § 1, 15 Stat. 37. In Counselman v. Hitch-
cock, 142 U. S. 547 (1892), this Court held that immunity of 
this type could not be used to compel a witness to testify 
against himself, because it did not provide protection co-
extensive with the Fifth Amendment. The Counselman 
Court reasoned that the statute 
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against him ... in any criminal proceeding, in a court of 
the United States. But it had only that effect. It could 
not, and would not, prevent the use of his testimony 
to search out other testimony to be used in evidence 
against him . . . . It could not prevent the obtaining 
and the use of witnesses and evidence which should be 
attributable directly to the testimony he might give 
under compulsion, and on which he might be convicted, 
when otherwise, and if he had refused to answer, he 
could not possibly have been convicted." Id., at 564. 
In concluding, the Court stated that "no statute which leaves 
the party or witness subject to prosecution after he answers 
the criminating question put to him, can have the effect of 
supplanting the privilege conferred by the Constitution of the 
United States." Id., at 585. 
Due to this latter statement in the Counselman opinion, 
Congress and the lower courts assumed that only a broad 
"transaction" immunity would satisfy the requirements of the 
Fifth Amendment. Thus, beginning in 1893, Congress en-
acted a series of statutes giving a witness complete immunity 
from prosecution for any crime divulged in compelled testi-
mony. This reliance on transaction immunity continued 
until 1970, when Congress enacted § 6002 as part of the Orga-
nized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-452, 84 Stat. 
927. 
In the meantime, however, the Court decided several cases 
suggesting that some forms of use immunity would be 
constitutionally permissible. In Murphy v. Waterfront 
Comm'n, 378 U. S. 52 (1964), the Court held that a state wit-
ness could not be compelled to give testimony that could be 
incriminating under federal law "unless the compelled testi-
mony and its fruits cannot be used in any manner by federal 
officials in connection with a criminal prosecution against 
him." Id., at 79. In a footnote, the Court added that once a 
defendant had been immunized in a state proceeding, "the 
4 
81-825-CONCUR 
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federal authorities have the burden of showing that their evi-
dence is not tainted by establishing that they had an inde-
pendent, legitimate source for the disputed evidence." 
lbui., n. 18. Several years later, in Gardner v. Broderick, 
392 U. S. 273, 276 (1968), the Court stated that "[a]nswers 
may be compelled regardless of the [Fifth Amendment] privi-
lege if there is immunity from federal and state use of the 
compelled testimony or its fruits in connection with a criminal 
prosecution against the person testifying." And shortly 
thereafter, in People v. La Bello, 24 N. Y. 2d 598, 602, 249 
N. E. 2d 412, 414 (1969), the New York Court of Appeals in-
terpreted Murphy and Gardner to hold that Counselman did 
not bar use immunity statutes, so long as they protected the 
immunized witness "from the use of his testimony or the 
fruits thereof." 
B 
It was in this context that Congress in 1969 began consid-
ering a new type of immunity statute. The House and Sen-
ate reports accompanying the Organized Crime Control Act 
of 1970 make clear that Congress was persuaded by the rea-
soning of these cases. After quoting from LaBello and dis-
cussing Counselman and Murphy at length, see S. Rep. No. 
91-617, pp. 52--55 (1969); H. R. Rep. No. 91-1188, pp. ~11 
(1970), the reports state that the statutory immunity pro-
vided by § 6002 "is intended to be as broad as, but no broader 
than, the privilege against self-incrimination. . . . It is de-
signed to reflect the use-restriction immunity concept of 
Murphy . .. rather [than] the transaction immunity concept 
of Counselman." S. Rep. No. 91-617, p. 145; H. R. Rep. 
No. 91-1188, p. 12; see H. R. Rep. No. 91-1549, p. 42 (1970). 
Section 6002's prohibition against the use of compelled tes-
timony or "any information directly or indirectly derived 
from such testimony" reflected Congress' view of the extent 
of the Fifth Amendment privilege. According to the House 
and Senate reports, the phrase was chosen to conform to 
"present law" on "the use of evidence derivatively obtained." 
81-825-CONCUR 
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The reports then cite Wong Sun v. United St,ates, 371 U. S. 
471 (1963), the seminal case on what is commonly known as 
the "fruits" doctrine, as representing "present law." See 
S. Rep. No. 91-617, p. 145; H. R. Rep. No. 91-1188, p. 12; 
H. R. Rep. No. 91-1549, p. 42. In Murphy and Gardner, 
upon which Congress relied, the Court had used the term 
"fruits" to describe the constitutional limits on use immunity. 
References to the "fruits" doctrine are scattered throughout 
the legislative history, whenever the boundaries of the use 
immunity statute are discussed. 1 In Kasti,gar v. United 
States, 406 U. S. 441, 461 (1972), we recognized that the im-
munity § 6002 provides is "analogous to the Fifth Amendment 
reqajrement in cases of coerced confessions." We noted that 
§ 6002 was modeled on a recommendation from the National 
Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, and we 
quoted with approval a Commission report stating: "'The 
proposed immunity is . . . of the same scope as that fre-
quently, even though unintentionally, conferred as the result 
of constitutional violations by law enforcement officers.'" 
Id., at 452, n. 36 (quoting Second Interim Report of the Na-
tional Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, 
Mar. 17, 1969, Working Papers of the Commission 1446 
(1970)). 
In li_g__ht of this evidence of legislative intent, the phrase 
"directly or indirectly derived from" in § 6002 cannot be re-
' See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 91--617, p. 108 (§6002 "is a restriction against 
use of incriminating disclosures or their fruits"); Hearings on S. 30, et al. 
before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 216 (1969) (report of 
New York County Lawyers' Association) (under § 6002, the "compelled 
testimony or its fruits may not be used against the witness"); id., at 281 
(statement of Rep. Poff) (rule of § 6002 is "similar to the exclusionary rule 
which is now applied to evidence assembled in violation of various constitu-
tional rights"); id., at 506 (statement of Sen. McClellan) (use immunity 
statutes can be made constitutional "through the use of the fruit of the poi-
sonous tree process of derivative suppression, an analogy borrowed from 
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garded as ambiguous or lacking in meaning. It seems to me 
that Congress made its intent clear. First, it intended to 
grant only the minimum protection required by the Constitu-
tion. Second, it believed that the protection constitutionally 
requireom cases of compelled testimony was identical to the 
protection required in cases of coerced statements or evi-
dence otherwise illegally obtained. Congress understood 
that when an incriminating statement has been obtained 
through coercion, the Fifth Amendment generally prohibits 
use of the statement or its "fruits." In order to ascertain 
whether respondent Conboy's deposition testimony would be 
"directly or indirectly derived from" his immunized grand 
jury testimony, we must determine whether it woul be 
"!rllits" as that concept 1s un erstood in the context of the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments. 2 
III 
In Wong Sun v. United States, supra, the Court held that 
a statement1 ollowing an illegal arrest must be suppressed as 
"fruits" of the arrest !!_nl~ it r~ ts from "an intervening 
independ~ ct of a free will," and Ts not "sufficiently an act 
of free will to purge the pr imary taint of the unlawful inva-
sion." 371 U. S., at 486. In Harrison v. United States, 392 
U. S. 219, 222-224 (1968), the Court applied a similar stand-
ard to statements following an illegally obtained confession. 
Our more recent cases have adhered to this test. See, e.g., 
Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U. S. 98, 107-110 (1980); Brown 
v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590, 600-604 (1975). In determining 
whether this standard is met, we examine a range of factors 
2 I am somewhat baffled by the Court's assertion, ante, at 8, that 
''whether particular information is 'derived from' immunized materials, is 
'fruit' of 'tainted' information, or is the product of a 'new source' are conclu-
sions that 'may conceal concrete complexities.' " The concepts of "fruit" 
and "taint" are familiar and useful ones that are employed by this Court 
and other courts on a regular basis. As I explain below, their application 
to the facts of this case should not prove too difficult a task. 
II /1 §..~ t vt-
~ -
jt~t:J2-
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including the speaker's knowledge of his right to remain si-
lent; the temporal proximity of the constitutional violation 
and the subsequent statement; the nature of the violation and 
of the Government's involvement; and, of course, the volun-
tariness of the statement. See id., at 603--604. 3 In brief, \ 
the issue is whether the speaker has voluntarily chosen to 
make the later statement, uninfluenced by the fact that prior 
statements have been compelled. 
Under the facts of this case, I find little difficulty in con-
cluding that if respondent Conboy had chosen to testify dur-
ing his civil deposition, his state~ would ,!.lOt ha'v,e been 
"~ vious immunized testTmony. 4 First, Con-
boy i ttended his deposition a ccompanied by a lawyer. He 
was obviously aware of his Fifth Amendment rights, and he 
asserted them with vigor. Second, there is no suggestion 
that Conboy was under a misapprehension about the relation-
ship between his immunized testimony and his civil deposi-
tion. The deposition took place long after the conclusion of 
the immunized testimony, and Conboy did not remain un.,Jier 
the impression that his testimony was 6em com elled by the 
Jus 1c e men . rom ·s past experience before the 
gr~ oy knew that each time the Justice Depart-
ment required his testimony, it provided a fresh grant of use 
3 In Kasti,gar v. United States, 406 U. S. 441, 459 (1972), we recognized 
that Congress intended § 6002 to provide the minimum protection required 
by the Constitution. Wong Sun and its progeny establish that the "fruits" 
doctrine provides all the protection the Constitution requires. Thus, al-
though my analysis is framed in terms of constitutional standards, the issue 
here of what the Constitution requires is not different from the issue of 
what Congress intended. 
• My analysis is necessarily limited to testimony given in the absence of 
a threat of contempt by the District Court. The District Court may not 
hold Conboy in contempt unless the testimony sought is protected by the 
grant of use immunity or, in other words, unless it is "fruits." The ques-
tion whether the testimony is "fruits" thus cannot turn on whether the Dis-
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immunity. Government attorneys were not involved in this 
civil case, and no fresh grant of immunity had been obtained. 
Under the circumstances, there was no danger that Conboy 
would ~rte!!tlY incriminate himself uncter some linger-
ing compulsion of tlie prosecuting ~~thorities. Any staj:,e-
ment he made would have been an m e endent act of free 
~ .. \ Consequen y, a onboy ans'Yered the deposition 
) 
questions, hi~_testimony would not iiave been protectep by 
tliefilginal immunity grant because it would not have been 
directly or mdirectly derived from his immunized testimony. 
It seems unlikely to me that a prior grant of use immunity 
would ever justify compelling a witness' testimony over a 
claim of Fifth Amendment privilege at a subsequent civil 
deposition. The assertion of the privilege is itself an inde-
pendent act of free will, which should signal the judge super-
vising the civil proceedings that the testimony may well not 
be "derived from" the immunity grant. Although the com-
pelled testimony would be inadmissible at a subsequent crim-
inal trial, 5 I agree with the Court that a witness should not 
be forced to rely upon the uncertainties of a later motion to 
suppress. This would indeed " ' "let the cat out" with no as-
surance whatever of putting it back."' Ante, at 13 (quoting 
Maness v. Meyers, 419 U. S. 449, 463 (1975)). 
I do not believe, as the Court apparently does, see, ante, at 
13-14, that ~ ver a witness immunized in prior proceed-
ings testifies at a civil deposition UJithout asserting a Fifth 
Amendment privilege, his testimony automatically should be 
5 Deposition testimony compelled by means of a contempt order, over 
the assertion of a Fifth Amendment privilege, would be inadmissible at a 
subsequent criminal trial whether or not it was later held to be within the 
scope of the original grant of immunity. If the testimony was within the 
grant of immunity (i. e. , if it was "fruits"), it would be inadmissible under 
§ 6002. If the testimony was not within the grant of immunity, the wit-
ness should have been permitted to assert his privilege and the testimony 
wrongfully compelled should be excluded. See Maness v. Meyers, 419 
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admissible against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution. 
If there is a subsequent prosecution and the Government 
seeks to introduce deposition testimony of this sort, the 
judge in the criminal case should determine whether, under 
the circumstances, the deposition testimony is inadmissible 
as "derived from" the prior immunized statements. If the 
witness reasonably believed that his prior grant of immunity 
protected his testimony, the testimony might well be derived 
from the immunity grant under the standards I have set forth 
above. If, on the other hand, the deposition ~stimonx ~as a 
truly ina~ndent act of free will, it would e admissible in 
any later prose~n~ .... -
"'} 
2. 
21. It is ~n-ecessary to decide in this-ca'Se whether 
'', " 
wrongfully compelled evidence ultimately might be excluded, cf. 
Maness, 419 U.S., at 474-475 {WHITE, J., concurring in the result}; 
Murphy, 378 U.S., at 79, OI' whether tbe: testilllOQ¥~ 
.,j rorou:c::ii ao<J iA pc j or pr&eeedings, mrtr testttt~s""\,€ a erv11 aep~ 
--W j thou t 3 S SOC .... , d pt !th l\iiie ii!'!iliEh L pti O; 1 ., 0 , i o--a<lmhrs-1 bJ.e =::-: 
subsequent criminal trial of the deponent. We address the use of an 
exclusionary rule in a subsequent criminal trial only to make clear 
that the District Court's compulsion order here cannot be justified 











TO: Jim Browning DATE: Nov. 17, 1982 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
81-825 Pillsbury 
My comments on proposed changes in our first draft 
are as follows: 
Page 1. OK 
Page 8. It seems to me that the safest way to 
deal with the full paragraph on 8, and the paragraph that 
begins at the bottom of page 8
1
is simply to condense them 
along the lines of my proposed rider. 
Page 9. I doubt the desirability of adding a 
footnote 14. It seems to me that the explanation made in 
your draft seems a bit "self conscious", and is not likely 
to persuade Chambers that do not like our opinion. 
Page 13. Subject to discussion with you, I am 
inclined simply to omit the full paragraph that 




strongly that Conboy could not rely on a prediction as to 
what some court would do in the future. We thus adequately 
address Conboy's interest. In the next paragraph ("J f we 
simply .•. "), the first two sentences add little to what 
is said above. The remainder of the paragraph addresses the 
government's interests, but here again have we not 
adequately done this elsewhere ? See subpart B, p. 11 and 
12. 
2. 
If we omitted the first full paragraph, we could 
relegate the Garner quotation to a footnote if there is a 
proper place for it. We could add the last sentence in Part 
III (""' believe Conboy ••• ") at the end of the paragraph 
on page 13 that concludes with the quotation from Maness. 
What do you think? 
Page 14. Add my footnote on Blackmun's concurring 
opinion. 
Your Proposed Note 21. I suggest a revision of 
it, and that it be located separately from my comment on 
Blackmun's opinion. 
* * * 
Although the foregoing would require considerable 
revision, I do not think - subject to your views - that we 
are cutting out any of the real "muscle". In view of the 
rumbling around the corridors that you report, these 
~
omissions - plus minor additions - may make it difficult for 
1 
people to agree with Justice Blackmun. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
ss 
"' ,.. r - -
lfp/ss 11./17/82 
MEMO RA.ND UM 
TO: Jim Browning DATE: No,,. 17, 1982 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
81-825 Pillsbury 
My comments on proposed chanqes in our first draft 
are as follows: 
Page 1. OK 
Page 8. It seems to me that the safest way to 
~eal with the full paragraph on 8, and the paraqraoh th~t 
begins at the bottom of paqe 8 i.s simply to conden~e th~"ll 
along the lines of my proposed rider. 
Page 9. I doubt the ~esirability of addinq a 
footnote 14. It see•s to me that the explanation made tn 
your draft ~eems a bit ffself conscious", and is not likely 
to persua~e Cha~b~rs that do not like our opinion. 
Page 13. Subject to aiscussion ~ith you, I am 
inclinea siI'lply to omit thl:" full paragraph that begi.ns "if 
we si.mply ••• ". The foreqoing paragraph makes the point 
strongly that Conboy could not rely on a prediction as to 
what some court woulf' <lo in the future. we thus adequately 
address Conboy's interest. In the next paragraph ("if we 
simply ••• "), the first two sentences add little to what 
is said above. The remainder of the paragraph addresses the 
government's interests, but here again have we not 
adequately done this elsewhere. See subpart E, p. 11 and 
12. 
~ ~~ r · - - - 2. 
If we omitted the first full paragraph, we could 
relegate the Garner quotation to a footnote if there is a 
proper place for it. We could add the last sentence in Part 
III ("we believe Conboy ••• ") at the end of the paragraph 
on page 13 that concludes with the quotation from ~aness. 
What do you think? 
Page 14. Add my footnote on Blackmun's concurring 
opinion. 
Your Proposed Note 21. I suggest a revision of 
it, and that it be located separately from my comment on 
Blackmun's opinion. 
* * * 
Although thP foregoing would require consirlerahle 
revision, I do not think - subject to your views - that we 
are cutting out any of the real "muscl~". In view of the 
rumbling around the corridors that you report, these 
omissions - olus minor additions - mav make it difficult for 
people to agree with Justice Blackmun. 









.JUSTICE w .. . .J . BRENNAN, JR. 
- -~n:pr mtt <q cnrl cf flrt 'Jl:Tttittb .:§hdtg 
Jf a.a'lpnghm. ~. QJ. 20 ffe J!. ~ 
Nov. 18, 1982 
Re: Pillsbury v. Conboy, No. 81-825 
Dear Harry: 
I have read your concurring opinion in the above 
case. I agree strongly with your general approach to the 
issue in the case. Like you, I cannot agree with Lewis 
that "the language of the statute permits either party's (CJ 
interpretation and compels neither." On the contrary, I 
am in accord with your analysis. Conboy's deposition 
testimony can be compelled only if (apart from this very 
compulsion order) it is immune under§ 6002 from later 
criminal use'r4rt is immune only if it is "derived" from 
the ear~ier order to testify under§ 6003. It is 
"derived" only if it would be a "fruit" of Conboy's 
earlier testimony under the Fifth Amendment. And it is ~ 
'---Uv., 
not such a fruit. Hence, as you conclude, the immunity ~-------statute creates no warrant for compelling this 
depostition testimony, regardless of the content of the 
proposed questioning or cross-examination. 
I do have some reservations, however, about Part III 
of your opinion, in which you demonstrate that Conboy's 









immunized testimony. My concerns are two. First, I 
would like to find a way to avoid relying on Fourth 
Amendment cases as setting the standard for the Fifth 
Amendment fruits doctrine. Second, I think it is 
unnecessary and possibly harmful to use a factual 
analy sis of the fruits doctrine that leaves open the 
possibility that the outcome might be different in a 
future case because of differences in the factual record 
I have taken the liberty of attaching a suggested set of 
alterations to Part III for your consideration. 
My first disagreement is more a matter of rhetoric 
and case citation than of the real substance of your 
reasoning. Nevertheless, I think it may be worth drawing 
? 
attention to, hecause I fear that your present opinion 
9./-
the~; tends to equate the fruits doctrine applicable under 
Fifth Amendment to that presently applied under the 
Fourth. 
In Part III of your opinion, you say that the proper 
test of fruits to apply under the Fifth Amendment is the 
same as the test of "free will" appl i ed in such Fourth 
Amendment cases as Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 
471; Brown v. Il l inois, 422 U.S. 590; and Rawl i ngs v. 
Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98. Your statement of th is test (pp. 
6-7) is a paraphrase of your seminal exposition of the 
test in Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-04. I agree with your 










is whether the speaker has voluntarily chosen to make the 
later statement, uninfluenced by the fact that prior 
statements have been compelled." Reliance on Wong Sun 
and Brown for this conclusion is troubling, however, 
because of the baggage that those cases carry due to 
their Fourth Amendment origins. 
~4 
In Brown, your opinion stressed that the test of the 
fruits doctrine under the Fourth Amendment is influenced 
by the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule under 
that Amendment. See 422 U.S. at 599-600. Lewis's 
concurrence in Brown made this even more explicit: "The 
notion of the 'dissipation of the taint' attempts to mark 
the point at which the detrimental consequences of 
illegal police action become so attenuated that the 
deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule no longer 
justifies its cost." Id. at 609. This explains why the 
most heavily stressed factor in the four-part Brown test 
is "the purpose and flagrancy of the official 
misconduct". Id., at 604. That factor has only limited /~ 
relevance to the state of mind of the witness, but it is 
obviously crucial to the problem of marginal deterrence. 
See also id. at 609-12 (POWELL, J., concurring); 
Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 110 (referring to "prophylactic 
exclusion" due to police misconduct); 3 w. LaFave, Search 
& Seizure §11.4 (a). 
.. ~ 
I 




Application of this Brown-Wong Sun Fourth Amendment 
rule is inappropriate under the Fifth Amendment because ? f 1:4.> 1 
-- ---------
the purposes of the exclusionary rule are different in 
the two contexts. To be sure, the exclusionary rule does 
serve a deterrent purpose under the Fifth Amendment. But 
it is more than that--it is the heart of the 
constitutional right at stake. Strictly speaking, one 
has no right not to give incriminating testimony per se. 
Rather, the object of the Fifth Amendment is "to secure 
the witness against a criminal prosecution, which might 
be aided directly or indirectly by his [compelledl 
disclosure". Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 595. Thus, 
the exclusion of compelled testimony or its fruits is 
itself part and parcel of the Fifth Amendment right, 
whether or not the original compulsion was lawful. See 
also, e.g., Murphy v. i·laterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 57 
n.6; United States v. Kurzer, 534 F.2d 511, 516 (CA2 
1976). Hence, I am reluctant to suggest by citation that 
the Fifth Amendment fruits doctrine is subject to the 
"diminishing returns" deterrence limitation of Brown. 
I do not suggest that we need get into this 
Fourth/Fifth business in this opinion. Rather, I 
only a substitution of Fifth Amendment authority. 
suggest w9-tl $" 
r:::t~ 
attempted this in the first paragraph of the attached. 
As for my second reservation, it seems to me that 









in this case is not whether we affirm or reverse, but 
that we clearly state a bright-line rule for the guidance 
of persons in Conboy's position. I am reluctant, 
therefore, to suggest that there might be a different 
result on slightly variant facts. Yet I fear that your 
opinion does so, both because the paragraph on pp. 7-8 is 
limited to the facts of this case, and because of your 
implications in the following two paragraphs. I have 
attempted to remedy this in the remainder of my suggested 
change. 
Naturally, I do not mean to impose any change on 
you, nor do I have my heart set on the particular 
language in my proposal. Changes along the general lines 
I have suggested, however, would make it easier for me to 






Just i ce Blackmun 
Copy to Justice Powell 
•• .. r 
~-
lfp/ss 11/18/82 
20. JUSTICE BLACKMUN's opinion concurring in the 
result applies the "fruits" doctrine "to the facts of this 
case" and concludes that, if Conboy had testified, his 
deposition would be "an independent act of free will." 
Post, at 7, 8. We do not think that this analysis 
adequately explains the holding in this case: that courts 
may not compel testimony over the assertion of a valid Fifth 
Amendment privilege, in the absence of an operative grant of 
immunity under §6002. The issue presented is whether the 
prior grant of immunity would have immunized Conboy's 
deposition answers. If it would not, Conboy could not 
properly be compelled to speak; if, however, the original 
~ 
immunity continued to .t.e- effective, Conboy had a duty to 
testify. JUSTICE BLACKMUN's analysis appears to assume that 
the prior grant would not immunize the deposition testimony. 
This assumption would make it unnecessary to address 
petitioners' principal argument that the prior grant of 
immunity already had supplanted Conboy's Fifth Amendment 
privilege. 
CH AM B ERS O F 
JUSTICE B Y RON R . WHITE 
- -
.iu:p-tttttt <!Jttttrl ttf tlrt ~th ;§tatt.ll' • ./ ' 
~fringhtn. ~. <!J. 2llffe'!,~ V 
November 22 , 1982 
Re: 81 - 825 - The Pillsbury Company 
v . Conboy 
Dear Lewis , 




Copies to the Conference 
cpm 
C HAM B ERS O F 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
-
;§UFtUU C!Jttnri llf tltt ~th ;§fattg 
jilu!p:ttghm. ~. C!J. 2ll~~$ 
-
November 22, 1982 
Re: No. 81-825 Pillsbury v. Conboy 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely~ 
Justice Powel l 








j)u.pumt ~llttrl of tqt ~~ j;taftg 
Jflt$'lp:nghtn. ,. Q}. 20ffe'1-.;J 
November 23, 1982 
-
Re: 81-825 - Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy 
Dear Lewis: 
✓ 
I am in agreement with your opinion, but I 
question note 18, page 11. The issue is not before us, 
and I am loath to invite the questions it would raise. 
Do you really need it? 
Regards, 
Justice Powell 
-~ do ~ 
~~ 











,ju.p:rmtt (!}ltltrl of t4t ~h- ,jhtttg 
.. as4ittght~ ~ . QI. 2llffe~.;l 
November 23, 1982 
-
Re: 81- 825 - Pillsbury Co . v . Conboy 
Dear Lewis : 
'V 
I a m i n agreement with your opini on , but I 
question note 18, page 11 . The issue is not before us , 
and I am loath to invi te the questions it would raise . 





Dear Bil 1: 
I 
~; " Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter 
Harry, together with your suggested revision of Part III 
concurring opinion. 
I must say that, unless I misread your views, they 
ao not seem to differ substantially from my own. I agree 
that this is a Fifth Amendment case, and I have relied in 
second draft only on Fifth Amendment principles and .... 
authorities. 
~. Perhaps more fundamentally, I agree that it ls 
important to state clearly na bright-line rule" for the 
guidance of persons in Conboy•s position. In light of the 
way that I restated the issue in my second draft (p. 1), and 
the quite specific holding in the concluding paragraph {p. 
14), a bright-li.ne would be established. 
To be sure, I do undertake - as is customary in 
Court opinion - to address and answer petitioner's 
arguments. I also consider and address interests of the 
government, the witness and the civil plaintiffs. aut I 
no fundamental difference between the views of the three of 
us. I would be happy to consider any specific suggestions 
that either you or Harry may have. 
There would be less likelihood of confusion as 








JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
-
~t~ <qomt cf tqt ~ttittb ~htltg 
._Mlftttgfo1t, ~. <q. 2.llffe'1-,;l 
Re: No. 81-825 - Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy 
Dear Bill: 
November 24, 1982 
/ 
A revision of my concurrence is now necessary in view 
of the changes Lewis has made in his second draft. I have 
sent my revisions to the printer, and it should be ready for 
circulation on Friday. 
I am making some word changes in the next to the last 
paragraph of my concurrence. These are directed to your 
second reservation. Whether they will be satisfactory to 
you, I do not know. As to your first reservation and the 
substitute language you propose, I am somewhat hesitant. I 
agree that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments' fruits doctrines 
are not necessarily coextensive. The Harrison case, however, 
which is the only Fifth Amendment fruits case of which I am 
aware, provides no standard. It simply says that some type 
of fruits doctrine applies. But it also cites several 
Fourth Amendment cases on this point, including Wong Sun. 
Furthermore, I believe that Congress relied on Fourth Amend-
ment fruits cases when it enacted§ 6002. I have added a 
new footnote 2 which bears upon this problem. 
This, indeed, is a difficult and obviously important 
case. 
Justice Brennan 





JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'cONNOR 
,_ -
.$51tl}rttttt <!I1t1trt of t4~ 'J!inilib .$5tatt,s-
Jlulfhtgton, ~. <!t• 2.ogr~~ 
November 24, 1982 
No. 81-825 Pillsbury Company v. Conboy 
Dear John, 











JUSTICE w,. , J , BRENNAN, JR, 
-
~nvttmt~ottrlof~t~b~taltg 
~ufringLm, ~. ~. 20ffe)l,, 
November 30, 1982 
Re: Pillsbury v. Conboy, No. 81-825 
Dear Harry: 
Thank you for your latest letter explaining the 
revisions in you concurring opinion in the above case. I 
appreciate your prompt response. 
I am still uncomfortable with your fruits analysis 
in Part III, and that is why I have found it necessary to 
file the enclosed circulation. I have touched before on 
the problem of Fourth versus Fifth Amendment authority, 
and I will not trouble you with jt again. Even aside 
from that, however, I cannot agree that the test stated 
in Brown v. Illinois is particularly apposite or useful 
as applied in a case such as the present one. Your 
analysis focuses on Conboy's actual state of mind and 
concludes that his choice to testify, had he made such a 
choice, would have been voluntary and independent. Yet 
this is to hypothesize that Conboy made precisely the 
opposite choice from the one he made. If, ex hypothesi, 
Conboy had chosen to testify, may we assume that his 
state of mind would have been the same? I fear that your 










in his footnote 7--that the existence of the privilege is 
somehow made to depend on the willingness to assert it. 
Your analysis is better fitted, I feel, to a case 
where a person such as Conboy has already testified and 
is seeking to suppress his deposition testimony at some 
later stage. In that case, under either Brown or 
Harrison, the focus must be on the witness's subjective 
reasons for testifying. In the present case, however, 
where the inquiry is whether the witness remains under 
the immunizing and compulsive effect of a prior immunity 
order, sur~ly the primary focus must be on the scope of 
the origin~l compulsion to testify. 
I hope I have taken sufficient steps in my brief 
opinion to assure that litigants will understand that 
there is a majority behind the rule announced by you and 









JUSTICE W M . .J . BRENNAN, JR. 
- -
.iu;prtntt (!Jttttri ttf f4t ~h ,itau~ 
Jla,1dpngt~ ~. <q. 211ffe'!$ 
November 30, 1982 
Re: Pillsbury v . Conboy, No. 81-825 
Dear Lewis: 
Thank you for your letter concerning the above case. 
As the enclosed circulation shows, while you and I 
share some doubts about Harry's concurring opinion, I 
confess that I am in closer agreement with his general 
approach to the case than with yours. 
Your opinion casts the issue in terms of whether the 
prior immunity order has already compelled Conboy's 
privilege with respect to this deposition (p . 7). Yet the 
balance of your opinion does not address the scope of the 
immunity granted or of the testimony compelled. Instead, 
you decide the case on a different basis: which answer 
to the question produces a better result for the 
protection of the Government's and the witness's 
interests. While this sort of black-box statutory 
construction is often all we have to go on, I prefer to 
avoid it where possible: it is dependent on factual 
analyses that range from the empirical to the 
hypothetical (as your debate with John's dissent 
illustrates). I prefer the more direct approach I have 
' --. - --2-
suggested to Harry in my previous letter to him and in 
the enclosed letter to him. 
I agree that it would be preferable to have a 
majority opinion in this case. I have tried, in my 
separate opinion, to make it clear that your bottom-line 
holding, at least, commands the support of a majority 





Copy to Justice Blackmun 
P.S.: I am also particularly distressed by the 
first sentence of your footnote 21 (p.13). I would have 
thought it settled beyond any possible speculation that 
wrongfully compelled evidence must always be excluded in 
a subsequent criminal prosecution. 












From: Justice Marshall 
Circulated: 1Jir.l:, .t 1982 
Recirculated: a I -
1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-825 
THE PILLSBURY COMPANY, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. 
JOHN CONBOY 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
[December-, 1982] 
JUSTICE MARSHALL, concurring in the judgment. 
I agree with the plurality that "courts may not compel tes-
timony over the assertion of a valid Fifth Amendment privi-
lege, in the absence of an operative grant of immunity under 
[18 U. S. C.] § 6002." Ante, at 13, n. 20. I concur in the 
judgment even though, in my view, if respondent had an-
swered questions based on his prior immunized testimony, 
his answers could not properly have been used against him in 
a subsequent criminal trial. I write to explain why Conboy 
retained his Fifth Amendment privilege even though his an-
swers could not properly be used against him. 
If Conboy had voluntarily answered petitioners' deposition 
questions, his answers would have been "directly or indi-
rectly derived from" his prior testimony before the grand 
jury. The questions were based solely on the transcript of 
respondent's grand jury testimony. There is no suggestion 
that the same or similar questions would have been asked had 
petitioners' attorneys not obtained a transcript of the grand 
jury testimony. Thus, if respondent had answered the ques-
tions, his answers would not have been "derived from a legiti-
mate source wholly independent of the compelled testimony." 
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U. S. 441, 460 (1972). 
The admission of such answers at a subsequent criminal 
prosecution would represent a substantial departure from the 
J~ 













PILLSBURY CO. v. CONBOY 
fundamental premise of this Court's decision in Kastigar. In 
upholding the use-immunity statute against an attack based 
upon the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, the Court concluded that use immunity affords a wit-
ness protection "as comprehensive as the protection afforded 
by the privilege." Id., at 449. The Court stated that the 
statute "prohibits the prosecutorial authorities from using 
the compelled testimony in any respect," id., at 453 (empha-
sis in original), and that it "provides a sweeping proscription 
of any use, direct or indirect, of the compelled information 
and any information derived therefrom," id., at 460. If the 
prosecution could introduce answers elicited from a witness 
by questions that would not have been asked but for the 
witness's immunized testimony, the protection afforded by 
use immunity would not be "as comprehensive as the protec-
tion afforded by the privilege." Id., at 449. 
I therefore agree with my Brother STEVENS that answers 
to the questions posed by petitioners' attorneys could not 
properly have been used at a subsequent criminal trial. It 
does not follow, however, that respondent can be compelled 
to answer. In this case it is conceded that, had respondent 
never given the immunized testimony before the grand jury, 
he would have been entitled to invoke the Fifth Amendment 
privilege in response to questions concerning the same sub-
ject matter as the questions asked at the deposition. The 
only question is whether respondent is barred from asserting 
the Fifth Amendment privilege because he previously testi-
fied under a statutory grant of immunity and because his an-
swers to the deposition questions would be "directly or indi-
rectly derived" from his prior immunized testimony. 
In my view, a trial judge may not constitutionally compel a 
witness to give incriminating testimony solely upon a finding 
that the witness's answers could not properly be used against 
him in a later criminal proceeeding. 1 This Court's decision 
1 A witness is generally entitled to invoke the Fifth Amendment privi-
81-825-CONCUR 
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in Kastigar v. United States, 406 U. S. 441 (1972), does not 
support such compulsion. In Kastigar the Court was con-
cerned with a federal statute that permits a United States 
Attorney, a federal agency, or a duly authorized represent-
lege against self-incrimination whenever there is a realistic possibility that 
his answer to a question can be used in any way to convict him of a crime. 
It need not be probable that a criminal prosecution will be brought or that 
the witness's answer will be introduced in a later prosecution; the witness 
need only show a realistic possibility that his answer will be used against 
him. Moreover, the Fifth Amendment forbids not only the compulsion of 
testimony that would itself be admissible in a criminal prosecution, but also 
the compulsion of testimony, whether or not itself admissible, that may aid 
in the development of other incriminating evidence that can be used at 
trial. See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U. S. 479, 486 (1951). 
The privilege is inapplicable only "if the testimony sought cannot possi-
bly be used as a basis for, or in aid of, a criminal prosecution against the 
witness." Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 597 (1896). It has long been 
recognized that the court may require a witness to give testimony, includ-
ing testimony that admits to involvement in a criminal act, when there is 
no possibility of future criminal charges being brought against the witness. 
For example, a witness may be compelled to testify concerning his involve-
ment in a crime when he is protected from later prosecution by the Double 
Jeopardy Clause, see, e.g., Reina v. United States, 364 U. S. 507, 513 
(1960) (dictum), by the applicable statute of limitations, see, e. g., United 
States v. Goodman, 289 F. 2d 256, 259 (CA4 1961), or by a pardon. See 
Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 599-600 (1896). As JUSTICE BRENNAN 
indicated in his dissenting opinion in Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U. S. 548, 
564-565 (1971) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting from dismissal of certiorari), this 
limitation upon the privilege against self-incrimination is derived from the 
language of the Fifth Amendment: 
"Implicitly, of course, 'in any criminal case' suggests a limitation upon the 
reach of the privilege . . . . [l]f there is no possibility of a criminal case, 
then the privilege would not apply. And that is precisely the basis on 
which this Court has consistently upheld grants of immunity from Brown 
v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591 (1896), to Ullman v. United States, 350 U. S. 422 
(1956)." 
It has also been recognized that a court may compel a witness to testify 
when his answers could neither implicate him in any criminal conduct nor 
possibly lead to the discovery of past criminal conduct. See Hoffman v. 
United States, 341 U. S. 479 (1951); Heicke v. United States, 227 U. S. 131, 
4 
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ative of Congress to grant use immunity and thereby compel 
a witness to give incriminating testimony. See 18 U. S. C. 
§§ 6002-6005. Kastigar itself involved a grant of use immu-
nity conferred upon a witness called to testify before a grand 
jury. In upholding the use-immunity statute against con-
stitutional attack, the Court held only that, pursuant to stat-
utory authority to confer such immunity, the government 
may constitutionally compel incriminating testimony in ex-
change for immunity from use or derivative use of that testi-
mony. 406 U. S., at 462. Kastigar does not hold that a trial 
judge, acting without statutory authority to grant immunity, 
may rely on prior immunized testimony to overrule an other-
wise valid assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege by a 
deponent in a civil case. 
Whatever justification there may be for requiring a wit-
ness to give incriminating testimony in aid of a criminal in-
vestigation after the government has granted use immunity, 
there is no similar justification for compelling a witness to 
give incriminating testimony for the benefit of a private liti-
gant when the government has not chosen to grant immu-
nity. Any interest served by compelling the testimony is in-
sufficient to justify subjecting the witness to the risks that 
attend the compulsion of incriminating testimony. 
Whenever a witness is forced to give incriminating testi-
mony, there is a significant risk that fruits of that testimony 
will later be used against him. Further incriminating evi-
dence that is derived from compelled testimony cannot al-
ways be traced back to its source: 
142-145 (1913). This limitation, too, is implicit in the language of the con-
stitutional guarantee, since a witness who has been forced to provide testi-
mony that cannot incriminate him has not in any meaningful sense been 
"compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." 
In this case, the Fifth Amendment privilege is fully applicable. Re-
spondent remains subject to criminal prosecution, and his answers to the 
deposition questions asked by petitioners' attorneys would both impli-
cate him in criminal conduct and tend to lead to further incriminating 
information. 
81-82~CONCUR 
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"A witness who suspects that his compelled testimony 
was used to develop a lead will be hard pressed indeed to 
ferret out the evidence necessary to prove it, for though 
the Court puts the burden of proof on the government, 
the government will have no difficulty in meeting its bur-
den by mere assertion if the witness produces no con-
trary evidence. The good faith of the prosecuting au-
thorities is thus the sole safeguard of the witness' rights. 
... [E]ven their good faith is not a sufficient safeguard. 
For the paths of information through the investigative 
bureaucracy may well be long and winding, and even a 
prosecutor acting in the best faith cannot be certain that 
somewhere in the depths of his investigative apparatus, 
often including hundreds of employees, there was not 
some prohibited use of the compelled testimony." 
Kastigarv. United States, 406 U.S., at 469 (MARSHALL, 
J., dissenting). 
See also Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U. S., at 567-568 (1971) 
(BRENNAN, J., dissenting from dismissal of certiorari); 
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 525 (1958). If respondent 
is not allowed to assert the Fifth Amendment privilege, he 
may undergo numerous civil depositions, he may be forced to 
elaborate upon his original testimony, and his testimony may 
be disseminated broadly. As a result, he may face a much 
greater risk that tainted evidence will be used against him 
than he initially faced following the compulsion of the grand 
jury testimony. As the plurality recognizes, the opportunity 
to seek exclusion of tainted evidence is an incomplete protec-
tion, for "a court, at the time of the civil testimony, [cannot] 
pre-determine the decision of the court in a subsequent crimi-
nal prosecution on the question whether the Government has 
met its burden of proving 'that the evidence it proposes to 
use is derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of 
the compelled testimony."' Ante, at 12 (quoting Kastigar v. 
United States, 406 U. S., at 460). Cf. Maness v. Meyers, 
419 u. s. 449, 461-463 (1975). 
6 
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It may be appropriate to subject a witness to these risks 
when the government has conferred use immunity pursuant 
to statutory authorization, but the interests supporting com-
pulsion of the testimony are far weaker here. In Kastigar 
the Court noted that the use immunity statute advanced the 
government interests in compelling incriminating testimony, 
id., at 443---444, 446-447, and in leaving open the possibility of 
prosecuting the witness on the basis of "evidence from legiti-
mate independent sources," id., at 461. In this case, how-
ever, neither Congress nor the United States Attorney have 
made a similar expression of government interest. 2 The 
only public interest that would be served by forcing respond-
ent to testify would be that of obtaining testimony relevant to 
a private antitrust suit. 3 Even that interest would not be 
substantially served. 4 
2 As the plurality observes, the government interests that supported 
the compulsion of incriminating testimony in Kastigar would be under-
mined by the compulsion of respondent's testimony in this case. The gov-
ernment interest in preserving the chance to prosecute respondent in the 
future based on "legitimate independent" evidence would be compromised 
by the creation of additional immunized testimony. Ante, at 11- 12. 
3 Even if the U. S. Attorney consented to the trial judge's compulsion of 
respondent's answers, the judge's action might be improper. As the plu-
rality notes, it is an open question whether the Government has statutory 
authority "to immunize the testimony of a witness in a civi l proceeding 
when the Government determines that the public interest would be 
served." Ante, at n. 18 (emphasis added). Moreover, the constitutional-
ity of such a statutory authorization remains open to doubt. Cf. Garrity v. 
New Jersey , 385 U. S. 493, 496 (1967) (declining to consider constitutional-
ity of forfeiture-of-office statute which, in effect, allowed the authorities to 
compel a public officer, under threat of removal from office, to provide in-
criminating testimony in exchange for immunity from use or derivative use 
of that testimony at a criminal proceeding). 
Indeed, this Court has not yet spoken as to the circumstances under 
which a trial court in a criminal case may compel a defense witness to 
testify concerning questions as to which he had previously testified before 
the grand jury or may compel the Government to secure that witness's tes-
timony by granting him immunity. Cf. United States v. Praetorius, 622 
81--825--CONCUR 
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If he were compelled to answer petitioners' deposition 
questions, Conboy would face a realistic risk that his testi-
mony would lead to further incriminating evidence that he 
would be unable to exclude at a subsequent criminal prosecu-
tion. The interests underlying the use-immunity statute 
have no application here, and in my view the general interest 
in obtaining testimony cannot be considered an adequate sub-
stitute for those interests. I therefore join the plurality in 
concluding that the Fifth Amendment does not permit a trial 
judge in a civil case to compel incriminating testimony solely 
upon a finding that the testimony would be "directly or indi-
rectly derived from" the witness's previously immunized 
testimony. 
For the foregoing reasons, I concur in the judgment. 
F. 2d 1054, 1064 (CA2 1980); United States v. Morrison, 535 F. 2d 223, 229 
(CA3 1976); United States v. Alessio, 528 F. 2d 1079 (CA9 1976); Earl v. 
United States, 361 F. 2d 531, 534 n. 1 (CADC 1966) (Burger, J.). 
'As the plurality points out, it is questionable whether the deposition 
testimony would be admissible at trial, in light of the limits that might have 
to be placed on cross-examination by the other civil litigants. Ante, at 11. 
Nor would respondent's answers help petitioners obtain further relevant 
information, since petitioners already have access to respondent's grand 
jury testimony. 
job 10/07/82 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Jim 
Re: Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, No. 81-825 
~ 
You asked whether the U.S. Attorneys had the power to authorize 
immunity grants in connection with the civil depositions here. 
1. Under 18 u.s.c. §6002, "[w)henever a witness refuses, on 
the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or 
provide other information in a proceeding before or ancillary to ••. a 
court of the United States, ••. and the person presiding over the 
proceeding" orders the witness to testify, his testimony may not be 
used against him in any criminal case. 
2. Under §6003, a U.S. Attorney may request such testimony 
when in his judgment 
(1) the testimony or other information from such 
individual may be necessary to the public interest; and 
(2) such individual has refused or is likely to 
refuse to testify or provide other information on the 
basis of his privilege against self-incrimination. 
3. Amici curiae, other similarly situated civil deponents, 
argue that the "Government cannot obtain immunity for witnesses in 
private litigation," citing United States v. Dunham Concrete 
Products, Inc., 475 F.2d 1241 (CA5 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 832 
(1973). I read Dunham, however, as standing only for the 
proposition that, under the old immunity statute, immunity was "to 
" 
be granted solely by Government officials." Id., at 1245. The CA 
stated that Congress had "authorized immunity from criminal 
prosecution only to the extent that the Government actively 
acquiesced." Id., at 1246. 
2. 
4. I am unable to see why the Government could not immunize 
witnesses in private litigation. There may be good policy reasons 
for not granting immunity in particular cases, but I cannot find, 
after brief research, that there is any legal obstacle to doing so. 
Affirmance of the CA7's judgment would, it would seem, give the 
Government the choice of furthering enforcement of the antitrust 
laws through private suits or through criminal sanctions. 
December 8, 1982 
81-825 Pillsbury v. Conboy 
Dear Byron and Bill: 
Here is a fourth draft with changes made to 
reconcile Thurgood's separate opinion with ours. I see no 
substantive difference between our views. 
He has now helpfully agreed to join this opinion, 
filing his as a concurrence. Unless you have some 
objection, I will recirculate. The Chief has indicated he 





- -j;uprttnt (!f itttrl itf tltt ~tb j;tatts 
jiufrhtghm. ~. QI. 2llffe~~ 
C HAMBERS O F 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
December 9, 1982 
Re: No. 81-825 Pillsbury v. Conboy 
Dear Lewis: 
I am sufficiently troubled by the paragraph beginning on 
page 13 and carrying over to page 14 in your fourth draft that 
I cannot at present continue to join the opinion if this 
paragraph remains in it. I will ponder the matter further. 
Justice Powell 
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CHAMBE RS OF' 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST / 
December 15, 1982 
Re: No. 81-825 The Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy 
Dear Lewis: 




cc: The Conference 
December 17, 1982 
81-825 The Pillsbury Co. v . Conboy 
Dear Chief: 
After extended "negotiations", my fourth draft now has 
the aoproval of BRW, ~Mand WHR. 
Although you have indicated an intension to join, I do 
not yet have a formal join note . 
~his is a case in which HA~ circulated an opinion al-
most immediately that concurs only in the judgment . Bill 
Brennan has a much shorter opinion concurring in the judg-
ment, and John has a dissent in which Sandra has joined . We 




C HAMBERS O F 
.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
-
~nµumt C!Inurt nf tqt ~b ~taitg 
'ilctttfriugfon. g) . "t· 2UffeJ!.' 
December 17, 1982 
v -
Re: No. 81-825 - The Pillsbury Co. v . Conboy 
Dear Lewis: 





cc: The Conference 
- -~lltlTt!tU (!Jonri ttf tltt ~ ?t _§ta.ttg 
C H AMBE RS OF 
T H E CHIEF JUSTICE 
:.-ulfinghtn. ~- (ij. 211,S>t~ 
December 17, 1982 
Re: No. 81-825, The Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy 
Dear Lewis, 




Copies to the Conference 
- -
j\u.prtutt C!Jcurl ltf t4t ~h j\taftg 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF .JUSTI CE 
Jfufringht~ ~. <ij. 21lbi~~ 
December 17, 1982 
Re: No. 81-825, The Pillsbury Co. v . Conboy 
Dear Lewis, 
This will confirm my informal "join . " 
Regards, 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
..,./ , , .1 4 
lfp/ss 01/11/83 81-825 Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy 
This case presents a question/ involving the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self incrimination/ and the fed-
eral statute/ that authorizies the granting of use immunity 
for testimony that otherwise would be protected. 
~~ 0 As an oral summary of the case would not be infor-
- A 
mative, I will merely frame the question and state our dis-
position of it. 
Respondent had been granted use immunity for his 
grand jury testimonyf n a criminal antitrust case. Subse-
quently, a civil suit was brought by the petitioners. They 
sought to have respondent/ when taking his deposition- / 
repeat verbatim/ or closely track/ his prior immunized testi-
mony. Respondent claimed the Fifth Amendment privilege. The 
DC rejected the claim. 
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, re-----
versed the District Court. It held that the prior immunity 
did not carry over to the civil deposition. 
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
We hold, in the absence of a duly authorized grant of immu-
nity at the time,/ that respondent could not be compelled -




\.., ,· i: • · • 
Our reasons for this conclusioyare set forth 
fully in an opinion filed this morning with the Clerk. 
2. 
Justice Marhsall has filed a separate concurring 
opinion. Justices Brennan and Blackmun have filed opinions 
concurring in the judgment. And Justice Stevens has filed a 
-,== 



































Petitioners' premise is that the deposition of Conboy is 
designed not to discover new information, 15 but to obtain evi-
dence that simply repeats the statements in the immunized tran-
script.16 Because there will be little opportunity for the grant 
of immunity to sweep in statements on direct examination that the 
Government did not in tend to immunize, or for the deponent to 
give responses that may fall outside of the grant of immunity and 
later be used against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution, 
Conboy's deposition will yield only a carbon copy of the grand 
jury transcript. In such a situation, it would be desirable that 
civil plaintiffs, particularly those bringing private suits that 
supplement the er iminal enforcement of the federal anti trust 
laws, have access to the available, probative information. 
But even if the direct examination is limited to the ques-
tions and answers in the immunized transcript, there remains the 
right of cross examination, a right traditionally relied upon 
expansively to test credibility as well as to seek the truth. 




P. 18 {middle of page): 
A District Court's grant of immunity in a subsequent civil 
proceeding in effect could invest the deponent with transactional 
immunity. This is precisely the kind of immunity Congress in-
tended to prohibit. The purpose of §6002 was to limit the scope 
of immunity to the level that is constitutionally required, as 
well as to limit the use of immunity to those cases in which des-
ignated executive officers determine that gaining the witness's 
testimony outweighs the loss of the opportunity for criminal 
prosecution of that witness. 
~ ~ ., ---
lfp/vde 11/17/82 
PILLS GINA-POW 
Rider - 81-825 Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy 
Consider adding a note along the following lines, possibly 
' 
at the end of the opinion: 
Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion addresses a 
~
situation not present in this case: He applie-s the 
~ 
~ 
"fruits" doctrine where a witness's testimony at a 
deposition is an "independent act of a free will", i.e. is 
knowingly and vrrluntarily given in the absence of any 
compulsion by the court. Justice Blackmun concludes that 
"had Conboy answered the deposition questions [as 'an 
independent act of free will'], his testimony would not 
-, , _ __ 
2. 
have been protected by the original immunity grant II . . . . 
Post at 8. Although there may be no reason to disagree 
with this- hypothetical, it is not presented in this 
case. Therefore, we have not addressed it. 
lfp/ss 11/17/82 Rider A, p. 14 (Pillsbury) 
PILL14 SALLY-POW 
21. It is unnecessary to speculate whether 
wrongfully compelled evidence might be excluded in a 
subsequent criminal trial of the deponent. Cf. Maness v. 
Myers, 419 U.S., at 474-475 (White, J., concurring in the 
result). We have considered the use of an exclusionary 
rule in such a trial to make clear that the District 
Court's compulsion order in this case cannot be justified 
retroactively by the subsequent exclusion of the compelled 
testimony. 
\ ..- .. • --,. 
lfp/ss 11/17/82 Rider A, p. 8 (Pillsbury) 
PILL8 SALLY-POW 
Before accepting either interpretation, we think it 
necessary to consider which of the contending views more 
satisfactorily accommodates both the government's need for 
admissible evidence and the individual's interest in 
avoiding self incrimination. In this case there also is 
the interest - recognized as important - in obtaining 
admissible evidence in a civil antitrust suit. We note at 
the outset that although there may be practical reasons 
for not testifying13 , as far as the deponent's Fifth 
Amendment right is concerned he should be indifferent 
between the protection afforded by silence and that 
afforded by immunity. A deponent's primary interest is 
- ..... 
2. 
that the protection be certain. The government's 
interest, however, may be affected seriously by whether 
the deponent relies at the civil deposition on his Fifth 
Amendment privilege or on his prior grant of immunity. 
With due recognition of petitioner's need for admissible 
evidence, our inquiry then is whether this need can be met 
without threatening the government's interest in limiting 
the scope of an immunity grant or encroaching upon the 
deponent's certainty of protection. 
,,. 
lfp/ss 11/17/82 Rider A, p. 8 (Pillsbury) 
PILL8 SALLY-POW 
fl · Before accepting either interpretation, we think it 
/ 
~ 1/ 
necessary to consider which 
satisfactoril~:-:::le~etts 
of the contending views more 
bo t h the government's need for ---
admissible evidence and the individual's interest in 
avoiding self incrimination. In this case there also is 
the interest-- recognized as important -in obtaining 
admissible evidence in a civil antitrust suit. We note at 
the outset that although there may be practical reasons 
I~ 
for not testifying~ as far as the deponent's Fifth 
Amendment right is concerned he should be indifferent 
between the protection afforded by silence and that 
afforded by immunity. A deponent's primary interest is 
2. 
/ that the protection be certain. The government's --
interest, however, may be affected seriously by whether 
the deponent relies at the civil deposition on his Fifth 
Amendment privilege or on his prior grant of immunity. 
/ with due recognition of petitioner\fs) need for admissible 
evidence, our inquiry then is whether this need can be met 
/ without threatening the 2overnment's interest in limiting -
the scope of an immunity grant or encroaching upon the 
deponent's certainty of protection. 
}--- ~ 
• 
IC/ ,. n 
lfp/ss 11/17/82 Rider A, E• 1J crt11_~bt1~) 
PILL14 SALLY-POW 
19 7" It is unnecessary to speculate whether 
wrongfully compelled evidence might be excluded in a 
subsequent criminal trial of the deponent. Cf. Maness v. 
Myers, 419 U.S., at 474-475 (White, J., concurring in the 
L¼~J 
result). We hav2 eoAsi~e~lthe use of 
~ 
rule in such a triall to make clear that 
an exclusionary 
the District 
Court's compulsion order in this case cannot be justified 
retroactively by the subsequent exclusion of the compelled 
testimony. 
l,,Q 
p /-t I< r<' 7 l, 
(' ti' ,,,, 
C,, 0 /V'f 
" erts" f-1? 
t"s 
(!, iw' f 
•·· . . ~ 
~t.,r 
&~ .::0 --
Rider - 81-825 
Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion addresses a 
~
situation not present in this case: He appliJl,6 the 
A, 
"fruits" doctrine where a witness's testimony at a 
deposition is' an •independent act of ~ e will", i.e., is 
~ 
knowingly and voluntarily given in the absence of any 
compulsion by the court. Justice Blackmun concludes that 
"had Conboy answered the deposition questions [as 'an 
independent act of free will'], his testimony would not 
'4. 11111, 
2. 
have been protected by the original immunity grant II . . . . 
1l Although there may be no reason to disagree 
hypothetical, it is not presented in 
case. Therefore, we have not addressed it. 
1 
R~~ 
job 11/27/82 ( trv"µ~ 
1 
cv1 ~r ~-eu.-Z 
~ r)'f 
--~ 
.(/ The fo l lowing might be added to footnote 18 or, if you want, 
replace footnote 18 as it is now written: 
r 
' The dissent minimizes the fralue of th;J"enforcement interest 
,.. s 
that our construction of §6002 /seeks t":§) protect, post, at 10, 11, 
~ ~ ,\ 
13, contending that~ "relo/ on a highly theoretical and 
hyROthetical prosecutorial interest," id., at 13. w~ ,,t.,ti tt I ~l /· /. ~ -•~/2_ /-/,vt,. -1 --
su£ f~r s-from-two flaws. - First, by conceding ~ there is~ me / 
"slight risk" t. hat the deponent' ~ testimony may @omeho~ 
~ - prose~ the dissen t \ ~~l'-.that its interpretation of §6002 
~J.. 7 provides at least somewhat broader immunity than Congress intended. 
~..,,... I >"'I·• 
.., 
~ --., c.,u..,u~, 
Seeoad., in the dissent' s "judgment [,] the enforcement interest in 
' 
gaining access to such details at a deposition far outweighs th[at] 
~- l~t<"~ 
risk ...• " Id., at 13. See also id., at 9. (. 'Bbe-t "judgment," 
however, ·.s~ e-xae~ reserved for officials of the Department 
of Justice, not the federal courts, to make on a case-by-case basis. 
Although the dissent has "no doubt that the prosecutor could take 
steps to keep the scope of the subsequent inquiry within proper 
bounds," it does not explain how the Government, not a party to this 
case, will protect its interests. 
9 'J o~~:;I 
job 11/17/82 
14. Although~ "':2/,) co; clude that Congress did not intend in 
§6002 to give civil plaintiff/ any greater means of obtaining 
evidence than~ o~ ld have in the absence of a prior grant of ~...i.;_.~ 
immunity, we cannot assume in reaching that conclusion, as does~ 
~ 1-..o ~"'°"~ 0 ~ h b ' d · · · d · ,_-oeReW£5e1..ee, tat Conoy s eposition testimony woul necessarily 
produce new material in need of exclusion o r immunization. That 
something "new" has been produced assumes the answer to the question 
presented. Because petitioners, as civil plaintiffs, have a right 
to Conboy's evidence in the absence of a privilege, and because they 
contend that Conboy's privilege [!1 a §'"alread;i been supplanted by the 
prior grant of immunity, we canno\~ GOlz:'ton "fruits" analysis 
to "the facts of this case," post, at 7, until we have explained why 
the original immunity does not cover the deposition testimony. 
Petitioners' argument is that such scope of the original grant of 
immunity would not be inconsistent with congressional intent because 
it does not increase the amount of immunized evidence. We think 
there is a need to address that substantial argument. 
I 
lfp/ss 11/18/82 
20. JUSTICE BLACKMUN's opinion concurring in the 
judgment applies the "fruits" doctrine "to the facts of this 
case" and concludes that, if Conboy had testified, his 
deposition would be "an independent act of free will." 
Post, at 7, 8. We do not think that this analysis 
adequately explains the holding in this case: that courts 
may not compel testimony over the assertion of a valid Fifth 
Amendment privilege, in the absence of an operative grant of 
immunity under §6002. The issue presented is whether the 
prior grant of immunity would have immunized Conboy's 
deposition answers. If it would not, Conboy could not 
properly be compelled to speak; if, however, the original 
immunity continued to be effective, Conboy had a duty to 
testify. JUSTICE BLACKMUN's analysis appears to assume that 
Conboy had a right to remain silent at the deposition, see 
post, at 7, which by definition assumes that there is no 
immunity. This assumption would make it unnecessary to 
address petitioners' principal argument that the prior grant 
of immunity already had supplanted Conboy's Fifth Amendment 
privilege. 
II t 1"(f W•~ -. ~ ,, _____ ___... ~~ 
~ Supreme Court of the United States 
Memorandum 
----------- ---- -- --- ---- -- --- --- --- ----- ----- ----- ------- ---, 19 --- ----- --
, . 13 ... 1 .t fy " 
JJif,, ~UM.~,,!,J--
'1· ..,, 1. It I VJ_-••' .., 
} ''c ,, 
~.~ 
- -------
& 1~ - 9 'd 
job 11/18/82 &L#U /? ~/..La/ 
} II 
-~ 7. 
20. JUSTICE BLACKMUN's opinion concurring in the result 
applies the "fruits" doctrine "to the facts of this case" and 
concludes that, if Conboy had testified, his d eposition would be "an 
independent act of free will." Post, at 7, 8. We do not think that 
this analysis adequately explains the holding in this ca 
courts may not compel testimony over the assertion of a valid Fifth 
Amendment privilege, in the absence of a of immunity 
under §6002. The issue presented is whether the prior grant of 
immunity continuef to exist at the time oK~~sition. If it 
A~ll ~· ..... l '*~ ~ ~ ·.-. ,~ rn not, Conboy may ll.Q.t b~ comp e1'1ed to speak; -,~owev.e5, , ~ f,Jthe 
original immunity continueR to exist, Conboy hat/.. a duty to testify. 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN's analysis of Conboy's deposition testimony, 
however, necessarily assumes\\hat_ conboy hacf a Fifth Amendment right >\ ,, 
to remain silent at the deposition, see post, at 7, which by 
~ 
definition assumes that there is no immuni :iJ Sweh analysis fails 
to address petitioners' principal argument that the prior grant of 






20. JUSTICE BLACKMUN's opinion concurring in the 
'~ 
l.J~cbu~ applies the "fruits" doctrine "to the facts of this 
case" and concludes that, if Conboy had testified, his 
deposition would be "an independent act of free will." 
Post, at 7, 8. We do not think that this analysis 
adequately explains the holding in this case: that courts 
may not compel testimony over the assertion of a valid Fifth 
Amendment privilege, in the absence of an operative grant of 
immunity under §6002. The issue presented is whether the 
prior grant of immunity would have immunized Conboy's 
deposition answers. If it would not, Conboy could not 
properly be compelled to speak; if, however, the original 
-k 
immunity continued to t.o effective, Conboy had a duty to 
testify. JUSTICE BLACKMUN's analysis appears to assume that 
the prior grant would not immunize the deposition testimony. 
This assumption would make it unnecessary to address 
petitioners' principal argument that the prior grant of 







Although the parties make their argument in terms tracking 
those of the statute--whether the deposition testimony is "derived 
from" the prior testimony--it is clear that the crux of their 
............ 
dispute is whether the earlier grant of immunity itself compelled 
.......... 
Conboy to talk. 1 Petitioners contend that the prior grant OE 
' 
immunity already had supplant~ onboy's Fifth Amendment privile~e 
at the time of the civil deposition. ~ rtainly petitioners do not 
{
suggest that ~ny- civil deposition ,_..-.-
the original order, but or9 that 
testimony was within the scope of 
~ 
which ~"closely tracks" ~he prior 
/1. 
immunized testimony. Petitioners contend that such- civil depositi-orc \ 
Jr~ ..:,.,N .. -4'-/J ., /--,,. / / ~ ~'3-- testimony is different, becaus.e-i!t..(\4ee-s not threaten the \ 
Government's need for admissible evidence or th~ ind ~vidual'; /~ 
/ ,v .. ..,_., ~ ... J, # ,.., ~- / ~ 
interest in avoiding self incrimination. ~ W-ith no- dangel' to UN +-,~ -, 
- [ Government, or¥ Conboy's interests, courts should se-cu~ civil 
anti trust plaintiffs~ · · 'V-iden~cause 
{31,11-/, ~~'""~I 
')r---r--w..e~ the assumptions 
c..J )\ 9 rH... pu..,'-- ~--r.e ~ 
r-e-e-t.s. we conclude that District 
I,,. I 
upon which petitioners' conclusion 
Court;l cannot compel Conboy to 
answer deposition questions, over a valid assertion of his Fifth 
Amendment right, absent a duly authorized assurance of immunity at 
the time. 2 
<.-.A lh/_t:_ ~ ~ 
,I 
1see Brief for Petitioners 19 ("Conboy had no Fifth Amendment 
privilege to assert because of the coextensive protection 
provided by the immunity statute."): Reply Brief for Petitioners 
12 ("[R]equiring a witness to answer questions a second time that 
were previously answered under a grant of immunity does not 
result in an expansion of the original immunity grant."). 







_______ /~?'~ ~u'-<- ~fs-~1 
2JUSTICE BLACKMUNi assumes that Conboy had a right to remain 
silent at the deposition, which by definition assumes the 
immunity order itself does not compel a witness to testify at a 
civil deposition. He discusses the "fruits" doctrine where a 
witness's testimony at a deposition is "an independent act of 
free will" and concludes that "had Conboy answered the deposition 
2. 
questions, his testimony would not have been protected by the ~~ 
original immunity grant •... " Post, at 8. Although there mayJ be 
no reason to disagree with this hypothetical, it is not presented 7A-t-
in th i s case • ~ n-ee-~ i s., ,whether Conboy can be 
compelled to testify- ,t1hether the immunity order itself compels ~ 
him to track his prior testimony at the civil deposition--over 
the assertion of his Fifth Amendment rights . -\11\e,frieed not address 
~ . ions where ~ mistakenly belir-V-es ~he is co pelled to do so 
or doe.s_~r some other reason. , · 
/ B-ega,1=1~e'~ JUSTICE BLACKMON' s op inion . · _ a factual 
analysis~ the fruits doctrine,2r leaves open the possibility .__ ___ _ 
that the utcome in ·a subsequent riminal prosecution of the 
deponent · be different in a ture case because of 
differences in the factual record. He nevertheless concludes, as 
do we, that Di trict Courts are e ·thout power to compel a civil 
deponent tot stify over a valid ssertion of his Fifth Amendment 
right, abs en a separate grant o immu..:11 i ~y _g__u r SJ!_an.!.,. .!:-£, § 6 0 0 2. 
,1/ ~ l ,;_f-~-~ _2__\ 






Although the parties make their arguments in terms tracking 
those of the statute--whether the deposition testimony is "derived 
from" the prior testimony--it is clear that the crux of their 
dispute is whether the earlier grant of immunity itself compelled 
~~ Conboy to talk. 11-APetitioners contend that the prior grant of 
immunity already had supplanted Conboy's Fifth Amendment privilege 
at the time of the civil deposition. Petitioners would limit this 
immunity, of course, to testimony that "closely tracks" his prior 
immunized testimony. It is argued that this would not threaten the 
Government's need for admissible evidence or the individual's 
interest in avoiding self-incrimination. In the absence of such a 
threat, admissible evidence should be available to civil antitrust 
plaintiffs. But we cannot accept the assumptions upon which 
petitioners' conclusion rests. In our view, a District Court cannot 
compel Conboy to answer deposition questions, over a valid assertion 
of his Fifth Amendment right, absent a duly authorized assurance of 
immunity at the time. 1 1~ 
iz.. r see Brief for Petitioners 19 ("Conboy had no Fifth 
Amendment privilege to assert because of the coextensive 
protection provided by the immunity statute."); Reply Brief for 
Petitioners 12 ("[R]equiring a witness to answer questions a 
second time that were previously answered under a grant of 
immunity does not result in an expansion of the original immunity 
grant.") . 
I?-.-,, 
~ JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring in the Court's judgment, 
assumes that Conboy had a right to remain silent at the 
deposition, which by definition assumes the immunity order itself 
does not compel a witness to testify at a civil deposition. He 
discusses the "fruits" doctrine where a witness's testimony at a 
Footnote continued on next page. 
"' 
( 
deposition is "an independent act of free will" and concludes 
that "had Conboy answered the deposition questions, his testimony 
would not have been protected by the original immunity grant .•.. " 
Post, at 8. Although there may well be no reason to disagree 
with this hypothetical, it is not presented in this case. The 
issue is whether Conboy can be compelled to testify--i. e., 
whether the immunity order itself compels him to track his prior 
testimony at the civil deposition--over the assertion of his 
Fifth Amendment rights. We therefore need not address situations 
where a witness mistakenly believes he is compelled to do so or 
does so for some other reason. 
As JUSTICE BLACKMUN's opinion makes a factual analysis under 
the fruits doctrine, it appears to leave open the possibility 
that the outcome in a subsequent criminal prosecution of the 
deponent may be different in a future case because of differences 
in the factual record. He nevertheless concludes, as do we, that 
District Courts are without power to compel a civil deponent to 
testify over a valid assertion of his Fifth Amendment right, 





In Harrison v. United States, 392 u. S. 219 (1974), the 
Court addressed the problem of when a later statement by a 
witness whould be considered a "fruit" of an earlier compelled 
confession by that witness. In that case, the prosecution in an 
earlier trial had introduced three illegally obtained confessions 
allegedly made by the defendant. The defendant, faced with these 
statements, took the stand and tried to explain them away as best 
he could. His conviction was reversed because of the 
introduction of the illegal confessions. At his retrial, the 
prosecution introduced the defendant's rebuttal testimony from 
the first trial, arguing that the defendant had waived his Fifth 
Amendment privilege by taking the stand. The Court reversed the 
defendant's second conviction because his testimony at the first 
trial was a fruit of the original illegal confessions: 
"The question is not whether the petitioner made a 
knowing decision to testify, but~- If ~e did so in 
order to overcome the impact of confessions illegally 
obtained and hence improperly introduced, then his 
testimony was tainted by the same illegality that 
rendered the confessions themselves inadmissible." 392 
U. s., at 223 (footnote omitted; emphasis in original). 
In brief, the issue is whether the speaker has voluntarily chosen -
to make the later statement, uninfluenced by the fact that prior 
statements have been comoelled. 





grant of use immun i ty might influence a witness in Conboy's 
position to testify at a later civil deposition. 1 First, 
conceivably, the earlier grant of immunity might itself compel 
the witness to so testify. It is an open question whether the 
use immunity statute authorizes a United States Attorney to grant 
immunity for testimony at a civil deposition, see ante, at 12 
n. 19. But there is certainly no suggestion in this case that 
any civil deposition was within the scope of the testimony sought 
to be compelled by the immunity orders under which Conboy 
testified. 
Second, even if an immunity order does not actually compel a 
witness to testify at a civil deposition, the witness might 
reasonably believe that the order does so. There might be some 
unfortunate vagueness in the wording of the immunity order, for 
example. Failing that, an uncounselled witness might fail to 
assert his Fifth Amendment privilege because he reasonably 
misunderstands the scope or consequences of his prior immunity 
grant. But in any event, when a witness (such as Conboy) 
1A third possibility is that the witness might choose to 
testify at a deposition because it presents an opportunity to 
correct misstatements or omissions in his earlier testimony, to 
or proclaim his innocence, . or the like. This choice to testify 
would be "influenced" by the earlier testimony in the broadest 
sense of that word, but it is not what was meant in Harrison. 
When the defendant in that case testified in response to the 
introduction of his prior confessions, he was not indulging a 
desire for reputation or truth, but seeking to avoid conviction 
for a crime. The Fifth Amendment does not protect a witness who 
freely chooses to speak when he is under no compulsion to do so, 







actually asserts his privilege at his deposition, it cannot 
plausibly be said that he supposed himself to be covered by his 
prior immunity. His very act of refusing to testify belies the 
hypothesis. 
In Kastigar, we upheld the federal use immunity statute 
against a Fifth Amendment challenge because "the immunity 
provided by 18 U.S. C. § 6002 leaves the witness in 
substantially the same position as if the witness had claimed the 
Fifth Amendment privilege." 406 u. s., at 462; see also, Murphv, 
378 U.S., at 79. This case illustrates the substance of that 
constitutional test in the context of a later attempt to compel 
new testimony. The "same position" in which Conboy is left is 
this: he remains entitled to claim his Fifth Amendment privilege 
whenever anyone, other than a United States Attorney armed with a 
§ 6003 order, seeks to compel his testimony. The compulsion to 





Replace the material in note 13, page 8, beginning with 
"Although there may ... " and ending with "some other reason[]" with 
the following: 
We have no occasion to address this hypothetical. The 
issue is whether Conboy can be compelled to testify--i. 
e., whether the immunity order compels him to track his 
prior testimony at the civil deposition--over the 
assertion of his Fifth Amendment rights. If, as we 
conclude, the original grant of immunity does not extend 
to the subsequent civil proceeding, then the trial judge 
lacks authority to compel Conboy to testify over the 
assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege. This is so 
irrespective of whether, had he testified at the 
deposition rather than asserting the privilege, his 
answers could have been admitted against him at a criminal 
trial. We therefore need not now decide the extent to 
which civil deposition testimony, freely given by a 
witness in Conboy's position, is "directly or indirectly 
derived" from prior grand jury testimony. 
job 12/03/82 
RIDER B 
The following paragraph would begin after the sentence "We do 
not think such a predictive judgment is enough." Note 21 would be 
eliminated. 
Petitioners' interpretation of §6002 imposes risks on the 
deponent whether or not the deposition testimony properly can be 
used against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution. 1 It is true 
that were he compelled to testify over his assertion of the Fifth 
Amendment privilege, Conboy might be protected by "a 
constitutionally imposed use immunity" even if the trial judge had 
been wrong in his prediction that §6002 would require exclusion of 
Conboy's answers. Cf. Maness v. Myers, 419 U.S. 449, 474-475 (1975) 
(WHITE, J., concurring in the result). But the District Court's 
1our holding is limited to precluding District Courts from 
compelling testimony in a civil deposition over a valid assertion 
of the Fifth Amendment privilege, absent a specific assurance of 
immunity for such testimony. It is clear this holding does not 
depend on the assumption that the deposition answers could be 
used against a civil deponent in a subsequent criminal trial. 
Yet the dissenting opinion states, and much of its analysis 
depends, on the erroneous conclusion that" [t]he Court today 
holds that [Conboy's] answers could be used, even if he did 
nothing more than acknowledge the truth of his prior testimony." 
Post, at 3. 
2. 
compulsion order in this case, in the absence of statutory authority 
or a new grant of immunity by the United States Attorney, cannot be 
justified retroactively by the subsequent exclusion of the compelled 
testimony. 2 As JUSTICE MARSHALL notes in his concurring opinion: 
"Whatever justification there may be for requiring a witness to give 
incriminating testimony in aid of a criminal investigation after the 
government has granted use immunity, there is no similar 
justification for compelling a witness to give incriminating 
testimony for the benefit of a private litigant when the government 
has not chosen to grant immunity." Post, at 4. 
The result of compelling testimony--whether it is immunized or 
excluded--is that the Government's interests, as well as the 
witness's, suffer. Reliance on judicial exclusion of nonimmunized 
testimony would be inconsistent with the congressional policy of 
leaving the granting of immunity to the Executive Branch. 
2cf. post, at 4 (MARSHALL, J., concurring) ("Further 
incriminating evidence that is derived from compelled testimony 
cannot always be traced back to its source[.]"): note 14, supra 
(increasing risk of harm and perjury): note 22, supra (increasing 
exposure to civil liability). 
~'. ""-
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Except possibly in~ sem.Q choice of.\ language, I 
~ 
see no real difference in our views. I T' requesti-119 my 
clerk, Jim Browning, to explore with your clerk - if 
agreeable to you - possible changes in language of my 
opinion that would enable you to join it f r need a join 
from you for a Court. Byron and Bill Rehnquist have 
joined, and the Chief has advised that he will join. But 
~ 
Harry has written what in effect is a full opinion, and 
&..~ 
Bill Brennan has written opinion concurring in the 
I\ 
judgment. John and Sandra are in dissent. 
., ~ ....;,._ 
2. 
There were seven votes at Conference to affirm 
CA7. I ~ no~~la~~!f:;-C:,!'; basic 
analysis was not acceptable. Accordingly, I followed it 
rather closely. I therefore am surprised at the 
multiplicity of separate 
The Court will look more than a little silly 
with four separate opinions affirming CA7, in addition to 
a dissent, without a Court opinion. 
~ ' 
mine seem entirely~ , 
w 
M '/'ur analysis and 
ph.ras9oloqy differences that mav ::k xist. , 
Justic~shall 
~a. ~ , 
~~~~~~~-~ 
i ~- ~ 
~ ~A/,, ,._ j'&: 6 asu-f S' /-~ 
~~ J ~~ ~ ~~ 
~ 4zt~~ ~. c>;-, ~, 




The following sentence would replace the sentence on page 12, 
first full paragraph, beginning with the words "If a District Court 
were to conclude .... ": 
If a District Court were to conclude in a subsequent civil 
proceeding that the prior immunity order extended to civil 
deposition testimony closely tracking the immunized testimony, it in 
effect could invest the deponent with transactional immunity on 
matters about which he testified at the immunized proceedings. 
job 12/03/82 
RIDER D 
Add the following footnote after the first sentence of section 
Con page 12: 
None of the tests set forth by the Courts of Appeals, 
or by the dissent, that have adopted petitioners' 
interpretation of §6002 prov i de deponents with certain 
guidance as to when they must talk and when they must not. 
See note 16, supra. 
job 12/03/82 
RIDER E 
Add the following sentence to footnote 22 on page 14 after the 
second sentence: 
Moreover, the dissent overlooks the possible difficulty of 
securing the cooperation of individuals such as Conboy who may be 
more reluctant to testify in the immunized proceedings if they know 
that later deposition testimony may increase their exposure to civil 
liability. Finally, in the dissent's "judgment ..•. 
job 11/28/82 
~ ~-~.2:b 
OPI fY\ I ( ~ l!1A {, ~ Jt=) 
q~r&;2.2ct The dissent minimizes the enforcement interest that our 
construction of §6002 protects, post, at 10, 11, 13, contending that 
we "rel[y] on a highly theoretical and hypothetical prosecutorial 
interest," id., at 13. We note, however, that by conceding that 
there is some "slight risk" that the deponent's testimony may hamper 
a prosecution, id., at 13, the dissent concedes that its 
interpretation of §6002 provides at least somewhat broader immunity 
than Congress intended. Also, in the dissent's "judgment[,] the 
enforcement interest in gaining access to such details at a 
deposition far outweighs th[at] risk •••• " Id., at 13. See also 
id., at 9. This, however, is a judgment reserved for officials of 





Or1m :z._ 1 Or i r<\ z. f <ti-- <tz~q-
job 12/03/82 
RIDER B 
Petitioners' interpretation of §6002 imposes risks on the 
deponent whether or not the deposition testimony properly can be 
used against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution. f 22 It is true 
that were he compelled to testify over his assertion of the Fifth 
Amendment privilege, Conboy might be protected by "a 
constitutionally imposed use immunity" even if the trial judge had 
been wrong in his prediction that §6002 would require exclusion of 
Conboy's answers. Cf. Maness v. Myers, 419 U.S. 449, 474-475 (1975) 
(WHITE, J., concurring in the result). But the District Court's 
compulsion order in this case, in the absence of statutory authority 
or a new grant of immunity by the United States Attorney, cannot be 
justified retroactively by the subsequent exclusion of the compelled 
;.a 
testimony. t As JUSTICE MARSHALL notes in his concurring opinion: 
~-i-l our holding is limited to precluding District Courts from 
compelling testimony in a civil deposition over a valid assertion 
of the Fifth Amendment privilege, absent a specific assurance of 
immunity for such testimony. It is clear this holding does not 
depend on the assumption that the deposition answers could be 
used against a civil deponent in a subsequent criminal trial. 
Yet the dissenting opinion states, and much of its analysis 
depends, on the erroneous conclusion that "[t]he Court today 
holds that [Conboy's] answers could be used, even if he did 
nothing more than acknowledge the truth of his prior testimony." 
Post, at 3. 




"Whatever justification there may be for requiring a witness to give 
incriminating testimony in aid of a criminal investigation after the 
government has granted use immunity, there is no similar 
justification for compelling a witness to give incriminating 
testimony for the benefit of a private litigant when the government 
has not chosen to grant immunity." Post, at 4. 
The result of compelling testimony--whether it is immunized or 
excluded--is that the Government's interests, as well as the 
suffer. Reliance on judicial exclusion of nonimmunized 
testimony would be inconsistent with the congressional policy of 
leaving the granting of immunity to the Executive Branch. 
i--3-7cf. post, at 4 (MARSHALL, J., concurring) ("Further 
incriminating evidence that is derived from compelled testimony 
cannot always be traced back to its source[.]"); note 14, supra 
(increasing risk of harm and perjury); note 22, supra (increasing 






We have no occasion to address this hypothetical. The 
issue is whether Conboy can be compelled to testify--i. 
e., whether the immunity order compels him to track his 
prior testimony at the civil deposition--over the 
assertion of his Fifth Amendment rights. If, as we 
conclude, the original grant of immunity does not extend 
to the subsequent civil proceeding, then the trial judge 
lacks authority to compel Conboy to testify over the 
assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege. This is so 
irrespective of whether, had he testified at the 
deposition rather than asserting the privilege, his 
answers could have been admitted against him at a criminal 
trial. We therefore need not now decide the extent to 
which civil deposition testimony, freely given by a 
witness in Conboy's position, is "directly or indirectly 






If a District Court were to conclude in a subsequent civil 
proceeding that the prior immunity order extended to civil 
deposition testimony closely tracking the immunized testimony, it in 
effect could invest the deponent with transactional immunity on 
matters about which he testified at the immunized proceedings. 
0 -p 1 YY\ ~ 
job 12/03/82 
/_ ~-r--v o 
9-\ 
RIDER D 
set forth by the Courts of Appeals, 
or bMtfe dissent, ~ u ~v-e-a opted petitioners' 
interpretation of §600 ovideA eponents with certain 
guidance as to when they m k and when they must not. 
See note 16, supra. 
<S 
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Moreover, the dissent overlooks the possible difficulty of 
securing the cooperation of individuals such as Conboy who may be 
more reluctant to testify in the immunized proceedings if they know 





FIRST DRAFT: Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, No. 81-825 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
. _ q ~ The federal use immunity provision, 
J;:" t;;:: ~ 976), permits a federal court to order 
18 u.s.c. §6002 
a witness ~ e ~ 
y'v>' fi 15 { ii ¥> 





r to testify even though he has asserted his privilege 
against self-incrimination; however, "no testimony or ~ 
other information compelled under the order (or 
~··~ 
any ~ . 
~f 
information directly or indirectly derived from such 
testimony or other information) may be used against the 
witness in any criminal case •••. " The issue presented in 
this case is whether a deponent's civil deposition 
testimony, which repeats verbatim or closely tracks his 
prior immunized testimony, is "information directly or 
indirectly derived from [immunized] testimony." 
I. 
Respondent John Conboy is a former executive of a 
defendant in the In re Corrugated Container Anti trust 




I' ~ ~I~ f¥' 
2. 
United attorneys interviewed 
the conspiracy. That 
was conducted pursuant to a letter promise of 
use immunity. Conboy subsequently appeared before a grand 
'> 
jury investigating the price-fixing activities and, 
pursuant to 18 u.s.c. §6002, was granted formal use 
immunity for his testimony. 
Following the criminal indictment of several 
companies, numerous civil antitrust actions were filed in 
various United States district courts. Those actions were 
consolidated for discovery in the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of Texas. Petitioners are 
purchasers of corrugated containers who elected to opt-out 
of the class-action proceedings and pursue their own 
~ 
causes of action against t.l:le eo-nta:in~-£ manufacturers. 
Upon motion and a showing of compelling and particularized 
need, the tkstr ict Court ordered that portions of the 
immunized government interview and grand jury testimony of 
certain witnesses, 
~~ 
including that of Conboy, b~ p.Eodueed 
L~~ i 




t'e(s) 1 will appear on following pages. 
3. 
Pursuant to a subpoena, Conboy appeared for a 
deposition at which he, his counsel, and petitioners' 
counsel had copies of his immunized testimony. The 
transcripts were marked as deposition exhibits so that all 
could follow the intended examination. The questioning 
fell into the following pattern: a question was read from 
the transcript; it then was rephrased to include the 
transcript answer (i.e., "Is it not the fact that •... "); 
finally, Conboy was asked if he had "so testified" in his 
immunized interview and grand jury examination. 2 Conboy 
refused to answer each question, claiming a Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 
Petitioners' counsel moved the district court to 
1The propriety of the district court's release of grand 
jury materials to the civil parties in this case is not 
before the Court. 
2 An example of this three-question pattern is as 
follows: 
Q. "Who did you have price communications 
with at Alton Box Board?" 
Q. Is it not the fact that you had price 
communications with Fred Renshaw and Dick 
Herman •.• ? 
Q. Did you not so testify in your 
government interview of January 10, 1978? 
Joint Appendix 29-31. 
4. 
compel Conboy to answer the questions, and the court so 
ordered. When Conboy continued to claim his privilege, 
the district court held him in contempt, but stayed ~ 
',;l;,i., 
-eper8-eien- of -th e A- order pending appeal. A panel of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
affirmed the order of contempt, holding that, "[b]ecause 
the questions asked in this deposition were taken verbatim 
from or closely tracked the transcript of Conboy's grand 
jury testimony, we believe that his answers at the 
deposition would be 'derived from' the prior immunized 
[testimony] and therefore unavailable for use in any 
subsequent criminal prosecution." In re Corrugated 
Container Antitrust Litigation, Appeal of John Conboy, 655 
F.2d 748, 751 (CA7), rev'd in bane, 661 F.2d 1145 (1981). 
On rehearing, the in bane court first determined that 
Conboy's alleged fear of prosecution was more than 
"fanciful," 661 F.2d, at 1152, and that Conboy was 
therefore entitled to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege 
unless his deposition testimony could not be used against 
him in a subsequent criminal action, see id., at 1153. 3 
Footnote(s) 3 will appear on following pages. 
5. 
The court then held that under 18 U.5.C. §6002, absent a 
separate and independent grant of immunity, 4 a deponent's 
civil deposition testimony that repeats verbatim or 
closely tracks his prior immunized testimony is not 
protected. While acknowledging that verbatim questions 
"of course [would be] so derived" from the immunized 
testimony, the court reasoned that the answers to such 
questions "are derived from the deponent's current, 
independent memory of events" and thus "necessarily create 
a new source of evidence" that could be used in a 
subsequent criminal prosecution against Conboy. 661 F.2d, 
at 1155 (emphasis in original}. 
~~~ 
We granted to 
resolve the conflict in the courts of 
re Corrugated Container Anti trust Litigation, Appeal of 
Fleischacker, 644 F.2d 70, 75 (CA2 1981} (deposition 
answers immunized}, and Little Rock School District · v. 
3The correctness of the Seventh 
that Conboy could assert a Fifth 







A United States Attorney declined to authorize immunity 
grants in connection with the civil depositions here. 
I 
6. 
Borden, Inc., 632 F.2d 700, 705 (CA8 1980) (same), with In 
re Corrugated Container Anti-Trust Litigation, Appeal of 
Franey, 620 F.2d 1086, 1095 (CA5 1980) (answers not 
immunized), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (198:J._ 
vt.,~~ 
It c-afi AQE--..be dottb 
II. 
ar~ and essential ~ n '\ ~ee t:ba.t. a Reees~ 
~ , ~µ'_,. ~ ~ h, ~
':)-Pow~r of governmentA h, t!he- eempttloi-el'I: of testimony "to 
secure information necessary for effective law 
enforcement." See Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 
U.S. 52, 79 (1964) •5 "[T]he giving of testimony and the 
attendance upon court or grand jury in order to testify 
are public duties which every person ••• is bound to perform 
11 
upon being properly summoned." Blair v. United States, 11 
6-/~ 
250 U.S. 273, 281 (1919). The power to compel testimony 
is 
liberties embodied in 
the social costs of that compulsion substanti 
5see also United States v. Calandra, 414 u. s. 3 38, 3 45 
(1974); United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 41 (1973) 
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting); Kastifiar v. United States, 406 
U.S. 441, 443-444 {1973); Murp y, 378 U.S., at 93-94 
{WHITE, J., concurring); Blackmer v. United States, 284 
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406 U.S. 441 (1972), ni tea States, In Kastigar v.~ u~--
J-t,._ w .../...,,L,el_ •ned that ~ f...,, A tho ---G-oYr t e-eterm.L ¢> the Fifth ~ 
pr to 
Hu- 6-f~ 
~ stify -l:l l'\Q.€f' a 9ral"lt ef immuni-ty r' ~efta-t grant" must be co-
W...L ~ 




that tlJ.e J z,ng::.9e ~ 18 u.s,c . §6002 provided'\ .auch broae y' i: 
~vi/ 
II 
protection and thus "removed the dangers against which the 
privilege protects." Id., at 449. In rejecting the 
argument that use and derivative use immunity would not 
adequately protect a witness from various pessiblyz,' 
l,t.,,c<_ 
incriminating uses of the compelled testimony,Athj..s Ce~~t 1 : 
~
obsenz<eil /\ that "[t]he statute provides a sweeping 
proscription of any use, direct or indirect, of the 
compelled testimony and any information derived 
W..L.. 
therefrom ••.. " Id., at 460. Tfle Cou-r-t added that, once a 
J-,,2_,.J~ 
defendant aomo,r,,cl;,rat~s that he has testified under a grant 1: 
of immunity, "the prosecution [has] the affirmative duty 
to prove that the evidence it proposes to use is derived 
from a legitimate source wholly independent of the 
compelled testimony." Id. 
Congress' explicit prohibition on derivative use of 1 
8. 
compelled testimony was not merely a policy choice. 
JI-~ 
Rath@-t_,___.w.e...-d-eemce tt?at: breadt.h of immuni Ly~ essential to 
the constitutionality of the statute. No ~ n-arr~r 
immunity would have afforded protection co-extensive with 
the Fifth Amendment privilege it was supplanting. See 
id. , at 450, 453-45~ Thus, in determining whether the 
answers to verbatim questions taken from prior immunized 
testimony are included within the original immunity grant, 






does not l• 
afford "only parlous and nugatory protection" 
compelled testimony. See Conboy, 661 F.2d, at 
~ 
{Cummings, C .J., dissenting) ( pnmuni ty from use 




derivative use should "leave[] the witness and the Federal 
Government in substantially the same position as if the l• 
witness had claimed his privilege" in the absence of a 
grant of immunity. Murphy, 378 U.S., at 79. See 
Kastigar, 406 U.S., at 458-459. 
Although the immunity granted under 18 u.s.c. §6002 
~ ~k.c L4,,II= ~ ~ 
snffieignt.l-y protect.¢ the individual's 
y " 
~ 
right/ against 1) 
6'-.:yt;., i& f. 
self-incrimination, i ~ is clear that Congress RlQaAe==={'.o 
9. 
~~f ~~ .,J.o ~ ~ 
M-iew-t:-h-e ~ran L ef fte -more immunity 
I\ 
than was 
constitutionally required. For many years, the fedePal 
g'" imHtY-n4 ey ±'tlW pre'v"~that an immunized witness could not 
ferr- ~f- ~ 
be prosecuted~ any \tran~~ct~on about which he testified. 
A ~ ~ 
l ' 
See New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 457 (1979); 
~
Kastigar, 406 U.S., at 451. Prosecutors~ were frequently t7 
reluctant to grant immunity to 
potential targets of criminal investigations. See S. Rep. 
No. 91-617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 53 (1969). The "major 11 
purpose," however, of the Organized Crime Control Act of 
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 927, of which &eetio~ 
5 600 2 was a key provision, was "to provide the er iminal 
justice system with the necessary legal tools to get at 
organized er ime •••. [and was] aimed at strengthening the 11 
evidence gathering process and insuring that the evidence 
will then be available and admissible at trial." 116 
Cong. Rec. 35,200 (1970) (statement of Rep. St. Germain). 
In Murphy, JUSTICE WHITE stated that II [i]mmunity must 
be as broad as, but not harmfully and wastefully broader l ' 
than, the privilege against self-incrimination." 378 
U.S. , at 10 7 (concurring opinion) ( quoted with approval in 















116 Cong. Rec. 35,291 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff)) ~ 
~~~ ~{ , Congress in 1970 repealed the 
authority for transactional immunity and provided for the 1· 
a.c--~L,,.A.J 
less comprehensive use immunity i R l S u.~.G . §6002. In 
its committee report, the House explained that 18 U.S.C. 
a--P 
§6002 was not to provide an "immunity bath," bttt was to be 
-1 
"no broader than" the Fifth Amendment privilege. H.R. No. 
91-1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1970 U.S. 1: 
Code Cong. & Ad. News 4007, 4017. / As Representative Poff;--, 
sponsor and principal draftsman of the legislation, stated 
in testimony before the Senate, use immunity embodies the 
"exchange theory," and anything that goes beyond "the quid 
quo pro" is "a gratuity, one which the Government need not 11 
make." Measures Relating to Organized Crime: Hearings on 
S. 30 et al. Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and 
Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 
Cong., 1st Sess. 286 (1969) [hereinafter Senate -- ------.r 
case now before s, l! 
~ 
r-e~~d eh-&....~~s 4lc..-e-e ~ ::"£:t' 
\ 




balancing the need for certain information 
~~ against the need for particular criminal prosecutions, are 




executive ~r:;::;-;epresentative Poff stated 
/ 
- / /. n~ n~ 
v 
/ l ouse debates: "[T]he Attorney General must approve 
in the \ 
use of 
the immunity provisions, so that this very important 
matter of immunizing witnesses will be closely 
controlled." 116 Cong. Rec. 35,291 (1970) .
1 
( In addressing 
the procedures in 18 u.s.c. §6005 for compelling testimony 
before congressional proceedings, Representative Poff 
explained that the "procedure will allow for studied 
c onsultation and a weighing of the value and possible 
c onsequences of immunizing a particular witness, which 
procedure is, I believe, an appropriate means of 
protecting the overriding public interest regarding gran ~ / 
~ c- -- --~ 
~ i ~ Id. 6 Congress clearly foresaw the courts 
6The Department of Justice specifically lobbied for some 
notice provision before immunity is granted, "because it 
allows the Attorney General, who perhaps has the best 
perspective to choose which of two competing immunity 
grant situations is more important to the overall 
administration of justice, to lobby with the competing 
agencies or branches of government and attempt to persuade 
one that it should defer to the other in the best 
interests of the public." Senate Hearings, supra, at 386 
(statement of Assistant Attorney General Will Wilson). 
See id., at 370 · (memorandum of Department of Justice 





as playing only a minor role in the immunizing process: 2: 
..... 
"The court's role in granting the order is merely to find 
the facts on which the order is predicated. The statutory 
language is 'shall. ' 





Review ~ hat second 
7 ? 
prosecutive discretion is not authorized." H.R. Rep. No. 
VV wt' l 
,,,~ ~ 91-1549, supra, at 43~ H.R. Rep. No. 91-1188, 91st Cong., 
; ~ .. h 2d Sess. 
, ~~r"'r.,r . 
,;~ -~ r- ----This 
13 (1970). 
III. 
case presents o/Y a question of statutory 
interpretation: Did Congress in 18 U. S.-G. . §6002 intend to 
2: 
immunize testimony in civil proceedings when the witness 2 
repeats the testimony that he gave in grand jury 
proceedings pursuant to a grant of use immunity? Because '?---/ 
~;_t the scope of the grant @£-a Q.J;.t1:1~0,: y immuni~y must 
be co-extensive with t~ ~ C-E-m~;.e-,~ n-'1:rt"'n:JT'l~e--h'v the Fifth 
p,,,--t,~~,> 
Amendmen )\' we also no~ ~aril y must determine whether the 
~ Amendment would require the testimony, if wrongfully 
compelled, to be excluded from a subsequent criminal 
comments). Cf. President's Commission on Law Enforcement 
and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a 
Free Society 141 (1967) (recommending that "[i ]mmuni ty 
should be granted only with the prior approval of the 
jurisdiction's chief prosecuting officer."). 
2 : 
13. 
trial. As JUSTICE BLACKMUN noted in United States v. 
Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115 (1980), "[s] ince the privilege 
itself is defined in terms of the incriminating effect of 2 
truthful testimony, it does not seem irrational to weigh 
alternative methods for protecting this constitutional 
right in terms of their effect as well." Id., at 134 
(concurring in the result) (emphasis in original) • 
9 j,-M ,../ 
~;; 
The "fruits of the poisonous tree doctrine" is .a--, 2 
~~1-
£eeet ~ of the exclusionary rule that excludes from 
prosecutorial use certain information acquired through the 
exploitation of information obtained as a result of a 
constitutional violation. "Fruits" can be "unpoisoned," 
however, if the prosecution can show that the allegedly 2, 
tainted evidence was procured from an independent source, 
see Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 
385, 392 (1920), or that any connection between the 
official illegality and the prosecution's derived evidence 
has become so "attenuated" as to dissipitate the taint, 2, 
see Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939). 
"[T]his Court has never gone so far as to hold that making 
a confession under circumstances which preclude its use, 
✓ 
h) ~Jt., ft..,_ ~~~ 
~~ ~Ji,~ ~~d► ,. oP 
14. 
! • ~ ~ /k-L~.,,dl ~ ~ ~ to 
~~ ~ ~~~U-L-~~ 
o-i,,- ;1.-<A.- ~k~--s..--. 
perpetually disables the confessor from making a usable 
one after those conditions have been removed." United 
States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540-541 (1947) j It is not 
disputed that the questions asked of Conboy were directly 
or indirectly derived from his immunized testimony. The 
issue is whether the causal connection between the 
2. 
questions and the answers is so direct that the answers 2 ' 
~ ~~ ~ ~~,, 
 and therefore should be excluded under the 
;\ 
grant of immunity. 
Conboy' s position is straightforward: Questions do 
not incriminate; answers do. Unlike the questions, 
answers are not directly or indirectly derived from the 2 1 
immunized grand jury or interview transcripts, but from 
the deponent's current, independent memory of events. 
Even when a deponent's deposition answers are identical to 
those he gave to the grand jury, he must tell the truth at 
the deposition, not as he told it before the grand jury, 21 
but as he knows it. Each new statement of the deponent 
~~ 
creates a new "source." In sum, ~ grant of immunity does 
" 
not prevent the prosecutor from prosecuting; it merely 
limits his sources of evidence. 
15. 
Petitioners' argument is based s::.~e±>y on the 
language i~~ 6002 and on a common understanding 
~ 
of the words "derived from." The questions formulated 
after review of immunized testimony are clearly "derived 
from" the prior testimony. Thus, answers to such 
2· 
questions, that repeat verbatim or closely track a 2· 
deponent's testimony, are necessarily also "derived from" 
and "tainted by" 
p ..e,_,k,~ I ~~, 
such testimony. ,\ ;I'here is no basis in ,,.,,,,, 
logic or law for Conboy's Ht8~¥Sie-etl distinction between 
questions de£ived from immuftiBed testimeny and answers 
responsive to those same questions. An answer by its very 21 
nature is evoked by and responds to information contained 
in a question. 
The language of the statute permits either parties' 
interpretation and compels neither. If it points in one 
direction, however, the broad wording of ?'a u.s.c. §6002, 2: 
and the expeme ive ~ e rpr eta t ion 
1 
e;f;,, td-,,e gaiie tb aJ. 
~ l;i:& # 
ldA~Ya~e in Kastigar, suggests that we should be EQl~etaAt 
to exclude information from the coverage of the immunity 
grant that admittedly has a close tie with the immunized 






information is "derived from" immunized materials, is 
"fruit" of "tainted" information, or is the product of a 
"new source" are conclusions that "may conceal concrete 
complexities. 117 Nardone, 308 U.S., at 341. As the Court 
has noted: "Sophisticated argument may prove a causal 21 
7use of conclusory labels can lead to difficult 
analyses and troubling results in particular factual 
situations. Three examples will suffice. 
First, many questions in Conboy's interview and grand 
jury transcripts are ~ious ones that any civil antitrust 
plaintiff would explore. If petitioners' counsel asks 
these questions in a civil deposition without reviewing 
the grand jury transcript, Conboy presumably would face 
the danger that his answer could be used against him in a 
criminal prosecution. On the other hand, if the same 
question is asked by counsel who has seen the grand jury 
transcript, the answer cannot, under petitioners' 
interpretation of 18 U.S.C. §6002, be used .agmins4; Cogboy. 
It is not clear why the same witness, giving the same 
answer to the same question; 1 should enjoy different 
immunities. ~~ >-
Second, ~u~~se Conboy repeated his immunized grand 
jury testimony to a reporter who had reviewed the grand 
jury testimony and asked verbatim a question in the 
transcript. Petitioners argue that it is possible to 
distinguish this situation: in the example, the witness 
voluntarily repeated his immunized testimony, whereas in 
the present case, Conboy will be compelled to repeat his 
testimony. To assume, however, that Conboy's statements 
here are involuntary is to assume the answer to the 
question presented: The answers here are involuntary 
precisely because they are, according to petitioners, 
immune. ~~ 
Third, suppo.se two codefendants engage in criminal 
activity. One codefendant is called before the grand 
jury, is given use immunity, and testifies fully about 
both defendants' criminal activity. The panel majority in 
the Seventh Circuit stated that if the nonimmunized 
codefendant decides to testify against the immunized 
codefendant in a later criminal prosecution, "nothing in 
our ruling would prohibit [] prosecution" based upon this 
testimony. 655 F.2d, at 753 n.8. If, however, the 
nonimmunized codefendant is asked questions that are 
derived from the questions asked of the immunized 
codefendant during his grand jury appearance, his answers 
.,-would seem to be as "tainted" by and "derived" from the 
, derived questions as would the answers of the immunized 




connection between information obtained through [the 
unlawful governmental conduct] and the Government's proof. 
As a matter of good sense, however, such connection may 
have become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint." Id. 
We believe that, rather than r y adopting a conclusory 
e,f-~~ 
label for the deposition testimony, e fflt!-eh--me-r-e---e-raf ~nbre 
~ at i mmcrn-i zed t s . 'Wfl"6-t.he,,r;... Ht &- Shi ~ 'iii~ c:: meun s of a~ 
to determine which of the two interpretations of 18 u.s.c. 
§6002 most satisfactorily accommodates the government's 
c7tta1 need for admissible evidence and the 
individual's f-undrental interest in avoiding self-
. . . . 8 1ncr1m1nat1on. 
As an initial matter, it should be noted that, 
although there may be practical reasons for not 
8see Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 
287 (1977) ("[T]he proper test to apply .•. is one which [] 
protects against the invasion of constitutional rights 
without commanding undesirable consequences not necessary 
to the assurance of those rights.") ; Brown v. Illinois, 
422 U.S. 590, 604 (1975) (reversing because state court 
failed "to evaluate the circumstances of the case in light 
of the policy served by the exclusionary rule"); Murphy, 
378 U.S., at 79 (stating an exclusionary rule "to 
implement [Fifth Amendment] and accommodate the interests 
of the ••. Government [] in investigating and prosecuting 
crime"). See generally C. Whitebread, Criminal Procedure 
§2.04, at 37 (1980). We thus need not decide whether 
rerosecutorial use of immunized testimony to elicit further 
( 
incriminating statements from a previously immunized 
witness would create any special problems. 




















. f . 9 test1 y1ng, , as far as the deponent's Fifth Amendment 
right is concerned, he should be indifferent between the 
protection afforded by silence and that afforded by 
immunity. The government's 
~ ~
interests, however ~ ,  
~ ~e..U..y affected by the choice. Our specific inquiry then 
1 .i\ 
3: 
is whether petitioners can satisfy their need for 3. 
admissible evidence without threatening the government's 
interest in limiting the scope of an immunity grant or 
encroaching upon the deponent's certainty of protection. 
A. 
Questions taken verbatim from a transcript of 3 
immunized testimony and asked ~ a deponent could evoke 
.1. ? ~ 
one of several responses: {)() the el-ef'OTI"Mls could repeat or 
adopt his immunized answer; 10 
A.I,. 
(/ ) he could affirm that the 
transcript of his immunized answer accurately reflects his 
A.,U, 
prior testimony; (J) he could recall additional 
9aesides the c:,s•~s costs of testifying against close 
associates, any witness increases the risk of committing 
perjury the more he talks. Cf. 18 u.s.c. §6002 (no 
compelled testimony "may be used against the witness in 
any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury [or] 
giving a false statement"). 
lOThe extreme case would be where petitioners read Conboy 
the entire immunized grand jury transcript; ask him if 




information responsive to the question but not disclosed 
{Iv) 
in his immune testimony; or (,} he could disclose 
information that is not responsive to the question. 
. ' d d ~~ Pet1t1oners o not conten, nor could they, that~ grant 
-1 
of s~y use immunity affords protection for all self- 3: 
incriminating information disclosed by the immunized 
witnesses on~ occasion before or after the giving of 
the immunized testimony. Rather, petitioners argue that 
only the first three responses would be "derived from" his 
immune testimony and therefore unavailable for use against 3 
the deponent in any subsequent criminal prosecution. 
The difficulty is creating a distinction between 
"responsive" and "not responsive" answers that is 
susceptible to principled application. Several tests have 
been 
C/.r-J,~~~ 
The Eighth Circuit in 
'\ 
I ~ I 
Borden held 
,{ 
11The district court's civil contempt order stated that 
the questions asked in the deposition "were taken 
directly" from the immunized transcripts, but did not 
define exactly what deposition questions petitioners could 
ask. The district court's actions in this litigation with 
respect to other witnesses in the same position as Conboy 
suggest that the si-e-trrjct court meant to allow deposition 
questions other than verbatim renditions of questions 
previously asked by the government. In Pretrial Order No. 
37, /\ the '1ie-t,~~urt: ordered deponents to answer all 
questions previously answered "and, further, to answer 
other questions relating to the same substantive matters 
testified to in other such grants of immunity." In 
Pretrial Order No. 40, vacated by trhe Fifth Circuit in 










( /J ~: t'. ) ~ ~~, 1 ~ 20. 




1-t,v.__~~ ~ ,t.~~--? 
that, as long as the deposition questions were confined to 
"' the same time, geographical and substantive frame work 
as the [witness' immunized] grand jury testimony," the 
witness' testimony was protected, and, therefore, he had 
no Fifth Amendment privilege to assert. 632 F.2d, at 705 
(quoting Appeal of Starkey, 600 F.2d 1043, 1048 (CAB 
Cl--~~j,vv)/1..A.. ~ ( 
1979)). The Second Circuit in Fleischacker required 
1 ~ 
answers to questions "concerning specific subjects that 
actually were touched upon by questions appearing in the 
transcript of the immunized testimony." 644 F.2d, at 79. 
The dissent in this Seventh Circuit case would have 
treated Conboy' s answers as derived from his immunized 
testimony "where the questions were asked so as to afford 
3 , 
3 ! 
~ Conboy the choice of (1) repeating his originally 
~~ ", 
immunized answer, ( 2) adopting his immunized answer when 3 
it was repeated to him, or (3) affirming that the 
transcript of his immunized answer was his prior 
Franey,~ the district court held €ha£1.es Franey in contempt 
for not answering deposition questions taken verbatim from 
the transcripts as well as questions "closely related in 
subject matter." Pretrial Order No. 44 held a deponent in 
contempt for failing to answer questions "derived from the 
same substantive matters as covered in his immunized 
testimony." 
r-- -~72u~~w-~ 
 ,1-f, ~ Ji-{) ~  
21. 
~ . 
testimony." 661 F.2d, at 1160 (Cummings, C .J., 
dissenting). 
Despite the <3-t ±ve-== and nee~ to articulate the 31 
distinction between responsive and not responsive answers 
with precision, it is clear that it -w-i:Y ul-t;..ima-t.ely ~  
~ ~-
a case-by-case determination that inevitably will 
---~~~-
I 
involve some degree of judgment. That the answer will not 
~ ~ 
always be clear or that courts would not always reach the 31 
~ ~ 
same result upon the s.ame facts is not reason, however, to 
reject petitioners' theory if the congressional goal of 
granting no more immunity than is necessary is secured and 
if the deponent's Fifth Amendment rights are scrupulously 
preserved. Thus, it is necessary to ascertain whether 3 ' 
some amount of imprecision is acceptable in defining the 
scope of a grant of statutory use immunity. 
B. 
It is important first to determine what degree of 
1 
imprecision petitioners' interpretation of 18 u.s.c. §6002 3 ' 
asks the government and the deponent to assume. 
1 
Petitioners frame narrowly the issue presented: whether a 
deponent's deposition testimony that "repeats verbatim or 
22. 
closely tracks" his immunized testimony is derived 
information. We must be careful, however, that we do not 31 
premise our decision on an empirical assumption that does 
not reflect the actual uses of immunized testimony in 
civil depositions. Conboy gave no answers to the 
questions asked of him at the deposition, making it 
difficult to formulate a rule limited to the facts of this 31 
case. We believe that we must consider all possible 
responses as equally probable. 
We fully realize that this assumption may not reflect 
what actually would happen if Conboy were compelled to 
testify in this case. Conservative counsel will ensure as 31 
far as possible that his client reads or repeats the 
statements in the immunized transcript. Because there 
probably will be little opportunity for the grant of 
immunity to sweep in statements on direct examination that 
the government did not intend to immunize, or for the 3~ 
deponent to give responses that may fall outside of the 
grant of immunity and be later used against him in a 
subsequent er iminal prosecution, there is 1 i ttle social 
gain in stating that Conboy's deposition testimony would 
23. 
be self-incriminating. In such a situation, it would seem 4( 
desirable that civil plaintiffs, particularly those 
bringing private suits that supplement the criminal 
enforcement of the federal anti trust laws, should have 
access to the available, probative information. 
Our concern is twofold: First, we are skeptical of 41 
the parties' ability to limit the questioning and 
answering to that shown in the immunized transcript, yet 
produce an admissible deposition transcript. Second, the 
consequences of not limiting the scope of the deposition 
may be quite damaging to the individual and governmental 4: 
interests embodied in 18 u.s.c. §6002. 
C. 
Each of the tests that petitioners suggest for 
determining the scope of permissible deposition 
questioning permits petitioners to ask question~ that the 4 
government did not. Petitioners' argument assumes that 
direct examination at least may produce information that 
does not simply repeat the immunized testimony, but that 
~ 
will nevertheless b~ immune. We will assume for purposes 
of this decision, however, that petitioners seek to depose 4: 
24. 
Conboy, not with the expectation that Conboy will reveal 
something that petitioners do not know, but with the 
desire of creating a deposition transcript that simply 
restates the immunized testimony. This is a practical 
aim. Grand jury transcripts may not be admissible as 4: 
evidence in a civil trial because the testimony is not 
subject to cross examination. 12 
If Conboy's deposition examination is confined to a 
reiteration of his immunized testimony, the deposition 
will yield a mere carbon copy of the grand jury 4: 
transcripts and presumably will be subject to the same 
admissibility objections because of lack of opportunity to 
cross examine •13 Conboy' s deposition answers could be 
12For purposes of this case, we assume that the immunized 
transcripts are not admissible. Cf. Fed. R. Evid. 803(8) 
{hearsay exception for certain public records); Fed. R. 
Evid. 804 {a) (1) {witness unavailable when exempted from 
testifying on ground of privilege); Fed. R. Evid. 
80 4 {b) (1) { former testimony adrniss ible when witness 
unavailable and the party against whom the testimony is 
now offered had an opportunity for cross examination). 
13cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26{b) (1) {stating depositions may 
be taken "if the information sought appears reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 
evidence"); Fed. R. Civ. P. 30 {c) {allowing cross 
examination at depositions); Fed. R. Civ. P. 32{a) 
{deposition "admissible under the rules of evidence 
applied as though the witness were then present and 
testifying"); Fed R. Evid. 804 {b) (1) {deposition 
admissible if the party against whom the testimony is now 
offered in a ci vi 1 act ion had an opportunity to develop 
testimony by cross examination). 
25. 
exculpatory of him and his employer, and inculpatory of 
other defendants. Those other defendants might attempt to 4. 
impeach Conboy's testimony by a showing that he was indeed 
guilty of antitrust violations. Petitioners recognize 
this problem, but maintain that the antitrust defendants 
"would be entitled to test the accuracy and truthfulness 
of Conboy's repeated immunized testimony without going 4, 
beyond the confines of that testimony." Reply Brief for 
Petitioners 14-15. In an effort to mark out those 
"confines," petitioners argue that United States v. 
Cardillo, 316 F.2d 606 {CA2 1963), provides an appropriate 
standard for determining the scope of permissible cross- 4 
examination: 
In determining whether the testimony of a 
witness who invokes the privilege against self-
incrimination during cross-examination may be 
used against the defendant, a distinction must 
be drawn between cases in which the assertion of 
the privilege merely precludes inquiry into 
collateral matters which bear only on the 
credibility of the witness and those cases in 
which the assertion of the privilege prevents 
inquiry into matters about which the witness 
testified on direct examination. Where the 
privilege has been invoked as to purely 
collateral matters, there is little danger of 
prejudice to the defendant and, therefore, the 
witness's testimony may be used against him. On 
the other hand, if the witness by invoking the 
privilege precludes inquiry into the details of 
his direct testimony, there may be a substantial 
danger of prejudice because the defense is 
deprived of the right to test the truth of his 
direct testimony and, therfore, that witness's 








Id., at 611 (citations omitted). 




assume--correctly, we believe--that meaningful cross-
examination is meant to and very often will produce 









































deposition cannot be easily limited to repeating verbatim 
More important, we believe 
the 
government and the individual's interests embodied in 18 ':~ ~ ' u.s.c. §6002. 
7 
~.v._ . ....,ri. ~-
[Ii tl'f" p D. ~K We need not pause long to calculate 
~ / deviation between deposition testimony and 
the degree of 
immunized 
~~) testimony or to discuss the inconsistency with 
congressional policy if, as we have found to be the likely ~k> 
~ -, case, 
u,1u1 ~ 
~(f> 
the compelled deposition testimony exceeds the four 








~ ~ se immunity was m.e.a;it to immunize and exclude 
from a subsequent criminal trial only that information to 
~ 
which the government has expressly surrendered /\ use. 
~ ::}r f the government is engaged in an ongoing 4 
investigation of the particular activity at issue, 
immunizing new information may make it more difficult ~ 
~ 
~ t+le '§J ove.i:.nme:i.t to show in a subsequent prosecution ~~ 
similar information was obtained from wholly independent 
sources. The ~ purpose of 18 u.s.c. §6002 was to ease 
~~ 
51 
prosecution, not complicate it. A The government should ~ 
~~ 
have to bear such risks as I\ 1:-R-e "costs" of granting 
immunity to a wi tne~ / What "costs" society must assume 
those that the Fifth Amendment privilege 
~ 
before com elling t mony is a judgmentj ror r e gtlrl. ators 5 
~~~ -t,,t.t ◄ ~., f~ /l~h~ J4 ~ M_;.:/-, 
t:o mal<:>e .
1 
In 18 U.S.C. §6002,~ ss made its intent 
clear that society should bear no more "costs" than those 
that are are constitutionally required, d 
~~ 
an rt s ho1:1-ld 




the social benefits outweigh ~ 
1 





Ne lEHiS ~ 1bli-n9 ---a--re ~re· t'vSs-ib-i-e 
4/- fetitioners' , -
interpretation of 18 U.S.C. §6002 places 
" 
the deponent. Unless the grant of immunity assures a 5. 
witness that his incriminating testimony will not be used 
against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution, the 
witness has not received the full {:;-;~ his Fifth 
Amendment privilege that he has been forced to exchange / 
"Before the government puts its seal of approval on such 5: 
an interrogation [ eliciting incriminating testimony] , it 
must provide an absolutely reliable guarantee that it will 
ecide~ lo~t -H~~tates Atton::- ~ ,l 
immunize the testimony of a witness in a civil proceeaing 
bet.ween two partie--s when the government determines that 
the public interest is more app~opriately furthered in a 
particular case by a private damage action than by a 
criminal 'prosecution. · ronger case or 
one u n onent's civil deposition testimony 
repeating prior immunized testimony is available for use 
against him in any subsequent criminal prosecution. Such 
a policy would maximize governmental discretion concernin 
how b st to enforce certain regulator sche es 8 
U.S.C. §6 can compe te 1mony '[w henever a witness 
refuses" to testify "in a proceeding before or ancillary 
to .•• a court .•• of the United State,"); id., §6003 {may 
compel testimony government believes "may---se necessary to 
the public interest"); 116 Cong. Rec. 36,293 {1970) 
{statement of Sen. Hruska) {reading §6002 as "enabl [ing] 
the Government in i!!!Y_ court ..• proceeding" to compel 
testimony) {emphasis added); 116 Cong. Rec. 853 {1970) 
{statement of Sen. Young) {" [T]he power of the district 
attorney to compel a witness to testify is ••.. apparently 
available in any case in a federal court, including civil 
actions between private parties.") {quoting from a 
memorandum prepared by the American Civil Liberties 
Union). 
~ lk,, ~~ .e-,,:,--ih J it- ~- &.-
/241 as,• •1.,J ~ ~ ~ 
~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
~~~~~ -
29. 
not use the testimony in any way at all in aid of 
prosecution of the witness." Kastigar, 406 U.S., at 471 
{MARSHALL, J., dissenting) {emphasis added). Some thought s: 
thus must be given to situations where the deponent's 
testimony departs from the immunized transcript, either by 
mistake or under court order to testify and stand subjeetc:::r 
~ cross-examination. See also Rogers v. United States, 
340 U.S. 367, 373 (1951) {"Disclosure of a fact waives the s: 
privilege as to details."). 
No court can immunize a witness. That task, as we 
a,..c..,c:... 
have noted, i :,./ peculiarly I\ executive one, and no 
government prosecutor is a party to this case. Even more t?-
~~~ 
~ -i-ffl~ert:etn ~ ::m>A court ~ guarantee.) at the time of the 
deposition ) that at a subsequent criminal trial the 
prosecution wou~d not ~ t be found to have met its 
burden t,~that the evidence it proposes to use is 
-'\ 
derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of the 
s: 
compelled testimony." Kastigar, 406 U.S., at 460. Yet in 5 
holding Conboy in contempt for his Fifth Amendment 
~ 
silence, the district court here essentially predict~ that 
a court in a future criminal prosecution of Conboy will be 
~-~ 9 ~ ~ ~ ~ 
0~) J ~~~~~1~pu-v 30. 
Pa,,,-fJI/r (t~e./'1J,'3J-31/-) . J a~..e.-~ ~ ~ cf/ 
~~ d,~.<~,,~ , ~ -4-z,, 14:J ~ d' 
-/4.H> PY- ~-lt-.tL/4 ~
to protect against evidentiary use of the 
deposition testimony petitioners seek. We believe that 5, 
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Fifth Amendment privilege, the individual must have 
certain protection. As the Court stated in Maness v. 
Meyers, 419 U.S. 449 (1975), compelling a witness to 
testify in "reliance upon a later objection or motion to 5 1 
suppress would 'let the cat out' with no assurance 
whatever of putting it back." Id., at 463. 





simply were to assume that, even if the district court 
compelling the testimony is wrong in its prediction, the 5! 
court hearing the criminal case may be able to exclude the 
wrongfully produced evidence. Cf. Maness, 419 U.S., at 
474-475 (WHITE, J., concurring in the result); Murphy, 378 
U.S., at 79. That the witness may not be in actual danger 
from compelled testimony, however, still would not justify 51 
the compulsion here. It would be inappropriate to rely on 
the exclusionary rule to create excludable evidence. We 
must not fail to distinguish between the protection 
afforded a witness by a grant of statutory immunity that 
31. 
contemporaneously supplants the protection afforded that 51 
witness under the Fifth Amendment, and any judicial 
exclusionary rule that may be applied at a later date to 
remedy judicial error in compelling certain testimony. As 
JUSTICE MARSHALL noted in his Kastigar dissent: 
The exclusionary rules provide a partial and 
inadequate remedy ..• and deterrent [to 
unconstitutional interrogations]. An immunity 
statute, on the other hand, is much more 
ambitious than any exclusionary rule. It does 
not merely attempt to provide a remedy for past 
[constitutional violations], which should never 
have occurred. An immunity statute operates in 
advance of the event, and it author i zes--even 
encourages--interrogation that would otherwise 
be prohibited by the Fifth Amendment. 
406 U.S., at 470. We believe Conboy acted properly in 




court's compulsion order and by testing the validity of 5 
his privilege on appeai. 15 
Not only is it unseemly for a court to rely on a 
remedial tool to limit individual harm that it could avoid 
completely, it also is inconsistent with the congressional 
1511The Court has held that an individual under compulsion 
to make disclosures as a witness who revealed information 
instead of claiming the privilege lost the benefit of the 
privilege." Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 653 
(1976) (citing United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 7-10 
(1970)). 
33. 
determination of taint" when they mask the actual effects 
of immunizing testimony. When a witness' testimony is 
excluded in a subsequent er iminal trial that the 
government did not seek or desire to immunize, the 
government has lost, to at least some extent, the benefit 6: 
of its strategic use-immunity tool. Under whatever label 
the exclusion is made, the effect is that the government 
loses the benefit of information that it did not expressly 
surrender. 
It is arguable that misjudging the scope of the 6 : 
immunity grant is simply a risk or cost that the 
government bears when it decides to grant immunity. The 
risks that petitioners' interpretation of 18 U.S.C. §6002 
impose, however, are significantly different from those 
that routinely accompany a grant of immunity. First, when 6: 
the government is asking the questions, it has much 
greater control over exactly what information is disclosed 
than when civil litigants examine and cross-examine. 
Second, the prosecution assumes the risks voluntarily 
after making some analysis as to the costs and benefits. 6 
One of the costs that he should consider, of course, is 
32. 
policy of leaving the granting of immunity to the 5' 
executive branch. Petitioners see no such problem, 
arguing that it has always been for the courts to 
determine whether an assertion of the privilege is proper 
and whether evidence should be excluded as derivative of 
immunized testimony. See Zicarelli v. New Jersey State 5 ' 
Commission of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472, 479-481 (1972); 
Kastigar, 406 U.S., at 460; Murphy, 378 U.S., at 79 & 
n.18; Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951). 
Petitioners contend that, when a district court orders a 
deponent to testify, he is merely determining the scope of 61 
the already granted immunity. There is no de facto grant 
of immunity, because the original grant of immunity 
"continues," and the district court merely determines 
prospectively the "taint" of the new information. Conboy, 
on the other hand, argues that nothing in 18 U.S.C. §6002 6 
supports the view that Congress intended district courts 
to have the power to grant broad, continuing immunity that 
extends to testimony in civil proceedings. 
Again, we should avoid conclusory labels such as "de 
facto immunity," "continual immunity," or "prospective 6 
34. 
the possibility that his interpretation of the scope of 
the immunity grant may vary from that of the courts', but 
it is considerably more difficult to estimate and weigh 
that possibility in proceedings to which the government 6 : 
will not be a party. Third, in the usual case, the 
determination of the scope of immunity is made by the 
judge presiding over the criminal prosecution of the 
previously immunized witness, where the prosecutor is 
before the judge seeking to introduce evidence to secure a 6 1 
criminal conviction. The prosecutor has some control over 
how it will meet its burden of proof on the issue of 
taint. When, however, the issue whether the witness 
should answer a particular question is answered by the 
judge in the private civil case, the government stands to 6 
lose valuable admissible evidence without some one present 
to protect its interests. In sum, the possibility of the 
immunity grant covering even some statements in a civil 
deposition very 1 ikely would di scour age the government's 
use of its immunizing powers to gather evidence--a result 6! 







):"'N4m 1F1h this Court has emphasized the imper tance of 
the private action as a means of ~~he policy 
~ .,., ~l',,~-'Jf 
goals of certain federal regulatory echeme s-- ~t1c h as that 
..Jl. . .., • 
t!.l;i~WJ~::nt,o1;:.1,1._,u:__i:;.u-1;:__.L,-W-w.t;~:u......siiL~.,.l-l;;.J...J.tt,,~ 1,.,G&-W,l9"'F 5'ee Perma Life 
I\ 
Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 




supplant, A ~ov e r-Hme1"1-t.a.l e.f~s. , ~th s4ri--l a-nd -eri min a l . 6t 
Petitioners' proposed construction of 18 U.S.C. §6002, 
while c e£ t -;/ fti y coming within the language of the section, 
~ 
sweeps further than Congress intended and ~ t hinder 
governmental enforcement of ~ criminal t&;iriof+g of 
c ~~I.J..J.....,oL.A'!~.u.-i:N,;..w,,1,,~ ~~~es. It also puts the deponent in 6 
some danger of criminal prosecution unless he receives an 
assurance of immunity or exclusion that the courts cannot 
properly give. Finally, it fails to further either of the 
exclusionary rule's goals of deterring unlawful 
governmental conduct or of maintaining the judiciary' s 6' 
"clean hands." Silence preserves the deponent' s rights 
and the government's interests, as well as the judicial 
resources that would otherwise be required by making the 
36. 
many difficult judgments that petitioners' interpretation 
of 18 u.s.c. §6002 would require. In sum, the petitioners 6 ' 
have not shown that the uncertainties that their 
interpretation would create are justified, despite their 
important, legitimate need for admissible evidence. 
v. 
We hold that a deponent's civil deposition testimony, 6 
made without an express governmental assurance of 
a.f ft-<, ~ , 
immunity, is not "information directly or indirectly 
" 
derived from" the immunized testimony, and ,i--s therefore 
i,Jl. 
~ ailable for use against him in a subsequent criminal 
,\ 
prosectuion. The judgment of the Court of Appeals ~ e 61 







SECOND DRAFT: Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, No. 81-825 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Pursuant to the federal use immunity provisions, 18 
u.s.c. §6001.:..6005 (1976), a United States Attorney, with 
the approval of the Attorney General, may request an order 
from a federal court compelling a witness to testify even 
though he has asserted his privilege against self- J 
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whether a deponent's civil deposition testimony, 
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2. 
defendant in the In re Corrugated Container Antitrust 
Litigation, M.D.L. 310 (S.D. Tex.). In January 1978, 
United States Department of Justice attorneys interviewed 
Conboy following a promise of use immunity. Conboy 
subsequently appeared before a grand jury investigating 
the price-fixing activities and, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§6002, was granted formal use immunity for his testimony. 
Following the criminal indictment of several 
companies, numerous civil antitrust actions were filed in 
various United States district courts. Those actions were 
consolidated for discovery in the United States District 
~ 
Court for the Southern District of Texas. Petitioners are 
A 
purchasers of corrugated containers who elected to opt-out 
of the class-action proceedings and pursue their own 
causes of action against manufacturers. Upon motion and a 
showing of compelling and particularized need, the 
District Court ordered that portions of the immunized 
government interview and grand jury testimony of certain 
witnesses, including that of Conboy, be made available to 
lawyers for the class and opt-outs. 1 
Footnote(s) 1 will appear on following pages. 
3. 
Pursuant to a subpoena, Conboy appeared for a 
deposition at which he, his counsel, and petitioners' 
counsel had copies of his immunized testimony. The 
transcripts were marked as deposition exhibits so that all 
could follow the intended examination. The questioning 
fell into the following pattern: a question was read from 
the transcript; it then was rephrased to include the 
transcript answer (i.e., "Is it not the fact that. ... "); 
finally, Conboy was asked if he had "so testified" in his 
immunized interview and grand jury examination. 2 Conboy 
refused to answer each question, claiming a Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 
Petitioners' counsel moved the District Court to 
1The propriety of the District Court's release of grand 
jury materials to the ci vi 1 parties in this case is not 
before the Court. 
2An example of 
follows: 
this three-question pattern is as 
Q. "Who did you have price communications 
with at Alton Box Board?" 
Q. Is it not the fact that you had price 
communications with Fred Renshaw and Dick 
Herman ... ? 
Q. Did you not so testify in your 
government interview of January 10, 1978? 
Joint Appendix 29-31. 
4. 
compel Conboy to answer the questi_ons, and the court so ~ 
ordered. When Conboy continued to claim his privilege, 
the District Court held him in contempt, but stayed its 
order pending appeal. A panel of the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the order of 
contempt, holding that, "[b]ecause the questions asked in E 
this deposition were taken verbatim from or closely 
tracked the transcript of Conboy's grand jury testimony, 
we believe that his answers at the deposition would be 
'derived from' the prior immunized [testimony] and 
therefore unavailable for use in any subsequent criminal E 
prosecution." In re Corrugated Container Antitrust 
Litigation, Appeal of John Conboy, 655 F.2d 748, 751 
~ J-k.,LJ..~ J 
(CA7), rev'd __i-r( bane, 661 F.2d 1145 (1981). ~ :iJ 
rH...-~;/~~,~~ 
On rehearin;¼ 'i>ll!e t;" ba~co0,oi~! irst determined that 
Conboy's alleged fear of prosecution was more than 
"fanciful," 661 F.2d, at 1152, and that Conboy was 
therefore entitled to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege 
unless his deposition testimony could not be used against 
him in a subsequent criminal action, see id., at 1153. 3 
Footnote(s) 3 will appear on following pages. 
5. 
The court then held that under §6002, absent a separate , 
and independent grant of . . 4 1mmun1ty, a deponent's civil 
deposition testimony that repeats verbatim or closely 
tracks his prior immunized testimony is not protected. 
While acknowledging that verbatim questions "of course 
[would be] so derived" from the immunized testimony, the f 
court reasoned that the answers to such questions "are 
derived from the deponent's current, independent memory of 
events" and thus "necessarily create a new source of 
evidence" that could be used in a subsequent criminal 
prosecution against Conboy. 661 F.2d, at 1155 (emphasis 
in original). 
We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict in the 
Courts of Appeals, 5 and now affirm. 
3The correctness of the Court of Appeals' 
that Conboy could assert a Fifth Amendment 
absent some immunity, is not before us. 
conclusion 
privilege, 
4A United States Attorney declined to authorize immunity 
grants in connection with the civil depositions here. 
5compare In re Corrugated Container Antitrust 
Litigation, AJ?peal of Fleischacker, 644 F.2d 70, 75 (CA2 
1981) (deposition answers immunized), and Little Rock 
School District v. Borden, Inc., 632 F.2d 700, 705 (CAB 
1980) (same), with In re Corru ated Container Anti-Trust 
Litigation, Appeal o Franey, F. 1 , 9 CA5 




It is settled that government must have the power to c 
compel testimony "to secure information necessary for 
effective law enforcement." Murphy v. Waterfront 
Comm i s s ion , 3 7 8 U • S • 5 2 , 7 9 { 19 6 4) • 6 For many years, 
however, a person who was compelled to testify under a 
grant of governmental immunity could not be prosecuted for c 
any conduct about which he had testified. See New Jersey 
v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 457 {1979). Prosecutors 
therefore were reluctant to grant immunity to potential 
targets of criminal investigations. See S. Rep. No. 91-
617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 53 {1969). lC 
The "major purpose" of the Organized Crime Control 
Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 927, of which 
§6002 was a key provision, was "to provide the criminal 
justice system with the necessary legal tools 
to ••• strengthen[] the evidence gathering process and 
6see United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 345 
{1974); United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 41 {1973) 
{MARSHALL, J., dissenting); Kasti~ar v. United States, 406 
U.S. 441, 443-444 {1973); Murp y, 378 U.S., at 93-94 
{WHITE, J., concurring); Blackmer v. United States, 284 
U.S. 421, 438 {1932); Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 




insur [e] that the evidence will then be available and 
admissible at trial." 116 Cong. Rec. 35,200 (1970) 
(statement of Rep. St. Germain). Congress sought to make 
the immunity tool more useful for law enforcement officers 
through two specific changes. First, Congress made the 
grant of immunity less expansive7 by repealing the 
authority for transactional immunity and providing for the 
less comprehensive use immunity authorized in §6002. 8 
7 In Murphy, JUSTICE WHITE stated that "[i]mmunity must 
be as broad as, but not harmfully and wastefully broader 
than, the privilege against self-incrimination." 378 
U.S., at 107 (concurring opinion) (quoted with approval in 
116 Cong. Rec. 35,291 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff)). 
In its committee report, the House explained that §6002 
was not to provide an "immunity bath," but was to be "no 
broader than" the Fifth Amendment privilege. H.R. No. 91-
1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code 
Cong. & Ad. News 4007, 4017. 
8section 6002 provides: 
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of 
his privilege against self-incrimination, to 
testify or provide other information in a 
proceeding before or ancillary to--
(1) a court or grand jury of the United 
States, 
(2) an agency of the United States, or 
(3) either House of Congress, a joint 
committee of the two Houses, or a committee 
or a subcommittee of either House 
and the person presiding over the proceeding 
communicates to the witness an order issued 
under this part, the witness may not refuse to 
comply with the order on the basis of his 
privilege against self-incrimination; but no 
testimony or other information compelled under 
the order (or any information directly or 
indirectly derived from such testimony or other 
information) may be used against the witness in 
any criminal case, except a prosecution for 
Footnote continued on next page. 
lJ 
8. 
Second, Congress gave certain officials in the Department 
of Justice9 exclusive authority to grant immunities. 10 
perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise 
failing to comply with the order. 
Section 6001(2) defines "other information" to include 
"any book, paper, document, record, recording, or other 
material." 
9section 6003 states: 
(a) In the case of any individual who has 
been or may be called to testify or provide 
other information at any proceeding before or 
ancillary to a court of the United States or a 
gr and jury of the United States, the United 
States district court for the judicial district 
in which the proceeding is or may be held shall 
issue, in accordance with subsection (b) of this 
section, upon the request of the United States 
attorney for such district, an order requiring 
such individual to give testimony or provide 
other information which he refuses to give or 
provide on the basis of his privilege against 
self-incrimination, such order to become 
effective as provided in section 6002 of this 
part. 
(b) A United States attorney may, with the 
approval of the Attorney General, the Deputy 
Attorney General, or any designated Assistant 
Attorney General, request an order under 
subsection (a) of this section when in his 
judgment--
Cl) the testimony or other information from 
such individual may be necessary to the 
public interest; and 
(2) such individual has refused or is 
likely to refuse to testify or provide 
other information on the basis of his 
privilege against self-incrimination. 
10congress c ~ ly foresaw the courts as playing only a 
minor role in the immunizing process: "The court's role in 
granting the order is merely to find the facts on which 
the order is predicated." H.R. Rep. No. 91-1549, supra 
note 7, at 43, reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. 
News 4018; H.R. Rep. No. 91-1188, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 13 
(1970). See 116 Cong. Rec. 35,291 (1970) (statement o 
Poff) . / The\- D'e:J?artment . of ~ · - · - -
l J 
9. 
The Court upheld the constitutionality of the ~ 
use immunity statute in Kastigar v. United States, 406 
U.S. 441 (1972). The power to compel testimony, of 
course, is limited by the Fifth Amendment, and we held 
that any grant of immunity must be co-extensive with the 1~ 
privilege. We were satisfied, however, that §6002 
provided this measure of protection and thus "removed the 
dangers against which the privilege protects." Id., at 
449. In rejecting the argument that use and derivative 
use immunity would not adequately protect a witness from 1; 
• w/ ~ 
~ 
~  .r l-1, 
~~-
11" r 
various incriminating uses of the compelled testimony, we 
emphasized that "[t] he statute provides a sweeping 
proscription of any use, direct or indirect, of the 
compelled testimony and any information derived 
' ~ ompeting immunT ty gran t si € 1On rs ffinr e import.ant t~ he overall administration of just·ce, 
~ i ompeting agencies or branches of 
o persuade one that it should ~r t o --cne otne r lll UHe' 
~ e re.st.s G-f- tl:lo p nhJ i c " Measures Relating 
Or~ani zed Crime: Hearings on S. 30 et al. Before the 
Su comm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 386 (1969) {statement 
of Assistant Attorney General Will Wilson). See id 
370 {memorandum of Department of Justice commentsT: 
~ v-P 
~q, ~ 
Vtv.L IY e. 
/v'j _.). . ,..).l,9 ~ ~,./{LY ~ / ~/IA'_J v"' ,.Yyr . ~ -
i?resfdent' s -CommissYon"'"'" _ on __ Law Enforcement and 
Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a 
Free Society 141 (1967) {recommending that "[i]mmunity 
should be granted only with the prior approval of the 
jurisdiction's chief prosecuting officer."). 
~ ~-- 1.:: ~ ~ ~ ~ r.i,., .>J-0 , . 
. . • . • ;k v,v , ~~ ~p,· 






therefrom ..•• " Id., at 460. We added that, once a 1: 
defendant establishes that he has testified under a grant 
of immunity, "the prosecution [has] the affirmative duty 
to prove that the evidence it proposes to use is derived 
from a legitimate source wholly independent of the 
compelled testimony." Id. Thus, "immunity from use and 1: 
derivative use should 'leave[] the witness and the Federal 
Government in substantially the same position as if the 
witness had claimed his privilege' in the absence of a 
grant of immunity." Kastigar, 406 U.S., at 458-459 
(quoting Murphy, 378 U.S., at 79). lL 
III. 
With the foregoing statutory history and relevant 
principles in mind, we turn now to the facts in this case 
and the contentions of the parties. It is not disputed 
that the questions asked of Conboy were directly or 1i 
indirectly derived from his immunized testimony. The 
issue is whether the causal connection between the 
questions and the answers is so direct that the answers 
also are derived from that testimony and therefore should 
be excluded under the grant of immunity. 1~ 
11. 
Petitioners' argument is based on the language of 
§6002 and on a common understanding of the words "derived 
t:nt.,~~ 
from." The questions formulated afte r r e vi ew of immunized 
testimony are clearly "derived from" the prior testimony. 
Thus, answers to such questions, that repeat verbatim or l! 
closely track a deponent's testimony, are necessarily also 
"derived from" and "tainted by" such testimony. 
Petitioners therefore say there is no basis in logic or 
~ 
law for Go~ 
-\ 
~-41'4~"'1~ 
distinction between questions and answers 
,\ 
responsive to those same questions. An answer by its very lE 
nature is evoked by and responds to information contained 
in a question. 
~ 
Conboy's position is straightforward: Questions do 
I\ 
not incriminate; answers do. Unlike the questions, 
answers are not directly or indirectly derived from the lE 
immunized grand jury or interview transcripts, but from 
the deponent's current, independent memory of events. 
Even when a deponent's deposition answers are identical to 
~ ~ ~ -1-o 
those he gave to the grand jury, he~ JtU.l,gJ: tell the truth ~ _ n, ~not as he told it before the grand jury, 
I\ 
~ 
but as he knows it. 
~ 
Each new statement of the deponent 
1~ 
12. 
creates a new "source." In sum, the initial grant of 
immunity does not prevent the prosecutor from prosecuting; 
it merely limits his sources of evidence. 
The language of the statute permits either parties' 1~ 
interpretation and compels neither. If it points in one 
directio~ T r t the broad wording of §6002, and our 
interpretation of it in Kastigar, suggests that we should 
hesitate to exclude information from the coverage of the 
immunity grant that admittedly has a close tie with the lf 
immunized testimony. In the end, however, whether 
particular information is "derived from" immunized 
materials, is "fruit" of "tainted" information, or is the 
product of a "new source" are conclusions that "may 
conceal concrete complexities." Nardone v. United States, H 
308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939). As the Court has noted: 
"Sophisticated argument may prove a causal connection 
between information obtained through [the unlawful 
governmental conduct] and the Government's proof. As a 
matter of good sense, however, such connection may have 1~ 
become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint." Id. We 
believe that, rather than adopting a conclusory label for 
13. 
the deposition testimony, it is desirable to determine 
which of the two interpretations of §6002 most 
satisfactorily accommodates the government's need for 1~ 
admissible evidence and the individual's interest in 
'd' lf . . . t' ll avo1 1ng se -1ncr1m1na 10n. 
Although there may be practical reasons for not 
testifying, 12as far as the deponent's Fifth Amendment 
right is concerne ~ he should be indifferent between the 2( 
~ 
protection afforded by silence and that afforded by 
immunity. The government's interests, however, may be 
affected seriously by the choice. Our specific inquiry 
then is whether petitioners can satisfy their need for 
admissible evidence without threatening the government's 2( 
11see Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 
287 (1977) (" [T]he proper test to apply ••• is one which [] 
protects against the invasion of constitutional rights 
without commanding undesirable consequences not necessary 
to the assurance of those rights.") ; Brown v. Illinois, 
422 U.S. 590, 604 (1975) (reversing because state court 
failed "to evaluate the circumstances of the case in light 
of the policy served by the exclusionary rule"); Murphy, 
378 U.S., at 79 (stating an exclusionary rule "to 
implement [Fifth Amendment] and accommodate the interests 
of the ... Government [] in investigating and prosecuting 
crime"). See generally C. Whitebread, Criminal Procedure 
§2.04, at 37 (1980). 
12Besides the costs of testifying against close 
associates, any witness increases the risk of committing 
perjury the more he talks. Cf. 18 u.s.c. §6002 (perjured 





interest in limiting the scope of an immunity grant or 
encroaching upon the deponent's certainty of protection. 
A. 
Questions taken verbatim from a transcript of 
immunized testimony and asked a deponent could evoke one 2] 
of several responses: (i) he could repeat or adopt his 
immunized 13 answer; (ii) he could affirm that the 
$ 
transcript of his immunized answer accurately reflects his 
~ 
prior testimony; (iii) he could recall additional 
information responsive to the question but not disclosed 2] 
in his immune testimony; or (iv) he could disclose 
information that is not responsive to the question. 
Petitioners do not contend, nor could they, that the prior 
grant of use immunity affords protection for all self-
incriminating information disclosed by the immunized 2: 
witnesses on~ occasion [E_.efore or( after the giving of 
the immunized testimony. Rather, petitioners argue that 
only the first three responses would be "derived from" his 
13The extreme case would be where petitioners read -Ggft'ee,y £ 
the entire immunized grand jury transcript; as!( aim _ if 














:1 ! r~ 
15. 
~-k 
immune testimony and therefore unavailable for use against 
I\ 
the deponent in any subsequent criminal prosecution. 
Petitioners' argument has as its premise that 
~UX-~ 
conse.rva.t--i-v-e counsel will ensure that Ri s ,01 ieA-t reads or 
repeats the statements in the immunized transcript. 
Because there will be little opportunity for the grant of 
immunity to sweep in statements on direct examination that 
the government did not intend to immunize, or for the 
deponent to give responses that may fall outside of the 
grant of immunity and be later used against him in a 
subsequent er iminal prosecution, there is little social 
~c 
gain in stating that Conboy's deposition,\ t-es-t-i-mefly ~ ould 
be self-incriminating. In such a situation, it woul1 s ~ 
desirable that civil plaintiffs, particularly those 
bringing private suits that supplement the criminal 
1 
~ enforcement of the federal anti trust 
~ ,<y) access to the avail· -
rce1 laws, should have 





13 u...1- dJ,u... ~~ ~/2--,_:..,_/ 1-/..c I- . ~ 
I tti W9 are ~ li: al-~oweo\Le f'-r of, ~e par-i=i~s I abili ~ ...L .. 
( ~ 
I •- _ "• I~ ~ _ 4 ~ • ~ . . . 5 S. ~r,\!Jl L.-~ ~ lJ Nm 1-t: the quest 1on1~ and answer rft<J J. t<> eh a ~ ohewn in the ~ 
\ - - . a.,,€_ ~f ~a_ 
"----.f\( ~ immunized transcript,~ yet p,E-OQ--1oe at:1 admisaibl:e deposition 
) ~ . ~~k~~~~~k,~. 0 ~- Assuming that petitioners seek to depose 
/3 u_f-~ '-2-J>i. ~~LI-~ 16. 
~,,--~ "'-1!-,c~ ✓ e:2..- 4~ 
~ ~ ~fi--~~~ 
,L,t;> ~f-~~~~,.-a,,.&,,. ~~--
Conboy, not - with the expectation of discovering new 2~ 
' f ' 14 b ' h h . t ~~ 1n orma t1on, ut w1 t t e 1n ent to crea e epes1 1On 
~ t that simply restates the immunized testimony, 15 
~ ~~ ~ 4-. 
the deposi{ ion will yield w--ffteq:.,p carbon copy of the grand 
~ ~ ,:,,zr 
jury transcripts ~  4a ·eaumab-½1 w-i-.J:. l: --be-s---43 ubje~ t-s the ✓ 
7°p H.e, L-;>/4,,j-~~1-l-l-1.,~,V),-~,£iJ) 
~~ admissibility objections because-- "'f la& of 2~ 
~~~~~ 
. 16 t. t. . o~e-f~ ~ -0c:..-..c.c)..-,-G-1~;-&-~ ~fflt:M2e • Pe 1 1 oner s r ecog n 1 ze 
14Direct examination may not be as limited as petitioners 
assume. The dissent in the Court of Appeals would have 
treated Conboy' s answers as derived from his immunized 
testimony "where the questions were asked so as to afford 
Mr. Conboy the choice of (1) repeating his originally 
immunized answer, (2) adopting his immunized answer when 
it was repeated to him, or (3) affirming that the 
transcript of his immunized answer was his prior 
testimony." 661 F.2d, at 1160 (Cummings, C.J., 
dissenting). The District Court's civil contempt order, 
however, stated that the questions asked in the deposition 
"were taken directly" from the immunized transcripts, but 
did not define exactly what deposition questions 
petitioners could ask. Other Courts of Appeals have 
permitted a broader scope of direct questioning than the 
dissent below would have. See In re Corrugated Container 
Antitrust Liti ation, A eal of Fleischacker, 644 F.2d 70, 
79 (CA 9 ) compe 1ng answers to questions "concerning 
specific subjects that actually were touched upon by 
questions appearing in the transcript of the immunized 
testimony"): Little Rock School District v. Borden, Inc., 
632 F.2d 700, 705 (CA8 1980) (compelling answers as long 
as deposition questions confined to "'the same time, 
geographical and substantive frame work as the [witness' 
immunized] grand jury testimony"') (quoting Appeal of 
Starkey, 600 F.2d 1043, 1048 (CA8 1979)). 
15For purposes of this case, we assume that the grand 
jury transcripts are inadmissible as evidence in a civil 
trial because the testimony is not subject to cross 
examination. Cf. Fed. R. Evid. 803(8) (hearsay exception 
for certain public records): Fed. R. Evid. 804(a) (1) 
(witness unavailable when exempted from testifying on 
ground of privilege): Fed. R. Evid. 804(b) (1) (former 
testimony admissible when witness unavailable and the 
party against whom the testimony is now of feredhad an 
opportunity for cross examination). 





this problem, but maintain that the antitrust defendants 
"would be entitled to test the accuracy and truthfulness 
of Conboy' s repeated immunized testimony without going 
beyond the confines of that testimony." Reply Br i ef for0 2~ 
Pe 5. Regardless of any limitations that may 
be imposed on its scope, 17 
~./.c,~A, 
however, ~ i rtgf.a l cross 
examination is '!fte-ai'rt to and 
~ 
often will produce 
information that was not elicited on direct. Thus, w-e-y--
in deciding whether the government may use 2E 
~
Conboy's st a t eme-R-ts in a criminal prosecution against him, 
we must assume that, to produce admissible evidence, the 
scope of cross examination at the deposition cannot be 
~ 
easily limited to repeating verbatim from the immunized 
I\ 
testimony. This empirical assumption implicates both the 2E 
government and the individual's interests embodied in 
16cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (1) (stating depositions may 
be taken "if the information sought appears reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 
evidence"); Fed. R. Civ. P. 30 (c) (allowing cross 
examination at depositions); Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a) 
(deposition "admissible under the rules of evidence 
applied as though the witness were then present and 
testifying"); Fed. R. Evid. 804(b) (1) (deposition 
admissible if the party against whom the testimony is now 
offered in a ci vi 1 act ion had an opportunity to develop 
testimony by cross examination). 





Use immunity was in tended to immunize and exclude 
from a subsequent criminal trial only that information to 2~ 
-
which the government 9 expressl~ surrendered future use. ~ 
If the government is engaged in an ongoing investigation 1 
of the particular activity at issue, immunizing new ✓ 
( ..e..1 -~ ~ ¾ ,t:c, f ~~ A,, ~ 
information may make it more difficult to show in a 
I\. 
subsequent prosecution that similar information was 
obtained from wholly independent sources. The purpose of 
§6002 was to ease prosecution, not complicate it. Whether 
the government must bear additional "costs" when it grants 
immunity to a witness is a judgment that the legislative 
branch normally should make. In §6002, it seems to us 
that Congress made its intent clear that society should 
bear no more "costs" than those that are constitutionally 
~ 
required, and these should A borne only when, in the 
judgment of designated officers, the social benefits 
outweigh them. 18 
~~ 
18we need not decide whether United States Attorneys ~have 
authority to immunize the testimony of a witness in a 






Petitioners' interpretation of §6002 also places 
substantial risks on the deponent. Unless the grant of 
irnrnuni ty assures a witness that his incriminating 
him in a subsequent 25 
criminal prosecution, the witness s not received the 
full protection of his Fifth Amendment pr'i__vilege that he 
~~ 
has been forced to 
~ . . 1rnrnun1ze a witness. 
exchange. No court,~ ~~ '1 e-an r /-
That ~'haven~ is 
J\ 
JI\ · au 
peculiarly an executive one, and ~Ro ~~ p l'-Os-e~\ r 
a_ ~. •;_1_:''M .. A ~ //7. • ~_.1_.. J.. ~ i . /() ~ L J. / . ·. ' 
4~'1PJ..~~~ll'H-<,r--,---~ ~
c/r i --~ t~-to , ~ ai:-s cas e . J Nor can a court guarantee, at 
2~ 
he time of 
~ ~~/ ~a..l- u...c... ~~ 
the c epo.i U on~-E-~ ~ ~ a subsequent · · 
I\ 
~ -~ 
.trial t be ::fVc.rse1:1L:i.fHl. --we.H3:d-7'A be foun ~ to have met 
_..) 
{le s aiy. ~ ~ ~ . 
civil proceeding en the governrnen determines that the 
public interest more appropriately furthered in a 
particular case by a private damage action than by a 
er irninal prosecution. Cf. 18 U.S. C. §600 2 (can compel 
testimony "[w]henever a witness refuses" to testify "in a 
proceeding before or ancillary to ••. a court .•• of the 
United State,"); id., §6003 (may compel testimony 
government believes "may be necessary to the public 
interest"); 116 Cong. Rec. 36,293 (1970) (statement of 
Sen. Hruska) (reading §6002 as "enabl [ing] the Government 
in ~court ••• proceeding" to compel testimony) (emphasis 
added); 116 Cong. Rec. 853 (1970) (statement of Sen. 
Young) (" [T]he power of the district attorney to compel a 
witness to testify is .••• apparently available in any case 
in a federal court, including civil actions between 
private parties.") (quoting from a memorandum prepared by 
the Arner ican Ci vi 1 Liberties Union) . If this authority 
exists, it could resolve the problem here presented in 
many civil cases in which the immunity issue is raised. 
~~a- ~t J A.---1-~ ~ ~ 1-J.-<_ ~ 
,~-~~ ~• <s ... 1£.,t..~ 




burden of proving "that the evidence it proposes to use is 
derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of the 3( 
compelled testimony." Kastigar, 406 U.S., at 460. Yet in 
holding Conboy in contempt for his Fifth Amendment 
silence, the District Court here essentially predicted 
that a court in any future criminal prosecution of Conboy 
will be obligated to protect against evidentiary use of 3( 
the deposition testimony petitioners seek. We ~ 7:::ef-~ 
't 
Q eAa~ such a predictive judgment is ~ enough. 
If we simply were to assume, as petitioners urge, 
w-,;u_ 
that, the court hearing the criminal case "'fft-a,y be able to 
~ 
exclude ~ wrongfully produced evidence, cf. Maness v. 3J 
Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 474-475 (1975) (WHITE, J., 
concurring in the result); Murphy, 378 U.S., at 79, our 
~ ~~~~~~ 
f~s would be diminisd t! K~4ia ;it!iil- no€ bk . 
~ . ~IJ-~ ,h-4-1<~ . 
y apprep-ri:~te ~e~ justify the compulsionl\lh-eii,Q. We ~eHls,fnoc--~ 
~ L-f-- ~ A rely on the exclusionary rule • to eree1.t:e QJK:li.Hiable 
5 ~~LA A-rA-£~  
ewidenGe"- Fi :e-s t-;,,-..,ws m.us.t aot fail to distinguish be tween 
-'\ 
the protection afforded a witness by a grant of statutory 
1----fJL~ 
immunity that contemporaneousl~ upplants the protection > 
~ 1 
O!--







~ .. f,..I 
? 
21. 
judicial exclusionary rule that may be applied at a later 3: 
~ 
date to remedy judicial error in compelling certain 
testimony. See Kastigar, 406 U.S., at 470 (MARSHALL, J., 
~/ c •~".;. R .4--:;C~ c,-f.-
dissenting) . 19 Second ,--exeJ..u~:: nonimmunized testimony 
~~~ 
_i-a inconsistent with the congressional policy of leaving 
1 
the granting of immunity to the executive branch. 
Petitioners see no such problems, arguing that it ~ 
always been for the courts to determine whether an 
assertion of the privilege is proper and whether evidence 
should be excluded as derivative of immunized testimony, 
3: 
see, e. g., Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Commission of ( 3: 
Inves tig at ion, 406 U.S. 4 72, 4 79-481 ( 197 2) ; Hoffman v. I 
United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951), and that, when a 
district court orders a deponent to testify, it is merely 
determining the scope of the already granted immunity. 
There is no de facto grant of immunity, because the 3: 
19we believe Conboy acted properly in maintaining his 
silence in the face of the District Court's compulsion 
order and by testing the validity of his privilege on "'( 
appeal. "The Court has held that an individual under tJ I 
compulsion to make disclosures as a witness who revealed 
information instead of claiming the privilege lost the 
benefit of the privilege." Garner v. United States, 424 
U.S. 648, 653 (1976) (citing United States v. Kordel, 397 
U.S. 1, 7-10 (1970)). 
22. 
original grant of immunity "continues." Again, however, 
we should avoid conclusory labels such as "de facto 
✓7 
immunity" and "continual immunity" when they mask the 
actual effects of immunizing testimony. When a witness' 
testimony that the government did not seek or desire to 3~ 
immunize is excluded in a subsequent criminal trial, the 
government has lost, to at least some extent, the benefit 
of its strategic use-immunity tool. 
IV. 
This Court has emphasized the importance of the 3~ 
/ 
private action as a means of furthering the policy goals 
~ 
of certain federal regulatory statutes, including the 
federal antitrust laws. See, e. g., Perma Life Mufflers, 
Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 
(1968). But private civil actions can only supplement, 3~ 
not supplant, the primary responsibility of government. 
Petitioners' proposed construction of §6002, while coming 
within the language of the section, sweeps further than 
Congress intended and could hinder governmental 
enforcement of its criminal laws. It also puts the 3~ 
deponent in some danger of criminal prosecution unless he 
23. 
receives an assurance of immunity or exclusion that the 
courts cannot properly give. Finally, it fails to further 
either of the exclusionary rule's goals of deterring 
unlawful governmental conduct or of maintaining the 3E 
judiciary' s "clean hands." Silence, on the other hand, 
preserves the deponent's rights and the government's 
interests, as well as the judicial resources that would 
otherwise be required by making the many difficult 
judgments that petitioners' interpretation of §6002 would 3E 
require. In sum, the petitioners have not shown that the 
uncertainties that their interpretation would create are 
justified, despite their important, legitimate need for 
admissible evidence. 
v. 3~ 
We hold that a deponent's civil deposition testimony, 
made without an express governmental assurance of immunity 
at the time, is not "information directly or indirectly 
derived from" the immunized testimony, and therefore may 
be available for use against him in a subsequent criminal 3~ 










CHAMBERS DRAFT: Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, No. 81-825 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Pursuant to the federal use immunity provisions, 18 
u.s.c. §6001-6005 (1976), a United States Attorney, with 
the approval of the Attorney General, may request an order 
from a federal court compelling a witness to testify even 
though he has asserted his privilege against self-
incrimination. Section 6002 provides, however, that "no 
testimony or other information compelled under the order 
{or any information directly or indirectly derived from 
such testimony or other information) may be used against 
the witness in any criminal case .... " The issue presented 
in this case is whether a deponent's civil deposition 
testimony, repeating verbatim or closely tracking his 
prior immunized testimony, is "information" so "directly 
or indirectly derived from [the immunized] testimony" that 










Respondent John Conboy is a former executive of a 
defendant in the In re Corrugated Container Anti trust 
Litigation, M.D.L. 310 (S.D. Tex.). In January 1978, 
United States Department of Justice attorneys interviewed 
Conboy following a promise of use immunity. Conboy 
subsequently appeared before a grand jury investigating 
@ price-fixing activities and, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§6002, was granted formal use immunity for his testimony. 
Following the criminal indictment of several 
companies, numerous civil antitrust actions were filed in 
various United States district courts. Those actions were 
consolidated for discovery in the '1n1 Led State~ istrict 
Court for the Southern District of Texas. Petitioners 
here are purchasers of corrugated containers who elected 
~ ~ ut of the class-action proceedings and pursue 
I (t,£ &\ i 
~ '1 • their own causes of action against manufacturers. ( upon ~p motion and a showing of compelling and particularized')'. 
Ll ~ ,.>- "' .,,,-, need ~ the District Court ordered that portions of the 
~~ 
V vr-1~ 
immunized government interview and grand;\jury testimony 






1' # [£;, 
~ ,.iJ I 
~~ 
3. 
available to lawyers for the class and opt-outs. 1 
Pursuant to a subpoena issued by the 81:Iited Stale ~ 
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 
Conboy appeared for a deposition at which he, his counsel, 
and petitioners' counsel had copies of his immunized 
testimony. The transcripts were marked as deposition 
exhibits so that all could follow the intended 
examination. The questioning fell into the following 
pattern: a question was read from the transcript; it then 
was rephrased to include the transcript answer (i.e., "Is 
it not the fact that ..•. "); finally, Conboy was asked if 
he had "so testified" in his immunized interview and grandA 
jury examination. 2 Conboy refused to answer each 
1The propriety of the District Court's release of grand }-
jury materials to the civil parties iA this oasd\ is not 
before the Court. 
2An example of 
follows: 
this three-question pattern is as 
Q. "Who did you have pr ice communications 
with at Alton Box Board?" 
. . . . 
Q. Is it not the fact that you had price 
communications with Fred Renshaw and Dick 
Herman ..• ? 
Q. Did you not so testify in your 
government interview of January 10, 1978? 






question, =~ 7\ Fifth Amendment privilege against 
lf
. . . . ~L 
Se ;,_cr~:r~ ~~ 
compel Conboy to answer the questions • aHe the co1:1£t s;o , 
i,I 
..,._, ,lora,j- When Conboy continued to claim his privilege, 
the District Court held him in contempt, but stayed its 
order pending appeal. A panel of the 1'11ieed State't-court 
<.ovt-4114. pf 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed thel\order ~ 
oontem:Pl holding that, "[b] ecause the questions asked in 
this deposition were taken verbatim from or closely 
tracked the transcript of Conboy's grand jury testimony, 
we believe that his answers at the deposition would be 
'derived from' the prior immunized [testimony] and 
therefore unavailable for use in any subsequent criminal 
prosecution." In re Corrugated Container Antitrust 
Litigation, Appeal of John Conboy, 655 F.2d 748, 751 
(CA7), rev'd en bane, 661 F.2d 1145 (1981). 
On rehearing en bane, the Court of Appeals reversed 
3chief Judge John V. 
District Court for 
expressly exercised 
District Court for 
pursuant to 28 u.s.c. 
Singleton, Jr. of the Uni led State:}- J-
the Southern District of Texas '-' 
the powers of the Uni bed State~./ 




the District Court. It first determined that Conboy's 
alleged fear of prosecution was more than "fanciful," 661 7 
L:> 
F.2d, at 1152, and that Conboy ~ the--;;fore~ entitled to 
assert his Fifth Amendment privilege unless his deposition 
testimony could not be used against him in a subsequent 
criminal action, see id., at 1153. 4 The court then held 
that under §6002, absent a separate and independent grant 81 
of immunity, 5 a deponent's civil deposition testimony that 
repeats verbatim or closely tracks his prior immunized 
testimony is not protected. While acknowledging that 
verbatim questions "of course [would be-@erived" from 
the immunized testimony, the court reasoned that the 8 
answers to such questions "are derived from the deponent's 
current, independent memory of events" and thus 
"necessarily create a new source of evidence" that could 
be used in a subsequent criminal prosecution against 
El, 
Conboy. 6.61 F.2~ at 1155 (emphasis in original). 
4The correctness of the Court of Appeals' 
that Conboy could assert a Fifth Amendment 
absent some immunity, is not before us. 
conclusion 
privilege, 
5A United States Attorney declined to authorize immunity 
grants in connection with the civil depositions here. 
9 1 
6. 
We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict in the 
Courts of Appeals, 6 and now affirm. 
II. 
It is settled that government must have the power to 
compel testimony "to secure information necessary for 9 1 
effective law enforcement." Murphy v. Waterfront 
Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964). 7 For many years, 
however, a person who was compelled to testify under a 
grant of governmental immunity could not be prosecuted for 
any conduct about which he had testified. See New Jersey 101 
11> 
,K;~,, 
~~ v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 457 (1979). Prosecutors H "-fv~ ,, 
grant immunity to potential 





targets of criminal investigations. See S. Rep. No. 91-
617, Ql.t CoRq,, let 
If· 
SQ•o/53 (1969). 
6compare In re Corrugated Container Antitrust 
Litigation, Appeal of Fleischacker, 644 F.2d 70, 75 (CA2 
1981) (deposition answers immunized), and Little Rock 
School District v. Borden, Inc., 632 F.2d 700, 705 (CA8 
1980) (same), with In re Corrugated Container Anti-Trust 
Litigation, A eal of Frane , 620 F.2d 1086, 1095 (CA5 
(answers not 1mmun1ze), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102 
(1981). 
7see United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 345 
(1974); United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 41 (1973) 
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting); Kastigar v. United States, 406 
U.S. 441, 443-444 (1973); Murphy, 378 U.S., at 93-94 
(WHITE, J., concurring); Blackmer v. United States, 284 
U.S. 421, 438 (1932); Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 






The "major purpose" of the Organized Crime Control 10! 
Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 927, of which 
§6002 was a key provision, was "to provide the criminal 
justice system with the necessary legal tools 
to ••. strengthen[] the evidence gathering process and 
insur [e] that the evidence will then be available and 111 
admissible at trial." 116 Cong. Rec. 35,200 (1970) 
(statement of Rep. St. Germain). Congress sought to make 
the immunity tool more useful for law enforcement officers 
through two specific changes. First, Congress made the 
grant of immunity less expansive8 by repealing the 11 
authority for transactional immunity and providing for the 
less comprehensive use immunity authorized in §6002. 9 
8 In Murphy, JUSTICE WHITE stated that "[i]mmunity must 
be as broad as, but not harmfully and wastefully broader 
than, the privilege against self-incrimination." 378 
U.S., at 107 (concurring opinion) (quoted with approval in 
116 Cong. Rec. 35,291 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff)). 
In its committee report, the House explained that §6002 
was not to provide an "immunity bath," but was to be "no 
broader than" the Fifth Amendment privilege. H.R. No. 91-
154g, ~~l~t CoR9,, Je Sos ~ £Qp£i~tge iR 1970 U.S. Coe ~ 
~ng. & Ad. News 400}, 4 ~ 
9section 6002 provides: 
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of 
his privilege against self-incrimination, to 
testify or provide other information in a 
proceeding before or ancillary to--
(1) a court or grand jury of the United 
States, 
Footnote continued on next page. 
8. 
Second, Congress gave certain officials in the Department 
of Justice10 exclusive authority to grant immunities. 11 
(2) an agency of the United States, or 
(3) either House of Congress, a joint 
committee of the two Houses, or a committee 
or a subcommittee of either House 
and the person presiding over the proceeding 
communicates to the witness an order issued 
under this part, the witness may not refuse to 
comply with the order on the basis of his 
privilege against self-incrimination; but no 
testimony or other information compelled under 
the order (or any information directly or 
indirectly derived from such testimony or other 
information) may be used against the witness in 
any criminal case, except a prosecution for 
perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise 
failing to comply with the order. 
Section 6001 ( 2) defines "other information" to include 
"any book, paper, document, record, recording, or other 
material." 
10section 6003 states: 
(a) In the case of any individual who has 
been or may be called to testify or provide 
other information at any proceeding before or 
ancillary to a court of the United States or a 
gr and jury of the United States, the United 
States district court for the judicial district 
in which the proceeding is or may be held shall 
issue, in accordance with subsection (b) of this 
section, upon the request of the United States 
attorney for such district, an order requiring 
such individual to give testimony or provide 
other information which he refuses to give or 
provide on the basis of his privilege against 
self-incrimination, such order to become 
effective as provided in section 6002 of this 
part. 
(b) A United States attorney may, with the 
approval of the Attorney General, the Deputy 
Attorney General, or any designated Assistant 
Attorney General, request an order under 
subsection (a) of this section when in his 
judgment--
(1) the testimony or other information from 
such individual may be necessary to the 
public interest; and 
(2) such individual has refused or is 
Footnote continued on next page. 
Footnote(s) 11 will appear on following pages. 
1 ~-
9. 
The Court upheld the constitutionality of the use 1 : 
immunity statute in Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 
/ 
441 {1972). The power to compel testimony s 
limited by the Fifth Amendment, and we held that any grant 
of immunity must be co-extensive with the privilege. We 
were satisfied, however, that §6002 provided this measure 1 : 
of protection and thus "removed the dangers against which · 
the privilege protects." Id., at 449. In rejecting the 
-
argument that use and der ivativel\ use immunity would not 
adequately protect a witness from various incriminating 
uses of the compelled testimony, we emphasized that "[t]he 1: 
statute provides a sweeping proscription of any use, 
direct or indirect, of the compelled testimony and any 
information derived therefrom ••.• " Id., at 460. We added 
likely to refuse to testify or provide 
other information on the basis of his 
privilege against self-incrimination. 
11congress foresaw the courts as playing only a minor 
role in the immunizing process: "The court's role in 
granting the order is merely to find the facts on which 
the order is predicated." H.R. Rep. No. 91-1549, supra 
note 8, at 43, .u;ip.rintee in J97Q u.s Code Caog , As, "'-
New~ 4018~ H.R. Rep. No. 91-1188, ~]st Cong,, 2d Sess"'}r _13 
{1970). See 116 Cong. Rec. 35,291 {1970) {statement of 
Rep. Poff). Cf. President's Commission on Law Enforcement 
and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a 
Free Society 141 {1967) {recommending that "[i]mmunity 
should be granted only with the prior approval of the 




tha{once a defendant establishes that he has testified 
under a grant of immunity, "the prosecution [has] the 13! 
affirmative duty to prove that the evidence it proposes to 
use is derived from a legitimate source wholly independent 
of the compelled testimony." Id. Thus, "immunity from 
use and derivative use should 'leave[] the witness and the 
Federal Government in substantially the same position as 141 
if the witness had claimed his privilege' in the absence 
of a grant of immunity." Kastigar, 406 U.S., at 458-459 
{quoting Murphy, 378 U.S., at 79). 
III. 
With the foregoing statutory history and relevant 14 
principles in mind, we turn now to the faces i J this case . 
acna the ceAt:entieAs ef the :parti a-.;..)' It is not disputed 
that the questions asked of Conboy were directly or 
indirectly derived from his immunized testimony. The 
issue is whether the causal connection between the 151 
questions and the answers is so direct that the answers 
also are derived from that testimony and therefore should 
be excluded under the grant of immunity. 








§6002 and on a common understanding of the words "derived 15! 
from." The questions formulated on the basis of immunized 
testimony are clearly "derived from" the prior testimony. 
Thus, answers to such questions, ~ epeat verbatim or 
closely track a deponent's testimony, are necessarily also 
"derived from" and "tainted by" such testimony. 161 
Petitioners therefore sa ft--J • Y tbe~ l- no basis iA loqic 0£ 
~ for the distinction made by the Court of Appeals 
between questions and answers responsive to those same 
questions. An answer by its very nature is evoked by and 
responds to information contained in a question. 16 
Conboy's position is also straightforward: Questions 
do not incriminate; answers do. Unlike the questions, 
answers are not directly or indirectly derived from the 
immunized grand jury or interview transcripts, but from 
the deponent's current, independent memory of events. 171 
Even when a deponent's deposition answers are identical to 
those he gave to the grand jury, he is under oath to tell 
the truth, not necessarily as he told it before the grand 
jury, but as he knows it now. Each new statement of the 
deponent creates a new "source." In sum, the initial 17 1 
12. 
grant of immunity does not prevent the prosecutor from 
prosecuting; it merely limits his sources of evidence. 
The language of the statute permits either parties' 
interpretation and compels neither. l'"f' 1f • • 'J. - □CJ I ii I R I ti AnP 
-girectioJ the broad wording of §6002, and our 181 -
~ 
interpretation of it in Kastigar, suggests that we should 
hesitate to exclude information from the coverage of the 
immunity grant that admittedly has a close tie with the 
immunized testimony. In the end, however, whether 
particular information is "derived from" immunized 18 
materials, is "fruit" of "tainted" information, or is the 
product of a "new source" are conclusions that "may 
conceal concrete complexities." Nardone v. United States, 
308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939). As the Court has noted: 
"Sophisticated argument may prove a causal connection 19 
between information obtained through [the unlawful 
governmental conduct] and the Government's proof. As a 
matter of good sense, however, such connection may have 
become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint." Id. We 
believe that/rather than adopting a conclusory label for 19! 






which of the two interpretations of §6002 
r~ 
mos-t:-
satisfactorily accommodates the {1>vernment's need for 
admissible evidence and the individual's interest in 
avoiding self-incrimination. 12 
Although there may be practical reasons for not 
testifying, 13 as far as the deponent' s Fifth Amendment 
right is concerned he should be indi f fer en t between the 
protection afforded by silence and that afforded by 
immunity. The {3Pvernment' s interests, however, may be 
affected seriously by the choice. Our specific inquiry 
then is whether petitioners can satisfy their need for 
21 
2f 
admissible evidence without threatening the & vernment' s C,,../ 
interest in limiting the scope of an immunity grant or 
12see Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 2~ 
287 (1977) ("[T]he proper test to apply ..• is one which [] 
protects against the invasion of constitutional r igh s 
without commanding undesirable consequences not necessary 
to the assurance of those rights."); Brown v. Illi · 
422 U.S. 590, 604 (1975) (reversing because e court 
failed "to evaluate the circumstances oft case in light 
of the pol icy served by the exc . .1 luuss ~ io y rule") ; Murphy, 
378 U.S., at 79 (stating ! ~ clusionary rule "to 
implement [Fifth ~n~ accommodate the interests 
of the ... Government ] in investigating and prosecuting 
crime"). See gener y C. Whitebread, Criminal Procedure 
§2.04, at 37 (1980). 
13Besides the costs of testifying against close 
associates, any witness increases the risk of committing 
perjury the more he talks. Cf. 18 U.S.C. §6002 (perjured 





encroaching upon the deponent's certainty of protection. 21( 
A. 
Questions taken verbatim from a transcript of 
immunized testimony ~nc3 a □ lcee a depone~ could evoke one 
fr~~~ 
of several responsesf ( i) he could repeat or adopt his 
immunized answer; 14 (ii) he could affirm that the 21 1 
transcript of his immunized answers accurately reflects 
his prior testimony; (iii) he could recall additional 
information responsive to the question but not disclosed 
in his immune testimony; or (iv) he could disclose 
information that is not responsive to the question. 22 1 
Petitioners do not contend, nor could they, that the prior 
grant of use immunity affords protection for all self-
incriminating information disclosed by the immunized 
witnesses on ~ occasion after the giving of the 
immunized testimony. Rather, petitioners argue that only 22 
the first three responses would be "derived from" his 
immune testimony and therefore would be unavailable for 








jury transcript; then ask the 
testimony; and he answers 4 
15. 
use against the deponent in any subsequent criminal 
~.!'!.JP J/4/:ff~ ~~ 
(J>'r-r,.,_~ ~ efJ;-,,::t-/r,  ll""1 -
prosecution. 
a-£€ftimenl has as i !!s' pre'misej\that coans~l ~ 
if:!:t.. 
Petitioners' 
.will ensure that tbe witAess read~ or repeats 
statements in the immunized .!!:J transcript. Because 
will be little opportunity for the grant of immunity to 
sweep in statements on direct examination that the 
ui' @vernment did not intend to immunize, or for the deponent 
to give responses that may fall outside of the grant of 
iC, immunity and t e s lilir/ used against him 
criminal prosecution, 
Conbg,ition 
i ~ n such a- si~uation, it would be desirable 
that civil plaintiffs, particularly those bringing private 
suits that supplement the criminal enforcement of the 
federal antitrust laws, have access to the available, 
probative information. 







ana11ars wil~ e ~ e ~¾ o thoS!! in the u:;u:  
transcript ,.... a::wr ~H.¾a~::i!...1.. ...  at wi l l be 
~ r{) . 
~ A ailll!bsible in the civil liti<;tatioA, hsnm!ng 
~~ 
.,,\ ~fn 




petttisReFS--- seek to depose Conboy, not ~ J'e 
~13ectati.9.!!,_--4-ai scover J new information, 15 ;~ _ tho 
i. RiiteA-t to obtain evidence that simply resta tes» -the 
immunized t cs timony, 16 the depos 1 t1on w111 yield only. a 
cat=een eepy of the grand Jury transcrif)t.s. Jfflt there -is 
the right of cross QXamination,, a right traditionally 
r 
251 
relied upon expansively to test credibility as well as to 25! 
15oirect examination may not be as limited as petitioners 
assume. -'l'he dis.sent in the Court of Appeals would have 
t-£:..eated Conboy' s answers as derived from his immunized.. 
teseimony "where the questions were asked so as to afford 
Mr. Conboy the choice of {1} repeating his or1g1.1Hrll¥-
i~u~~~ed answerd (2) ado~ting his immunized answer when 
ic repeate to bim or (3) affirming that the-
transcript of his immunized answer wa-s his prior 
testimony." 661 F.2d, al 1160 (Cummings, C.J.~ 
d~ The District Court's civil contempt order.,->2-
however ,J- stated that the questions asked in the deposition 
"were taken directly" from the immunized transcripts, but 
did not define exactly what deposition questions 
petitioners could ask. Other Courts of Appe?ls have --fv 
permi tted a broader scope-of direct questioning.{than the ')Al 
dtssent below wo1:1ld have.. See In re Corrugated Container L.Lu~ 
Antitrust Litigation, Appeal of Fleischacker, 644 F.2d 70, ~ ~ 
79 (CA2 1981) (compelling answers to questions "concerning , J,. . . 
specific subjects that actually were touched upon by ~~ 
questions appearing in the transcript of the immunized ~ 
testimony"); Little Rock School District v. Borden, Inc., · 
632 F.2d 700, 705 (CA8 1980) (compelling answers as long ,_'_-h~ 
as deposition questions confined to "'the same time, -r4"'-·-; 
geographical and substantive frame work as the [witness' 1 
immunized] gr and jury testimony'") ( quoting Appeal of 
Starkey, 600 F.2d 1043, 1048 (CA8 1979)). 
16For purposes of this case, we assume that the grand 
jury transcripts are inadmissible as evidence in a civil 
trial because the testimony is not subject to cross 
examination. Cf. Fed. R. Evid. 80 3 (8) (hear say exception 
for certain public records); Fed. R. Evid. 804(a) (1) 
(witness unavailable when exempted from testifying on 
ground of privilege); Fed. R. Evid. 804(b) (1) (former 
testimony admissible when witness unavailable and the 
party against whom the testimony is now of fered~d an 
opportunity for cross examination). 
17. 
seek the truth. To the extent this right is limited or 
denied, admissibility objections are likely to be 
f sustained. 171 Petitioners recognize this problem, but 
Vi~ maintain that the anti trust defendants "would be entitled 
~ I~ ·,Y to test the accuracy and truthfulness of Conboy' s repeated 
A At ~, ~ immunized testimony without going beyond the confines of 17-7 that testimony." Regardless of any limitations that may 
1 ~ 
~ 
be imposed on its scope, 18 however, cross examination is 
intended to and often will produce information that wa7 
not elicited on direct. -Tfius, ±-n deciding whether_ the 
W vernment mav use Conbov' s answ~rs in a ct iminal 
prosecution against him, :e must assume that, to produce 
admissible evidence, the scope of cross examination at the 
deposition cannot easily be limited to~ ng gerbatim 
~ the immunized testimony. This <~ssumption 
p 
17cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (1) (stating N1 epositr 
be taken "if the information sought appears rea~onably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of adm Assible 
evidence"); Fed. R. Civ. P. 30 (c) (allowing 
examination at depositions); Fed. R. Civ. P. 
(deposition "admissible under the rules of evi~ nce 
applied as though the witness were then present and 
testifying"); Fed. R. Evid. 804 (b) (1) (deposi ion 
admissible if the party against whom the testimony is now 
offered in a ci vi 1 act ion had an opportunity to dev lop 
testimony by cross examination). 
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B. 
Use immunity was in tended to immunize and exclude 
a subsequent criminal trial only that information to 27 ! 
which the ~ overnment expressly has surrendered future use. 
If the ~ overnment is engaged in an ongoing investigation 
of the particular activity at issue, immunizing new 
information (e. g., the answers to questions in a case 
like this one) may make it more difficult to show in a 28 1 
subsequent prosecution that similar 
obtained from wholly independent 
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Petitioners' interpretation of §6002 also places 
substantial risks on the deponent. Unless the grant of 
immunity assures a witness that his incriminating 
testimony will not be used against him in a subsequent 
criminal prosecution, the witness has not received the 
full protection of his Fifth Amendment privilege that he 
has been forced to exchange. No court has authority to 
immunize a witness. That responsibility, as we have 
noted, is peculiarly an executive one, and only the 
Attorney General or a designated officer of the Department 
of Justice has authority to grant use immunity. See 18 
U.S.C. §§6002, 6003. Nor can a court, at the time of the 
19we need not decide whether United States Attorneys 
presently have authority to immunize the testimony of a 
witness in a ci vi 1 proceeding when the /government 
determines that the public interest would be se't'ved. Cf. 
18 U.S.C. §6002 (can compel testimony "[w]henever a 
witness refuses" to testify "in a proceeding before or 
ancillary to •.• a court ••• of the United State,"): id., 
§6003 (may compel testimony @overnment believes "maybe 
necessary to the public interest"): 116 Cong. Rec. 36,293 
(1970) (statement of Sen. Hruska) (reading §6002 as 
"enabl[ing] the Government in~ court ... proceeding" to 
compel testimony) (emphasis added): 116 Cong. Rec. 853 
(1970) (statement of Sen. Young) (" [T]he power of the 
district attorney to compel a witness to testify 
is .•.• apparently available in any case in a federal court, 
including civil actions between private parties.") 
(quoting from a memorandum prepared by the American Civil 
Liberties Union). If this authority exists, it could 
resolve the problem here presented in many civil cases in 




civil testimony, pre-determine the decision of the court 31 
in a subsequent criminal prosecution on the question 
whether the @:'vernment has met its burden of proving "that 
the evidence it proposes to use is derived from a 
legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled 
testimony." Kastigar, 406 U.S., at 460. Yet in holding 3. 
Conboy in contempt for his Fifth Amendment silence, the 
~ 
District Court li~e essentially predicted that a court in 
any future criminal prosecution of Conboy will be 
obligated to protect against evidentiary use of the 
deposition testimony petitioners seek. We do not think 3. 
such a predictive judgment is enough. 
If we simply were to assume, as petitioners urge, 
µ- J,De1 ~ at the court hearing the criminal case will be able to 
LI. ; A 7 . ,., ~ 
~ ,,c ? . r ~· exclude wrongfully produced evidence, cf. Maness v. 
Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 474-475 (1975) (WHITE, J., 
J7,A-~ 
concurring in the result): Murphy, 378 U.S., at 79, our 
r~~'~ I concerns would be diminished. But such an assumption 
)!.tz, t would not justify the compulsion sought by petitioners 
We do not think it appropriate to rely 
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21. 
distinguish between the protection afforded a witness by a 
grant of statutory immunity that contemporaneously 
supplants the Fifth Amendment protection, and a judicial 
exclusionary rule that may be applied at a later date to 
remedy judicial error in compelling certain testimony. 331 
See Kastigar, 406 u. s., at 470 (MARSHALL, J. , 
dissenting) . 20 Moreover, judicial exclusion of 
nonimmunized testimony would be inconsistent with the 
congressional policy of leaving the granting of immunity 
to the executive branch. Je_/ -1,, ~ ~ 5f -'1 ~ L" 
r ,1~, 
~~~ 
\~ -,.f '1 .tt,. ~ ' ~H, ~ &. y:1- c.r-,.1, · ti IV ~ :!,m!::t 
This Court has emphasized the importance of the L 
private action as a means of furthering the policy goals 
of certain federal regulatory statutes, including the 
federal antitrust laws. See, e. g., Perma Life Mufflers, 
Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 
20we believe Conboy acted properly in maintaining his 
silence in the face of the District Court's compulsion 
order and by testing the validity of his privilege on 
appeal. "The Court has held that an individual under 
compulsion to make disclosures as a witness who revealed 
information instead of claiming the privilege lost the 
benefit of the privilege." Garner v. United States, 424 
U.S. 648, 653 (1976) (citing United States v. Kordel, 397 
U.S. 1, 7-10 (1970)). 
34 
22. 
(1968); United States v. Borden Co., 347 U.S. 514, 518-519 
(1954). But private civil actions can only supplement, 
~ 
not supplant, the primary responsibility of;\@'vernment. C6f 
Petitioners' proposed construction of §600?, wbi.le cominE:J- 34 1 
,~1V~ w..iehin the language of the scetio:t-sweeps further than 
~ "' ';f),M 
j ~ v" 
tv (L 
.:t. 
Congress intended and could ;n~ overnm~ c.:!. 
lawst It • ~ 1,~ enforcement of its criminal 
T~_.:~ '1 deponent in some danger of criminal prosecution unless he 
~',yvl j, 
receives an assurance of immunity or exclusion that the 351 
courts cannot properly give. !"ihally, 1t tails to farther 
eJ._ther o.f .th.e exclusionary rule's goals ef deterring -
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j_udiciary's "clean hands. n. Silence, on the other hand, 
preserves the deponent's rights and the ~ vernment's 35 
,, 
interests, as well as the judicial 
otherwise be required 1° ~ ~ mak~ the many difficult 
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We hold that a deponent's civil deposition testimony, 
ade without an express governmental assurance of immunity 36 1 
time, is not "information directly or indirectly 
derived from" the immunized testimony, and therefore may 
be available for use against him in a subsequent criminal 
prosectuion. The judgment of the Court of Appeals 
accordingly is 37 1 
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CHAMBERS DRAFT: Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, No. 81-825 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Pursuant to the fed er al use immunity provisions, 18 
U.S.C. §6001-6005 (1976), a United States Attorney, with 
the approval of the Attorney General, may request an order 
from a federal court compelling a witness to testify even 
though he has asserted his privilege against self-
incrimination. Section 6002 provides, however, that "no 
testimony or other information compelled under the order 
(or any information directly or indirectly derived from 
such testimony or other information) may be used against 
the witness in any criminal case .... " The issue presented 
in this case is whether a deponent's civil deposition 
testimony, repeating verbatim or closely tracking his 
prior immunized testimony, is "information" so "directly 
or indirectly derived from [the immunized] testimony" that 




Respondent John Conboy is a former executive of a 
defendant in the In re Corrugated Container Anti trust 
Litigation, M.D.L. 310 (S.D. Tex.). In January 1978, 
United States Department of Justice attorneys interviewed 
Conboy following a promise of use immunity. Conboy 
subsequently appeared before a grand jury investigating 
price-fixing activities and, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §6002, 
was granted formal use immunity for his testimony. 
Following the criminal indictment of several 
companies, numerous civil antitrust actions were filed in 
various United States district courts. Those actions were 
consolidated for discovery in the District Court for the 
Southern District of Texas. Petitioners here are 
purchasers of corrugated containers who elected to opt out 
of the class-action proceedings and pursue their own 
causes of action against manufacturers. The District 
Court ordered that portions of the immunized government 
interview and grand-jury testimony of certain witnesses, 
including that of Conboy, be made available to lawyers for 
1 the class and opt-outs. 
Footnote(s) 1 will appear on following pages. 
3. 
Pursuant to a subpoena issued by the District Court 
for the Northern District of Illinois, Conboy appeared in 
Chicago for a deposition at which he, his counsel, and 
petitioners' counsel had copies of his immunized 
testimony. The transcripts were marked as deposition 
exhibits so that all could follow the intended 
examination. The questioning fell i nto the following 
pattern: a question was read from the transcript; it then 
was rephrased to include the transcript answer (i.e., "Is 
it not the fact that .... "); finally, Conboy was asked if 
he had "so testified" in his immunized interview and 
d . . t. 2 gran -Jury exam1na 1On. Conboy refused to answer each 
question, asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege against 
1The propriety of the District Court's release of grand 
jury materials to the civil parties is not before the 
Court. 
2An example of 
follows: 
this three-question pattern is as 
Q. "Who did you have price communications 
with at Alton Box Board?" 
. . . . 
Q. Is it not the fact that you had price 
communications with Fred Renshaw and Dick 
Herman ... ? 
Q. Did you not so testify in your 
government interview of January 10, 1978? 
Joint Appendix 29-31. 
4. 
self-incrimination. 
The District Court granted petitioners' motion to 
compel Conboy to answer the questions. 3 When Conboy 
continued to claim his privilege, the District Court held 
him in contempt, but stayed its order pending appeal. A E 
panel of the Court of Appeals for the Seven th Circuit 
affirmed the contempt order, holding that, "[bJecause the 
questions asked in this deposition were taken verbatim 
from or closely tracked the transcript of Conboy's grand 
jury testimony, we believe that his answers at the E 
deposition would be 'derived from' the prior immunized 
[testimony] and therefore unavailable for use in any 
subsequent criminal prosecution." In re Corrugated 
Container Antitrust Litigation, Appeal of John Conboy, 655 
F.2d 748, 751 (CA?), rev'd en bane, 661 F.2d 1145 (1981). 
On rehearing en bane, the Court of Appeals reversed 
the District Court. It first determined that Conboy's 
alleged fear of prosecution was more than "fanciful," 661 
of the District 
Texas expressly 
Court for the 
to 28 u.s.c. 
3chief Judge John V. Singleton, Jr. 
Court for the Southern District of 
exercised the powers of the District 
Northern District of Illinois pursuant 
§1407(b). 
5. 
F.2d, at 1152, and that Conboy therefore was entitled to 
assert his Fifth Amendment privilege unless his deposition 
testimony could not be used against him in a subsequent 
criminal action, see id., at 1153. 4 The court then held 
that under §6002, absent a separate and independent grant 
of immunity, 5 a deponent's civil deposition testimony that 
repeats verbatim or closely tracks his prior immunized 
testimony is not protected. While acknowledging that 
verbatim questions "of course [would be] derived" from the 
immunized testimony, the court reasoned that the answers 
to such questions "are derived from the deponent's 
current, independent memory of events" and thus 
"necessarily create a new source of evidence" that could 
be used in a subsequent criminal prosecution against 
Conboy. Id., at 1155 (emphasis in original). 
We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict in the 
Courts of Appeals, 6 and now affirm. 
4The correctness of the Court of Appeals' 
that Conboy could assert a Fifth Amendment 
absent some immunity, is not before us. 
conclusion 
privilege, 
5A United States Attorney declined to authorize immunity 
grants in connection with the civil depositions here. 
Footnote(s) 6 will appear on following pages. 
6. 
II. 
It is settled that government must have the power to 
compel testimony "to secure information necessary for 
effective law enforcement." Murphy v. Waterfront 
Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964) . 7 For many years, 
however, a person who was compelled to testify under a 
grant of governmental immunity could not be prosecuted for 
any conduct about which he had testified. See New Jersey 
v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 457 (1979). Prosecutors 
therefore were reluctant to grant such "transactional" 1 
immunity to potential targets of criminal investigations. 
See S. Rep. No. 91-617, p. 53 (1969). 
The "major purpose" of the Organized Crime Control 
Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 927, of which 
6compare In re Corrugated Container Antitrust 
Litigation, Al:?peal of Fleischacker, 644 F.2d 70, 75 (CA2 
1981) (deposition answers immunized), and Little Rock 
School District v. Borden, Inc., 632 F.2d 700, 705 (CA8 
1980) (same), with In re Corrugated Container Anti-Trust 
Litigation, Appeal of Franey, 620 F.2d 1086, 1095 (CA5 
1980) (answers not immunized), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102 
(1981). 
7see United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 345 
(1974); United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 41 (1973) 
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting); Kastigar v. United States, 406 
U.S. 441, 443-444 (1973); Murphy, 378 U.S., at 93-94 
(WHITE, J., concurring); Blackmer v. United States, 284 
U.S. 421, 438 (1932); Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 
273, 281 (1919); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 600 
(1896). 
7. 
§600 2 was a key provision, was "to provide the criminal 11 
justice system with the necessary legal tools 
to ... strengthen[J the evidence gathering process and 
insur [e] that the evidence will then be available and 
admissible at trial." 116 Cong . Rec . 3 5 , 2 0 0 ( 19 7 0 ) 
(statement of Rep. St. Germain). Congress sought to make 1 
the immunity tool more useful for law enforcement officers 
through two specific changes. First, Congress made the 
grant of immunity less expansive8 by repealing the 
authority for transactional immunity and providing for the 
less comprehensive use immunity authorized in §6002. 9 1 
8 In Murphy, JUSTICE WHITE stated that "[i]mmunity must 
be as broad as, but not harmfully and wastefully broader 
than, the privilege against self-incrimination." 378 
U.S., at 107 (concurring opinion) (quoted with approval in 
116 Cong. Rec. 35,291 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff)). 
In its committee report, the House explained that §6002 
was not to provide an "immunity bath," but was to be "no 
broader than" the Fifth Amendment privilege. H.R. No. 91-
1549, p. 5 (1970). 
9section 6002 provides: 
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of 
his privilege against self-incrimination, to 
testify or provide other information in a 
proceeding before or ancillary to--
( 1) a court or gr and jury of the United 
States, 
(2) an agency of the United States, or 
(3) either House of Congress, a joint 
committee of the two Houses, or a committee 
or a subcommittee of either House 
and the person presiding over the proceeding 
communicates to the witness an order issued 
Footnote continued on next page. 
8. 
Second, Congress gave certain officials in the Department 
of Justice10 exclusive authority to grant immunities. 11 
under this part, the witness may not refuse to 
comply with the order on the basis of his 
privilege against self-incrimination; but no 
testimony or other information compelled under 
the order (or any information directly or 
indirectly derived from such testimony or other 
information) may be used against the witness in 
any criminal case, except a prosecution for 
perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise 
failing to comply with the order. 
Section 6001(2) defines "other information" to include 
"any book, paper, document, record, recording, or other 
material." 
10section 6003 states: 
(a) In the case of any individual who has 
been or may be called to testify or provide 
other information at any proceeding before or 
ancillary to a court of the United States or a 
grand jury of the United States, the United 
States district court for the judicial district 
in which the proceeding is or may be held shall 
issue, in accordance with subsection (b) of this 
section, upon the request of the United States 
attorney for such district, an order requiring 
such individual to give testimony or provide 
other information which he refuses to give or 
provide on the basis of his privilege against 
self-incrimination, such order to become 
effective as provided in section 6002 of this 
part. 
(b) A United States attorney may, with the 
approval of the Attorney Gener al, the Deputy 
Attorney General, or any designated Assistant 
Attorney General, request an order under 
subsection (a) of this section when in his 
judgment--
(1) the testimony or other information from 
such individual may be necessary to the 
public interest; and 
(2) such individual has refused or is 
likely to refuse to testify or provide 
other information on the basis of his 
privilege against self-incrimination. 
11congress foresaw the courts as playing only 
role in the immunizing process: "The court's 
granting the order is merely to find the facts 





The Court upheld the constitutionality of the use 
immunity statute in Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 
441 (1972). The power to compel testimony is limited by 1 
the Fifth Amendment, and we held that any grant of 
immunity must be co-extensive with the privilege. We were 
satisfied, however, that §6002 provided this measure of 
protection and thus "removed the dangers against which the 
privilege protects." Id., at 449. In rejecting the 1 
argument that use and derivative-use immunity would not 
adequately protect a witness from various incriminating 
uses of the compelled testimony, we emphasized that" [t]he 
statute provides a sweeping proscription of any use, 
direct or indirect, of the compelled testimony and any 1 
information derived therefrom •.•• " Id., at 460. We added 
that once a defendant establishes that he has testified 
under a grant of immunity, "the prosecution [has] the 
affirmative duty to prove that the evidence it proposes to 
the order is predicated." H.R. Rep. No. 91-1549, supra 
note 8, at 43; H.R. Rep. No. 91-1188, p. 13 (1970). See 
116 Cong. Rec. 35,291 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff). 
Cf. President's Commission on Law Enforcement and 
Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a 
Free Society 141 (1967) (recommending that "[i]mmunity 
should be granted only with the prior approval of the 
jurisdiction's chief prosecuting officer."). 
10. 
use is derived from a legitimate source wholly independent 1 
of the compel led testimony." Id. Thus, "immunity from 
use and derivative use should 'leave[] the witness and the 
Federal Government in substantially the same position as 
if the witness had claimed his privilege' in the absence 
of a grant of immunity." Kastigar, 406 U.S., at 458-459 1 
(quoting Murphy, 378 U.S., at 79). 
III. 
With the foregoing statutory history and relevant 
principles in mind, we turn now to this case. It is not 
disputed that the questions asked of Conboy were directly 1 
or indirectly derived from his immunized testimony. The 
issue is whether the causal connection between the 
questions and the answers is so direct that the answers 
also are derived from that testimony and therefore should 
be excluded under the grant of immunity. 1 
Petitioners' argument is based on the language of 
§6002 and on a common understanding of the words "derived 
from." The questions formulated on the basis of immunized 
testimony are clearly "derived from" the prior testimony. 
Thus, the answers, that repeat verbatim or closely track a 1 
11. 
deponent's testimony, are necessarily also "derived from" 
and "tainted by" such testimony. Petitioners therefore 
find no basis for the distinction made by the Court of 
Appeals between questions and answers responsive to those 
same questions. An answer by its very nature is evoked by 1 
and responds to information contained in a question. 
Conboy's position is also straightforward: Questions 
do not incriminate; answers do. Unlike the questions, 
answers are not directly or indirectly derived from the 
immunized grand jury or interview transcripts, but from 1 
the deponent's current, independent memory of events. 
Even when a deponent's deposition answers are identical to 
those he gave to the grand jury, he is under oath to tell 
the truth, not necessarily as he told it before the grand 
jury, but as he knows it now. Each new statement of the 1 
deponent creates a new "source." In sum, the initial 
grant of immunity does not prevent the prosecutor from 
prosecuting; it merely limits his sources of evidence. 
The language of the statute permits either parties' 
interpretation and compels neither. The broad wording of 1 
§6002, and our interpretation of it in Kastigar, suggests 
12. 
that we should hesitate to exclude information from the 
coverage of the immunity grant that admittedly has a close 
tie with the immunized testimony. In the end, however, 
whether particular information is "derived from" immunized 1 
materials, is "fruit" of "tainted" information, or is the 
product of a "new source" are conclusions that "may 
conceal concrete complexities." Nardone v. United States, 
308 U .s. 338, 341 (1939). As the Court has noted: 
"Sophisticated argument may prove a causal connection 1 
between information obtained through [the unlawful 
governmental conduct] and the Government's proof. As a 
matter of good sense, however, such connection may have 
become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint." Id. We 
believe that rather than adopting a conclusory label for 1 
the deposition testimony, it is desirable to determine 
which of the two interpretations of §6002 more 
satisfactorily accommodates the Government's need for 
admissible evidence and the individual's interest in 
avoiding self-incrimination. 12 1 
12see Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 
287 (1977) (" [T]he proper test to apply .•. is one 
Footnote continued on next page. 
13. 
~lthough there may be practical reasons for not 
testifying, 13 as far as the deponent' s Fi £th Amendment 
right is concerned he should be indifferent between the 
protection afforded by silence and that afforded by 
immunity. He is interested, however, in that the 201 
protection given by the privilege or the grant of immunity 
is certain. Moreover, the Government's interests may be 
affected seriously by the choice. Our specific inquiry 
then is whether petitioners can satisfy their need for 
admissible evidence without threatening the Government's 20 1 
interest in limiting the scope of an immunity grant or 
encroaching upon the deponent's certainty of protection. 
A. 
Questions taken verbatim from a transcript of 
which •.. protects against the invasion of constitutional 
rights without commanding undesirable consequences not 
necessary to the assurance of those rights.") ; Brown v. 
Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604 (1975) (reversing because 
state court failed "to evaluate the circumstances of the 
case in light of the policy served by the exclusionary 
rule"); Murphy, 378 U.S., at 79 (stating an exclusionary 
rule "to implement [Fifth Amendment] and accommodate the 
interests of the ..• Government[] in investigating and 
prosecuting crime"). See generally C. Whitebread, 
Criminal Procedure §2.04, at 37 (1980). 
13Besides the costs of testifying against close 
associates, any witness increases the risk of committing 
perjury the more he talks. Cf. 18 u.s.c. §6002 (perjured 
testimony not immunized). 
14. 
immunized testimony could evoke one of several responses 21( 
from a deponent: (i) he could repeat or adopt his 
. . d 14 1mmun1ze answer; (ii) he could affirm that the 
transcript of his immunized answers accurately reflects 
his prior testimony; (iii) he could recall additional 
information responsive to the question but not disclosed 21! 
in his immune testimony; or (iv) he could disclose 
information that is not responsive to the question. 
Petitioners do not contend, nor could they, that the prior 
grant of use immunity affords protection for all self-
incriminating information disclosed by the immunized 221 
witnesses on ~ occasion after the giving of the 
immunized testimony. Rather, petitioners argue that only 
the first three responses would be "derived from" his 
immune testimony and therefore would be unavailable for 
use against the deponent in any subsequent criminal 22 1 
prosecution. 
Petitioners' premise is that the deposition of Conboy 
14The extreme case would be where petitioners read the 
entire immunized grand jury transcript; then ask the 
witness if that is his testimony; and he answers simply 
"Yes." 
15. 
is designed not to discover new information, 15 but to 
obtain evidence that simply repeats the statements in the 
immunized transcript. 16 Because there will be little 231 
opportunity for the grant of immunity to sweep in 
statements on direct examination that the Government did 
not intend to immunize, or for the deponent to give 
responses that may fall outside of the grant of immunity 
and later be used against him in a subsequent criminal 23! 
prosecution, Conboy's deposition will yield only a carbon 
copy of the grand-jury transcript. In such a situation, 
15Direct examination may not be as limited as petitioners 
assume. The District Court's civil contempt order stated 
that the questions asked in the deposition "were taken 
directly" from the immunized transcripts, but did not 
define exactly what deposition questions petitioners could 
ask. Other Courts of Appeals have permitted direct 
questioning to go beyond mere restatements of the prior 
testimony. See In re Corru ated Container Antitrust 
Litigation, Appeal o F e1sc acer, F. , CA 
1981) (compelling answers to questions "concerning 
specific subjects that actually were touched upon by 
questions appearing in the transcript of the immunized 
testimony"): Little Rock School District v. Borden, Inc., 
632 F. 2d 700, 705 (CA8 1980) (compelling answers as long 
as deposition questions confined to "'the same time, 
geographical and substantive frame work as the [witness' 
immunized) grand jury testimony"') (quoting Appeal of 
Starkey, 600 F.2d 1043, 1048 (CA8 1979)). 
16For purposes of this case, we assume that the grand 
jury transcripts are inadmissible as evidence in a civil 
trial because the testimony is not subject to cross 
examination. Cf. Fed. R. Evid. 803(8) (hearsay exception 
for certain public records): Fed. R. Evid. 804(a) (1) 
(witness unavailable when exempted from testifying on 
ground of privilege): Fed. R. Evid. 804 (b) (1) (former 
testimony admissible when witness unavailable and the 
party against whom the testimony is now of fered--i:iad an 
opportunity for cross examination). 
16. 
it would be desirable that civil plaintiffs, particularly 
those bringing private suits that supplement the criminal 
enforcement of the federal antitrust laws, have access to 241 
the available, probative information. 
But even if the direct examination is limited to the 
questions and answers in the immunized transcript, there 
remains the right of cross examination, 17 a right 
traditionally relied upon expansively to test credibility 24 1 
as well as to seek the truth. Petitioners recognize this 
problem, but maintain that the antitrust defendants "would 
be entitled to test the accuracy and truthfulness of 
Conboy's repeated immunized testimony without going beyond 
the confines of that testimony." Regardless of any 
limitations that may be imposed on its scope, 18 however, 
17cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26{b) (1) {stating that depositions 
may be taken "if the information sought appears reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 
evidence"); Fed. R. Civ. P. 30 {c) {allowing cross 
examination at depositions); Fed. R. Civ. P. 32{a) 
{deposition "admissible under the rules of evidence 
applied as though the witness were then present and 
testifying"); Fed. R. Evid. 804 {b) (1) {deposition 
admissible if the party against whom the testimony is now 
offered in a civil action had an opportunity to develop 
testimony by cross examination). 
18see United States v. Cardillo, 316 F.2d 606, 611 {CA2 
1963) { in determining whether testimony of a witness who 
invokes the privilege during cross examination may be used 
against deft, draws a distinction between cases in which 
the assertion of the privilege merely precludes inquiry 
Footnote continued on next page. 
25 1 
17. 
cross examination is intended to and often will produce 
information not elicited on direct. We must assume that, 
to produce admissible evidence, the scope of cross 
examination at the deposition cannot easily be limited to 25 1 
the immunized testimony. This assumption implicates both 
the Government's and the individual's interests embodied 
in §6002. 
B. 
Use immunity was intended to immunize and exclude 26 1 
from a subsequent criminal trial only that information to 
which the Government expressly has surrendered future use. 
If the Government is engaged in an ongoing investigation 
of the particular activity at issue, immunizing new 
information (e. g., the answers to questions in a case 26 ~ 
like this one) may make it more difficult to show in a 
subsequent prosecution that similar information was 
obtained from wholly independent sources. A District 
Court's grant of immunity in a subsequent civil proceeding 
into collateral matters that bear on credibility of 
witnesses and those in which assertion prevents inquiry 
into matters about which witness testified on direct). 
18. 
in effect could invest the deponent with transactional 27( 
immunity on matters about which he testified at the 
immunized proceedings. This is precisely the kind of 
immunity Congress intended to prohibit. The purpose of 
§6002 was to limit the scope of immunity to the level that 
is constitutionally required, as well as to limit the use 27 
of immunity to those cases in which designated executive 
off ice rs determine that gaining the witness' testimony 
outweighs the loss of the opportunity for criminal 
prosecution of that witness. 19 
c. 
Petitioners' interpretation of §6002 also places 
substantial risks on the deponent. Unless the grant of 
19we need not decide whether United States Attorneys 
presently have authority to immunize the testimony of a 
witness in a civil proceeding when the Government 
determines that the public interest would be served. Cf. 
18 U.S.C. §6002 (can compel testimony "[w]henever a 
witness refuses" to testify "in a proceeding before or 
ancillary to .•. a court ... of the United State,"); id., 
§6003 (may compel testimony Government believes "may be 
necessary to the public interest"); 116 Cong. Rec. 36,293 
(197 0) (statement of Sen. Hruska) (reading §600 2 as 
"enabl[ing] the Government in~ court •.. proceeding" to 
compel testimony) (emphasis added); 116 Cong. Rec. 853 
(1970) (statement of Sen. Young) (" [T]he power of the 
district attorney to compel a witness to testify 
is ...• apparently available in any case in a federal court, 
including civil actions between private parties.") 
(quoting from a memorandum prepared by the American Civil 
Liberties Union). If this authority exists, it could 
resolve the problem here presented in many civil cases in 
which the immunity issue is raised. 
281 
19. 
immunity assures a witness that his incriminating 
testimony will not be used against him in a subsequent 
criminal prosecution, the witness has not received the 28 1 
certain protection of his Fifth Amendment privilege that 
he has been forced to exchange. No court has authority to 
immunize a witness. That responsibility, as we have 
noted, is peculiarly an executive one, and only the 
Attorney General or a designated officer of the Department 29 1 
of Justice has authority to grant use immunity. See 18 
U.S.C. §§6002, 6003. Nor can a court, at the time of the 
civil testimony, pre-determine the decision of the court 
in a subsequent criminal prosecution on the question 
whether the Government has met its burden of proving "that 29 1 
the evidence it proposes to use is derived from a 
legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled 
testimony." Kastigar, 406 U.S., at 460. Yet in holding 
Conboy in contempt for his Fifth Amendment silence, the 
District Court below essentially predicted that a court in 30 1 
any future criminal prosecution of Conboy will be 
obligated to protect against evidentiary use of the 
deposition testimony petitioners seek. We do not think 
20. 
such a predictive judgment is enough. As the Court stated 
in Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449 (1975), compelling a 30~ 
witness to testify in "reliance upon a later objection or 
motion to suppress would 'let the cat out' with no 
assurance whatever of putting it back." Id., at 463. 
If we simply were to assume, as petitioners urge, 
that the court hearing the criminal case will be able to 31( 
exclude wrongfully compelled evidence, cf. id., at 474-475 
(WHITE, J., concurring in the result); Murphy, 378 U.S., 
at 79, Conboy's uncertainty might be diminished, but not 
eliminated, cf. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 373 
(1951). Conboy could face prosecutorial challeges that he 31~ 
waived his privilege and that the testimony was not 
wrongfully compelled. Reliance on an exclusionary rule 
would also implicate the Government's interests. Judicial 
exclusion of nonimmunized testimony would be inconsistent 
with the congressional policy of leaving the granting of 32( 
immunity to the executive branch. Moreover, the 
necessarily broad scope of a judicial exclusionary rule 
that provides certain protection to the deponent would 
frustrate congressional intent to grant no more immunity 
21. 
than the Constitution requires. 32: 
"The Court has held that an individual under 
compulsion to make disclosures as a witness who revealed 
information instead of claiming the privilege lost the 
benefit of the privilege." Garner v. United States, 424 
U.S. 648, 653 (1976) (citing United States v. Kordel, 397 33( 
U.S. 1, 7-10 (1970)). We believe Conboy acted properly in 
maintaining his silence in the face of the District 
Court's compulsion order and by testing the validity of 
his privilege on appeal. 
IV. 33: 
This Court has emphasized the importance of the 
private action as a means of furthering the policy goals 
of certain federal regulatory statutes, including the 
federal antitrust laws. See, e. g., Perma Life Mufflers, 
Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 34( 
(1968): United States v. Borden Co., 347 U.S. 514, 518-519 
(1954) . But private civil actions can only supplement, 
not supplant, the primary responsibility of Government. 
Petitioners' proposed construction of §6002 sweeps further 
than Congress intended and could hinder governmental 34: 
22. 
enforcement of its criminal laws by turning use immunity 
into a form of transactional immunity for subjects 
examined in the immunized proceeding. It also puts the 
deponent in some danger of criminal prosecution unless he 
receives an assurance of immunity or exclusion that the 35( 
courts cannot properly give. Silence, on the other hand, 
preserves the deponent's rights and the Government's 
interests, as well as the judicial resources that 
otherwise would be required to make the many difficult 
judgments that petitioners' interpretation of §6002 would 35~ 
require. 
V. 
We hold that a deponent's civil deposition testimony, 
made without an express governmental assurance of immunity 
at the time, is not "information directly or indirectly 36( 
derived from" the immunized testimony, and therefore may 
be available for use against him in a subsequent criminal 
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Pursuant to the federal use immunity provisions, 18 
U.S. C. §6001-6005 (1976), a United States Attorney, JJ.rita 0 
~ tnea pproval7Yf-the~Attorney-{ienera-I, may request an order 
from a federal court compelling a witness to testify even 
though he has asserted his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. Section 6002 provides, however, that "no testimony or 
other information compelled under the order (or any informa-
tion · directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or 
other information) may be used against the witness in any 
criminal case. . . . " The issue presented in this case is 
whether a deponent's civil deposition testimony, repeating 
verbatim or closely tracking his prior immunized testimony, 
is "information" so "directly or indirectly derived from [the 
immunized] testimony" that it cannot be used against the wit-
ness in a subsequent criminal prosecution. 
I 
Respondent John Conboy is a former executive of a defend-
ant in the In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 
M.D.L. 310 (S.D. Tex.). In January 1978, United States 
Department of Justice attorneys interviewed Conboy follow-
. ing a promise of use immunity. Conboy subsequently ap-
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ties and, pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 6002, was granted formal 
use immunity for his testimony. 
Following the criminal indictment of several companies, 
numerous civil antitrust actions were filed in various United 
States district courts. Those actions were consolidated for 
discovery in the District Court for the Southern District of 
Texas. Petitioners here are purchasers of corrugated con-
tainers who elected to opt out of the class-action proceedings 
and pursue their own causes of action against manufacturers. 
The District Court ordered that portions of the immunized 
government interview and grand-jury testimony of certain 
witnesses, including that of Conboy, be made available to 
lawyers for the class and opt-outs. 1 
Pursuant to a subpoena issued by the District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois, Conboy appeared in Chicago for 
a deposition at which he, his counsel, and petitioners' counsel 
had copies of his immunized testimony. The transcripts 
were marked as deposition exhibits so that all could follow 
the intended examination. The questioning fell into the fol-
lowing pattern: a question was read from the transcript; it 
then was rephrased to include the transcript answer (i. e., "Is 
it not the fact that .... "); finally, Conboy was asked if he had 
"so testified" in his immunized interview and grand-jury 
examination. 2 Conboy refused to answer each question, as-
serting his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. 
1 The propriety of the District Court's release of grand jury materials to 
the civil parties is not before the Court. 
2 An example of this three-question pattern is as follows: 
Q. "Who did you have price communications with at Alton Box Board?" 
Q. Is it not the fact that you had price communications with Fred 
Renshaw and Dick Herman ... ? 
Q. Did you not so testify in your government interview of January 10, 
1978? 
Joint Appendix 29--31. 
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The District Court granted petitioners' motion to compel 
Conboy to answer the questions. 3 When Conboy continued 
to claim his privilege, the District Court held him in con-
tempt, but stayed its order pending appeal. A panel of the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the con-
tempt order, holding that, "[b]ecause the questions asked in 
this deposition were taken verbatim from or closely tracked 
the transcript of Conboy's grand jury testimony, we believe 
that his answers at the deposition would be 'derived from' the 
prior immunized [testimony] and therefore unavailable for 
use in any subsequent criminal prosecution." In re Corru-
gated Container Antitrust Litigation, Appeal of John 
Conboy, 655 F. 2d 748, 751 (CA7), rev'd en bane, 661 F. 2d 
1145 (1981). 
On rehearing en bane, the Court of Appeals reversed the 
District Court. It first determined that Conboy's alleged 
fear of prosecution was more than "fanciful," 661 F. 2d, at 
1152, and that Conboy therefore was entitled to assert his 
Fifth Amendment privilege unless his deposition testimony 
could not be used against him in a subsequent criminal action, 
see id., at 1153. 4 The court then held that under § 6002, ab-
sent a separate and independent grant of immunity, 5 a depo-
nent's civil deposition testimony that repeats verbatim or 
closely tracks his prior immunized testimony is not protected. 
While acknowledging that verbatim questions "of course 
[would be] derived" from the immunized testimony, the court 
reasoned that the answers to such questions "are derived 
from the deponent's current, independent memory of events" 
and thus "necessarily create a new source of evidence" that 
3 Chief Judge John V. Singleton, Jr. of the District Court for the South-
ern District of Texas expressly exercised the powers of the District Court 
for the Northern District of Illinois pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1407(b). 
' The correctness of the Court of Appeals' conclusion that Conboy could 
assert a Fifth Amendment privilege, absent some immunity, is not before 
us. 
5 A United States Attorney declined to authorize immunity grants in 
connection with the civil depositions here. 
4 
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could be used in a subsequent criminal prosecution against 
Conboy. Id., at 1155 (emphasis in original). 
We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict in the Courts 
of Appeals, 6 and now affirm. 
II 
It is settled that government must have the power to com-
pel testimony "to secure information necessary for effective 
law enforcement." Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 
U. S. 52, 79 (1964). 7 For many years, however, a person 
who was compelled to testify under a grant of governmental 
immunity could not be prosecuted for any conduct about 
which he had testified. See New Jersey v. Portash, 440 
U. S. 450, 457 (1979). Prosecutors therefore were reluctant 
to grant such "transactional" immunity to potential targets of 
criminal investigations. See S. Rep. No. 91-617, p. 53 
(1969). 
The "major purpose" of the Organized Crime Control Act 
of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 927, of which § 6002 was 
a key provision, was "to provide the criminal justice system 
with the necessary legal tools to . . . strengthen[] the evi-
dence gathering process and insur[e] that the evidence will 
then be available and admissible at trial." 116 Cong. Rec. 
35,200 (1970) (statement of Rep. St. Germain). Congress 
sought to make the immunity tool more useful for law en-
6 Compare In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, Appeal of 
Fleischacker, 644 F. 2d 70, 75 (CA2 1981) (deposition answers immunized), 
and Little Rock School District v. Borden, Inc., 632 F. 2d 700, 705 (CA8 
1980) (same), with In re Corrugated Container Anti-Trust Litigation, Ap-
peal of Franey, 620 F. 2d 1086, 1095 (CA5 1980) (answers not immunized), 
cert. denied, 449 U. S. 1102 (1981). 
1 See United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 345 (1974); United 
States v. Mara, 410 U. S. 19, 41 (1973) (MARSHALL, J. , dissenting); 
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U. S. 441, 443-444 (1973); Murphy, 378 
U. S., at 93-94 (WHITE, J., concurring); Blackmer v. United States, 284 
U. S. 421, 438 (1932); Blair v. United States, 250 U. S. 273, 281 (1919); 
Br<YWn v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 600 (1896). 
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forcement officers through two specific changes. First, Con-
gress made the grant of immunity less expansive 8 by repeal-
ing the authority for transactional immunity and providing 
for the less comprehensive use immunity authorized in 
§ 6002. 9 Second, Congress gave certain officials in the De-
partment of Justice 10 exclusive authority to grant 
immunities. 11 
8 In Murphy, JUSTICE WHITE stated that "[i]mmunity must be as broad 
as, but not harmfully and wastefully broader than, the privilege against 
self-incrimination." 378 U. S., at 107 (concurring opinion) (quoted with 
approval in 116 Cong. Rec. 35,291 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff)). In its 
committee report, the House explained that § 6002 was not to provide an 
"immunity bath," but was to be "no broader than" the Fifth Amendment 
privilege. H. R. No. 91-1549, p. 5 (1970). 
9 Section 6002 provides: 
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-
incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding be-
fore or ancillary to-
(1) a court or grand jury of the United States, 
(2) an agency of the United States, or 
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses, or a 
committee or a subcommittee of either House 
and the person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the witness 
an order issued under this part, the witness may not refuse to comply with 
the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but notes-
timony or other information compelled under the order (or any information 
directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) 
may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution 
for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with 
the order. 
Section 6001(2) defines "other information" to include "any book, paper, 
document, record, recording, or other material." 
10 Section 6003 states: 
(a) In the case of any individual who has been or may be called to testify 
or provide other information at any proceeding before or ancillary to a 
court of the United States or a grand jury of the United States, the United 
States district court for the judicial district in which the proceeding is or 
may be held shall issue, in accordance with subsection (b) of this section, 
upon the request of the United States attorney for such district, an order 
6 
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The Court upheld the constitutionality of the use immunity 
statute in Kastigar v. United States, 406 U. S. 441 (1972). 
The power to compel testimony is limited by the Fifth 
Amendment, and we held that any grant of immunity must 
be co-extensive with the privilege. We were satisfied, how-
ever, that § 6002 provided this measure of protection and 
thus "removed the dangers against which the privilege pro-
tects." Id., at 449. In rejecting the argument that use and 
derivative-use immunity would not adequately protect a wit-
ness from various incriminating uses of the compelled testi-
mony, we emphasized that "[t]he statute provides a sweeping 
proscription of any use, direct or indirect, of the compelled 
testimony and any information derived therefrom. . . . " Id., 
at 460. We added that once a defendant establishes that he 
has testified under a grant of immunity, "the prosecution 
[has] the affirmative duty to prove that the evidence it pro-
poses to use is derived from a legitimate source wholly inde-
pendent of the compelled testimony." Id. Thus, "immunity 
from use and derivative use should 'leave[] the witness and 
the Federal Government in substantially the same position as 
if the witness had claimed his privilege' in the absence of a 
grant of immunity." Kastigar, 406 U. S., at 458-459 (quot-
ing Murphy, 378 U. S., at 79). 
requiring such individual to give testimony or provide other information 
which he refuses to give or provide on the basis of his privilege against self-
incrimination, such order to become effective as provided in section 6002 of 
this part. 
(b) A United States attorney may, with the approval of the Attorney 
General, the Deputy Attorney General, or any designated Assistant Attor-
ney General, request an order under subsection (a) of this section when in 
his judgment-
(1) the testimony or other information from such individual may be nec-
essary to the public interest; and 
(2) such individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide 
other information on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination. 
11 Congress foresaw the courts as playing only a minor role in the immu-
nizing process: "The court's role in granting the order is merely to find the 
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7 
With the foregoing statutory history and relevant princi-
ples in mind, we turn now to this case. It is not disputed 
that the questions asked of Conboy were directly or indi-
rectly derived from his immunized testimony. The issue is 
whether the causal connection between the questions and the 
answers is so direct that the answers also are derived from 
that testimony and therefore should be excluded under the 
grant of immunity. 
Petitioners' argument is based on the language of § 6002 
and on a common understanding of the words "derived from." 
The questions formulated on the basis of immunized testi-
mony are clearly "derived from" the prior testimony. Thus, 
the answers, that repeat verbatim or closely track a depo-
nent's testimony, are necessarily also "derived from" and 
"tainted by" such testimony. Petitioners therefore find no 
basis for the distinction made by the Court of Appeals. be-
tween questions 'and answers responsive to those same ques-
tions. An answer by its very nature is evoked by and re-
sponds to information contained in a question. 
Conboy's position is also straightforward: Questions do not 
incriminate; answers do. Unlike the questions, answers are 
not directly or indirectly derived from the immunized grand 
jury or interview transcripts, but from the deponent's cur-
rent, independent memory of events. Even when a depo-
nent's deposition answers are identical to those he gave to 
the grand jury, he is under oath to tell the truth, not neces-
sarily as he told it before the grand jury, but as he knows it 
facts on which the order is predicated." H. R. Rep. No. 91-1549, supa 
note 8, at 43; H. R. Rep. No. 91-1188, p. 13 (1970). See 116 Cong. Rec. 
35,291 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff). Cf. President's Commission on 
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime 
in a Free Society 141 (1967) (recommending that "[i]mmunity should be 
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now. Each new statement of the deponent creates a new 
"source." In sum, the initial grant of immunity does not pre-
vent the prosecutor from prosecuting; it merely limits his ----.._ 
sources of evidence. V\. 1 s ) . 
The language of the statute permits either p e ' inter- 0 - - ..,........'\ W-
pretation and compels neither. The broad wording of§ 6002, ~-r-1- .f.,,.... ~ 
and our interpretation of it in Kastigar, suggests that we -:I, G-e.. t,li.A ~ 
should hesitate to exclude information from the coverage of ~ lr, L ~ 
the immunity grant that admittedly has a close tie with the <, h ~ 0 
immunized testimony. In the end, however, whether par- v- ) ~ 
ticular information is "derived from" immunized materials, is <1::, 
"fruit" of "tainted" information, or is the product of a "new 
source" are conclusions that "may conceal concrete complex-
ities." Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338, 341 (1939). 
As the Court has noted: "Sophisticated argument may prove 
a causal connection between information obtained through 
[the unlawful governmental conduct] and the Government's 
proof. As a matter of good sense, however, such connection 
may have become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint." 
Id. We believe that rather than adopting a conclusory label 
for the deposition testimony, it is desirable to determine 
which of the two interpretations of § 6002 more satisfactorily 
accommodates the Government's need for admissible evi-
dence and the individual's interest in avoiding self-
incrimination. 12 
Although there may be practical reasons for not testify-
12 See Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 287 (1977) 
("[T]he proper test to apply ... is one which ... protects against the inva-
sion of constitutional rights without commanding undesirable consequences 
not necessary to the assurance of those rights. "); Brown v. Illinois, 422 
U. S. 590, 604 (1975) (reversing because state court failed "to evaluate the 
circumstances of the case in light of the policy served by the exclusionary 
rule"); Murphy , 378 U. S. , at 79 (stating an exclusionary rule "to imple-
ment [Fifth Amendment] and accommodate the interests of the .. . Gov-
ernment[] in investigating and prosecuting crime"). See generally C. 
Whitebread, Criminal Procedure § 2.04, at 37 (1980). 
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ing, 13 as far as the deponent's Fifth Amendment right is con-
cerned he should be indifferent between the protection af-
forded by silence and that afforded by immunity. He is 
interested, however, in that the protection given by the priv-
ilege or the grant of immunity is certain. Moreover, the 
Government's interests may be affected seriously by the 
choice. Our specific inquiry then is whether petitioners can 
satisfy their need for admissible evidence without threaten-
ing the Government's interest in limiting the scope of an im-
munity grant or encroaching upon the deponent's certainty of 
protection. 
A 
Questions taken verbatim from a transcript of immunized 
testimony could evoke one of several responses from a depo-
nent: (i) he could repeat or adopt his immunized answer;14 (ii) 
he could affirm that the transcript of his immunized answers 
accurately reflects his prior testimony; (iii) he could recall ad-
ditional information responsive to the question but not dis-
closed in his immune testimony; or (iv) he could disclose in-
formation that is not responsive to the question. Petitioners 
do not contend, nor could they, that the prior grant of use im-
munity affords protection for all self-incriminating informa-
tion disclosed by the immunized witnesses on any occasion 
after the giving of the immunized testimony. Rather, peti-
tioners argue that only the first three responses would be 
"derived from" his immune testimony and therefore would be 
unavailable for use against the deponent in any subsequent 
criminal prosecution. 
Petitioners' premise is that the deposition of Conboy is de-
13 Besides the costs of testifying against close associates, any witness in-
creases the risk of committing perjury the more he talks. Cf. 18 U. S. C. 
§ 6002 (perjured testimony not immunized). 
"The extreme case would be where petitioners read the entire immu-
nized grand jury transcript; then ask the witness if that is his testimony; 
and he answers simply "Yes." 
10 
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signed not to discover new information, 15 but to obtain evi-
dence that simply repeats the statements in the immunized 
transcript. 16 Because there will be little opportunity for the 
grant of immunity to sweep in statements on direct examina-
tion that the Government did not intend to immunize, or for 
the deponent to give responses that may fall outside of the 
grant of immunity and later be used against him in a subse-
quent criminal prosecution, Conboy's deposition will yield 
only a carbon copy of the grand-jury transcript. In such a 
situation, it would be desirable that civil plaintiffs, particu-
larly those bringing private suits that supplement the crimi-
nal enforcement of the federal antitrust laws, have access to 
the available, probative information. 
But even if the direct examination is limited to the ques-
tions and answers in the immunized transcript, there remains 
the right of cross examination, 17 a right traditionally relied 
15 Direct examination may not be as limited as petitioners assume. The 
District Court's civil contempt order stated that the questions asked in the 
deposition "were taken directly" from the immunized transcripts, but did 
not define exactly what deposition questions petitioners could ask. Other 
Courts of Appeals have permitted direct questioning to go beyond mere 
restatements of the prior testimony. See In re Corrugated Container 
Antitrust Litigation, Appeal of Fleischacker, 644 F . 2d 70, 79 (CA2 1981) 
(compelling answers to questions "concerning specific subjects that actu-
ally were touched upon by questions appearing in the transcript of the im-
munized testimony''); Little Rock School District v. Borden, Inc., 632 F . 2d 
700, 705 (CA8 1980) (compelling answers as long as deposition questions 
confined to "'the same time, geographical and substantive frame work as 
the [witness' immunized] grand jury testimony"') (quoting Appeal of 
Starkey, 600 F. 2d 1043, 1048 (CA8 1979)). 
16 For purposes of this case, we assume that the grand jury transcripts 
·are inadmissible as evidence in a civil trial because the testimony is not 
subject to cross examination. Cf. Fed. R. Evid. 803(8) (hearsay exception 
for certain public records); Fed. R. Evid. 804(a)(l) (witness unavailable 
when exempted from testifying on ground of privilege); Fed. R. Evid. 
804(b)(l) (former testimony admissible when witness unavailable and the 
party against whom the testimony is now offered had an opportunity for 
cross examination). 
17 Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(l) (stating that depositions may be taken "if 
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upon expansively to test credibility as well as to seek the 
truth. Petitioners recognize this problem, but maintain that 
the antitrust defendants "would be entitled to test the accu-
racy and truthfulness of Conboy's repeated immunized testi-
mony without going beyond the confines of that testimony." 
Regardless of any limitations that may be imposed on its 
scope, 18 however, cross examination is intended to and often 
will produce information not elicited on direct. We must as-
sume that, to produce admissible evidence, the scope of cross 
examination at the deposition cannot easily be limited to the 
immunized testimony. This assumption implicates both the 
Government's and the individual's interests embodied in 
§6002. 
B 
Use immunity was intended to immunize and exclude from 
a subsequent criminal trial only that information to which the 
Government expressly has surrendered future use. If the 
Government is engaged in an ongoing investigation of the 
particular activity at issue, immunizing new information (e. 
g., the answers to questions in a case like this one) may make 
it more difficult to show in a subsequent prosecution that sim-
ilar information was obtained from wholly independent 
the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discov-
ery of admissible evidence"); Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(c) (allowing cross examina-
tion at depositions); Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a) (deposition "admissible under the 
rules of evidence applied as though the witness were then present and tes-
tifying"); Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(l) (deposition admissible if the party against 
whom the testimony is now offered in a civil action had an opportunity to 
develop testimony by cross examination). 
18 See United States v. Cardillo, 316 F. 2d 606, 611 (CA2 1963) (in deter-
mining whether testimony of a witness who invokes the privilege during 
cross examination may be used against deft, ;draws a distinction between 
cases in which the assertion of the privilege merely precludes inquiry into 
collateral matters that bear on credibility of witnesses and those in which 
assertion prevents inquiry into matters about which witness testified on 
direct). 
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sources. A District Court's grant of immunity in a subse-
quent civil proceeding in effect could invest the deponent 
with transactional immunity on matters about which he testi-
fied at the immunized proceedings. This is precisely the 
kind of immunity Congress intended to prohibit. The pur-
pose of § 6002 was to limit the scope of immunity to the level 
that is constitutionally required, as well as to limit the use of 
immunity to those cases in which designated executive offi-
cers determine that gaining the witnes~ testimony outweighs 
the loss of the opportunity for crimina:i prosecution of that 
witness. 19 
C 
Petitioners' interpretation of § 6002 also places substantial 
risks on the deponent. Unless the grant of immunity as-
sures a witness that his incriminating testimony will not be 
used against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution, the 
witness has not received the certain protection of his Fifth 
Amendment privilege that he has been forced to exchange. 
No court has authority to immunize a witness. That respon-
sibility, as we have noted, is peculiarly an executive one, and 
only the Attorney General or a designated officer of the De-
19 We need not decide whether United States Attorneys presently have 
authority to immunize the testimony of a witness in a civil proceeding when 
the Government determines that the public interest would be served. Cf. 
18 U. S. C. § 6002 (can compel testimony "[w]henever a witness refuses" to 
testify "in a proceeding before or ancillary to ... a court ... of the United 
State,"); ul., § 6003 (may compel testimony Government believes "may be 
necessary to the public interest"); 116 Cong. Rec. 36,293 (1970) (statement 
of Sen. Hruska) (reading § 6002 as "enabl[ing] the Government in any court 
.. . proceeding" to compel testimony) (emphasis added); 116 Cong. Rec. 
853 (1970) (statement of Sen. Young) ("[T]he power of the district attorney 
to compel a witness to testify is .. .. apparently available in any case in a 
federal court, including civil actions between private parties.") (quoting 
from a memorandum prepared by the American Civil Liberties Union). If 
this authority exists, it could resolve the problem here presented in many 
civil cases in which the immunity issue is raised. 
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partment . of Justice has authority to grant use immunity. 
See 18 U. S. C. §§ 6002, 6003. Nor can a court, at the time 
of the civil testimony, pre-determine the decision of the court 
in a subsequent criminal prosecution on the question whether 
the Government has met its burden of proving "that the evi-
dence it proposes to use is derived from a legitimate source 
wholly independent of the compelled testimony." Kastigar, 
406 U. S., at 460. Yet in holding Conboy in contempt for his 
Fifth Amendment silence, the District Court below essen-
tially predicted that a court in any future criminal prosecu-
tion of Conboy will be obligated to protect against eviden-
tiary use of the deposition testimony petitioners seek. We 
do not think such a predictive judgment is enough. As the 
Court stated in Maness v. Meyers, 419 U. S. 449 (1975), com-
pelling a witness to testify in "reliance upon a later objection 
or motion to suppress would 'let the cat out' with no assur-
ance whatever of putting it back." Id., at 463. 
If we simply were to assume, as petitioners urge, that the 
court hearing the criminal case will be able to exclude wrong-
fully compelled evidence, cf. id., at 474-475 (WHITE, J., con-
curring in the result); Murphy, 378 U. S., at 79, Conboy's un-
certainty might be diminished, but not eliminated, cf. Rogers 
v. United States, 340 U. S. 367, 373 (1951). Conboy could 
face prosecutorial challeges that he waived his privilege and 
that the testimony was not wrongfully compelled. Reliance 
on_ an exclusionary rule would also implicate the Govern-
ment's interests. Judicial exclusion of nonimmunized testi-
mony would be inconsistent with the congressional policy of 
leaving the granting of immunity to the executive branch. 
Moreover, the necessarily broad scope of a judicial exclusion-
ary rule that provides certain protection to the deponent 
would frustrate congressional intent to grant no more immu-
nity than the Constitution requires. 
"The Court has held that an individual under compulsion to 
make disclosures as a witness who revealed information in-
stead of claiming the privilege lost the benefit of the privi-
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lege." Garner v. United States, 424 U. S. 648, 653 (1976) 
(citing United States v. Kordel, 397 U. S. 1, 7-10 (1970)). 
We believe Conboy acted properly in maintaining his silence 
in the face of the District Court's compulsion order and by 
testing the validity of his privilege on appeal. 
IV 
This Court has emphasized the importance of the private 
action as a means of furthering the policy goals of certain fed-
eral regulatory statutes, including the federal antitrust laws. 
See, e. g., Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts 
Corp., 392 U. S. 134, 139 (1968); United States v. Borden 
Co., 347 U. S. 514, 518-519 (1954). But private civil actions 
can only supplement, not supplant, the primary responsibil-
ity of Government. Petitioners' proposed construction of 
§ 6002 sweeps further than Congress intended and could hin-
der governmental enforcement of its criminal laws by turning 
use immunity into a form of transactional immunity for sub-
jects examined in the immunized proceeding. It also puts 
the deponent in some danger of criminal prosecution unless 
he receives an assurance of immunity or exclusion that the 
courts cannot properly give. Silence, on the other hand, 
preserves the deponent's rights and the Government's inter-
ests, as well as the judicial resources that otherwise would be 
required to make the many difficult judgments that petition-
ers' interpretation of § 6002 would require. 
V 
We hold that a deponent's civil deposition testimony, made 
without an express governmental assurance of immunity at 
the time, is not "information directly or indirectly derived 
from" the immunized testimony, and therefore may be avail-
able for use against him in a subsequent criminal prosectuion. 
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ant to the federal use immunity provisions, 18 
U. S. C\ § 6001-6005 (1976), a United States Attorney, with 
the apprcival of the Attorney General, may request an order 
from a federal court compelling a witness to testify even 
though he has asserted his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. Section 6002 provides, however, that "no testimony or 
other information compelled under the order (or any informa-
tion directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or 
other information) may be _used against the witness in any 
criminal case. . .. " The issue presented in this case is 
whether a deponent's civil deposition testimony, repeating 
verbatim or closely tracking his prior immunized testimony, 
is "information" so "directly or indirectly derived from [the 
immunized] testimony" that it cannot be used against the wit-
ness in a subsequent criminal prosecution. 
I 
Respondent John Conboy is a former executive of a defend-
ant in the In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 
M.D.L. 310 (S.D. Tex.). In January 1978, United States 
Department of Justice attorneys interviewed Conboy follow-
ing a promise of use immunity. Conboy subsequently aR- . 
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ties and, pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 6002, was granted formal 
use immunity for his testimony. 
Following the criminal indictment of several companies, 
numerous civil antitrust actions were filed in various United 
States district courts. Those actions were consolidated for 
discovery in the District Court for the Southern District of 
Texas. Petitioners here are purchasers of corrugated con-
tainers who elected to opt out of the class-action proceedings 
and pursue their own causes of action against manufacturers. 
The District Court ordered that portions of the immunized 
government interview and grand-jury testimony of certain 
witnesses, including that of Conboy, be made available to 
lawyers for the class and opt-outs. 1 
Pursuant to a subpoena issued by the District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois, Conboy appeared in Chicago for 
a deposition at which he, his counsel, and petitioners' counsel 
had copies of his immunized testimony. The transcripts 
were marked as · deposition exhibits so that all could follow 
the intended examination. The questioning fell into the fol-
lowing pattern: a question was read from the transcript; it 
then was rephrased to include the transcript answer (i. e., "Is 
it not the fact that .... "); finally, Conboy was asked if he had 
"so testified" in his immunized interview and grand-jury 
examination. 2 Conboy refused to answer each question, as-
serting his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. 
1 The propriety of the District Court's release of grand jury materials to 
the civil parties is not before the Court. 
2 An example of this three-question pattern is as follows: 
Q. "Who did you have price communications with at Alton Box Board?" 
Q. Is it not the fact that you had price communications with Fred 
Renshaw and Dick Herman ... ? 
Q. Did you not so testify in your government interview of January 10, 
1978? 
Joint Appendix 29-31. 
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The District Court granted petitioners' motion to compel 
Conboy to answer the questions. 3 When Conboy continued 
to claim his privilege, the District Court held him in con-
tempt, but stayed its order pending appeal. A panel of the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the con-
tempt order, holding that, "[b]ecause the questions asked in 
this deposition were taken verbatim from or closely tracked 
the transcript of Conboy's grand jury tes~ ony, we believe , 
that his answers at the deposition would ~ rived from' the 
prior immunized [testimony] and therefore unavailable for 
use in any subsequent criminal prosecution." In re C orru-
gated Container Antitrust Liti,gation, Appeal of John 
Conboy, 655 F. 2d 748, 751 (CA7), rev'd en bane, 661 F. 2d 
1145 (1981). 
On rehearing en bane, the Court of Appeals reversed the 
District Court. It first determined that Conboy's alleged 
fear of prosecution was more than "fanciful," 661 F. 2d, at 
1152, and that Conboy therefore was entitled to assert his 
Fifth Amendment privilege unless his deposition testimony 
could not be used against him in a subsequent criminal action, 
see id., at 1153. 4 The court then held that under § 6002, ab-
sent a separate and independent grant of immunity, 5 a depo-
nent's civil deposition testimony that repeats verbatim or 
closely tracks his prior immunized testimony is not protected. 
While acknowledging that verbatim questions "of course 
[ would be] derived" from the immunized testimony, the court 
reasoned that the answers to such questions "are derived 
from the deponent's current, independent memory of events" 
and thus "necessarily create a new source of evidence" that 
3 Chief Judge John V. Singleton, Jr. of the District Court for the South-
ern District of Texas expressly exercised the powers of the District Court 
for the Northern District of Illinois pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1407(b). 
' The correctness of the Court of Appeals' conclusion that Conboy could 
assert a Fifth Amendment privilege, absent some immunity, is not before 
us. 
5 A United States Attorney declined to authorize immunity grants in 
connection with the civil depositions here. 
4 
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could be used in a subsequent criminal prosecution against 
Conboy. Id., at 1155 (emphasis in original). 
We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict in the Courts 
of Appeals, 6 and now affirm. 
II 
It is settled that government must have the power to com-
pel testimony "to secure information necessary for effective 
law enforcement." Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 
U. S. 52, 79 (1964). 7 For many years, however, a person 
who was compelled to testify under a grant of governmental 
immunity could not be prosecuted for any conduct about 
which he had testified. See New Jersey v. Portash, 440 
U. S. 450, 457 (1979). Prosecutors therefore were reluctant 
to grant such "transactional" immunity to potential targets of 
criminal investigations. See S. Rep. No. 91-617, p. 53 
(1969). 
The "major purpose" of the Organized Crime Control Act 
of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 927, of which §6002 was 
a key provision, was "to provide the criminal jum · e system 
with the necessary legal tools to . . . strength the evi-
dence gathering process and insur[e] that the e ence will 
then be available and admissible at trial." 116 Cong. Rec. 
35,200 (1970) (statement of Rep. St. Germain). Congress 
sought to make the immunity tool more useful for law en-
• Compare In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, Appeal of 
Fleischacker, 644 F. 2d 70, 75 (CA2 1981) (deposition answers immunized), 
and Little Rock School District v. Borden, Inc., 632 F. 2d 700, 705 (CAB 
1980) (same), with In re Corrugated Container Anti-Trust Litigation, Ap-
peal of Franey, 620 F. 2d 1086, 1095 (CA5 1980) (answers not immunized), 
cert. denied, 449 U. S. 1102 (1981). 
1 See United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 345 (1974); United 
States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 41 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting); 
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U. S. 441, 443-444 (1973); Murphy, 378 
U. S., at 93-94 (WHITE, J., concurring); Blackmer v. United States, 284 
U. S. 421, 438 (1932); Blair v. United States, 250 U. S. 273, 281 (1919); 
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forcement officers through two specific changes. First, Con-
gress made the grant of immunity less expansive 8 by repeal-
ing the authority for transactional immunity and providing 
for the less comprehensive use immunity authorized in 
§ 6002. 9 Second, Congress gave certain officials in the De-
partment of Justice 10 exclusive authority to grant 
immunities. 11 
8 In Murphy, .JUSTICE WHITE stated that "[i]mmunity must be as broad 
as, but not harmfully and wastefully broader than, the privilege against 
self-incrimination." 378 U. S., at 107 (concurring opinion) (quoted with 
approval in 116 Cong. Rec. 35,291 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff)). In its 
committee report, the House explained that § 6002 was not to provide an 
"immunity bath," but was to be "no broader than" the Fifth Amendment 
privilege. H. R. No. 91-1549, p. 5 (1970). 
• Section 6002 provides: 
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-
incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding be-
fore or ancillary to-
(1) a court or grand jury of the United States, 
(2) an agency of the United States, or 
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses, or a 
committee or a subcommittee of either House 
and the person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the witness 
an order issued under this part, the witness may not refuse to comply with 
the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but no tes-
timony or other information compelled under the order (or any information 
directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) 
may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution 
for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with 
the order. 
Section 6001(2) defines "other information" to include "any book, paper, 
document, record, recording, or other material." 
10 Section 6003 states: 
(a) In the case of any individual who has been or may be called to testify 
or provide other information at any proceeding before or ancillary to a 
court of the United States or a grand jury of the United States, the United 
States district court for the judicial district in which the proceeding is or 
may be held shall issue, in accordance with subsection (b) of this section, 
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The Court upheld the constitutionality of the use immunity 
statute in Kastigar v. United States, 406 U. S. 441 (1972). 
The power to compel testimony is limited by the Fifth 
Amendment, and we held that any grant of immunity must 
be co-extensive with the privilege. We were satisfied, how-
ever, that § 6002 provided this measure of protection and 
thus "removed the dangers against which the privilege pro-
tects." Id., at 449. In rejecting the argument that use and 
derivative-use immunity would not adequately protect a wit-
ness from various incriminating uses of the compelled testi-
mony, we emphasized that "[t]he statute provides a sweeping 
proscription of any use, direct or indirect, of the compelled 
testimony and any information derived therefrom. . . . " Id., 
at 460. We added that once a defendant establishes that he 
has testified under a grant of immunity, "the prosecution 
[has] the affirmative duty to prove that the evidence it pro-
poses to use is derived from a legitimate source wholly inde-
pendent of the compelled testimony:." Id . Thus, "immunity d_ 
from use and derivative use iAO~,df 'lea~ tness and \:JJ~ 
the Federal Government in substantially-~ ~;~~ · ~osition as f'> 
if the witness had claimed his privilege' in the absence of a 
grant of immunity." Kastigar, 406 U. S., at 458-459 (quot-
ing Murphy, 378 U. S., at 79). 
requiring such individual to give testimony or provide other information 
which he refuses to give or provide on the basis of his privilege against self-
incrimination, such order to become effective as provided in section 6002 of 
this part. 
(b) A United States attorney-may, with the approval of the Attorney 
General, the Deputy Attorney General, or any designated Assistant Attor-
ney General, request an order under subsection (a) of this section when in 
his judgment-
(1) the testimony or other information from such individual may be nec-
essary to the public interest; and 
(2) such individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide 
other information on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination. 
11 Congress foresaw the courts as playing only a minor role in the immu-
nizing process: "The court's role in granting the order is merely to find the 
~k,u\cl 
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III 
7 
With the foregoing statutory history and relevant princi-
ples in mind, we turn now to this case. It is not disputed 
that the questions asked of Conboy were directly or indi-
rectly derived from his immunized testimony. The issue is 
whether the causal connection between the questions and the 
answers is so direct that the answers also are derived from 
that testimony and therefore should be excluded under the 
grant of immunity. 
Petitioners' argument is based on the language of § 6002 
and on a common understanding of the words "derived from." 
The questions formulated on the basis of immunized testi-
mony are clearly "derived from" the prior testimony. Thus, 
the answeriw that repeat verbatim or closely track a depo-
neriPstestilffifriY© are necessarily also "derived from" and 
"tainted by'' such testimony. Petitioners therefore find no 
basis for the distinction made by the Court of Appeals be-
tween questions and answers responsive to those same ques-
tions. An answer by its very nature is evoked by and re-
sponds to information contained in a question. 
Conboy's position is also straightforward: Questions do not 
incriminate; answers do. Unlike the questions, answers are 
not directly or indirectly derived from the immunized grand 
jury or interview transcripts, but from the deponent's cur-
rent, independent memory of events. Even when a depo-
nent's deposition answers are identical to those he gave to 
the grand jury, he is under oath to tell the truth, not neces-
sarily as he told it before the grand jury, but as he knows it 
facts on which the order is predicated." H. R. Rep. No. 91-1549, supra 
note 8, at 43; H. R. Rep. No. 91-1188, p. 13 (1970). See 116 Cong. Rec. 
35,291 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff). Cf. President's Commission on 
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime 
in a Free Society 141 (1967) (recommending that "[i]mmunity should be 
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now. Each new statement of the deponent" creates a new 
"source." In sum, the initial grant of immunity does not pre-
vent the prosecutor from prosecuting; it merely limits his 
sources of evidence. 
The language of the statute permits either parties' inter-
pretation and compels neither. The broad wording of§ 6002, 
and our interpretation of it in Kasti,gar, suggests that we 
should hesitate to exclude information from the coverage of 
the immunity grant that admittedly has a close tie with the 
immunized testimony. In the end, however, whether par-
ticular information is "derived from" immunized materials, is 
"fruit" of "tainted" information, or is the product of a "new 
source" are conclusions that "may conceal concrete complex-
ities. " Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338, 341 (1939). 
As the Court has noted: "Sophisticated argument may prove 
a causal connection between information obtained through 
[the unlawful governmental conduct] and the Government's 
proof. As a matter of good sense, however, such connection 
may have become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint." 
Id. We believe that rather than adopting a conclusory label 
for the deposition testimony, it is desirable to determine 
which of the two interpretations of § 6002 more satisfactorily 
accommodates the Government's need for admissible evi-
dence and the individual's interest in avoiding self-
incrimination. 12 
Although there may be practical reasons for not testify-
" See Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 287 (1977) 
("[T]he proper test to apply ... is one which .. . protects against the inva-
sion of constitutional rights without commanding undesirable consequences 
not necessary to the assurance of those rights. "); Brown v. Illinois, 422 
U. S. 590, 604 (1975) (reversing because state court failed "to evaluate the 
circumstances of the case in light of the policy served by the exclusionary 
rule"); Murphy, 378 U. S., at 79 (stating an exclusionary rule "to imple-
ment [Fifth Amendment] and accommodate the interests of the ... Gov-
ernment[] in investigating and prosecuting crime"). See generally C. 
Whitebread, Criminal Procedure § 2.04, at 37 (1980). 
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ing, 13 as far as tH deponent's Fifth Amendment right is con-
cerned he should e indifferent between the protection af-
forded by silence that afforded by immunity. He is I) 
interested, howeve , in hat the protection given by the priv-
ilege or the grant · munity is certain. Moreover, the 
Government's interests may be affected seriously by the 
choice. Our specific inquiry then is whether petitioners can 
satisfy their need for admissible evidence without threaten-
ing the Government's interest in limiting the scope of an im-
munity grant or encroaching upon the deponent's certainty of 
protection. 
A 
Questions taken verbatim from a transcript of immunized 
testimony could evoke one of several responses from a depo-
nent: (i) he could repeat or adopt his immunized answer;14 (ii) 
he could affinn that the transcript of his immunized answers 
accurately reflects his prior testimony; (iii) he could recall ad-
ditional information responsive to the question but not dis-
closed in his immune testimony; or (iv) he could disclose in-
formation that is not responsive to the question. Petitioners 
do not contend, nor could they, that the prior grant of use im-
munity affords protection for all self-incriminating informa-
tion disclosed by the immunized witnesses on any occasion 
after the giving of the immunized testimony. Rather, peti-
tioners argue that only the first three responses would be 
"derived from" his immune testimony and therefore would be 
unavailable for use against the deponent in any subsequent 
criminal prosecution. 
Petitioners' premise is that the deposition of Conboy is de-
13 Besides the costs of testifying against close associates, any witness in-
creases the risk of committing perjury the more he talks. Cf. 18 U. S. C. 
§ 6002 (perjured testimony not immunized). 
" The extreme case would be where petitioners read the entire immu-
nized grand jury transcript; then ask the witness if that is his testimony; 
and he answers simply "Yes." 
10 
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signed not to discover new information, 15 but to obtain evi-
dence that simply repeats the statements in the immunized 
transcript. 16 Because there will be little opportunity for the 
grant of immunity to sweep in statements on direct examina-
tion that the Government did not intend to immunize, or for 
the deponent to give responses that may fall outside of the 
grant of immunity and later be used against him in a subse-
quent criminal prosecution, Conboy's deposition will yield 
only a carbon copy of the grand-jury transcript. In such a 
situation, it would be desirable that civil plaintiffs, particu-
larly those bringing private suits that supplement the crimi-
nal enforcement of the federal antitrust laws, have access to 
the available, probative information. 
But even if the direct examination is limited to the ques-
tions and answers in the immunized transcript, there remains 
the right of cross examination, 17 a right traditionally relied 
15 Direct examination may not be as limited as petitioners assume. The 
District Court's civil contempt order stated that the questions asked in the 
deposition "were taken directly" from the immunized transcripts, but did 
not define exactly what deposition questions petitioners could ask. Other 
Courts of Appeals have permitted direct questioning to go beyond mere 
restatements of the prior testimony. See In re Corrugated Container 
Antitrust Litigation, Appeal of Fleischacker, 644 F. 2d 70, 79 (CA2 1981) 
(compelling answers to questions "concerning specific subjects that actu-
ally were touched upon by questions appearing in the transcript of the im-
munized testimony"); Little Rock School District v. Borden, Inc., 632 F . 2d 
700, 705 (CA8 1980) (compelling answers as long as deposition questions 
confined to "'the same time, geographical and substantive frame work as 
the [witness' immunized] grand jury testimony"') (quoting Appeal of 
Starkey, 600 F. 2d 1043, 1048 (CA8 1979)). 
16 For purposes of this case, we assume that the grand jury transcripts 
are inadmissible as evidence in a civil trial because the testimony is not 
subject to cross examination. Cf. Fed. R. Evid. 803(8) (hearsay exception 
for certain public records); Fed. R. Evid. 804(a)(l) (witness unavailable 
when exempted from testifying on ground of privilege); Fed. R. Evid. 
804(b)(l) (former testimony admissible when witness unavailable and the 
party against whom the testimony is now offered had an opportunity for 
cross examination). 
17 Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(l) (stating that depositions may be taken "if 
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upon expansively to test credibility as well as to seek the 
truth. Petitioners recognize this problem, but maintain that 
the antitrust defendants "would be entitled to test the accu-
racy and truthfulness of Conboy's repeated immunized testi-
mony without going beyond the confines of that testimony." 
Regardless of any limitations that may be imposed on its 
scope, 18 however, cross examination is intended to and often 
will produce information not elicited on direct. We must as-
sume that, to produce admissible evidence, the scope of cross 
examination at the deposition cannot easily be limited to the 
immunized testimony. This assumption implicates both the 
Government's and the individual's interests embodied in 
§6002. 
B 
Use immunity was intended to immunize and exclude from 
a subsequent criminal trial only that information to which the 
Government expressly has surrendered future use. If the 
Government is engaged in an ongoing investigation of the 
particular activity at issue, immunizing new information (e. 
g., the answers to questions in a case like this one) may make 
it more difficult to show in a subsequent prosecution that sim-
ilar information was obtained from wholly independent 
the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discov-
ery of admissible evidence"); Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(c) (allowing cross examina-
tion at depositions); Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a) (deposition "admissible under the 
rules of evidence applied as though the witness were then present and tes-
tifying"); Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(l) (deposition admissible if the party against 
whom the testimony is now offered in a civil action had an opportunity to 
develop testimony by cross examination). 
18 See United States v. Cardillo, 316 F. 2d 606, 611 (CA2 1963) (in deter-
mining whether testimony of a witnes~· vokes the privilege during 
cross examination may be used again t deft, raws a distinction between 
cases in which the assertion of the priVI merely precludes inquiry into 
collateral matters that bear on credibility of witnesses and those in which 
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sources. A District Court's grant of immunity in a subse-
quent civil proceeding in effect could invest the deponent 
with transactional immunity on matters about which he testi-
fied at the immunized proceedings. This is precisely the 
kind of immunity Congress intended to prohibit. The pur-
pose of § 6002 was to limit the scope of immunity to the level 
that is constitutionally required, as well as to limit the use of 
immunity to those cases in which designated executive offi-
cers determine that gaining the witness' testimony outweighs 
the loss of the opportunity for criminal prosecution of that 
witness. 19 
C 
Petitioners' interpretation of § 6002 also places substantial 
risks on the deponent. Unless the grant of immunity as-
sures a witness that his incriminating testimony will not be 
used against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution, the 
witness has not received the certain protection of his Fifth 
Amendment privilege that he has been forced to exchange. 
No court has authority to immunize a witness. That respon-
sibility, as we have noted, is peculiarly an executive one, and 
only the Attorney General or a designated officer of the De-
19 We need not decide whether United States Attorneys presently have 
authority to immunize the testimony of a witness in a civil proceeding when 
the Government determines that the public interest would be served. Cf. 
18 U. S. C. § 6002 (can compel testimony "[w]henever a witness refuses" to 
testify "in a proceeding before or ancillary to . .. a court ... of the United 
State,"); id., § 6003 (may compel testimony Government believes "may be 
necessary to the public interest"); 116 Cong. Rec. 36,293 (1970) (statement 
of Sen. Hruska) (reading § 6002 as "enabl[ing] the Government in any court 
. .. proceeding" to compel testimony) (emphasis added); 116 Cong. Rec. 
853 (1970) (statement of Sen. Young) ("[T]he power of the district attorney 
to compel a witness to testify is ... . apparently available in any case in a 
federal court, including civil actions between private parties.") (quoting 
from a memorandum prepared by the American Civil Liberties Union). If 
this authority exists, it could resolve the problem here presented in many 
civil cases in which the immunity issue is raised. 
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partment of Justice has authority to grant use immunity. 
See 18 U. S. C. §§ 6002, 6003. Nor can a court, at the time 
of the civil testimony, pre-determine the decision of the court 
in a subsequent criminal prosecution on the question whether 
the Government has met its burden of proving "that the evi-
dence it proposes to use is derived from a legitimate source 
wholly independent of the compelled testimony." Kasti,gar, 
406 U. S., at 460. Yet in holding Conboy in contempt for his 
Fifth Amendment silence, the District Court below essen-
tially predicted that a court in any future criminal prosecu-
tion of Conboy will be obligated to protect against eviden-
tiary use of the deposition testimony petitioners seek. We 
do not think such a predictive judgment is enough. As the 
Court stated in Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449 (1975), com-
pelling a witness to testify in "reliance upon a later objection 
or motion to suppress would 'let the cat out' with no assur-
ance whatever of putting it back." Id., at 463. 
If we simply were to assume, as petitioners urge, that the 
court hearing the criminal case will be able to exclude wrong-
fully compelled evidence, cf. id., at 474-475 (WHITE, J., con-
curring in the result); Murphy, 378 U. S., at 79, Conboy's un-
certainty might be diminished, but not eliminated, cf. Rogers 
v. United States, 340 U. S. 367, 373 (1951). Conboy could 
face prosecutorial challeges that he waived his privilege and 
that the testimony was not wrongfully compelled. Reliance 
on an exclusionary rule would also implicate the Govern-
ment's interests. Judicial exclusion of nonimmunized testi-
mony would be inconsistent with the congressional policy of 
leaving the granting of immunity to the executive branch. 
Moreover, the necessarily broad scope of a judicial exclusion-
ary rule that provides certain protection to the deponent 
would frustrate congressional intent to grant no more immu-
nity than the Constitution requires. 
"The Court has held that an individual under compulsion to 
make disclosures as a witness who revealed information in-
stead of claiming the privilege lost the benefit of the privi-
14 
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lege." Garner v. United States, 424 U. S. 648, 653 (1976) 
(citing United States v. Kordel, 397 U. S. 1, 7-10 (1970)). 
We believe Conboy acted properly in maintaining his silence 
in the face of the District Court's compulsion order and by 
testing the validity of his privilege on appeal. 
IV 
This Court has emphasized the importance of the private 
action as a means of furthering the policy goals of certain fed-
eral regulatory statutes, including the federal antitrust laws. 
See, e.g., Perrna Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts 
Corp., 392 U. S. 134, 139 (1968); United States v. Borden 
Co., 347 U. S. 514, 51~19 (1954). But private civil actions 
can only supplement, not supplant, the primary responsibil-
ity of Government. Petitioners' proposed construction of 
§ 6002 sweeps further than Congress intended and could hin-
der governmental enforcement of its criminal laws by turning 
use immunity into a form of transactional immunity for sub-
jects examined in the immunized proceeding. It also puts 
the deponent in some danger of criminal prosecution unless 
he receives an assurance of immunity or exclusion that the 
courts cannot properly give. Silence, on the other hand, 
preserves the deponent's rights and the Government's inter-
ests, as well as the judicial resources that otherwise would be 
required to make the many difficult judgments that petition-
ers' interpretation of § 6002 would require. 
V 
We hold that a deponent's civil deposition testimony, made \ 
without an express governmental assurance of immunity at ~ 
he time, is not "information directly or indirectly derived ,L ~ k, 
~
' from" ~ immunized testimony, and::=~ ~ / ..._, ~ no £W\ 
ab1.i for usli .igaiust him i;g, a sabs8(fa.i : ; 41 ~ ~ .,,,-Cofl'\p:-\\~ ov()t. kii> r The judgment of the Court of Appeals accordingly is ~ cf' \h ~ 
Affirmed T{~k A"'~ 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Pursuant to the federal use immunity provisions, 18 
U. S. C. § 6001-6005 (1976), a United States Attorney, with 
the approval of the Attorney General, may request an order 
from a federal court compelling a witness to testify even 
though he has asserted his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. Section 6002 provides, however, that "no testimony or 
other information compelled under the order (or any informa-
tion directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or 
other information) may be used against the witness in any 
criminal case. . .. " The issue presented in this case is 
whether a deponent's civil deposition testimony, repeating 
verbatim or closely tracking his prior immunized testimony, 
is "information" so "directly or indirectly derived from [the 
immunized] testimony" that it cannot be used against the wit-
ness in a subsequent criminal prosecution. 
I 
Respondent John Conboy is a former executive of a defend-
ant in the In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 
M.D.L. 310 (S.D. Tex.). In January 1978, United States 
Department of Justice attorneys interviewed Conboy follow-
ing a promise of use immunity. Conboy subsequently ap-
peared before a grand jury investigating price-fixing activi 
2 
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ties and, pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 6002, was granted formal 
use immunity for his testimony. 
Following the criminal indictment of several companies, 
numerous civil antitrust actions were filed in various United 
States district courts. Those actions were consolidated for 
discovery in the District Court for the Southern District of 
Texas. Petitioners here are purchasers of corrugated con-
tainers who elected to opt out of the class-action proceedings 
and pursue their own causes of action against manufacturers. 
The District Court ordered that portions of the immunized 
government interview and grand-jury testimony of certain 
witnesses, including that of Conboy, be made available to 
lawyers for the class and opt-outs. 1 
Pursuant to a subpoena issued by the District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois, Conboy appeared in Chicago for 
a deposition at which he, his counsel, and petitioners' counsel 
had copies of his immunized testimony. The transcripts 
were marked as deposition exhibits so that all could follow 
the intended examination. The questioning fell into the fol-
lowing pattern: a question was read from the transcript; it 
then was rephrased to include the transcript answer (i. e., "Is 
it not the fact that. . . . "); finally, Conboy was asked if he had 
"so testified" in his immunized interview and grand-jury 
examination. 2 Conboy refused to answer each question, as-
serting his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. 
1 The propriety of the District Court's release of grand jury materials to 
the civil parties is not before the Court. 
2 An example of this three-question pattern is as follows: 
Q. ''Who did you have price communications with at Alton Box Board?" 
Q. Is it not the fact that you had price communications with Fred 
Renshaw and Dick Herman ... ? 
Q. Did you not so testify in your government interview of January 10, 
1978? 
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The District Court granted petitioners' motion to compel 
Conboy to answer the questions. 3 When Conboy continued 
to claim his privilege, the District Court held him in con-
tempt, but stayed its order pending appeal. A panel of the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the con-
tempt order, holding that, "[b]ecause the questions asked in 
this deposition were taken verbatim from or closely tracked 
the transcript of Conboy's grand jury testimony, we believe 
~ his answers at the deposition would be 'derived from' the 
prior immunized [testimony] and therefore unavailable for 
use in any subsequent criminal prosecution." In re Corru-
gated Container Antitrust Litigation, Appeal of John 
Conboy, 655 F. 2d 748, 751 (CA7), rev'd en bane, 661 F. 2d 
1145 (1981). 
On rehearing en bane, the Court of Appeals reversed the 
District Court. It first determined that Conboy's alleged 
fear of prosecution was more than "fanciful," 661 F. 2d, at 
1152, and that Conboy therefore was entitled to assert his 
Fifth Amendment privilege unless his deposition testimony 
could not be used against him in a subsequent criminal action, 
see id., at 1153. 4 The court then held that under § 6002, ab-
sent a separate and independent grant of immunity, 5 a depo-
nent's civil deposition testimony that repeats verbatim or 
closely tracks his prior immunized testimony is not protected. 
While acknowledging that verbatim questions "of course 
[would be] derived" from the immunized testimony, the court 
reasoned that the answers to such questions "are derived 
from the deponent's current, independent memory of events" 
and thus "necessarily create a new source of evidence" that 
3 Chief Judge John V. Singleton, Jr. of the District Court for the South-
ern District of Texas expressly exercised the powers of the District Court 
for the Northern District of Illinois pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1407(b). 
• The correctness of the Court of Appeals' conclusion that Conboy could 
assert a Fifth Amendment privilege, absent some immunity, is not before 
us. 
• A United States Attorney declined to authorize immunity grants in 
connection with the civil depositions here. 
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could be used in a subsequent criminal prosecution against 
Conboy. Id., at 1155 (emphasis in original). 
We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict in the Courts 
of Appeals, 6 and now affirm. 
II 
It is settled that government must have the power to com-
pel testimony "to secure information necessary for effective 
law enforcement." Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 
U. S. 52, 79 (1964). 7 For many years, however, a person 
who was compelled to testify under a grant of governmental 
immunity could not be prosecuted for any conduct about 
which he had testified. See New Jersey v. Portash, 440 
U. S. 450, 457 (1979). Prosecutors therefore were reluctant 
to grant such "transactional" immunity to potential targets of 
criminal investigations. See S. Rep. No. 91-617, p. 53 
(1969). 
The "major purpose" of the Organized Crime Control Act 
of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 927, of which§ 6002 was 
a key provision, was "to provide the criminal justice system 
with the necessary legal tools to . . . strengthen[] the evi-
dence gathering process and insur[e] that the evidence will 
then be available and admissible at trial." 116 Cong. Rec. 
35,200 (1970) (statement of Rep. St. Germain). Congress 
sought to make thel\immunity i:1 more useful for law en-
s Compare In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, Appeal of 
Fleischacker, 644 F. 2d 70, 75 (CA2 1981) (deposition answers immunized), 
and Little Rock School District v. Borden, Inc. , 632 F. 2d 700, 705 (CA8 
1980) (same), with In re Corrugated Container Anti-Trust Litigation, Ap-
peal of Franey, 620 F. 2d 1086, 1095 (CA5 1980) (answers not immunized), 
cert. denied, 449 U. S. 1102 (1981). 
1 See United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 345 (1974); United 
States v. Mara, 410 U. S. 19, 41 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting); 
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U. S. 441, 443-444 (1973); Murphy, 378 
U. S. , at 93-94 (WHITE, J ., concurring); Blackmer v. United States , 284 
U. S. 421, 438 (1932); Blair v. United States , 250 U. S. 273, 281 (1919); 
Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 600 (1896). 
~-1 
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forcement officers through two specific changes. First, Con-
gress made the grant of immunity less expansive 8 by repeal-
ing the authority for transactional immunity and providing 
for the less comprehensive use immunity authorized in 
§ 6002. 9 Second, Congress gave certain officials in the De-
partment of Justice 10 exclusive authority to grant 
immunities. 11 
8 In Murphy, JUSTICE WHITE stated that "[i]mmunity must be as broad 
as, but not harmfully and wastefully broader than, the privilege against 
self-incrimination." 378 U. S., at 107 (concurring opinion) (quoted with 
approval in 116 Cong. Rec. 35,291 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff)). In its 
committee report, the House explained that § 6002 was not to provide an 
"immunity bath," but was to be "no broader than" the Fifth Amendment 
privilege. H. R. No. 91-1549, p. 5 (1970). 
9 Section 6002 provides: 
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-
incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding be-
fore or ancillary to-
(1) a court or grand jury of the United States, 
(2) an agency of the United States, or 
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses, or a 
committee or a subcommittee of either House 
and the person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the witness 
an order issued under this part, the witness may not refuse to comply with 
the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but notes-
timony or other information compelled under the order (or any information 
directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) 
may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution 
for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with 
the order. 
Section 6001(2) defines "other information" to include "any book, paper, 
document, record, recording, or other material." 
10 Section 6003 states: 
(a) In the case of any individual who has been or may be called to testify 
or provide other information at any proceeding before or ancillary to a 
court of the United States or a grand jury of the United States, the United 
States district court for the judicial district in which the proceeding is or 
may be held shall issue, in accordance with subsection (b) of this section, 
upon the request of the United States attorney for such district, an order 
6 
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The Court upheld the constitutionality of the use immunity 
statute in Kastigar v. United States, 406 U. S. 441 (1972). 
The power to compel testimony is limited by the Fifth 
Amendment, and we held that any grant of immunity must 
be co-extensive with the privilege. We were satisfied, how-
ever, that § 6002 provided this measure of protection and 
thus "removed the dangers against which the privilege pro-
tects." Id., at 449. In rejecting the argument that use and 
derivative-use immunity would not adequately protect a wit-
ness from various incriminating uses of the compelled testi-
mony, we emphasized that "[t]he statute provides a sweeping 
proscription of any use, direct or indirect, of the compelled 
testimony and any information derived therefrom. . . . " Id., 
at 460. We added that once a defendant establishes that he 
has testified under a grant of immunity, "the prosecution 
[has] the affirmative duty to prove that the evidence it pro-
poses to use is derived from a legitimate source wholly inde-
pendent of the compelled testimony." Id. Thus, "immunity 
from use and derivative use should 'leave[] the witness and 
the Federal Government in substantially the same position as 
if the witness had claimed his privilege' in the absence of a 
grant of immunity." Kastigar, 406 U. S., at 458-459 (quot-
ing Murphy, 378 U. S., at 79). 
requiring such individual to give testimony or provide other information 
which he refuses to give or provide on the basis of his privilege against self-
incrimination, such order to become effective as provided in section 6002 of 
this part. 
(b) A United States attorney may, with the approval of the Attorney 
General, the Deputy Attorney General, or any designated Assistant Attor-
ney General, request an order under subsection (a) of this section when in 
his judgment-
(1) the testimony or other information from such individual may be nec-
essary to the public interest; and 
(2) such individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide 
other information on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination. 
11 Congress foresaw the courts as playing only a minor role in the immu-
nizing process: "The court's role in granting the order is merely to find the 
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7 
With the foregoing statutory history and relevant princi-
ples in mind, we turn now to this case. It is not disputed 
that the questions asked of Conboy were directly or indi-
rectly derived from his immunized testimony. The issue is 
whether the causal connection between the questions and the 
answers is so direct that the answers also are derived from 
that testimony and therefore should be excluded under the 
grant of immunity. 
Petitioners' argument is based on the language of § 6002 
and on a common understanding of the words "derived from." 
The questions formulated on the basis of immunized testi-
mony are clearly "derived from" the prior testimony. Thus, 
the answers, that repeat verbatim or closely track a depo-
nent's testimony, are necessarily also "derived from" and 
"tainted by" such testimony. Petitioners therefore find no 
basis for the distinction made by the Court of Appeals be-
tween questions and answers responsive to those same ques-
tions. An answer by its very nature is evoked by and re-
sponds to information contained in a question. 
Conboy's position is also straightforward: Questions do not 
incriminate; answers do. Unlike the questions, answers are 
not directly or indirectly derived from the immunized grand 
jury or interview transcripts, but from the deponent's cur-
rent, independent memory of events. Even when a depo-
nent's deposition answers are identical to those he gave to 
the grand jury, he is under oath to tell the truth, not neces-
sarily as he told it before the grand jury, but as he knows it 
facts on which the order is predicated." H. R. Rep. No. 91-1549, supa 
note 8, at 43; H. R. Rep. No. 91-1188, p. 13 (1970). See 116 Cong. Rec. 
35,291 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff). Cf. President's Commission on 
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime 
in a Free Society 141 (1967) (recommending that "[i]mmunity should be 
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now. Each new statement of the deponent creates a new 
"source." In sum, the initial grant of immunity does not pre-
vent the prosecutor from prosecuting; it merely li~'mits his 
sources of evidence. 1-l ~ 
The language of the statute permits either parti ' inter-
pretation and compels neither. The broad wording of§ 6002, 
and our interpretation of it in Kasti,gar, suggests that we 
should hesitate to exclude information from the coverage of 
the immunity grant that admittedly has a close tie with the 
immunized testimony. In the end, however, whether par-
ticular information is "derived from" immunized materials, is 
"fruit" of "tainted" information, or is the product of a "new 
source" are conclusions that "may conceal concrete complex-
ities." Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338, 341 (1939). 
As the Court has noted: "Sophisticated argument may prove 
a causal connection between information obtained through 
[the unlawful governmental conduct] and the Government's 
proof. As a matter of good sense, however, such connection 
may have become so attenuated a·s to dissipate the taint." 
Id. We believe that rather than adopting a conclusory label 
for the deposition testimony, it is desirable to determine 
which of the two interpretations of § 6002 more satisfactorily 
accommodates the Government's need for admissible evi-
dence and the individual's interest in avoiding self-
incrimination. 12 
Although there may be practical reasons for not testify-
12 See Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) 
("[T]he proper test to apply ... is one which ... protects against the inva-
sion of constitutional rights without commanding undesirable consequences 
not necessary to the assurance of those rights."); Brown v. Illinois, 422 
U. S. 590, 604 (1975) (reversing because state court failed "to evaluate the 
circumstances of the case in light of the policy served by the exclusionary 
rule"); Murphy, 378 U. S., at 79 (stating an exclusionary rule "to imple-
ment [Fifth Amendment] and accommodate the interests of the .. . Gov-
ernment[] in investigating and prosecuting crime"). See generally C. 
Whitebread, Criminal Procedure § 2.04, at 37 (1980). 
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ing, 13 as far as the deponent's Fifth Amend nt right is con-
cerned he should be indifferent between t e protection af-
forded by silence and that afforded by i unity. 
inteFestea., aev;i:e•;er, iR that the protection · by the priv-
ilege or the grant of immunity is certain. Moreover, the 
Government's interests may be affected seriously by the 
choice. Our specific inquiry then is whether petitioners can 
satisfy their need for admissible evidence without threaten-
ing the Government's interest in limiting the scope of an im-
munity grant or encroaching upon the deponent's certainty of 
protection. 
A 
Questions taken verbatim from a transcript of immunized 
testimony could evoke one of several responses from a depo-
nent: (i) he could repeat or adopt his immunized answer;14 (ii) 
he could affirm that the transcript of his immunized answers 
accurately reflects his prior testimony; (iii) he could recall ad-
ditional information responsive to the question but not dis-
closed in his immune testimony; or (iv) he could disclose in-
formation that is not responsive to the question. Petitioners 
do not contend, nor could they, that the prior grant of use im-
munity affords protection for all self-incriminatin_g informa-
.tion disclosed by the immunized witness~n any occasion 
after the giving of the immunized testimony. Rather, peti-
tioners argue that only the first three responses would be 
"derived from" his immune testimony and therefore would be 
unavailable for use against the deponent in any subsequent 
criminal prosecution. 
Petitioners' premise is that the deposition of Conboy is de-
13 Besides the costs of testifying against close associates, any witness in-
creases the risk of committing perjury the more he talks. Cf. 18 U. S. C. 
§ 6002 (perjured testimony not immunized). 
14 The extreme case would be where petitioners read the entire immu-
nized grand jury transcript; then ask the witness if that is his testimony; 
and he answers simply "Yes." 
10 
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signed not to discover new information, 15 but to obtain evi-
dence that simply repeats the statements in the immunized 
transcript. 16 Because there will be little opportunity for the 
grant of immunity to sweep in statements on direct examina-
tion that the Government did not intend to immunize, or for 
the deponent to give responses that may fall outside of the 
grant of immunity and later be used against him in a subse-
quent criminal prosecution,~onboy's deposition will yield 
only a carbon copy of the grand-jury transcript. In such a 
situation, 1t would be desirable~ civil plaintiffs, particu-
larly those bringing private suits that supplement the crimi-
nal enforcement of the federal antitrust laws~ave access to 
the available, probative information. 
But even if the direct examination is limited to the ques- . 
tions and answers in the immunized transcript, there remains 
the right of cross examination, 17 a right traditionally relied 
16 Direct examination may not be as limited as petitioners assume. The 
District Court's civil contempt order stated that the questions asked in the 
deposition "were taken directly'' from the immunized transcripts, but did 
not define exactly what deposition questions petitioners could ask. Other 
Courts of Appeals have permitted direct questioning to go beyond mere 
restatements of the prior testimony. See In re Corrugated Container 
Antitrust Litigation, Appeal of Fleischacker, 644 F . 2d 70, 79 (CA2 1981) 
(compelling answers to questions "concerning specific subjects that actu-
ally were touched upon by questions appearing in the transcript of the im-
munized testimony''); Little Rock School District v. Borden, Inc., 632 F. 2d 
700, 705 (CA8 1980) (compelling answers as long as deposition questions 
confined to " 'the same time, geographical and substantive frame work as 
the [ witness' immunized] grand jury testimony' ") (quoting Appeal of 
Starkey, 600 F. 2d 1043, 1048 (CA8 1979)). 
1
• For purposes of this case, we assume that the grand jury transcripts 
are inadmissible as evidence in a civil trial because the testimony is not 
subject to cross examination. Cf. Fed. R. Evid. 803(8) (hearsay exception 
for certain public records); Fed. R. Evid. 804(a)(l) (witness unavailable 
when exempted from testifying on ground of privilege); Fed. R. Evid. 
804(b)(l) (former testimony admissible when witness unavailable and the 
party against whom the testimony is now offered had an opportunity for 
cross examination). 
11 Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(l ) (stating that depositions may be taken "if 
-
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upon expansively to test credibility as well as to seek the 
truth. Petitioners recognize this problem, but maintain that 
the antitrust defendants "would be entitled to test the accu-
racy and truthfulness of Conboy's repeated immunized testi-
mony without going beyond the confines of that testimony." 
Regardless of any limitations that may be imposed on its 
scope, 18 however, cross examination is intended to and often 
will produce information not elicited on direct. We must as-
sume that, to produce admissible evidence, the scope of cross 
examination at the deposition cannot easily be limited to the 
immunized testimony. This assumption implicates both the 
Government's and the individual's interests embodied in 
§6002. 
B 
Use immunity was intended to immunize and exclude from 
a subsequent criminal trial only that information to which the 
Government expressly has surrendered future use. If the 
Government is engaged in an ongoing investigation of the 
particular activity at issue, immunizing new information (e. 
g., the answers to questions in a case like this one) may make 
it more difficult to show in a subsequent prosecution that sim-
ilar information was obtained from wholly independent 
the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discov-
ery of admissible evidence"); Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(c) (allowing cross examina-
tion at depositions); Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a) (deposition "admissible under the 
rules of evidence applied as though the witness were then present and tes-
tifying"); Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(l) (deposition admissible if the party against 
whom the testimony is now offered in a civil action had an opportunity to 
develop testimony by cross examination). 
18 See United States v. Cardillo, 316 F. 2d 606, 611 (CA2 1963) (in deter-
mining whether testimony of a witness who invokes the privilege during 
cross examination may be used against deft, draws a distinction between 
cases in which the assertion of the privilege merely precludes inquiry into 
collateral matters that bear on credibility of witnesses and those in which 
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sources. A District Court's grant of immunity in a subse-
quent civil proceeding in effect could invest the deponent 
with transactional immunity on matters about which he testi-
fied at the immunized proceedings. This is precisely the 
kind of immunity Congress intended to prohibit. The pur-
pose of § 6002 was to limit the scope of immunity to the level 
that is constitutionally required, as well as to limit the use of 
.__ immunity to those cases in which aesignated 9Kes:i.1tive offi--: 
~ determine thai}gaitring the witness' testimony outweighs 
the loss of the opportunity for criminal prosecution of that 
witness. 19 
C 
Petitioners' interpretation of § 6002 also places substantial 
risks on the deponent. Unless the grant of immunity as-
sures a witness that his incriminating testimony will not be 
used against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution, the 
witness has not received the certain protection pf his Fifth 
Amendment privilege that he has been forced to exchange. 
No court has authority to immunize a witness. That respon-
sibility, as we have noted, is peculiarly an executive one, and 
only the Attorney General or a designated officer of the De-
'"We need not decide whether United States Attorneys,.i)resently have 
authority to immunize the testimony of a witness in a civil pfoceeding when 
the Government determines that the public interest would be served. Cf. 
18 U. S. C. § 6002 (can compel testimony "[w]henever a witness refuses" to 
testify "in a proceeding before or ancillary to ... a court . .. of the United 
State,"); id., § 6003 (may compel testimony Government believes "may be 
necessary to the public interest"); 116 Cong. Rec. 36,293 (1970) (statement 
of Sen. Hruska) (reading § 6002 as "enabl[ing] the Government in any court 
. . . proceeding" to compel testimony) (emphasis added); 116 Cong. Rec. 
853 (1970) (statement of Sen. Young) ("[T]he power of the district attorney 
to compel a witness to testify is .... apparently available in any case in a 
federal court, including civil actions between private parties.") (quoting 
from a memorandum prepared by the American Civil Liberties Union). If 
this authority exists, it could resolve the problem here presented in many 
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partment of Justice has authority to grant use immunity. 
See 18 U. S. C. §§ 6002, 6003. Nor can a court, at the time 
of the civil testimony, pre-determine the decision of the court 
in a subsequent criminal prosecution on the question whether 
the Government has met its burden of proving "that the evi-
dence it proposes to use is derived from a legitimate source 
wholly independent of the compelled testimony." Kastigar, 
406 U. S., at 460. Yet in holding Conboy in contempt for his 
Fifth Amendment silence, the District Court below essen-
tially predicted that a court in any future criminal prosecu-
tion of Conboy will be obligated to protect against eviden-
tiary use of the deposition testimony petitioners seek. We 
do not think such a predictive judgment is enough. As the 
Court stated in Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449 (1975), com-
pelling a witness to testify in "reliance upon a later objection 
or motion to suppress would 'let the cat out' with no assur-
ance whatever of putting it back." Id. , at 463. 
If we simply were to assume, as petitioners urge, that the 
court hearing the criminal case will be able to exclude wrong-
fully compelled evidence, cf. id., at 474-475 (WHITE, J. , con-
curring in the result); Murphy, 378 U. S., at 79, Conboy's un-
certainty might be diminished, but not eliminated, cf. Rogers 
v. United States, 340 U. S. 367, 373 (1951). Conboy could 
face prosecutorial challeges that he waived his privilege and 
that the testimony was not wrongfully compelled. Reliance 
on an exclusionary rule would also implicate the Govern-
ment's interests. Judicial exclusion of nonimmunized testi-
mony would be inconsistent with the congressional policy of 
leaving the granting of immunity to the g_xecutive g_ranch. 
Moreover, the necessarily broad scope of a "fudicial excfusion-
ary rule that provides certain protection to the deponent 
would frustrate congressional intent to grant no more immu-
nity than the Constitution requires. 
"The Court has held that an individual under compulsion to 
make disclosures as a witness who revealed information in-
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lege." Garner v. United States, 424 U. S. 648, 653 (1976) 
(citing United States v. Kordel, 397 U. S. 1, 7-10 (1970)). 
We believe Conboy acted properly in maintaining his silence 
in the face of the District Court's compulsion order and by 
testing the validity of his privilege on appeal. 
IV 
This Court has emphasized the importance of the private 
action as a means of furthering the policy goals of certain fed-
eral regulatory statutes, including the federal antitrust laws. 
See, e.g., Perrna Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts 
Corp., 392 U. S. 134, 139 (1968); United States v. Borden 
Co., 347 U. S. 514, 518--519 (1954). But private civil actions 
can only supplement, not supplant, the primary responsibil-
ity of Government. Petitioners' proposed construction of 
§ 6002 sweeps further than Congress intended and could hin-
der governmental enforcement of its criminal laws by turning 
use immunity into a form of transactional immunity for sub-
jects examined in the immunized proceeding. It also puts 
the deponent in some danger of criminal prosecution unless 
he receives an assurance of immunity or exclusion that the 
courts cannot properly give. Silence, on the other hand, 
preserves the deponent's rights and the Government's inter-
ests, as well as the judicial resources that otherwise would be 
required to make the many difficult judgments that petition-
ers' interpretation of § 6002 would require. 
V 
We hold that a deponent's civil deposition testimony, made 
withou~ii ex:pr9S8 gov9nuneBtal assurance of immunity at 
the time, is not "information directly or indirectly derived 
from" the immunized testimonif""and therefore may be avail-
able for use against him in a subsequent criminal prosectuion. 
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✓ U. S. Cl § 6001-6005 (1976), a United States Attorney.,. wiik .9-
_Q, tb8 a~p '}al ef tse f.Lttoffle) C cneP&l, may request an order 
from a federal court compelling a witness to testify even 
though he has asserted his privilege against self-incrimina-
✓ 
tion. Section 6002 provides, however, that "no testimony or 
other information compelled under the order (or any informa-
tion directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or 
other information) may be used against the witness in any 
criminal case .... " The issue presented in this case is 
whether a deponent's civil deposition testimony, repeating 
verbatim or closely tracking his prior immunized testimony, 
is "information" so "directly or indirectly derived from [the 
immunized] testimony'' that it cannot be used against the wit-
ness in a subsequent criminal prosecution. 
I 
Respondent John Conboy is a former executive of a defend-
ant in the In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 
M.D.L. 310 (S.D. Tex.). In January 1978, United States 
Department of Justice attorneys interviewed Conboy follow-
ing a promise of use immunity. Conboy subsequently ap- ✓ 
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ties and, pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 6002, was granted formal 
use immunity for his testimony. 
Following the criminal indictment of several companies, 
numerous civil antitrust actions were filed in various United 
States district courts. Those actions were consolidated for 
discovery in the District Court for the Southern District of 
Texas. Petitioners here are purchasers of corrugated con-
tainers who elected to opt out of the class-action proceedings 
and pursue their own causes of action against manufacturers. 
The District Court ordered that portions of the immunized 
government interview and grand-jury testimony of certain 
witnesses, including that of Conboy, be made available to 
lawyers for the class and opt-outs. 1 
Pursuant to a subpoena issued by the District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois, Conboy appeared in Chicago for 
a deposition at which he, his counsel, and petitioners' counsel 
had copies of his immunized testimony. The transcripts 
were marked as deposition exhibits so that all could follow 
the intended examination. The questioning fell into the fol-
lowing pattern: a question was read from the transcrip~ ; · 
then was rephrased to include the transcript answer (i. e., s s 
it not the fact that .... "); finally, Conboy was asked if he ad 
"so testified" in his immunized interview and grand-j~ 
examination. 2 Conboy refused to answer each questi~ s- s 
serting his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. 
1 The propriety of the District Court's release of grand jury materials to 
the civil parties is not before the Court. 
2 An example of this three-question pattern is as follows: 
Q. "Who did you have price communications with at Alton Box Board?;}__.. 
Q. Is it not the fact that you had price communications with Fred 
Renshaw and Dick Herman ... ? 
Q. Did you not so testify in your government interview of January 10, 
1978? 
Joint Appendix 29-31. 
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The District Court granted petitioners' motion to compel 
Conboy to answer the questions. 3 When Conboy continued 
to claim his privilege, the District Court held him in con-
tempt, but stayed its order pending appeal. A panel of the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the con-
tempt order, holding that, "[b ]ecause the questions asked in 
this deposition were taken verbatim from or closely tracked ✓ 
Jk the transcript of Conboy's grand jury testimony, we believe ( 
~ - iRM his answers at the deposition would b~ rived from' the A 
:::::;- prior immunized [testimony] and therefore unavailable for 
r ~ .:-, \e. 1 
Lr~u,,J. 
use in any subsequent criminal prosecution." In re Corru-
gated Container Antitrust Litigation, Appeal of John 
Conboy, 655 F. 2d 748, 751 (CA7), rev'd en bane, 661 F. 2d 
1145 (1981). 
On rehearing en bane, the Court of Appeals reversed the 
District Court. It first determined that Conboy's alleged 
fear of prosecution was more than "fanciful," 661 F. 2d, at 
1152, and that Conboy therefore was entitled to assert his 
Fifth Amendment privilege unless his deposition testimony 
could not be used against him in a subsequent criminal action, 
see id., at 1153. 4 The court then held that under § 6002, ab-
sent a separate and independent grant of immunity, 6 a depo-
nent' s civil deposition testimony that repeats verbatim or 
closely tracks his prior immunized testimony is not protected. 
While acknowledging that verbatim questions "of course 
[would be] derived" from the immunized testimony, the court 
reasoned that the answers to such questions "are derived 
from the deponent's current, independent memory of events" 
and thus "necessarily create a new source of evidence" that 
3 Chief Judge John V. Singleton, Jr. of the District Court for the South-
ern District of Texas expressly exercised the powers of the District Court 
for the Northern District of Illinois pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1407(b)./\ 
• The correctness of the Court of Appeals' conclusion that Conboy could 
assert a Fifth Amendment privilege, absent some immunity, is not before 
us. 
5 A United States Attorney declined to authorize immunity grants in 
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could be used in a subsequent criminal prosecution against 
Conboy. Id., at 1155 (emphasis in original). 
We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict in the Courts 
of Appeals, 6 and now affirm. 
-¥. :ft-----,, -----rr-
,., It is settled that government must have the power to com-
pel testimony "to secure information necessary for effective 
law enforcement." Murphy v. Wateefront Commission, 378 
U. S. 52, 79 (1964). 7 For many years, however, a person 
who was compelled to testify under a grant of governmental 
immunity could not be prosecuted for any conduct about 
which he had testified. See New Jersey v. Portash, · 440 
U. S. 450, 457 (1979). Prosecutors therefore were reluctant 
to grant such "transactional" immunity to potential targe~ 
criminal investigations. See S. Rep. No. 91-617, p. 53 
(1969). 
The "major purpose" of the Organized Crime Control Act 
of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 927, of which§ 6002 was 
a key provision, was "to provide the criminal justice s stem 
with the necessary legal tools to . . . strength the evi-
dence gathering process and insur[e] that the e ence will 
then be available and admissible at trial." 116 Cong. Rec. 
,/ 
35,200 (1970) (statement of Rep. St. Germain). Congress 
sought to make th~.,::4-~ ore useful for law en-
• Compare In re Corrugated Container A ntitrust Litigation, Appeal of 
Fleischacker, 644 F. 2d 70, 75 (CA2 1981) (deposition answers immunized), 
and Little Rock School District v. Borden, Inc .. , 632 F. 2d 700, 705 (CA8 
1980) (same), with In re Corrugated Container A nti-Trust Litigation, Ap-
peal of Franey, 620 F. 2d 1086, 1095 (CA5 1980) (answers not immunized), 
cert. denied, 449 U. S. 1102 (1981). 
7 See United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 345 (1974); United 
States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 41 (1973) (MARSHALL, J. , dissenting); 
Ka£itar v. United States, 406 U. S. 441, 443-444 (1973); Murphy, 378 
u.-~ at 93-94 (WHITE, J ., concurring); Blackmer v. United States, 284 
U. S. 421, 438 (1932); Blair v. United States , 250 U. S. 273, 281 (1919); 
Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 600 (1896). 
s 
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forcement officers through two specific changes. First, Con-
gress made the grant of immunity less expansive 8 by repeal-
ing the authority for transactional immunity and providing 
for the less comprehensive use immunity authorized in 
§ 6002. 9 Second, Congress gave certain officials in the De-
partment _ Jli._ Justice 10 exclusive authority to grant 
------;i::m:::m:-u:::m::•r;tir::"· e~ 
o/ 
8 In Murphy, JUSTICE WmTE stated that "[i]mmunity must be as broad 
as, but not harmfully and wastefully broader than, the privilege against 
self-incrimination." 378 U. S., at 107 (concurring opinion) (quoted with 
approval in 116 Cong. Rec. 35,291 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff)). In its 
committee report, the House explained that § 6002 was not to provide an 
"immunity bath," but was to be "no broader than" the Fifth Amendment 
privilege. I(.R. No. 91-1549, p. 5 (1970). 
9 Section 6002 provides: 
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-
incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding be-
fore or ancillary t(}-
(1>.a court or grand jury of the United States, 
(2. an agency of the United States, or 
(3~either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses, or a 
committee or a subcommittee of either House 
and the person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the witness 
an order issued under this part, the witness may not refuse to comply with 
the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but no tes-
timony or other information compelled under the order (or any information 
directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) 
may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution 
for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with 
the order. 
Section 6001(2) defines "other information" to include "any book, paper, 
document, record, recording, or other material." 
10 Section 6003 states: 
(a)t\In the case of any individual who has been or may be called to testify 
or provide other information at any proceeding before or ancillary to a 
court of the United States or a grand jury of the United States, the United 
States district court for the judicial district in which the proceeding is or 
may be held shall issue, in accordance with subsection (b) of this section, 
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The Court upheld the constitutionality of the use immunity 
statute in Kastigar v. United States, 406 U. S. 441 (1972). 
The power to compel testimony is limited by the Fifth 
Amendment, and we held that any grant of immunity must 
be co-extensive with the privilege. We were satisfied, how-
ever, that § 6002 provided this measure of protection and 
thus "removed the dangers against which the privilege pro-
tects." Id., at 449. In rejecting the argument that use and 
derivative-use immunity would not adequately protect a wit-
ness from various incriminating uses of the compelled testi-
mony, we emphasized that "[t]he statute provides a sweeping 
proscription of any use, direct or indirect, of the compelled 
testimony and any information derived therefrom .... " Id., 
at 460. We added that once a defendant establishes that he 
has testified under a grant of immunity, "the prosecution 
[has] the affirmative duty to prove that the evidence it pro-
poses to use is derived from .a legitima~ urce wholly inde- V 
pendent of the compelled test~~~:ri ' ~ Th&:', "immunity ~ 
from use and derivative use 'lea~ the witness and ____.Q{_QJ 7'. 
the Federal Government in substantially ~ same position as 
if the witness had claimed his privilege' in the absence of a 
grant of immunity." Kastigar, 406 U. S., at 458-459 (quot-
ing Murphy, 378 U. S., at 79). 
requiring such individual to give testimony or provide other information 
which he refuses to give or provide on the basis of his privilege against self-
incrimination, such order to become effective as provided in section 6002 of 
this part. 
(b)~ United States attorney may, with the approval of the Attorney 
General, the Deputy Attorney General, or any designated Assistant Attor-
ney General, request an order under subsection (a) of this section when in 
his judgment-
(l~the testimony or other information from such individual may be nec-
essary to the public interest; and 
(2)~ uch individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide 
other information on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination. J---
11 Congress foresaw the courts as playing only a minor role in the immu-
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III 
7 
With the foregoing statutory history and relevant princi-
ples in mind, we turn now to this case. It is not disputed 
that the questions asked of Conboy were directly or indi-
rectly derived from his immunized testimony. The issue is 
whether the causal connection between the questions and the 
answers is so direct that the answers also are derived from 
that testimony and therefore should be excluded under the 
grant of immunity. 
Petitioners' argument is based on the language of § 6002 
and on a common understanding of the words "derived from." 
The questions formulated on the basis of immunized testi-
mon are clearly "derived from" the prior testimony. Thus, 
t e answer that repeat verbatim or closely track a depo-
~nfs testimon:t;> are necessarily also "derived from" and 
"tainted by" such testimony. Petitioners therefore find no 
basis for the distinction made by the Court of Appeals be-
tween questions and answers responsive to those same ques-
tions. An answer by its very nature is evoked by and re-
sponds to information contained in a question. 
Conboy's position is also straightforward: Questions do not 
incriminate; answers do. Unlike the questions, answers are 
not directly or indirectly derived from the immunized grand 
jury or interview transcripts, but from ~he deponent's cur-
rent, independent memory of events. Even when a depo-
nent's deposition answers are identical to those he gave to 
the grand jury, he is under oath to tell the truth, not neces-
sarily as he told it before the grand jury, but as he knows it 
,. 
facts on which the order is predicated." H~ . Rep. No. 91-1549, supra 
'-note 8, at 43; H. R. Rep. No. 91-1188, p. 13 (1970). See 116 Cong. Rec. 
35,291 (1970) (sratement of Rep. Poff). Cf. President's Commission on 
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime 
in a Free Society 141 (1967) (recommending that "[i]mmunity should be 
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now. Each new statement of the deponent creates a new 
"source." In sum, the initial grant of immunity does not pre-
vent the prosecutor from prosecuting; it merely limits his 
sources of evidence. I •• ~ I 
The language of the statute permits either p~~
pretation and compels neither. The broad wording of§ 6002, 
and our interpretation of it in Kasti,gar, suggests that we 
should hesitate to exclude information from the coverage of 
the immunity grant that admittedly has a close tie with the 
immunized testimony. In the end, however, whether par-
ticular information is "derived from" immunized materials, is 
"fruit" of "tainted" information, or is the product of a "new 
source" are conclusions that "may conceal concrete complex-
ities." Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338, 341 (1939). 
As the Court has noted: "Sophisticated argument may prove 
a causal connection between information obtained through 
[the unlawful governmental conduct] and the Government's 
proof. As a matter of good sense, however, such connection 
~ 
have become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint." 
We believe that rather than adopting a conclusory label 
o the deposition testimony, it is desirable to determine 
which of the two interpretations of § 6002 more satisfactorily 
accommodates the Government's need for admissible · evi-
dence and the individual's interest in avoiding self-
incrimination. 12 
Although there may be practical reasons for not testify-
12 See Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) 
("[T]he proper test to apply . . . is one which ... protects against the inva-
sion of constitutional rights without commanding undesirable consequences 
not necessary to the assurance of those rights."); Brown v. Illinois, 422 
U. S. 590, 604 (1975) (reversing because state court failed "to evaluate the 
circumstances of the case in light of the policy served by the exclusionary 
rule"); Murphy, 378 U. S. , at 79 (stating an exclusionary rule "to imple-
ment [Fifth Amendment] and accommodate the interests of the ... Gov-
ernment[] in investigating and prosecuting crime"). See generally C. 
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ing, 13 as far as the deponent's Fifth Amendment ght is con-
v 
cerned he should be indifferent between the p otection af- .1.\ .. · .,/ 
forded by silence and that afforded by immu ·ty. /\He isO. J\ ""\~ "i>~ 
in:tiere~ted, hovt1ever, ~ that the protection~ by the riv- \'Y\.~ 10 
i!"ege or the grant of immunity is certain. , !)le ~ ..A. v · 
i.....;-.- Government's interest,wnay be affected seriously byl\~ - ~ ~ 
. ' -- x- -, q-ehoies. Our specific inquiry then is whether petitioners can /\ . . 
lb ~+;/4 satisfy their nee,Wor admissible evidence without threaten- ::::E:Ei 
A~---· mg the Government's mterest m lirmtmg the scope of an 1m- . 
munity grant or encroaching upon the deponent's certainty of . • ~ ~ ~ 
protection. , ~~ cw&_ ~ 
-- A ~ Of'-~ l\·~ 
Questions taken verbatim from a transcript of immunized · · 
testimony could evoke one of several responses from a depo- tr;;,.--:'ct- on. ~ · 
nent: (i) he could repeat or adopt his immunized answer~ (ii) ( -t1:» J,,. h,_.L. 
he could affirm that the transcript of his immunized answers 
accurately reflects his prior testimony; (iii) he could recall ad-
ditional information responsive to the question but not dis-
closed in his immune testimony; or (iv) he could disclose in-
formation that is not responsive to the question. Petitioners 
do not contend, nor could they, that the prior grant of use im-
munity affords protection for all self-incriminating informa- J2.... 
tion disclosed by the immunized witnes~ on any occasion 
after the giving of the immunized testimony. Rather, peti-
tioners argue tha~ only the first three responses would be 
"derived from" his immune testimony and therefore would be 
unavailable for use against the deponent in any subsequent 
criminal prosecution. 
Petitioners' premise is that the deposition of Conboy is de-
V 
1-.... ~ .. # 
13 Besides the costs of testifying against close associates, any witness in-
creases the risk of committing perjury the more he talks. Cf. 18 U. S. C. 
§ 6002 (perjured testimony not immunized). 
14 The extreme case would be where petitioners read the entire immu-
nized grand jury transcript; then ask the witness if that is his testimony; 
and he answers simply• "Yes. " 
10 
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signed not to discover new information, 15 but to obtain evi-
dence that simply repeats the statements in the immunized 
transcript. 16 Because there will be little opportunity for the 
grant of immunity to sweep in statements on direct examina-
tion that the Government did not intend to immunize, or for 
the deponent to give responses that may fall outside of the 
grant of immunity and later be used a ains · · se-
quent criminal prosecution, Conboy's deposition will yield 
only a carbon copy of the grand1~3 transcript. In such a 
situation, it would be desirable /\civil plaintiffs, particu-
larly those bringing private suits that supplement the crimi-
nal enforcement of the federal antitrust laws~ ave access to 
the available, probative information. 
But even if the direct examination is limited to the ques-
tions and answers in the immunized transcript, there remains 
the right of cross examination, 11 a right traditionally relied 
1
• Direct examination may not be as limited as petitioners assume. The 
District Court's civil contempt order stated that the questions asked in the 
deposition "were taken directly'' from the immunized transcripts, but did 
not define exactly what deposition questions petitioners could ask. Other 
Courts of Appeals have permitted direct questioning to go beyond mere 
restatements of the prior testimony. See In re Corrugated Container 
Antitrust Litigation, Appeal of Fleischacker, 644 F. 2d 70, 79 (CA2 1981) 
(compelling answers to questions "concerning specific subjects that actu-
ally were touched upon by questions appearing in the transcript of the im-
munized testimony''); Little Rock School District v. Borden, Inc., 632 F. 2d 
700, 705 (CA8 1980) (compelling answers as long as deposition questions 
confined to "'the same time, geographical and substantive frame work as 
the [witness' immunized] grand jury testimony"') (quoting Appeal of 
Starkey, 600 F. 2d 1043, 1048 (CA8 1979)). 
16 For purposes of this case, we assume that the grand jury transcripts 
are inadmissible as evidence in a civil trial because the testimony is not 
subject to cross examination. Cf. Fed. R. Evid. 803(8) (hearsay exception 
for certain public records); Fed. R. Evid. 804(a)(l) (witness unavailable 
when exempted from testifying on ground of privilege); Fed. R. Evid. 
804(b)(l) (former testimony admissible when witness unavailable and the 
party against whom the testimony is now offered had an opportunity for 
cross examination). 
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upon expansively to test credibility as well as to seek the 
truth. Petitioners recognize this problem, but maintain that 
the antitrust defendants "would be entitled to test the accu-
racy and truthfulness of Conboy's repeated immunized testi-
mony without going beyond the confines of that testimony." 
Regardless of any limitations that may be imposed on its 
scope, 18 however, cross examination is intended to and often 
will produce information not elicited on direct. We must as-
sume that, to produce admissible evidence, the scope of cross 
examination at the deposition cannot easily be limited to the 
immunized testimony. This assumption implicates both the 
Government's and the individual's interests embodied in 
§6002. 
B 
Use immunity was intended to immunize and exclude from 
a subsequent criminal trial only that information to which the 
Government expressly has surrendered future use. If the 
Government is engaged in an ongoing investigation of t_h_e __ 
particular activity at issue, immunizing new informatio.cl'f e. ,. ; g., the answers to questions in a case like this one) may make .,_ 
it more difficult to show in a subsequent prosecution that sim-
ilar information was obtained from wholly independent 
the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discov-
ery ofadmissible evidence"); Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(c) (allowing cross examina-
tion at depositions); Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a) (deposition "admissible under the 
rules of evidence applied as though the witness were then present and tes-
tifying"); Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(l) (deposition admissible if the party against 
whom the testimony is now offered in a civil action had an opportunity to 
develop testimony by cross examination). 
18 See United States v. Cardillo, 316 F. 2d 606, 611 (CA2 1963) (in deter-
mining whether testimony f a witness w o invokes the rivile e durin 
cross examination may be used agains , raws a distinction between 
cases in which the assertion of the privilege merely precludes inquiry into 
collateral matters that bear on credibility of witnesses and those in which 
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sources. A District Court's grant of immunity in a subse-
quent civil proceeding in effect could invest the deponent 
with transactional immunity on matters about which he testi-
fied at the immunized proceedings. This is precisely the 
kind of immunity Congress intended to prohibit. The pur-
pose of § 6002 was to limit the scope of immunity to the level ✓ 
that is constitutionally required, as well as to limit the use of G-c \ 01" 
immunity to those cases in which desig,•utterl e;x:eetttive offi'2. ~~orN~~~ ~ 
~ determine that gaining the witness~' testimony outweighs o(f ~ doo~ ~ 
the loss of the opportunity for crimin 1 prosecution of that .A ·-'- ,_l 
witness. 19 v ~
C 
Petitioners' interpretation of § 6002 also places substantial 
risks on the deponent. Unless the grant of immunity as-
sures a witness that his incriminating testimony will not be 
used against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution, the 
witness has not received the certain protection of his Fifth 
Amendment privilege that he has been forced to exchange. 
No court has authority to immunize a witness. That respon-
sibility, as we have noted, is peculiarly an executive one, and ) 
only the Attorney General or a designated officer of the De- .I\ ✓ 
L ... i-~ ¼"" ~ .J 
'"We need not decide whether United States Attorney~ presently have \ ):!~\ 
authority to immunize the testimony of a witness in a civil proceeding when 
the Government determines that the public interest would be served. Cf. 
18 U. S. C. § 6002 (can compel testimony "[w]henever a witness refuses" to 
testify "in a proceeding before or ancillary to ... a court ... of the United 
State,"); id., § 6003 (may compel testimony Government believes "may be 
necessary to the public interest"); 116 Cong. Rec. 36,293 (1970) (statement 
of Sen. Hruska) (reading § 6002 as "enabl[ing] the Government in any court 
... proceeding" to compel testimony) (emphasis added); 116 Cong. Rec. 
853 (1970) (statement of Sen. Young) ("[T]he power of the district attorney 
to compel a witness to testify is .. .. apparently available in any case in a 
federal court, including civil actions between private parties.") (quoting 
from a memorandum prepared by the American Civil Liberties Union). If 
this authority exists, it could resolve the problem here presented in many 
civil cases in which the immunity issue is raised. 
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partment of Justice has authority to grant use immunity. 
See 18 U. S. C. §§ 6002, 6003. Nor can a court, at the time 
of the civil testimony, pre-determine the decision of the court 
in a subsequent criminal prosecution on the question whether 
the Government has met its burden of proving "that the evi-
dence it proposes to use is derived from a legitimate source 
wholly independent of the compelled testimony." Kasti,gar, 
406 U. S., at 460. Yet in holding Conboy in contempt for his 
Fifth Amendment silence, the District Court below essen-
tially predicted that a court in any future criminal prosecu-
tion of Conboy will be obligated to protect against eviden-
tiary use of the deposition testimony petitioners seek. We 
do not think such a predictive judgment is enough. As the 
Court stated in Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449 (1975), com-
pelling a witness to testify in "reliance upon a later objection 
or motion to suppress would 'let the cat out' with no assur-
ance whatever of putting it back." Id., at 463. 
If we simply were to assume, as petitioners urge, that the 
court hearing the criminal case will be able to exclude wrong-
fully compelled evidence, cf. id., at 474-475 (WHITE, J., con-
curring in the result); Murphy, 378 U. S., at 79, Conboy's un-
certainty might be diminished, but not eliminated, cf. Rogers 
v. United States, 340 U. S. 367, 373 (1951). Conboy could 
face prosecutorial challeges that he waived his privilege and 
that the testimony was not wrongfully compelled. Reliance 
on an exclusionary rule would also implicate the Govern-
ment's interests. Judicial exclusion of nonimmunized testi-
mony would be inconsistent with the congressional policy of 
leaving the granting of immunity to the ~ ecutive hranch. 
Moreover, the necessarily broad scope of a judicial exciusion-
ary rule that provides certain protection to the deponent 
would frustrate congressional intent to grant no more immu-
nity than the Constitution requires. 
"The Court has held that an individual under compulsion to 
make disclosures as a witness who revealed information in-






PILLSBURY CO. v. CONBOY 
lege." Garner v. United States, 424 U. S. 648, 653 (1976) 
(citing United States v. Kordel, 397 U. S. 1, 7-10 (1970)). 
We believe Conboy acted properly in maintaining his silence 
in the face of the District Court's compulsion order and by 
-
__ t_e""'.:st".':'i~ng=-:t:-he_ v_a~lid_i_ty:_,o_f~h-is~pr~ili7ilege on appeal. 
IV 
This Court has emphasized the importance of the private 
action as a means of furthering the policy goals of certain fed-
eral regulatory statutes, including the federal antitrust laws. 
See, e.g., Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts 
Corp., 392 U. S. 134, 139 (1968); United States v. Borden 
Co., 347 U. S. 514, 518-519 (1954). But private civil actions 
can only supplement, not supplant, the primary responsibil-
ity of Government. Petitioners' proposed construction of 
§ 6002 sweeps further than Congress intended and could hin-
der governmental enforcement of its criminal laws by turning 
use immunity into a form of transactional immunity for sub-
jects examined in the immunized proceeding. It also puts 
the deponent in some danger of criminal prosecution unless 
he receives an assurance of immunity or exclusion that the 
courts cannot properly give. Silence, on the other hand, 
preserves the deponent's rights and the Government's inter-
ests, as well as the judicial resources that otherwise would be 
required to make the many difficult judgments that petition-
ers' interpretation of § 6002 would require. 
V 
l ~ ~e!} We hold that a deponent's civil deposition testimony, made 
withoutlaa 0;K;pr01e1e g:0v:0PRff.le:Rt~ assurance of immunity at 
✓ . ~ is not "information directly or indirectly derived rAr - from"~Amm~nized_ te~timon ' and ther:fo:e ma~ e ft'. ml. a 
,/ ~t»'7' 
✓ 
no+ be. t.ompe\\~ 
A O'J~ Q, Va 
~q-b 












From: Justice Powell 
Circulated: NOV 8 1982 
Recirculated:--- ------'---
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-825 
THE PILLSBURY COMPANY, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. 
JOHN CONBOY 
ON WRiT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
[November-, 1982] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Pursuant to the federal use immunity provisions, 18 
U. S. C. §§ 6001-6005 (1976), a United States Attorney may 
request an order from a federal court compelling a witness to 
testify even though he has asserted his privilege against self-
incrimination. Section 6002 provides, however, that "notes-
timony or other information compelled under the order ( or 
any information directly or indirectly derived from such testi-
mony or other information) may be used against the witness 
in any criminal case. . . . " The issue presented in this case is 
whether a deponent's civil deposition testimony, repeating 
verbatim or closely tracking his prior immunized testimony, 
is "information" so "directly or indirectly derived from [the 
immunized] testimony" that it cannot be used against the wit-
ness in a subsequent criminal prosecution. 
I 
Respondent John Conboy is a former executive of a defend-
ant in the In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 
M.D.L. 310 (S.D. Tex.). In January 1978, United States 
Department of Justice attorneys interviewed Conboy follow-
ing a promise of use immunity. Conboy subsequently ap-
peared before a grand jury investigating price-fixing activi-
ties and, pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 6002, was granted formal 
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Following the criminal indictment of several companies, 
numerous civil antitrust actions were filed in various United 
States district courts. Those actions were consolidated for 
discovery in the District Court for the Southern District of 
Texas. Petitioners here are purchasers of corrugated con-
tainers who elected to opt out of the class-action proceedings 
and pursue their own causes of action against manufacturers. 
The District Court ordered that portions of the immunized 
government interview and grand-jury testimony of certain 
witnesses, including that of Conboy, be made available to 
lawyers for the class and opt-outs. 1 
Pursuant to a subpoena issued by the District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois, Conboy appeared in Clµcago for 
a deposition at which he, his counsel, and petitioners' counsel 
had copies of his immunized testimony. The transcripts 
were marked as deposition exhibits so that all could follow 
the intended examination. The questioning fell into the fol-
lowing pattern: a question was read from the transcript; it 
then was rephrased to include the transcript answer (i. e., 
"Is it not the fact that .... "); finally, Conboy was asked if 
he had "so testified" in his immunized interview and grand-
jury examination. 2 • Conboy refused to answer each ques-
tion, asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. 
The District Court granted petitioners' motion to compel 
1 The propriety of the District Court's release of grand jury materials to 
the civil parties is not before the Court. 
2 An example of this three-question pattern is as follows: 
Q. ''Who did you have price communications with at Alton Box Board?" 
Q. Is it not the fact that you had price communications with Fred 
Renshaw and Dick Herman ... ? 
Q. Did you not so testify in your government interview of January 10, 
1978? 
Joint Appendix 29-31. 
,. 
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Conboy to answer the questions. 3 When Conboy continued 
to claim his privilege, the District Court held him in con-
tempt, but stayed its order pending appeal. A panel of the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the con-
tempt order, holding that, "[b]ecause the questions asked in 
this deposition were taken verbatim from or closely tracked 
the transcript of Conboy's grand jury testimony, we believe 
that his answers at the deposition would be 'derived from' the 
prior immunized [testimony] and therefore unavailable for 
use in any subsequent criminal prosecution." In re C orru-
gated Container Antitrust Liti,gation, Appeal of John 
Conboy, 655 F. 2d 748, 751 (CA7), rev'd en bane, 661 F. 2d 
1145 (1981). 
On rehearing en bane, the Court of Appeals reversed the 
District Court. It first determined that Conboy's alleged 
fear of prosecution was more than "fanciful," -661 F. 2d, at 
1152, and that Conboy therefore was entitled to assert his 
Fifth Amendment privilege unless his deposition testimony 
could not be used against him in a subsequent criminal action, 
see id., at 1153. 4 The court then held that under § 6002, ab-
sent a separate and independent grant of immunity, 5 a depo-
nent's civil deposition testimony that repeats verbatim or 
closely tracks his prior immunized testimony is not protected. 
While acknowledging that verbatim questions "of course 
[would be] derived" from the immunized testimony, the court 
reasoned that the answers to such questions "are derived 
from the deponent's current, independent memory of events" 
3 Chief Judge John V. Singleton, Jr. of the District Court for the South-
ern District of Texas expressly exercised the powers of the District Court 
for the Northern District of Illinois pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1407(b). The 
contempt hearing was conducted by telephone with his chambers in 
Houston. 
' The correctness of the Court of Appeals' conclusion that Conboy could 
assert a Fifth Amendment privilege, absent some immunity, is not before 
us. 
5 A United States Attorney declined to authorize immunity grants in 
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and thus "necessarily create a new source of evidence" that 
could be used in a subsequent criminal prosecution against 
Conboy. Id., at 1155 (emphasis in original). 
We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict in the Courts 
of Appeals, 6 and now affirm. 
II 
It is settled that government must have the power to com-
pel testimony "to secure information necessary for effective 
law enforcement." Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 
U. S. 52, 79 (1964). 7 For many years, however, a person 
who was compelled to testify under a grant of governmental 
immunity could not be prosecuted for any conduct about 
which he had testified. See New Jersey v. Portash, 440 
U. S. 450, 457 (1979). Prosecutors therefore were reluctant 
to grant such "transactional" immunity to potential targets 
of criminal investigations. See S. Rep. No. 91-617, p. 53 
(1969). 
The "major purpose" of the Organized Crime Control Act 
of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 927, of which §6002 was 
a key provision, was "to provide the criminal justice system 
with the necessary legal tools to . . . strengthe[n] the evi-
dence gathering process and insur[e] that the evidence will 
then be available and admissible at trial." 116 Cong. Rec. 
35,200 (1970) (statement of Rep. St. Germain). Congress 
• Compare In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, Appeal of 
Fleischacker, 644 F. 2d 70, 75 (CA2 1981) (deposition answers immunized), 
and Little Rock School District v. Borden, Inc., 632 F. 2d 700, 705 (CA8 
1980) (same), with In re Corrugated Container Anti-Trust Litigation, Ap-
peal of Franey, 620 F. 2d 1086, 1095 (CA5 1980) (answers not immunized), 
cert. denied, 449 U. S. 1102 (1981). 
1 See United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 345 (1974); United 
States v. Mara, 410 U. S. 19, 41 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting); Kasti-
gar v. United States, 406 U. S. 441, 443--444 (1973); Murphy, 378 U. S., at 
9~94 (WmTE, J., concurring); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421, 
438 (1932); Blair v. United States, 250 U. S. 273, 281 (1919); Brown v. 
Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 600 (1896). 
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sought to make the grant of immunity more useful for law en-
forcement officers through two specific changes. First, Con-
gress made the grant of immunity less expansive 8 by re-
pealing the authority for transactional immunity and provid-
ing for the less comprehensive use immunity authorized in 
§ 6002. 9 Second, Congress gave certain officials in the 
Department of Justice 10 exclusive authority to grant 
immunities. 11 
8 In Murphy, JUSTICE WmTE stated that "[i]mmunity must be as broad 
as, but not harmfully and wastefully broader than, the privilege against 
self-incrimination." 378 U. S., at 107 (concurring opinion) (quoted with 
approval in 116 Cong. Rec. 35,291 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff)). In its 
committee report, the House explained that § 6002 was not to provide an 
"immunity bath," but was to be "no broader than" the Fifth Amendment 
privilege. H.R. No. 91-1549, p. 5 (1970). 
9 Section 6002 provides: 
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-
incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding be-
fore or ancillary to-
(1) a court or grand jury of the United States, 
(2) an agency of the United States, or 
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses, or a 
committee or a subcommittee of either House 
and the person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the witness 
an order issued under this part, the witness may not refuse to comply with 
the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but no tes-
timony or other information compelled under the order (or any information 
directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) 
may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution 
for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with 
the order. 
Section 6001(2) defines "other information" to include "any book, paper, 
document, record, recording, or other material." 
10 Section 6003 states: 
(a) In the case of any individual who has been or may be called to testify 
or provide other information at any proceeding before or ancillary to a 
court of the United States or a grand jury of the United States, the United 
States district court for the judicial district in which the proceeding is or 
may be held shall issue, in accordance with subsection (b) of this section, 
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The Court upheld the constitutionality of the use immunity 
statute in Kastigar v. United States, 406 U. S. 441 (1972). 
The power to compel testimony is limited by the Fifth 
Amendment, and we held that any grant of immunity must 
be co-extensive with the privilege. We were satisfied, how-
ever, that § 6002 provided this measure of protection and 
thus "removed the dangers against which the privilege pro-
tects." Id., at 449. In rejecting the argument that use and 
derivative-use immunity would not adequately protect a wit-
ness from various incriminating uses of the compelled testi-
mony, we emphasized that "[t]he statute provides a sweeping 
proscription of any use, direct or indirect, of the compelled 
testimony and any information derived therefrom .... " Id., 
at 460. We added that once a defendant establishes that he 
has testified under a grant of immunity, "the prosecution 
[has] the affirmative duty to prove that the evidence it pro-
poses to use is derived from a legitimate source wholly inde-
pendent of the compelled testimony." Ibid. Thus, "immu-
nity from use and derivative use 'leaves the witness and the 
Federal Government in substantially the same position as if 
the witness had claimed his privilege' in the absence of a 
grant of immunity." Kastigar, 406 U. S., at 45S-459 (quot-
ing Murphy, 378 U. S., at 79). 
upon the request of the United States attorney for such district, an order 
requiring such individual to give testimony or provide other information 
which he refuses to give or provide on the basis of his privilege against self-
incrimination, such order to become effective as provided in section 6002 of 
this part. 
(b) A United States attorney may, with the approval of the Attorney 
General, the Deputy Attorney General, or any designated Assistant Attor-
ney General, request an order under subsection (a) of this section when in 
his judgment-
(1) the testimony or other information from such individual may be nec-
essary to the public interest; and 
(2) such individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide 
other information on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination. 
11 Congress foresaw the courts as playing only a minor role in the immu-
nizing process: "The court's role in granting the order is merely to find the 
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III 
7 
With the foregoing statutory history and relevant princi-
ples in mind, we turn now to this case. It is not disputed 
that the questions asked of Conboy were directly or indi-
rectly derived from his immunized testimony. The issue is 
whether the causal connection between the questions and the 
answers is so direct that the answers also are derived from 
that testimony and therefore should be excluded under the 
grant of immunity. 
Petitioners' argument is based on the language of § 6002 
and on a common understanding of the words "derived from." 
The questions formulated on the basis of immunized testi-
mony are clearly "derived from" the prior testimony. Thus, 
the answers that repeat verbatim or closely track a depo-
nent's testimony are necessarily also "derived from" and 
"tainted by'' such testimony. Petitioners therefore find no 
basis for the distinction made by the Court of Appeals be-
tween questions and answers responsive to those same ques-
tions. An answer by its very nature is evoked by and re-
sponds to information contained in a question. 
Conboy's position is also straightforward: Questions do not 
incriminate; answers do. Unlike the questions, answers are 
not directly or indirectly derived from the immunized grand 
jury or interview transcripts, but from the deponent's cur-
rent, independent memory of events. Even when a depo-
nent's deposition answers are identical to those he gave to 
the grand jury, he is under oath to tell the truth, not neces-
sarily as he told it before the grand jury, but as he knows it 
now. Each new statement of the deponent creates a new 
facts on which the order is predicated." H.R. Rep. No. 91-1549, supra 
note 8, at 43; H.R. Rep. No. 91-1188, p. 13 (1970). See 116 Cong. Rec. 
35,291 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff). Cf. President's Commission on 
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime 
in a Free Society 141 (1967) (recommending that "[i]mmunity should be 
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"source." In sum, the initial grant of immunity does not pre-
vent the prosecutor from prosecuting; it merely limits his 
sources of evidence. 
The language of the statute permits either party's inter-
pretation and compels neither. The broad wording of§ 6002, 
and our interpretation of it in Kastigar, suggests that we 
should hesitate to exclude information from the coverage of 
the immunity grant that admittedly has a close tie with the 
immunized testimony. In the end, however, whether par-
ticular information is "derived from" immunized materials, is 
"fruit" of "tainted" information, or is the product of a "new 
source" are conclusions that "may conceal concrete complex-
ities." Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338, 341 (1939). 
As the Court has noted: "Sophisticated argument may prove 
a causal connection between information obtained through 
[the unlawful governmental conduct] and the Government's 
proof. As a matter of good sense, however, such connection 
may have become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint." 
Ibid. We believe that rather than adopting a conclusory 
label for the deposition testimony, it is desirable to determine 
which of the two interpretations of § 6002 more satisfactor-
ily accommodates the Government's need for admissible 
evidence and the individual's interest in avoiding self-
incrimination. 12 
Although there may be ,practical reasons for not testify-
ing, 13 as far as the deponent's Fifth Amendment right is con-
12 See Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) 
("[T]he proper test to apply ... is one which ... protects against the inva-
sion of constitutional rights without commanding undesirable consequences 
not necessary to the assurance of those rights."); Brown v. Illinois, 422 
U. S. 590, 604 (1975) (reversing because state court failed "to evaluate the 
circumstances of the case in light of the policy served by the exclusionary 
rule"); Murphy, 378 U. S., at 79 (stating an exclusionary rule "to imple-
ment [Fifth Amendment] and accommodate the interests of the ... Gov- · 
ernment[] in investigating and prosecuting crime"). See generally C. 
Whitebread, Criminal Procedure § 2.04, at 37 (1980). 
1
• Besides the costs of testifying against close associates, any witness in-
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cerned he should be indifferent between the protection af-
forded by silence and that afforded by immunity. His 
primary interest is that the protection afforded by the privi-
lege or the grant of immunity is certain. The Government's 
interests, however, may be affected seriously by whether the 
deponent relies at the civil deposition on his Fifth Amend-
ment privilege or on his prior grant of immunity. Our spe-
cific inquiry then is whether petitioners can satisfy their need 
as antitrust plaintiffs for admissible evidence without threat-
ening the Government's interest in limiting the scope of an 
immunity grant or encroaching upon the deponent's certainty 
of protection. 
A 
Questions taken verbatim from a transcript of immunized 
testimony could evoke one of several responses from a depo-
nent: (i) he could repeat or adopt his immunized answer; 14 
(ii) he could affirm that the transcript of his immunized an-
swers accurately reflects his prior testimony; (iii) he could re-
call additional information responsive to the question but not 
disclosed in his immune testimony; or (iv) he could disclose 
information that is not responsive to the question. Petition-
ers do not contend, nor could they, that the prior grant of use 
immunity affords protection for all self-incriminating in-
formation disclosed by the immunized witness on any occa-
sion after the giving of the immunized testimony. Rather, 
petitioners argue that only the first three responses would be 
"derived from" his immune testimony and therefore would be 
unavailable for use against the deponent in any subsequent 
criminal prosecution. 
Petitioners' premise is that the deposition of Conboy is de-
creases the risk of committing perjury the more he talks. Cf. 18 U. S. C. 
§ 6002 (perjured testimony not immunized). 
"The extreme case would be where petitioners read the entire immu-
nized grand jury transcript; then ask the witness if that is his testimony; 
and he answers simply "Yes." 
10 
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signed not to discover new information, 15 but to obtain evi-
dence that simply repeats the statements in the immunized 
transcript. 16 Because there will be little opportunity for the 
grant of immunity to sweep in statements on direct examina-
tion that the Government did not intend to immunize, or for 
the deponent to give responses that may fall outside of the 
grant of immunity and later be used against him in a subse-
quent criminal prosecution, petitioners argue that Conboy's 
deposition will yield only a carbon copy of the grand-jury 
transcript. In such a situation, it would be desirable for civil 
plaintiffs, particularly those bringing private suits that sup-
plement the criminal enforcement of the federal antitrust 
laws, to have access to the available, probative information. 
But even if the direct examination is limited to the ques-
tions and answers in the immunized transcript, there remains 
the right of cross examination, 17 a right traditionally relied 
15 Direct examination may not be as limited as petitioners assume. The 
District Court's civil contempt order stated that the questions asked in the 
deposition "were taken directly'' from the immunized transcripts, but did 
not define exactly what deposition questions petitioners could ask. Other 
Courts of Appeals have permitted direct questioning to go beyond mere 
restatements of the prior testimony. See In re Corrugated Container 
Antitrust Litigation, Aweal of Fleischacker, 644 F. 2d 70, 79 (CA2 1981) 
(compelling answers to questions "concerning specific subjects that actu-
ally were touched upon by questions appearing in the transcript of the im-
munized testimony''); Little Rock School District v. Borden, Inc., 632 F. 2d 
700, 705 (CA8 1980) (compelling answers as long as deposition questions 
confined to "'the same time, geographical and substantive frame work as 
the [ witness' immunized] grand jury testimony'") (quoting Aweal of 
Swrkey, 600 F. 2d 1043, 1048 (CA8 1979)). 
16 For purposes of this case, we assume that the grand jury transcripts 
are inadmissible as evidence in a civil trial because the testimony is not 
subject to cross examination. Cf. Fed. R. Evid. 803(8) (hearsay exception 
for certain public records); Fed. R. Evid. 804(a)(l) (witness unavailable 
when exempted from testifying on ground of privilege); Fed. R. Evid. 
804(b)(l) (former testimony admissible when witness unavailable and the 
party against whom the testimony is now offered had an opportunity for 
cross examination). 
17 Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(l) (stating that depositions may be taken ''if 
.., 
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upon expansively to test credibility as well as to seek the 
truth. Petitioners recognize this problem, but maintain that 
the antitrust defendants "would be entitled to test the accu-
racy and truthfulness of Conboy's repeated immunized testi-: 
mony without going beyond the confines of that testimony." 
Regardless of any limitations that may be imposed on its 
scope, 18 however, cross examination is intended to and often 
will produce information not elicited on direct. We must as-
sume that, to produce admissible evidence, the scope of cross 
examination at the deposition cannot easily be limited to the 
immunized testimony. This assumption implicates both the 
Government's and the individual's interests embodied in 
§6002. 
B 
Use immunity was intended to immunize and exclude from 
a subsequent criminal trial only that information to which the 
Government expressly has surrendered future use. If the 
Government is engaged in an ongoing investigation of the 
particular activity at issue, immunizing new information 
(e.g., the answers to questions in a case like this one) may 
make it more difficult to show in a subsequent prosecution 
that similar information was obtained from wholly independ-
the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discov-
ery of admissible evidence"); Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(c) (allowing cross examina-
tion at depositions); Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a) (deposition "admissible under the 
rules of evidence applied as though the witness were then present and tes-
tifying"); Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(l) (deposition admissible if the party against 
whom the testimony is now offered in a civil action had an opportunity to 
develop testimony by cross examination). 
18 See United States v. Cardillo, 316 F. 2d 606, 611 (CA2 1963) (in deter-
mining whether testimony of a witness who invokes the privilege during 
cross examination may be used against defendant, court draws a distinc-
tion between cases in which the assertion of the privilege merely precludes 
inquiry into collateral matters that bear on credibility of witnesses and 
those in which assertion prevents inquiry into matters about which witness 
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ent sources. A District Court's grant of immunity in. a sub-
sequent civil proceeding in effect could invest the deponent 
with transactional immunity on matters about which he testi-
fied at the immunized proceedings. This is precisely the 
kind of immunity Congress intended to prohibit. The pur-
pose of § 6002 was to limit the scope of immunity to the level 
that is constitutionally required, as well as to limit the use of 
immunity to those cases in which the Attorney General, or 
officials designated by him, determine that gaining the 
witness's testimony outweighs the loss of the opportunity for 
criminal prosecution of that witness. 19 
C 
Petitioners' interpretation of § 6002 also places substantial 
risks on the deponent. Unless the grant of immunity as-
sures a witness that his incriminating testimony will not be 
used against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution, the 
witness has not received the certain protection of his Fifth 
Amendment privilege that he has been forced to exchange. 
No court has authority to immunize a witness. That respon-
sibility, as we have noted, is peculiarly an executive one, and 
only the Attorney General or a designated officer of the De-
19 We need not decide whether United States Attorneys, when desig-
nated by the Attorney General, presently have authority to immunize the 
testimony of a witness in a civil proceeding when the Government deter-
mines that the public interest would be served. Cf. 18 U. S. C. § 6002 
(can compel testimony "[w]henever a witness refuses" to testify "in a pro-
ceeding before or ancillary to . .. a court .. . of the United State,"); id. , 
§ 6003 (may compel testimony Government believes "may be necessary to 
the public interest"); 116 Cong. Rec. 36,293 (1970) (statement of Sen. 
Hruska) (reading § 6002 as "enabl[ing] the Government in any court ... 
proceeding" to compel testimony) (emphasis added); 116 Cong. Rec. 853 
(1970) (statement of Sen. Young) ("[T]he power of the district attorney to 
compel a witness to testify is .... apparently available in any case in a fed-
eral court, including civil actions between private parties.") (quoting from 
a memorandum prepared by the American Civil Liberties Union). If this 
authority exists, it could resolve the problem here presented in many civil 
cases in which the immunity issue is raised. 
.. 
81-825-0PINION 
PILLSBURY CO. v. CONBOY 13 
partment of Justice has authority to grant use immunity. 
See 18 U. S. C. §§ 6002, 6003. Nor can a court, at the time 
of the civil testimony, pre-determine the decision of the court 
in a subsequent criminal prosecution on the question whether 
the Government has met its burden of proving "that the evi-
dence it proposes to use is derived from a legitimate source 
wholly independent of the compelled testimony." Kastigar, 
406 U. S., at 460. Yet in holding Conboy in contempt for his 
Fifth Amendment silence, the District Court below essen-
tially predicted that a court in any future criminal prosecu-
tion of Conboy will be obligated to protect against eviden-
tiary use of the deposition testimony petitioners seek. We 
do not think sucli a predictive judgment is enough. As the 
Court stated in Maness v. Meyers, 419 U. S. 449 (1975), com-
pelling a witness to testify in "reliance upon a later objection 
or motion to suppress would 'let the cat out' with no assur-
ance whatever of putting it back." Id., at 463. 
If we simply were to assume, as petitioners urge, that the 
court hearing the criminal case will be able to exclude wrong-
fully compelled evidence, cf. id., at 474--475 (WHITE, J ., con-
curring in the result); Murphy , 378 U. S., at 79, Conboy's un-
certainty might be diminished, but not eliminated, cf. Rogers 
v.· United States , 340 U. S. 367, 373 (1951). Conboy could 
face prosecutorial challeges that he waived his privilege and 
that the testimony was not wrongfully compelled. Reliance 
on an exclusionary rule would also implicate the Govern-
ment's interests. Judicial exclusion of nonimmunized testi-
mony would be inconsistent with the congressional policy of 
leaving the granting of immunity to the Executive Branch. 
Moreover, the necessarily broad scope of a judicial exclusion-
ary rule that provides certain protection to the deponent 
would frustrate congressional intent to grant no more immu-
nity than the Constitution requires. 
"The Court has held that an individual under compulsion to 
make disclosures as a witness who revealed information in-
stead of claiming the privilege lost the benefit of the privi-
.. _ ' 
14 
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lege." Garner v. United States, 424 U. S. 648, 653 (1976) 
(citing United States v. Kordel, 397 U. S. 1, 7-10 (1970)). 
We believe Conboy acted properly in maintaining his silence 
in the face of the District Court's compulsion order and by 
testing the validity of his privilege on appeal. 
IV 
This Court has emphasized the importance of the private 
action as a means of furthering the policy goals of certain fed-
eral regulatory statutes, including the federal antitrust laws. 
See, e.g., Perrna Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts 
Corp., 392 U. S. 134, 139 (1968); United States v. Borden 
Co., 347 U. S. 514, 518--519 (1954). But private civil actions 
can only supplement, not supplant, the primary responsibil-
ity of Government. Petitioners' proposed construction of 
§ 6002 sweeps further than Congress intended and could hin-
der governmental enforcement of its criminal laws by turning 
use immunity into a form of transactional immunity for sub-
jects examined in the immunized proceeding. It also puts 
the deponent in some danger of criminal prosecution unless 
he receives an assurance of immunity or exclusion that the 
courts cannot properly give. Silence, on the other hand, 
preserves the deponent's rights and the Government's inter-
ests, as well as the judicial resources that otherwise would be 
required to make the many difficult judgments that petition-
ers' interpretation of § 6002 would require. 
V 
We hold that a deponent's civil deposition testimony, made 
without duly authorized assurance of immunity at the time, is 
not "information directly or indirectly derived from" prior im-
munized testimony within the meaning of § 6002, and there-
fore may not be compelled over a valid assertion of his Fifth 
Amendment privilege. The judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals accordingly is 
Affirmed. 
( • ' C 
• 
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testify even though he has asserted his privilege against self-
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timony or other information compelled under the order ( or 
any information directly or indirectly derived from such testi-
mony or other information) may be used against the witness 
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Respondent John Conboy is a former executive of a defend-  . 
ant in the In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Liti,gation, "I ~ 
M.D.L. 310 (S.D. Tex.). In January 1978, United States 
Department of Justice attorneys interviewed Conboy follow-
ing a promise of use immunity. Conboy subsequently ap-
peared before a grand jury investigating price-fixing activi-
ties and, pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 6002, was granted formal 
use immunity for his testimony. 
2 
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Following the criminal · indictment of several companies, 
numerous civil antitrust actions were filed in various United 
States district courts. Those actions were consolidated for 
discovery in the District Court for the Southern District of 
Texas. Petitioners here are purchasers of corrugated con-
tainers who elected to opt out of the class-action proceedings 
and pursue their own causes of action against manufacturers. 
The District Court ordered that portions of the immunized 
government interview and grand-jury testimony of certain 
witnesses, including that of Conboy, be made available to 
lawyers for the class and opt-outs. 1 
Pursuant to a subpoena issued by the District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois, Conboy appeared in Chicago for 
a deposition at which he, his counsel, and petitioners' counsel 
had copies of his immunized testimony. The transcripts 
were marked as deposition exhibits so that all could follow 
the intended examination. The questioning fell into the fol-
lowing pattern: a question was read from the transcript; it 
then was rephrased to include the transcript answer (i. e., 
"Is it not the fact that. . . . "); finally, Conboy was asked if 
he had "so testified" in his immunized interview and grand-
jury examination. 2 Conboy refused to answer each ques-
tion, asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. 
The District Court granted petitioners' motion to compel 
1 The propriety of the District Court's release of grand jury materials to 
the civil parties is not before the Court. 
2 An example of this three-question pattern is as follows: 
Q. ''Who did you have price communications with at Alton Box Board?" 
Q. Is it not the fact that you had price communications with Fred 
Renshaw and Dick Herman ... ? 
Q. Did you not so testify in your government interview of January 10, 
1978? 
Joint Appendix 29--31. 
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Conboy to answer the questions. 3 When Conboy continued 
to claim his privilege, the District Court held him in con-
tempt, but stayed its order pending appeal. A panel of the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the con-
tempt order, holding that, "[b ]ecause the questions asked in 
this deposition were taken verbatim from or closely tracked 
the transcript of Conboy's grand jury testimony, we believe 
that his answers at the deposition would be 'derived from' the 
prior immunized [testimony] and therefore unavailable for 
use in any subsequent criminal prosecution." In re C orru-
gated Container Antitrust Litigation, Appeal of John 
Conboy, 655 F. 2d 748, 751 (CA7), rev'd en bane, 661 F. 2d 
1145 (1981). 
On rehearing en bane, the Court of Appeals reversed the 
District Court. It first . determined that Conboy's alleged 
fear of prosecution was more than "fanciful," 661 F. 2d, at 
1152, and that Conboy therefore was entitled to assert his 
Fifth Amendment privilege unless his deposition testimony 
could not be used against him in a subsequent criminal action, 
see id., at 1153. 4 The court then held that under § 6002, ab-
sent a separate and independent grant of immunity, 5 a depo-
nent's civil deposition testimony that repeats verbatim or 
closely tr::i.cks his prior immunized testimony is not protected. 
While acknowledging that verbatim questions "of course 
[would be] derived" from the immunized testimony, the court 
reasoned that the answers to such questions "are derived 
from the deponent's current, independent memory of events" 
s Chief Judge John V. Singleton, Jr. of the District Court for the South-
ern District of Texas expressly exercised the powers of the District Court 
for the Northern District of Illinois pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1407(b). The 
contempt hearing was conducted by telephone with his chambers in 
Houston. 
' The correctness of the Court of Appeals' conclusion that Conboy could 
assert a Fifth Amendment privilege, absent some immunity, is not before 
us. 
5 A United States Attorney declined to authorize immunity grants in 
connection with the civil depositions here. 
4 
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and thus "necessarily create a new source of evidence" that 
could be used in a subsequent criminal prosecution against 
Conboy. Id., at 1155 (emphasis in original). 
We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict in the Courts 
of Appeals, 6 and now affirm. 
II 
It is settled that government must have the power to com-
pel testimony "to secure information necessary for effective 
law enforcement." Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 
U. S. 52, 79 (1964). 7 For many years, however, a person 
who was compelled to testify under a grant of governmental 
immunity could not be prosecuted for any conduct about 
which he had testified. See New Jersey v. Portash, 440 
U. S. 450, 457 (1979). Prosecutors therefore were reluctant 
. to grant such "transactional" immunity to potential targets 
of criminal investigations. See S. ·Rep. No. 91-617, p. 53 
(1969). 
The "major purpose" of the Organized Crime Control Act 
of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91--452, 84 Stat. 927, of which §6002 was 
a key provision, was "to provide the criminal justice system 
with the necessary legal tools to . . . strengthe[n] the evi-
dence gathering process and insur[e] that the evidence will 
then be available and admissible at trial." 116 Cong. Rec. 
35,200 (1970) (statement of Rep. St. Germain). Congress 
6 Compare In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, Appeal of 
Fleischacker, 644 F. 2d 70, 75 (CA2 1981) (deposition answers immunized), 
and Little Rock School District v. Borden, Inc., 632 F. 2d 700, 705 (CA8 
1980) (same), with In re Corrugated Container Anti-Trust Litigation, Ap-
peal of Franey, 620 F. 2d 1086, 1095 (CA5 1980) (answers not immunized), 
cert. denied, 449 U. S. 1102 (1981). 
1 See United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 345 (1974); United 
States v. Mara, 410 U. S. 19, 41 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting); Kasti-
gar v. United States, 406 U. S. 441, 443-444 (1973); Murphy, 378 U. S., at 
93-94 (WHITE, J., concurring); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421, 
438 (1932); Blair v. United States, 250 U. S. 273, 281 (1919); Brown v. 
Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 600 (1896). 
(. 
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sought to make the grant of immunity more useful for law en-
forcement officers through two specific changes. First, Con-
gress made the grant of immunity less expansive 8 by re-
pealing the authority for transactional immunity and provid-
ing for the less comprehensive use immunity authorized in 
§ 6002. 9 Second, Congress gave certain officials in the 
Department of Justice 10 exclusive authority to grant --' 
immunities. 11 
8 In Murphy, JUSTICE WlllTE stated that "[i]mmunity must be as broad 
as, but not harmfully and wastefully broader than, the privilege against 
self-incrimination." 378 U. S., at 107 (concurring opinion) (quoted with 
approval in 116 Cong. Rec. 35,291 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff)). In its 
committee report, the House explained that § 6002 was not to provide an 
"immunity bath," but was to be "no broader than" the Fifth Amendment 
privilege. H.R. No. 91-1549, p. 5 (1970). 
9 Section 6902 provides: 
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-
incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding be-
fore or ancillary to-
(1) a court or grand jury of the United States, 
(2) an agency of the United States, or 
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses, or a 
committee or a subcommittee of either House 
and the person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the witness 
an order issued under this part, the witness may not refuse to comply with 
the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but no tes-
timony or other information compelled under the order (or any information 
directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) 
may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution 
for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with 
the order. 
Section 6001(2) defines "other information" to include "any book, paper, 
document, record, recording, or other material. " 
10 Section 6003 states: 
(a) In the case of any individual who has been or may be called to testify 
or provide other information at any proceeding before or ancillary to a 
court of the United States or a grand jury of the United States, the United 
States district court for the judicial district in which the proceeding is or 
may be held shall issue, in accordance with subsection (b) of this section, 
[Footnotes 10 and 11 continue on page 6] 
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The Court upheld the constitutionality of the use immunity 
statute in Kastigar v. United States, 406 U. S. 441 (1972). 
The power to compel testimony is limited by the Fifth 
Amendment, and we held that any grant of immunity must 
be co-extensive with the privilege. We were satisfied, how-
ever, that § 6002 provided this measure of protection and 
thus "removed the dangers against which the privilege pro-
tects." Id., at 449. In rejecting the argument that use and 
derivative-use immunity would not adequately protect a wit-
ness from various incriminating uses of the compelled testi-
mony, we emphasized that "[t]he statute provides a sweeping 
proscription of any use, direct or indirect, of the compelled 
testimony and any information derived therefrom .... " / d., 
at 460. We added that once a defendant establishes that he 
has testified under a grant of immunity, "the prosecution 
[has] the affirmative duty to prove that the evidence it pro-
poses to use is derived from a legitimate source wholly inde-
pendent of the compelled testimony." Ibid. Thus, "immu-
nity from use and derivative use 'leaves the witness and the 
Federal Government in substantially the same position as if 
the witness had claimed his privilege' in the absence of a 
grant of immunity." Kastigar, 406 U. S., at 458--459 (quot-
ing Murphy, 378 U. S., at 79). 
upon the request of the United States attorney for such district, an order 
requiring such individual to give testimony or provide other information 
which he refuses to give or provide on the basis of his privilege against self-
incrimination, such order to become effective as provided in section 6002 of 
this part. 
(b) A United States attorney may, with the approval of the Attorney 
General, the Deputy Attorney General, or any designated Assistant Attor-
ney General, request an order under subsection (a) of this section when in 
his judgment-
(!) the testimony or other information from such individual may be nec-
essary to the public interest; and 
(2) such individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide 
other information on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination. 
11 Congress foresaw the courts as playing only a minor role in the immu-
nizing process: "The court's role in granting the order is merely to find the 
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7 
With the foregoing statutory history and relevant princi-
ples in mind, we turn now to this case. It is not disputed 
that the questions asked of Conboy were directly or indi-
rectly derived from his immunized testimony. The issue is 
whether the causal connection between the questions and the 
answers is so direct that the answers also are derived from 
that testimony and therefore should be excluded under the 
grant of immunity. 
Petitioners' argument is based on the language of § 6002 
and on a common understanding of the words "derived from." 
The questions formulated on the basis of immunized testi-
mony are clearly "derived from" the prior testimony. Thus, 
the answers that repeat verbatim or closely track a depo-
nent's testimony are necessarily also "derived from" and 
"tainted by'' such testimony. Petitioners therefore find no 
basis for the distinction made by the Court of Appeals be-
tween questions and answers responsive to those same ques-
tions. An answer by its very nature is evoked by and re-
sponds to information contained in a question. 
Conboy's position is also straightforward: Questions do not 
incriminate; answers do. Unlike the questions, answers are 
not directly or indirectly derived from the immunized grand 
jury or interview transcripts, but from the deponent's cur-
rent, independent memory of events. Even when a depo-
nent's deposition answers are identical to those he gave to 
the grand jury, he is under oath to tell the truth, not neces-
sarily as he told it before the grand jury, but as he knows it 
now. Each new statement of the deponent creates a new 
facts on which the order is predicated." H.R. Rep. No. 91-1549, supra 
note 8, at 43; H.R. Rep. No. 91-1188, p. 13 (1970). See 116 Cong. Rec. 
35,291 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff). Cf. President's Commission on 
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime 
in a Free Society 141 (1967) (recommending that "[i]mmunity should be 
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"source." In sum, the initial grant' f immunity does not pre-
vent the prosecutor from pros1 ting; it merely limits his 
sourc~s of e.Yi~e. 
' The language oTu~t~ut ·ts either party's inter-
pretation and compels neitheiC The broad wording of § 6002, 
and our interpretation of it m Kasti,gar, suggests that we 
should hesitate to exclude information from the coverage of 
the immunity grant that admittedly has a close tie with the 
immunized testimony. In the end, however, whether par- , ~ 
ticular information is "derived from" immunized materials, is / • 
"fruit" of "tainted" information, or is the product of a "new 
source" are conclusions that "may conceal concrete complex-.-l/~~ cOQL) J 
ities." Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338, 341 (1939(" ~ 
As tke Cetn-t °hfts noted: "Sop"histieatea ai:gumeR.t ma~ f)reve ~ 
a eattsttl eenneetiee. eetween iflioPffl:8:tion obtftiftea t}H,eaga -. 
[tbe l:Hli~~;:f;al g:ei.zerruBentsl eoftattet] ftfta t"he Go • er nment's do-
pi:oof 4 'i1 a matter ef g:eea seftse, "ho·.vever, stteh eoMeetion ;a.. 
maf bane beQeme se attee.aatee as te aissif)ate tae ta.mt." <-
..). {bid. We ee~:r, e t:hftt rather than :yloptiag a conclusory...,--~ 
} 
lab~l for the depos~tion tes\ im?ny, it is desirable to de_termi1rn 
. which of the two mterpretations of § 6002 more sat1sfactor- · 
I J ily aeeemmeaatel' the Government's need for admissible 
~ evidence and the individual's interest in avoiding self-
incrimination. 12 
Although there may be practical reasons for not testify-
ing, 13 as far as the deponent's Fifth Amendment right is con-
12 See Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 287 (1977) 
("[T]he proper test to apply . .. is one which ... protects against the inva-
sion of constitutional rights without commanding undesirable consequences 
not necessary to the assurance of those rights."); Brown v. Illinois, 422 
U. S. 590, 604 (1975) (reversing because state court failed "to evaluate the 
circumstances of the case in light of the policy served by the exclusionary 
rule"); Murphy, 378 U. S., at 79 (stating an exclusionary rule "to imple-
ment [Fifth Amendment] and accommodate the interests of the . . . Gov-
ernment[] in investigating and prosecuting crime"). See ~eftetftH:, G. ='t. 
Wlmee11ead, CFiHliRftl }q,90eetH10 § 2 04, at 37 (19iQ➔ _Q.. ,. 
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cerned he should be indifferent between the protection af-
forded by silence and that afforded by immunity. His 
primary interest is that the protection afforded by the privi-
lege or the grant of immunity is certain. The Government's 
interests, however, may be affected seriously by whether the 
deponent relies at the civil deposition on his Fifth Amend-
ment privilege or on his prior grant of immunity. Our spe-
cific inquiry then is whether petitioners can satisfy their need 
as antitrust plaintiffs for admissible evidence without threat-
ening the Government's interest in limiting the scope of an 
immunity grant or encroaching upon the deponent's certainty 
of protection. FN 14 
A 
Questions taken verbatim from a transcript of immunized 
testimony could evoke one of several responses from a depo-
nent: (i) he could repeat or adopt his immunized answer; JIC" 15 
(ii) he could affirm that the transcript of his immunized an-
swers accurately reflects his prior testimony; (iii) he could re-
call additional information responsive to the question but not 
disclosed in his immune testimony; or (iv) he could disclose 
information that is not responsive to the question. Petition-
ers ·do not contend, nor could they, that the prior grant of use 
immunity affords protection for all self-incriminating in-
formation disclosed by the immunized witness on any occa-
sion after the giving of the immunized testimony. Rather, 
petitioners argue that only the first three responses would be 
"derived from" his immune testimony and therefore would be 
unavailable for use against the deponent in any subsequent 
criminal prosecution. 
Petitioners' premise is that the deposition of Conboy is de-
creases the risk of committing perjury the more he talks. Cf. 18 U. S. C. 
§ 6002 (perjured testimony not immunized). 
15 / The extreme case would be where petitioners read the entire immu-
nized grand jury transcript; then ask the witness if that is his testimony; 
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/(p 
signed not to discover new information/ but to obtain evi-
dence that simply repeats the statements in the immunized 
transcript.~ ,1 Because there will be little opportunity for the 
grant of immunity to sweep in statements on direct examina-
tion that the Government did not intend to immunize, or for 
the deponent to give responses that may fall outside of the 
grant of immunity and later be used against him in a subse-
quent criminal prosecution, petitioners argue that Conboy's 
deposition will yield only a carbon copy of the grand-jury 
transcript. In such a situation, it would be desirable for civil 
plaintiffs, particularly those bringing private suits that sup-
plement the criminal enforcement of the federal antitrust 
· laws, to have access to the available, probative information. 
But even if the direct examination is limited to the ques-
tions and answers in the immunized transcript, there remains 
the right of cross examination/~a right traditionally relied 
,1, l'Direct examination may not be as limited as petitioners assume. The 
District Court's civil contempt order stated that the questions asked in the 
deposition ''were taken directly'' from the immunized transcripts, but did 
not define exactly what deposition questions petitioners could ask. Other 
Courts of Appeals have permitted direct questioning to go beyond mere 
restatements of the prior testimony. See In re Corrugated Container 
Antitrust Liti,gation, Appeal of Fleischacker, 644 F. 2d 70, 79 (CA2 1981) 
(compelling answers to questions "concerning specific subjects that actu-
ally were touched upon by questions appearing in the transcript of the im-
munized testimony''); Little Rock School District v. Borden, Inc ., 632 F. 2d 
700, 705 (CA8 1980) (compelling answers as long as deposition questions 
confined to " 'the same time~ geographical and substantive frame work as 
the [ witness' immunized] grand jury testimony'") (quoting Appeal of 
Starkey, 600 F. 2d 1043, 1048 (CA8 1979)). 
,..., ;'For purposes of this case, we assume that the grand jury transcripts 
are inadmissible as evidence in a civil trial because the testimony is not 
subject to cross examination. Cf. Fed. R. Evid. 803(8) (hearsay exception 
for certain public records); Fed. R. Evid. 804(a)(l) (witness unavailable 
when exempted from testifying on ground of privilege); Fed. R. Evid. 
804(b)(l) (former testimony admissible when witness unavailable and the 
party against whom the testimony is now offered had an opportunity for 
cross examination). 
ti / cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(l) (stating that depositions may be taken "if 
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upon expansively to test credibility as well as to seek the 
truth. Petitioners recognize this problem, but maintain that 
the antitrust defendants "would be entitled to test the accu-
racy and truthfulness of Conboy's repeated immunized testi-
mony without going beyond the confines of that testimony." 
Regardless of any limitations that may be imposed on its 
,q scope,.18' however, cross examination is intended to and often 
will produce information not elicited on direct. We must as-
sume that, to produce admissible evidence, the scope of cross 
examination at the deposition cannot easily be limited to the 
immunized testimony. This assumption implicates both the 
Government's and the individual's interests embodied in 
§6002. 
B 
Use immunity was intended to immunize and exclude from 
a subsequent criminal trial only that information to which the 
Government expressly has surrendered future use. If the 
Government is engaged in an ongoing investigation of the 
particular activity at issue, immunizing new information 
(e.g., the answers to questions in a case like this one) may 
make it more difficult to show in a subsequent prosecution 
that similar information was obtained from wholly independ-
the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discov-
ery of admissible evidence"); Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(c) (allowing cross examina-
tion at depositions); Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a) (deposition "admissible under the 
rules of evidence applied as though the witness were then present and tes-
tifying"); Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(l) (deposition admissible if the party against 
whom the testimony is now offered in a civil action had an opportunity to 
develop testimony by cross examination). 
,q >'See United States v. Cardillo, 316 F. 2d 606, 611(CA21963) (in deter-
mining whether testimony of a witness who invokes the privilege during 
cross examination may be used against defendant, court draws a distinc-
tion between cases in which the assertion of the privilege merely precludes 
inquiry into collateral matters that bear on credibility of witnesses and 
those in which assertion prevents inquiry into matters about which witness 
testified on direct). 
12 
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ent sources. A District Court's grant of immunity in a sub-
sequent civil proceeding in effect could invest the deponent 
with transactional immunity on matters about which he testi-
fied at the immunized proceedings. This is precisely the 
kind of immunity Congress intended to prohibit. The pur-
pose of § 6002 was to limit the scope of immunity to the level 
that is constitutionally required, as well as to limit the use of 
immunity to those cases in which the Attorney General, or 
officials designated by him, determine that gaining the 
witness's testimony outweighs the loss of the opportunity for 
criminal prosecution of that witness: °' 1-0 
C 
Petitioners' interpretation of § 6002 also places substantial 
risks on the deponent. Unless the grant of immunity as-
sures a witness that his incriminating testimony will not be 
used against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution, the 
witness has not received the certain protection of his Fifth . 
Amendment privilege that he has been forced to exchange. 
No court has authority to immunize a witness. That respon-
sibility, as we have noted, is peculiarly an executive one, and 
only the Attorney General or a designated officer of the De-
;J.0 J"We need not decide whether United States Attorneys, when desig-
nated by the Attorney General, presently have authority to immunize the 
.testimony of a witness in a civil proceeding when the Government deter-
mines that the public interest would be served. Cf. 18 U. S. C. § 6002 
(can compel testimony "[w]henever a witness refuses" to testify "in a pro-
ceeding before or ancillary to ... a court ... of the United State,"); id., 
§ 6003 (may compel testimony Government believes "may be necessary to 
the public interest"); 116 Cong. Rec. 36,293 (1970) (statement of Sen. 
Hruska) (reading § 6002 as "enabl[ing] the Government in any court ... 
proceeding" to compel testimony) (emphasis added); 116 Cong. Rec. 853 
(1970) (statement of Sen. Young) ("[T]he power of the district attorney to 
compel a witness to testify is .... apparently available in any case in a fed-
eral court, including civil actions between private parties.") (quoting from 
a memorandum prepared by the American Civil Liberties Union). If this 
authority exists, it could resolve the problem here presented in many civil 
cases in which the immunity issue is raised. 
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13 
partment of Justice has authority~o gi; nt use immunity. 
See 18 U. S. C. §§ 6002, 6003. Nor a court, at the time 
of the civil testimony, pre-determine the ecision of the court 
in a subsequent criminal prosecution on the question whether 
the Government has met its burden of proving "that the evi-
dence it proposes to use is derived from a legitimate source 
wholly independent of the compelled testimony." Kasti,gar, 
406 U. S., at 460. Yet in holding Conboy in contempt for his 
Fifth Amendment silence, the District Court below essen-
tially predicted that a court in any future criminal prosecu-
tion of Co.nboy will be obligated to protect against ~ viden-
tiary use of the deposition testimony petitioners seek. 2.\ 
do not think such a predictive judgment is enough. s the . 
Court stated in Maness v. Meyers, 419 U. S. 449 (1975), com-
pelling a witness to testify in "reliance upon a later objection 
or motion to suppress would 'let the cat out' with no assur-
ance whatever of putting it back." Id., at 463. 
' FN20 \ 
(~~, 
If'we si~ply~ er~ t~ assume, ~s petitioners urge, that the 
court hearmg the'crimmal case will "be able to exclude wrong-
fully compelled ei dence,"el %Q., at 474 47e (VlmTE, J., eae... 
eUf'l"iiig in tbw:isnlt~; A,%6,"fJh'Y, 278 IL S., at .ii), Conboy's un-
certaint;1~be diminished1,,.gl.lt not 1?1liroiuated., cf RggersR 
l U)O~ V ,r'l'b?,~88 8~td88j 34Q..U. i, 3Gry g't3 0:961). GeHaey COl.110 A. 
face prasecntorial ehaUig:es tl111it he wai·;ae sis ~ 1.rilog:0 aDe C2. 
· ,,. Reliance 
~ce~ 
on ~h.-exclusionary rule would alsg i:e:i,13Hee:te the Ge•4 et 1f? 




~.,Jri,iil. ~. ~ 
~ JO.., ~  • 
mony would be inconsistent with the congressional policy of 
leaving the granting of immunity to the Executive Branch. 
Moreover, the necessarily broad scope of a judicial exclusion-
ary rule that provides certain protection to the deponent 
would frustrate congressional intent to grant no more immu-
nity than the Constitution requires. 
"The Court has held that an individual under compulsion to 
make disclosures as a witness who revealed information in-
stead of claiming the privilege lost the benefit of the privi-
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lege." Garner v. United States, 424 U. S. 648, 653 (1976) 
(citing United States v. Kordel , 397 U. S. 1, 7-10 (1970)). 
We believe Conboy acted properly in maintaining his silence 
in the face of the District Court's compulsion order and by 
testing the validity of his privilege on appeal.~ 
IV 
This Court has emphasized the importance of the private 
action as a means of furthering the policy goals of certain fed-
eral regulatory statutes, including the federal antitrust laws. 
See, e. g., Perrna Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts 
Corp., 392 U. S. 134, 139 (1968); United States v. Borden 
Co., 347 U. S. 514, 51~19 (1954). But private civil actions 
can only supplement, not supplant, the primary responsibil-
ity of Government. Petitioners' proposed construction of 
§ 6002 sweeps further than Congress intended and could hin-
der governmental enforcement of its criminal laws by turning 
use immunity into a form of transactional immunity for sub-
jects examined in the immunized proceeding. It also puts 
the deponent in some danger of criminal prosecution unless 
he receives an assurance of immunity or exclusion that the 
courts cannot properly give. Silence, on the other hand, 
preserves the deponent's rights and the Government's inter-
ests, as well as the judicial resources that otherwise would be 
required to make the many difficult judgments that petition-
ers' interpretation of § 6002 would require. 
V 
We hold that a deponent's civil deposition testimony, made 
without duly authorized assurance of immunity at the time, is 
not "information directly or indirectly derived from" prior im-
munized testimony within the meaning of § 6002, and there-
fore may not be compelled over a valid assertion of his Fifth 
Amendment privilege. The judgment of the Court of Ap-
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-825 
THE PILLSBURY COMPANY, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. 
JOHN CONBOY 
ON WRIT OF CERTIO~ARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
[November-, 1982] 
.JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Pursuant to the federal use immunity provisions, 18 
U. S. C. §§ 6001-6005 (1976), a United States Attorney may 
request an order from a federal court compelling a witness to 
testify even though he has asserted his privilege against self-
incrimination. Section 6002 provides, .however, that "notes-
timony or other information compelled under the order ( or 
any information directly or indirectly derived from such testi-
mony or other information) may be used against the witness 
in any criminal case. . . . " The issue presented in this case is 
whether a deponent's civil deposition testimony, repeating 
verbatim or closely tracking his prior immunized testimony, 
is "information" so "directly or indirectly derived from [the 
immunized] testimony" that it e8ftnei be tleca a~nBi the wit c:.aJ1\ ~ ~~ o\lCX. 
iAOQO in e. BU8BeQU8At oFimifiel tn•aoceutiiiR +k. ~ • ~ "~ 
I c,~°t~~~ 
Respondent John Conboy is a former executive of a defend-  • 
ant in the In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, '1 ~ 
M.D.L. 310 (S.D. Tex.). In January 1978, United States 
Department of Justice attorneys interviewed Conboy follow-
ing a promise of use immunity. Conboy subsequently ap-
peared before a grand jury 'investigating price-fixing activi-
ties and, pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 6002, was granted formal 
use immunity for his testimony. 
\2 
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Following the criminal indictment of several companies, 
numerous civil antitrust actions were filed in various United 
States district courts. Those actions were consolidated for 
discovery in the District Court for the Southern District of 
Texas. Petitioners here are purchasers of corrugated con-
tainers who elected to opt out of the class-action proceedings 
and pursue their own causes of action against manufacturers. 
The District Court ordered that portions of the immunized 
government interview and grand-jury testimony of certain 
witnesses, including that of Conboy, be made available to 
lawyers for the class and opt-outs. 1 
Pursuant ,to a subpoena issued by the District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois, Conboy appeared in Chicago for 
a deposition at which he, his counsel, and petitioners' counsel 
had copies of his immunized testimony. The transcripts 
were marked as deposition exhibits so that all could follow 
the intended examination. The questioning fell into the fol-
lowing pattern: a question was read from the transcript; it 
then was rephrased to include the transcript answer (i. e., 
"Is it not' the fact that .... "); finally, Conboy was asked if 
he had "so testified" in his immunized interview and grand-
jury examination. 2 Conboy refused to answer each ques-
tion, asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. 
The District Court granted petitioners' motion to compel 
1 The propriety of the District Court's release of grand jury materials to 
the civil parties is not before the Court. 
2 An example of this three-question pattern is as follows: 
Q. ''Who did you have price communications with at Alton Box Board?" 
Q. Is it not the fact that you had price communications with Fred 
Renshaw and Dick Herman ... ? 
Q. Did you not so testify in your government interview of January 10, 
1978? 
Joint Appendix 29--31. 
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Conboy to answer the questions. 3 When Conboy continued 
to claim his privilege, the District Court held him in con-
tempt, but stayed its order pending appeal. A panel of the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the con-
tempt order, holding that, "[b ]ecause the questions asked in 
this deposition were taken verbatim from or closely tracked 
the transcript of Conboy's grand jury testimony, we believe 
that his answers at the deposition would be 'derived from' the 
prior immunized [testimony] and therefore unavailable for 
use in any subsequent criminal prosecution." In re C orru-
gated . Container Antitrust Litigation, Appeal of John 
Conboy, 655 F. 2d 748, 751 (CA7), rev'd en bane, 661 F. 2d 
1145 (1981). 
On rehearing en bane, the Court of Appeals reversed the 
District Court. It first determined that Conboy's alleged 
fear of prosecution was more than "fanciful," 661 F. 2d, at 
1152, and that Conboy therefore was entitled to assert his 
Fifth Amendment privilege unless his deposition testimony 
could not be used against him in a subsequent criminal action, 
see id., at 1153. 4 The court then held that under § 6002, ab-
sent a separate and independent grant of immunity, 5 a depo-
nent's civil deposition testimony that repeats verbatim or 
closely tracks his prior immunized testimony is not protected. 
While acknowledging that verbatim questions "of course 
[would be] derived" from the immunized testimony, the court 
reasoned that the answers to such questions "are derived 
from the deponent's current, independent memory of events" 
3 Chief Judge John V. Singleton, Jr. of the District Court for the South-
ern District of Texas expressly exercised the powers of the District Court 
for the Northern District of Illinois pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1407(b). The 
contempt hearing was conducted by telephone with his chambers in 
Houston. 
• The correctness of the Court of Appeals' conclusion that Conboy could 
assert a Fifth Amendment privilege, absent some immunity, is not before 
UL , 
5 A United States Attorney declined to authorize immunity grants in 
connection with the civil depositions here. 
4 
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and thus "necessarily create a new source of evidence" that 
could be used in a subsequent criminal prosecution against 
Conboy. Id., at 1155 (emphasis in original). 
We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict in the Courts 
of Appeals, 6 and now affirm. 
II 
It is settled that government must have the power to com-
pel testimony "to secure information necessary for effective 
law enforcement." Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 
U. S. 52, 79 (1964). 7 For many years, however, a person 
who was compelled to testify under a grant of governmental 
immunity could not be prosecuted for any conduct about 
which he had testified. See New Jersey v. Portash, 440 
U. S. 450, 457 (1979). Prosecutors therefore were reluctant 
to grant such "transactional" immunity to potential targets 
of criminal investigations. See S. Rep. No. 91-617, p. 53 
(1969). 
The "major purpose" of the Organized Crime Control Act 
of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 927, of which§ 6002 was 
a key provision, was "to provide the criminal justice system 
with the necessary legal tools to . . . strengthe[n] the evi-
dence gathering process and insur[e] that the evidence will 
then be available and admissible at trial." 116 Cong. Rec. 
35,200 (1970) (statement of Rep. St. Germain). Congress 
6 Compare In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, Appeal of 
Fleischacker, 644 F . 2d 70, 75 (CA21981) (deposition answers immunized), 
and Little Rock School District v. Borden, Inc., 632 F . 2d 700, 705 (CA8 
1980) (same), with In re Corrugated Container Anti-Trust Litigation, Ap-
peal of Franey, 620 F. 2d 1086, 1095 (CA5 1980) (answers not immunized), 
cert. denied, 449 U. S. 1102 (1981). 
1 See United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 345 (1974); United 
States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 41 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting); Kasti-
garv. United States, 406 U. S. 441, 443--444 (1973); Murphy, 378 U.S., at 
93-94 (WHITE, J., concurring); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421, 
438 (1932); Blair v. United States, 250 U. S. 273, 281 (1919); Brown v. 
Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 600 (1896). 
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sought to make the grant of immunity more useful for law en-
forcement officers through two specific changes. First, Con-
gress made the grant of immunity less expansive 8 by re-
pealing the authority for transactional immunity and provid-
ing for the less comprehensive use immunity authorized in 
§ 6002. 9 Second, Congress gave certain officials in the 
Department of Justice 10 exclusive authority to grant 
immunities. 11 
8 In Murphy, JUSTICE WmTE stated that "[i]mmunity must be as broad 
as, but not harmfully and wastefully broader than, the privilege against 
self-incrimination." 378 U. S., at 107 (concurring opinion) (quoted with 
approval in 116 Cong. Rec. 35,291 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff)). In its 
committee report, the House explained that § 6002 was not to provide an 
"immunity bath," but was to be "no broader than" the Fifth Amendment 
privilege. H.R. No. 91-1549, p. 5 (1970). 
9 Section 6002 provides: 
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-
incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding be-
fore or ancillary t~ 
(1) a court or grand jury of the United States, 
(2) an agency of the United States, or 
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses, or a 
committee or a subcommittee of either House 
and the person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the witness 
an order issued under this part, the witness may not refuse to comply with 
the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but notes-
timony or other information compelled under the order (or any information 
directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) 
may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution 
for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with 
the order. 
Section 6001(2) defines "other information" to include "any book, paper, 
document, record, recording, or other material." 
10 Section 6003 states: 
(a) In the case of any individual who has been or may be called to testify 
or provide other information at any proceeding before or ancillary to a 
court of the United States or a grand jury of the United States, the United 
States district court for the judicial district in which the proceeding is or 
may be held shall issue, in accordance with subsection (b) of this section, 
[Footnotes 10 and 11 continue on page 6] 
6 
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The Court upheld the constitutionality of the use immunity 
statute in Kastigar v. United States, 406 U. S. 441 (1972). 
The power to compel testimony is limited by the Fifth 
Amendment, and we held that any grant of. immunity must 
be co-extensive with the privilege. We were satisfied, how-
ever, that § 6002 provided this measure of protection and 
thus "removed the dangers against which the privilege pro-
tects." Id., at 449. In rejecting the argument that use and 
derivative-use immunity would not adequately protect a wit-
ness from various incriminating uses of the compelled testi-
mony, we emphasized that "[t]he statute provides a sweeping 
proscription of any use, direct or indirect, of the compelled 
testimony and any information derived therefrom. . . . " Id., 
at 460. We added that once a defendant establishes that he 
has testified under a grant of immunity, "the prosecution 
[has] the affirmative duty to prove that the evidence it pro-
poses to use is derived from a legitimate source wholly inde-
pendent of the compelled testimony." Ibid. Thus, "immu-
nity from use and derivative use 'leaves the witness and the 
Federal Government in substantially the same position as if 
the witness had claimed his privilege' in the absence of a 
grant of immunity." Kastigar, 406 U. S., at 458--459 (quot-
ing Murphy, 378 U. S., at 79). 
upon the request ·of the United States attorney for such district, an order 
requiring such individual to give testimony or provide other information 
which he refuses to give or provide on the basis of his privilege against self-
incrimination, such order to become effective as provided in section 6002 of 
this part. 
(b) A United States attorney may, with the approval of the Attorney 
General, the Deputy Attorney General, or any designated Assistant Attor-
ney General, request an order under subsection (a) of this section when in 
his judgment-
(!) the testimony or other information from such individual may be nec-
essary to the public interest; and 
(2) such individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide 
other information on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination. 
11 Congress foresaw the courts as playing only a minor role in the immu-
nizing process: "The court's role in granting the order is merely to find the 
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7 
With the foregoing statutory history and relevant princi-
ples in mind, we turn now to this case. It is not disputed 
that the questions asked of Conboy were directly or indi-
rectly derived from his immunized testimony. The issue is 
whether the causal connection between the questions and the 
answers is so direct that the answers also are derived from 
that testimony and therefore should be excluded under the 
grant of immunity. 
Petitioners' argument is based on the language of § 6002 
and on a common understanding of the words "derived from." 
The questions formulated on the basis of immunized testi-
mony are clearly "derived from" the prior testimony. Thus, 
the answers that repeat verbatim or closely track a depo-
nent' s testimony are necessarily also "derived from" and 
"tainted by" such testimony. Petitioners therefore find no 
basis for the distinction made by the Court of Appeals be-
tween questions and answers responsive to those same ques-
tions. An answer by its very nature is evoked by and re-
sponds to information contained in a question. 
Conboy's position is also straightforward: Questions do not 
incriminate; .answers do. Unlike the questions, answers are 
not directly or indirectly derived from the immunized grand 
jury or interview transcripts, but from the deponent's cur-
rent, independent memory of events. Even when a depo-
nent's deposition answers are identical to those he gave to 
the grand jury, he is under oath to tell the truth, not neces-
sarily as he told it before the grand jury, but as he knows it 
now. Each new statement of the deponent creates a new 
facts on which the order is predicated." H.R. Rep. No. 91-1549, supra 
note 8, at 43; H.R. Rep. No. 91-1188, p. 13 (1970). See 116 Cong. Rec. 
35,291 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff). Cf. President's Commission on 
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime 
in a Free Society 141 (1967) (recommending that "[i]mmunity should be 
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"source." In sum, the initial grant of immunity does not pre-
vent the prosecutor from prosecuting; it merely limits his 
sources of evidence. 
The language of the statute permits either party's inter-
pre tion and compels neither. The broad wording of§ 60 ... , 
and o interpretation of it in Kasti,gar, suggests th we 
should H itate to exclude information from the cov age of 
the imm grant that admittedly has a close t · with the 
immunized te ·mony. In the end, however, ether par-
ticular informati is "derived from" imm · d materials, is 
"fruit" of "tainted" · ormation, or is th roduct of a "new 
source" are conclusion hat "may con al concrete complex-
ities." Nardone v. Unit States, 8 U. S. 338, 341 (1939). 
As the Court has noted: "So · s · ated argument may prove 
a causal connection betwee ormation obtained through 
[the unlawful governmen cond and the Government's 
proof. As a matter of ood sense, ho ver, such connection 
may have become attenuated as to · sipate the taint." 
Ibid. We bell that rather than adopt a conclusory 
label for the osition testimony, it is desirable determine 
which of two interpretations of § 6002 more s · factor-
ily ac modates the Government's need for ad ible 
and the individual's interest in avoiding s 
· ~imination. 12 ~:r there W?l' be DFBC~iea:ixea;:s ;or: ~es~! 
1 ar as the deponent's Fifth me Uc: 1t 1 bs 
::l,ee Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 287 (1977) 
("[T]he proper test to apply . . . is one which . . . protects against the inva-
sion of constitutional rights without commanding undesirable consequences 
not necessary to the assurance of those rights."); Brown v. Illinois, 422 
U. S. 590, 604 (1975) (reversing because state court failed "to evaluate the 
circumstances of the case in light of the policy served by the exclusionary 
rule"); Murphy, 378 U. S., at 79 (stating an exclusionary rule "to imple-
ment [Fifth Amendment] and accommodate the interests of the ... Gov-
ernment[] in investigating and prosecuting crime"). See generally C. 
Whitebread, Criminal Procedure § 2.04, at 37 (1980). ' 
ti 'Besides the costs of testifying against close associates, any witness in-
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9 
Questions .taken verbatim from a transcript of immunized 
testim~ny could evoke one of several _re~ponse~ from a depo- I~ 
nent: (1) he could repeat or adopt his 1mmuruzed answer; )I(' "" . 
(ii) he could affirm that the transcript of his immunized an-
swers accurately reflects his prior testimony; (iii) he could re-
call additional information responsive to the question but not 
disclosed in his immune testimony; or (iv) he could disclose 
information that is not responsive to the question. Petition-
ers do not contend, nor could they, that the prior grant of use 
immunity affords protection for all self-incriminating in-
formation disclosed by the immunized witness on any occa-
sion after the giving of the immunized testimony. Rather, 
petitioners argue that only the first three responses would be 
"derived from" his immune testimony and therefore would be 
unavailable for use against the deponent in any subsequent 
criminal prosecution. 
Petitioners' premise is that the deposition of Conboy is de-
creases the risk of committing perjury the more he talks. Cf. 18 U. S. C. 
§ 6002 (perjured testimony not immunized). 
13 ..,i,,"fhe extreme case would be where petitioners read the entire immu-
A nized gran~ury transcript; then ask the witness if that is his testimony; 
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signed not to discover new information,..ijf but to obtain evi-
dence that simply repeats the statements in the immunized 
15 transcript. JK' Because there will be little opportunity for the 
grant of immunity to sweep in statements on direct examina-
tion that the Government did not intend to immunize, or for 
the deponent to give responses that may fall outside of the 
grant of immunity and later be used against him in a subse-
quent criminal prosecution, petitioners argue that Conboy's 
deposition will yield only a carbon copy of the grand-jury 
transcript. In such a situation, it would be desirable for civil 
plaintiffs, particularly those bringing private suits that sup-
plement the criminal enforcement of the federal antitrust 




But even if the direct examination is limited to the ques-
tions and answers in the immunized transcript, there remains 
the right of cross examination;"' a right traditionally relied 
'"' n:>irect examination may not be as limited as petitioners assume. The 
District Court's civil contempt order stated that the questions asked in the 
deposition ''were taken directly'' from the immunized transcripts, but did 
not define exactly what deposition questions petitioners could ask. Other 
Courts of Appeals have permitted direct questioning to go beyond mere 
restatements of the prior testimony. See In re Corrugated Container 
Antitrust Litigation, Appeal of Fleischacker, 644 F. 2d 70, 79 (CA2 1981) 
(compelling answers to questions "concerning specific subjects that actu-
ally were touched upon by questions appearing in the transcript of the im-
munized testimony''); Little Rock School District v. Borden, Inc., 632 F. 2d 
700, 705 (CA8 1980) (compelling answers as long as deposition questions 
confined to "'the same time, geographical and substantive frame work as 
the [ witness' immunized] grand jury testimony'") (quoting Appeal of 
Starkey, 600 F. 2d 1043, 1048 (CA8 1979)). 
.,.<For purposes of this case, we assume that the grand jury transcripts 
are inadmissible as evidence in a civil trial because the testimony is not 
subject to cross examination. Cf. Fed. R. Evid. 803(8) (hearsay exception 
for certain public records); Fed. R. Evid. 804(a)(l) (witness unavailable 
when exempted from testifying on ground of privilege); Fed. R. Evid. 
804(b)(l) (former testimony admissible when witness unavailable and the 
party against whom the testimony is now offered had an opportunity for 
cross examination). 
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upon expansively to test credibility as well as to seek the 
truth. Petitioners recognize this problem, but maintain that 
the antitrust defendants "would be entitled to test the accu-
racy and truthfulness of Conboy's repeated immunized testi-
mony without going beyond the confines of that testimony." 
Regardless of any limitations that may be imposed on its 
scope,~however, cross examination is intended to and often 
will produce information not elicited on direct. We must as-
sume that, to produce admissible evidence, the scope of cross 
examination at the deposition cannot easily be limited to the 
immunized testimony. This assumption implicates both the 
Government's and the individual's interests embodied in 
§6002. 
B 
Use immunity was intended to immunize and exclude from 
a subsequent" criminal trial only that information to which the 
Government expressly has surrendered future use. If the 
Government is engaged in an ongoing investigation of the 
particular activity at issue, immunizing new information 
(e.g., the answers to questions in a case like this one) may 
make it more difficult to show in a subsequent prosecution 
that similar information was obtained from wholly independ-
the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discov-
ery of admissible evidence"); Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(c) (allowing cross examina-
tion at depositions); Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a) (deposition "admissible under the 
rules of evidence applied as though the witness were then present and tes-
tifying"); Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(l) (deposition admissible if the party against 
whom the testimony is now offered in a civil action had an opportunity to 
develop testimony by cross examination). 
1'1 ~ee United States v. Cardillo, 316 F. 2d 606, 611(CA21963) (in deter-
mining whether testimony of a witness who invokes the privilege during 
cross examination may be used against defendant, court draws a distinc-
tion between cases in which the assertion of the privilege merely precludes 
inquiry into collateral matters that bear on credibility of witnesses and 
those in which assertion prevents inquiry into matters about which witness 
testified on direct). 
12 
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ent sources. A District Court's grant of immunity in a sub-
sequent civil proceeding in effect could invest the deponent 
with transactional immunity on matters about which he testi-
fied at the immunized proceedings. This is precisely the 
kind of immunity Congress intended to prohibit. The pur-
pose of § 6002 was to limit the scope of immunity to the level 
that is constitutionally required, as well as to limit the use of 
immunity to those cases in which the Attorney General, or 
officials designated by him, determine that gaining the 
witness's testimony outweighs the loss of the opportunity for 
criminal prosecution of that witness.--,s 
C 
Petitioners' interpretation of § 6002 also places substantial 
risks on the deponent. Unless the grant of immunity as-
sures a witness that his incriminating testimony will not be 
used against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution, the 
witness has not received the certain protection of his Fifth 
Amendment privilege that he has been forced to exchange. 
No court has authority to immunize a witness. That respon-
sibility, as we have noted, is peculiarly an executive one, and 
only the Attorney General or a designated officer of the De-
j8, /we need not decide whether United States Attorneys, when desig-
nated by the Attorney General, presently have authority to immunize the 
testimony of a witness in a civil proceeding when the Government deter-
mines that the public interest would be served. Cf. 18 U. S. C. § 6002 
(can compel testimony "[w]henever a witness refuses" to testify "in a pro-
ceeding before or ancillary to ... a court ... of the United State,"); id., 
§ 6003 (may compel testimony Government believes "may be necessary to 
the public interest"); 116 Cong. Rec. 36,293 (1970) (statement of Sen. 
Hruska) (reading § 6002 as "enabl[ing] the Government in any court ... 
proceeding" to compel testimony) (emphasis added); 116 Cong. Rec. 853 
(1970) (statement of Sen. Young) ("[T]he power of the district attorney to 
compel a witness to testify is .... apparently available in any case in a fed-
eral court, including civil actions between private parties. ") (quoting from 
a memorandum prepared by the American Civil Liberties Union). If this 
authority exists, it could resolve the problem here presented in many civil 
cases in which the immunity issue is raised. 
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partment of Justice has authority~o t use immunity. 
See 18 U. S. C. §§ 6002, 6003. Nor a court, at the time 
of the civil testimony, pre-determine the ecision of the court 
in a subsequent criminal prosecution on the question whether 
the Government has met its burden of proving "that the evi-
dence it proposes to use is derived from a legitimate source 
wholly independent of the compelled testimony." Kasti,gar, 
406 U. S., at 460. Yet in holding Conboy in contempt for his 
Fifth Amendment silence, the District Court below essen-
tially predicted that a court in any future criminal prosecu-
tion of Conboy will be obligated to protect against eviden-
tiary use of the deposition testimony petitioners seek. We e 1<\ 
do not think such a predictive judgment is enough. 'A.s the 
Court stated in Maness v. Meyers, 419 U. S. 449 (1975), com-
pelling a witness to testify in "reliance upon a later objection 
or motion to suppress would 'let the cat out' with no assur-
ance whatever of puttin2" it back." Id .. _a_t_46_3_. 
If we simply were to assume, as petitioners urge, that the 
court hearing the criminal case will be able to exclude wrong-
fully compelled evidence, cf. id., at 474-475 (WHITE, J., con-
curring in the result); Murphy, 378 U. S., at 79, Conboy's un-
certainty might be diminished, but not eliminated, cf. Rogers 
v. United States, 340 U. S. 367, 373 (1951). Conboy could 
face prosecutorial challeges that he waived his privilege and 
that the testimony was not wrongfully compelled. . Reliance 
on an exclusionary rule would also implicate the Govern-
ment's interests. Judicial exclusion of nonimmunized testi-
mony would be inconsistent with the congressional policy of 
leaving the granting of immunity to the Executive Branch. 
Moreover, the necessarily broad scope of a judicial exclusion-
ary rule that provides certain protection to the deponent 
would frustrate congressional intent to grant no more immu-
nity than the Constitution requires. 
"The Court has held that an individual under compulsion to 
make disclosures as a witness who revealed iiif ormation in-
stead of claiming the privilege lost the benefit of the privi-
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lege." Garner v. United States, 424 U. S. 648, 653 (1976) 
citing United States v. Kordel, 397 U. S. 1, 7-10 (1970)). 
We believe Conboy acted properly in maintaining his silence 
in the face of the District Court's compulsion order and by 
testing the validity of his privilege on appeal. ~ 
IV 
This Court has emphasized the importance of the private 
action as a means of furthering the policy goals of certain fed-
eral regulatory statutes, including the federal antitrust laws. 
See, e.g., Perrna Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts 
Corp., 392 U. S. 134, 139 (1968); United States v. Borden 
Co., 347 U. S. 514, 51~19 (1954). But private civil" actions 
can only supplement, not supplant, the primary responsibil-
ity of Government. Petitioners' proposed construction of 
§ 6002 sweeps further than Congress intended and could hin-
der governmental enforcement of its criminal laws by turning 
use immunity into a form of transactional immunity for sub-
jects examined in the immunized proceeding. It also puts 
the deponent in some danger of criminal prosecution unless 
he receives an assurance of immunity or exclusion that the 
courts cannot properly give. Silence, on the other hand, 
preserves the deponent's rights and the Government's inter-
ests, as well as the judicial resources that otherwise would be 
required to make the many difficult judgments that petition-
ers' interpretation of § 6002 would require. 
V 
We hold that a deponent's civil deposition testimony, made 
without duly authorized assurance of immunity at the time, is 
not "information directly or indirectly derived from" prior im-
munized testimony within the meaning of § 6002, and there-
fore may not be compelled over a valid assertion of his Fifth 
Amendment privilege. The judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals accordingly is · 
Affirmed. 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Pursuant to the federal use immunity provisions, 18 
U. S. C. §§6001-6005 (1976), a United States Attorney may 
request an order from a federal court compelling a witness to 
testify even though he has asserted his privilege against self-
incrimination. Section 6002 provides, however, that "notes-
timony or other information compelled under the order ( or 
any information directly or indirectly derived from such testi-
mony or other information) may be used against the witness 
in any criminal case. . . . " The issue presented in this case is 
whether a deponent's civil deposition testimony, repeating 
J 
. s\.o.&l, ~ 
~ .:...-~~batim or closely tracking his prior immunized testimony, 
 1~'information" " · · · · ~
~(\ I ••• 
.0 
~0/lt'I\~ •··· -~ · · · ' an be compelled over the ~ 
v assertion o Fifth Amendment privilege. 
~ 
Respondent John Conboy is a former executive of a defend-
ant in the In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 
M.D.L. 310 (S.D. Tex.). In January 1978, United States 
Department of Justice attorneys interviewed Conboy follow-
ing a promise of use immunity. Conboy subsequently ap-
peared before a grand jury investigating price-fixing activi-
ties and, pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 6002, was granted formal 
use immunity for his testimony. 
2 
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Following the criminal indictment of several companies, 
numerous civil antitrust actions were filed in various United 
States district courts. Those actions were consolidated for 
discovery in the District Court for the Southern District of 
Texas. Petitioners here are purchasers of corrugated con-
tainers who elected to opt out of the class-action proceedings 
and pursue their own causes of action against manufacturers. 
The District Court ordered that portions of the immunized 
government interview and grand-jury testimony of certain 
witnesses, including that of Conboy, be made available to 
lawyers for the class and opt-outs. 1 
Pursuant to a subpoe~a issued by the District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois, Conboy appeared in Chicago for 
a deposition at which he, his counsel, and petitioners' counsel 
had copies of his immunized testimony. The transcripts 
were marked as deposition exhibits so that all could follow 
the intended examination. The questioning fell into the fol-
lowing pattern: a question was read from the transcript; it 
then was rephrased to include the transcript answer (i. e., 
"Is it not the fact that .... "); finally, Conboy was asked if 
he had "so testified" in his immunized interview and grand-
jury examination. 2 Conboy refused to answer each ques-
tion, asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. 
The District Court granted petitioners' motion to compel 
1 The propriety of the District Court's release of grand jury materials to 
the civil parties is not before the Court. 
2 An example of this three-question pattern is as follows: 
Q. ''Who did you have price communications with at Alton Box Board?" 
Q. Is it not the fact that you had price communications with Fred 
Renshaw and Dick Herman ... ? 
Q. Did you not so testify in your government interview of January 10, 
1978? 
Joint Appendix 29--31. 
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Conboy to answer the questions. 3 When Conboy continued 
to claim his privilege, the District Court held him in con-
tempt, but stayed its order pending appeal. A panel of the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the con-
tempt order, holding that, "[b]ecause the questions asked in 
this deposition were taken verbatim from or closely tracked 
the transcript of Conboy's grand jury testimony, we believe 
that his answers at the deposition would be 'derived from' the 
prior immunized [testimony] and therefore unavailable for 
use in any subsequent criminal prosecution." In re C orru-
gated Container Antitrust Litigation, Appeal of John 
Conboy, 655 F. 2d 748, 751 (CA7), rev'd en bane, 661 F. 2d 
1145 (1981). 
On rehearing en bane, the Court of Appeals reversed the 
District Court. It first determined that Conboy's alleged 
fear of prosecution was more than "fanciful," 661 F. 2d, at 
1152, and that Conboy therefore was entitled to assert his 
Fifth Amendment privilege unless his deposition testimony 
could not be used against him in a subsequent criminal action, 
see id., at 1153. 4 The court then held that under § 6002, ab-
sent a separate and independent grant of immunity, 5 a depo-
nent's civil deposition testimony that repeats verbatim or 
closely tracks his prior immunized testimony is not protected. 
While acknowledging that verbatim questions "of course 
[would be] derived" from the immunized testimony, the court 
reasoned that the answers to such questions "are d~rived 
from the deponent's current, independent memory of events" 
3 Chief Judge John V. Singleton, Jr. of the District Court for the South-
ern District of Texas expressly exercised the powers of the District Court 
for the Northern District of Illinois pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1407(b). The 
contempt hearing was conducted by telephone with his chambers in 
Houston. 
• The correctness of the Court of Appeals' conclusion that Conboy could 
assert a Fifth Amendment privilege, absent some immunity, is not before 
us. 
5 A United States Attorney declined to authorize immunity grants in 
connection with the civil depositions here. 
4 
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and thus "necessarily create a new source of evidence" that 
could be used in a subsequent criminal prosecution against 
Conboy. Id., at 1155 (emphasis in original). 
We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict in the Courts 
of Appeals, 6 and now affirm. 
II 
It is settled that government must have the power to com-
pel testimony "to secure information necessary for effective 
law enforcement." Murphy v. Wateefront Commission, 378 
U. S. 52, 79 (1964). 7 For many years, however, a person 
who was compelled to testify under a grant of governmental 
immunity could not be prosecuted for any conduct about 
which he had testified. See New Jersey v. Portash, 440 
U. S. 450, 457 (1979). Prosecutors therefore were reluctant 
to grant such "transactional" immunity to potential targets 
of criminal investigations. See _S. Rep. No. 91-617, p. 53 
(1969). 
The "major purpose" of the Organized Crime Control Act 
of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 927, of which §6002 was 
a key provision, was "to provide the criminal justice system 
with the necessary legal tools to . . . strengthe[n] the evi-
dence gathering process and insur[e] that the evidence will 
then be available and admissible at trial." 116 Cong. Rec. 
35,200 (1970) (statement of Rep. St. Germain). Congress 
6 Compare In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, Appeal of 
Fleischacker, 644 F. 2d 70, 75 (CA2 1981) (deposition answers immunized), 
and Little Rock School District v. Borden, Inc., 632 F. 2d 700, 705 (CA8 
1980) (same), with In re Corrugated Container Anti-Trust Litigation, Ap-
peal of Franey, 620 F. 2d 1086, 1095 (CA51980) (answers not immunized), 
cert. denied, 449 U. S. 1102 (1981). 
1 See United States v. Calandra, · 414 U. S. 338, 345 (1974); United 
States v. Mara, 410 U. S. 19, 41 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting); Kasti-
gar v. United States, 406 U. S. 441, 443-444 (1973); Murphy, 378 U. S., at 
93-94 (WHITE, J., concurring); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421, 
438 (1932); Blair v. United States, 250 U. S. 273, 281 (1919); Braum v. 
Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 600 (1896). 
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sought to make the grant of immunity more useful for law en-
forcement officers through two specific changes. First, Con-
gress made the grant of immunity less expansive 8 by re-
pealing the authority for transactional immunity and provid-
ing for the less comprehensive use immunity authorized in 
§ 6002. 9 Second, Congress gave certain officials in the 
Department of Justice 10 exclusive authority to grant 
immunities. 11 
8 In Murphy, JUSTICE WHITE stated that "[i]mmunity must be as broad 
as, but not harmfully and wastefully broader than, the privilege against 
self-incrimination." 378 U. S., at 107 (concurring opinion) (quoted with · 
approval in 116 Cong. Rec. 35,291 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff)). In its 
committee report, the House explained that § 6002 was not to provide an 
"immunity bath," but was to be "no broader than" the Fifth Amendment 
privilege. H.R. No. 91-1549, p. 5 (1970). 
9 Section 6002 provides: 
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-
incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding be-
fore or ancillary to-
(1) a court or grand jury of the United States, 
(2) an agency of the United States, or 
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses, or a 
committee or a subcommittee of either House 
and the person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the witness 
an order issued under this part, the witness may not refuse to comply with 
the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but no tes-
timony or other information compelled under the order (or any information 
directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) 
may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution 
for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with 
the order. 
Section 6001(2) defines "other information" to include "any book, paper, 
document, record, recording, or other material." 
10 Section 6003 states: 
(a) . In the case of any individual who has been or may be called to testify 
or provide other information at any proceeding before or ancillary to a 
court of the United States or a grand jury of the United States, the United 
States district court for the judicial district in which the proceeding is or 
may be held shall issue, in accordance with subsection (b) of this section, 
[Footnotes 10 and 11 continue on page 6] 
6 
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The Court upheld the constitutionality of the use immunity 
statute in Kasti,gar v. United States, 406 U. S. 441 (1972). 
The power to compel testimony is limited by the Fifth 
Amendment, and we held that any grant of immunity must 
be co-extensive with the privilege. We were satisfied, how-
ever, that § 6002 provided this measure of protection and 
thus "removed the dangers against which the privilege pro-
tects." Id., at 449. In rejecting the argument that use and 
derivative-use immunity would not adequately protect a wit-
ness from various incriminating uses of the compelled testi-
mony, we emphasized that "[t]he statute provides a sweeping 
proscription of any use, direct or indirect, of the compelled 
testimony and any information derived therefrom. . . . " Id., 
at 460. We added that once a defendant establishes that he 
has testified under a grant of immunity, "the prosecution 
[has] the affirmative duty to prove that the evidence it pro-
poses to use is derived from a legitimate source wholly inde-
pendent of the compelled testimony." Ibid. Thus, "immu-
nity from use and derivative use 'leaves the witness and the 
Federal Government in substantially the same position as if 
the witness had claimed his privilege' in the absence of a 
grant of immunity." Kasti,gar, 406 U. S., at 458-459 (quot-
ing Murphy, 378 U. S., at 79). 
upon the request of the United States attorney for such district, an order 
requiring such individual to give testimony or provide other information 
which he refuses to give or provide on the basis of his privilege against self-
incrimination, such order to become effective as provided in section 6002 of 
this part. 
(b) A United States attorney may, with the approval of the Attorney 
General, the Deputy Attorney General, or any designated Assistant Attor-
ney General, request an order under subsection (a) of this section when in 
his judgment-
(!) the testimony or other information from such individual may be nec-
essary to the public interest; and 
(2) such individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide 
other information on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination. 
11 Congress foresaw the courts as playing only a minor role in the immu-
nizing process: "The court's role in granting the order is merely to find the 
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7 
With the foregoing statutory history and relevant princi-
ples in mind, we turn now to this case. It is not disputed 
that the questions asked of Conboy were directly or indi-
rectly derived from his immunized testimony. The issue is 
whether the causal connection between the questions and the 
answers is so direct that the answers also are derived from 
that testimony and therefore should be excluded under the 
grant of immunity. · · 
Petitioners' argument is based on the language of § 6002 
and on a common understanding of the words "derived from." 
The questions formulated on the basis of immunized testi-
mony are clearly "derived from" the prior testimony. Thus, 
the answers that repeat verbatim or closely track a depo-
nent' s testimony are necessarily also "derived from" and 
"tainted by" such testimony. Petitioners therefore find no 
basis for the distinction made by the Court of Appeals be-
tween questions and answers responsive to those same ques-
tions. An answer by its very nature is evoked by and re-
sponds to information contained in a question. 
Conboy's position is also straightforward: Questions do not 
incriminate; answers do. Unlike the questions, answers are 
not directly or indirectly derived from the immunized grand 
jury or interview transcripts, but from the deponent's cur-
rent, independent memory of events. Even when a depo-
nent's deposition answers are identical to those he gave to 
the grand jury, he is under oath to tell the truth, not neces-
sarily as he told it before the grand jury, but as he knows it 
now. Each new statement of the deponent creates a new 
facts on which the order is predicated." H.R. Rep. No. 91-1549, su:pra 
note 8, at 43; H.R. Rep. No. 91-1188, p. 13 (1970). See 116 Cong. Rec. 
35,291 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff). Cf. President's Commission on 
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime 
in a Free Society 141 (1967) (recommending that "[i]mmunity should be 
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"source." In sum, the initial grant of immunity does not pre-
vent the prosecutor from prosecuting; it merely limits his 
sources of evidence. 
Before accepting eitherJ""werprgt,atian, we think it neces-
sary to consider which of the contending views more satisfac-
torily protects both the Government's need for admissible ev-
idence and the individual's interest in avoiding self 
incrimination. In this case there also is the interest-recog-
nized as important-in obtaining admissible evidence in a 
civil antitrust suit. We note at the outset that although 
there may be practical reasons for not testifyingt,\as far as 
the deponent's Fifth Amendment right is concerned he 
should be indifferent between the protection afforded by si-
lence and that afforded by immunity. A deponent's primary 
interest is that the protection be certain. The Government's 
interest, however, may be affected seriously by whether the 
deponent relies at the civil deposition on his Fifth Amend-
ment privilege or on his prior grant of immunity. With due 
recognition of petitioners' need for admissible evidence, our 
inquiry then is whether this need can be met without threat-
ening the Government's interest in limiting the scope of an 
immunity grant or encroaching upon the deponent's certainty 
of protection. 
A 
Questions taken verbatim from a transcript of immunized 
testimony could evoke one of several responses from a depo-
nent: (i) he could repeat or adopt his immunized answer; 13 
(ii) he could affirm that the transcript of his immunized an-
swers accurately reflects his prior testimony; (iii) he could re-
12 Besides the costs of testifying against close associates, any witness in-
creases the risk of committing perjury the more he talks. Cf. 18 U. S. C. 
§ 6002 (perjured testimony not immunized). 
18 The extreme case would be where petitioners read the entire immu-
nized grand-jury transcript; then ask the witness if that is his testimony; 
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call additional information responsive to the question but not 
disclosed in his immune testimony; or (iv) he could disclose 
information that is not responsive to the question. Petition-
ers do not contend, nor could they, that the prior grant of use 
immunity affords protection for all self-incriminating in-
formation disclosed by the immunized witness on any occa-
sion after the giving of the immunized testimony. Rather, 
petitioners argue that only the first three responses would be 
"derived from" his immune testimony and therefore would be 
unavailable for use against the deponent in any subsequent 
criminal prosecution. 
Petitioners' premise is that the deposition of Conboy is de-
signed not to discover new information, 14 but to obtain evi-
dence that simply repeats the statements in the immunized 
transcript. 15 Because there will be little opportunity for the 
grant of immunity to sweep in statements on direct examina-
u Direct examination may not be as limited as petitioners assume. The 
District Court's civil contempt order stated that the questions asked in the 
deposition ''were taken directly'' from the immunized transcripts, but did 
not define exactly what deposition questions petitioners could ask. Other 
Courts of Appeals have permitted direct questioning to go ~yond mere 
restatements of the prior testimony. See In re Corrugated Container 
Antitrust Litigation, Appeal of Fleischacker, 644 F. 2d 70, 79 (CA2 1981) 
(compelling answers to questions "concerning specific subjects that actu-
ally were touched upon by questions appearing in the transcript of the im-
munized testimony''); Little Rock School District v. Borden, Inc., 632 F. 2d 
700, 705 (CA8 1980) (compelling answers as long as deposition questions 
confined to "'the same time, geographical and substantive frame work as 
the [ witness' immunized] grand jury testimony'") (quoting Appeal of 
Starkey, 600 F. 2d 1043, 1048 (CA8 1979)). 
15 For purposes of this case, we assume that the grand jury transcripts 
are inadmissible as evidence in a civil trial because the testimony is not 
subject to cross examination. Cf. Fed. R. Evid. 803(8) (hearsay exception 
for certain public records); Fed. R. Evid. 804(a)(l) (witness unavailable 
when exempted from testifying on ground of privilege); Fed. R. Evid. 
804(b)(l) (former testimony admissible when witness unavailable and the 
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tion that the Government did not intend to immunize, or for 
the deponent to give responses that may fall outside of the 
grant of immunity and later be used against him in a subse-
quent criminal prosecution, petitioners argue that Conboy's 
deposition will yield only a carbon copy of the grand-jury 
transcript. In such a situation, it would be desirable for civil 
plaintiffs, particularly those bringing private suits that sup-
plement the criminal enforcement of the federal antitrust 
laws, to have access to the available, probative information. 
But even if the direct examination is limited to the ques-
tions and answers in the immunized transcript, there remains 
the right of cross examination, 16 a right traditionally relied 
upon expansively to test credibility as well as to seek the 
truth. Petitioners recognize this problem, but maintain that 
the antitrust defendants "would be entitled to test the accu-
racy and truthfulness of Conboy's repeated immunized testi-
mony without going beyond the confines of that testimony." 
Regardless of any limitations that may be imposed on its 
scope, 11 however, cross examination ·is intended to and often 
will produce information not elicited on direct. We must as-
sume that, to produce admissible evidence, the scope of cross 
examination at the deposition cannot easily be limited to the 
16 Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(l) (stating that depositions may be taken ''if 
the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discov-
ery ofadmissible evidence"); Fed. R. Civ. P . 30(c) (allowing cross examina-
tion at depositions); Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a) (deposition "admissible under the 
rules of evidence applied as though the witness were then present and tes-
tifying"); Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(l) (deposition admissible if the party against 
whom the testimony is now offered in a civil action had an opportunity to 
develop testimony by cross examination). 
17 See United States v. Cardillo, 316 F. 2d 606, 611 (CA2 1963) (in deter-
mining whether testimony of a witness who invokes the privilege during 
cross examination may be used against defendant, court draws a distinc-
tion between cases in which the assertion of the privilege merely precludes 
inquiry into collateral matters that bear on credibility of witnesses and 
those in which assertion prevents inquiry into matters about which witness 
testified on direct). 
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immunized testimony. This assumption implicates both the 
Government's and the individual's interests embodied in 
§6002. 
B 
Use immunity was intended to immunize and exclude from 
a subsequent criminal trial only that information to which the 
Government expressly has surrendered future use. If the 
Government is engaged in an ongoing investigation of the 
particular activity at issue, immunizing new information 
(e.g., the answers to questions in a case like this one) may 
make it more difficult to show in a subsequent prosecution ~ ('I • • /'l 
1 that similar information was obtained from wholl inde end- ~ Cl., 'D~ ~
~ ent sources. · · ~ ;,. ~ i-,,_, a.. • 
~ ieqnent chriJ pro:::sediug m e ect cou mvest the eponent :so~ '2..« ~ ~
with transactional immuruty on matters about which he testi- ~ 1: :aco~ of ~ .. 
fled at the immunized proceedings. This is precisely the . . - -1' 
kind of immunity Congress intended to prohibit. The pur-~ ":~ ~ -,-
pose of § 6002 was to limit the scope of immunity to the level ~ 
that is constitutionally required, as well as to limit the use of ~ ~ · ' · 
immunity to those cases in which the Attorney General, or C) ~ 
officials designated by him, determine that gaining the . . 
witness's testimony outweighs the loss of the opportunity for ~ 
criminal prosecution of that witness. 18 • 
1 
'1:-
18 We need not decide whether United States Attorneys, when desig-
nated by the Attorney General, presently have authority to immunize the 
testimony of a witness in a civil proceeding when the Government deter-
mines that the public interest would be served. Cf. 18 U. S. C. § 6002 
(can compel testimony "[w]henever a witness refuses" to testify ''in a pro-
ceeding before or ancillary to ... a court ... of the United State,"); id., 
§ 6003 (may compel testimony Government believes "may be necessary to 
the public interest"); 116 Cong. Rec. 36,293 (1970) (statement of Sen. 
Hruska) (reading § 6002 as "enabl[ing] the Government in any court ... 
proceeding" to compel testimony) (emphasis added); 116 Cong. Rec. 853 
(1970) (statement of Sen. Young) ("[T]he power of the district attorney to 
compel a witness to testify is .... apparently available in any case in a fed-
eral court, including civil actions between private parties.") (quoting from 
12 
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C 
Petitioners' interpretation of § 6002 also places substantial 
risks on the deponent. Unless the grant of immunity as-
sures a witness that his incriminating testimony will not be 
used against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution, the 
witness has not received the certain protection of his Fifth 
Amendment privilege that he has been forced to exchange. 
No court has authority to immunize a witness. That respon-
sibility, as we have noted, is peculiarly an executive one, and 
only the Attorney General or a designated officer of the De-
partment of Justice has authority to grant use immunity. 
See 18 U. S. C. §§6002, 6003. Nor should a court, at the 
time of the civil testimony, pre-determine the decision of the 
court in a subsequent criminal prosecution on the question 
whether the Government has met its burden of proving "that 
the evidence it proposes to use is derived from a legitimate 
source wholly independent of the compelled testimony." 
Kastigar, 406 U. S., at 460. Yet in holding Conboy in con-
tempt for his Fifth Amendment silence, the District Court 
below essentially predicted that a court in any future criminal 
prosecution of Conboy will be obligated to protect against 
evidentiary use of the deposition testimony petitioners seek. 
We do not think such a predictive judgment is enough. 19 As 
the Court stated in Maness v. Meyers, 419 U. S. 449 (1975), 
compelling a witness to testify in "reliance_ upon a later 
a memorandum prepared by the American Civil Liberties Union). If this 
authority exists, it could resolve the problem here presented in many civil 
cases in which the immunity issue is raised. 
19 It is unnecessary to speculate whether wrongfully compelled evidence 
might be excluded in a subse uent criminal trial of the deponent. Cf. 
Maness v. Myers , 419 . . ~74--47i WHITE, J. , concurring in the re-
sult). We refer to the use of exclus onary rule in such a trial only to 
make clear that the District Co 's com ulsion order in this case cannot be 
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objection or motion to suppress would 'let the cat out' with no 
assurance whatever of putting it back." Id., at 463. We be-
lieve Conboy acted properly in maintaining his silence in the 
face of the District Court's compulsion order and by testing 
the validity of his privilege on appeal. 20 
IV 
This Court has emphasized the importance of the private 
_action as a means of furthering the policy goals of certain fed-
eral regulatory statutes, including the federal antitrust laws. 
See, e.g., Perrna Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts 
Corp., 392 U. S. 134, 139 (1968); United States v. Borden 
Co., 347 U. S. 514, 518-519 (1954). But private civil actions 
can only supplement, not supplant, the primary responsibil-
ity of Government. Petitioners' proposed construction of 
§ 6002 sweeps further than Congress intended and could hin-
der governmental enforcement of its criminal laws by turning 
use immunity into a form of transactional immunity for sub-
jects examined in the immunized proceeding. It also puts 
the deponent in some danger of criminal prosecution unless 
he receives an assurance of immunity or exclusion that the 
courts cannot properly give. Silence, on the other hand, 
preserves the deponent's rights and the Government's inter-
ests, as well as the judicial resources that otherwise would be 
required to make the many difficult judgments that petition-
ers' interpretation of § 6002 would require. ;..____ ~ 
I ~ ). ~ STICE BLACKMUN's aeReQPfli.;{ opinio addresses a situation not 
._ ___ _. present in this case: He discusses the "fruits' doctrine where a witness's 
testimony at a deposition is "an independent act of free will", i. e., is know-
ingly and voluntarily given in the absence of any compulsion by the court. 
Justice Blackmun concludes that "had Conboy answered the deposition 
questions [as 'an independent act of free will'], his testimony would not 
have been protected by the original immunity grant ... ". Post, at 8. 
Although there may be no reason to disagree with this hypothetical, it is 
not presented in this case. Therefore, we have not addressed it . . 
..J mM. b'(j'{fn\]? a~ ..j(l, £;]? .,y i,~wr!tz . 
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V 
Amendment privilege. 
peals accordingly is 
J/-,d~~ 
Affirmed. 
w~ w.~ n- ~·.s ~ . . ~. 
d~ ~ b, \f"""' ~ ,ci 
. ~-~ ~ ~ ~\ ~ ~~ ·" I I • . ,_ C\-=--:~ .... ...,.,,\~ 
(__j 0:,:: -'l,IIJ2_ W<N/.. I ~ 3( f .: * VU'-l""'-"'"0 '----J ~
-- ~ ~ °t f~002.) ~ 
- J 
\\O\J 1 ~ ,~?.>~ 
¾eQ): 1,8-14 
2nd DRAFT 








From: Justice Powell 
Circulated: _______ _ 
Recirculated:NOV 2 2 19ef 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-825 
THE PILLSBURY COMPANY, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. 
JOHN CONBOY 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
[November-, 1982] 
JUSTICE POWELi. delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Pursuant to the federal use immunity provisions, 18 
U. S. C. §§ 6001-6005 (1976), a United States Attorney may 
request an order from a federal court compelling a witness to 
testify even though he has asserted his privilege against self-
incrimination. Section 6002 provides, however, that "notes-
timony or other information compelled under the order (or 
any information directly or-indirectly derived from such testi-
mony or other information) may be used against the witness 
in any criminal case. . . . " The issue presented in this case is 
whether a deponent's civil deposition testimony, repeating 
verbatim or closely tracking his prior immunized testimony, 
I is immunized "information" that can be compelled over the valid assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege. 
I 
Respondent John Conboy is a former executive of a defend-
ant in the In re Corrugated C<>nt,ainer Antitrust Litigation, 
M.D.L. 310 (S.D. Tex.). In January 1978, United States 
Department of Justice attorneys interviewed Conboy follow-
ing a promise of use immunity. Conboy subsequently ap-
peared before a grand jury investigating price-fixing activi-
ties and, pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 6002, was granted formal 
use immunity for his testimony. 
2 
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Following the criminal indictment of several companies, 
numerous civil antitrust actions were filed in various United 
States district courts. Those actions were consolidated for 
discovery in the District Court for the Southern District of 
Texas. Petitioners here are purchasers of corrugated con-
tainers who elected to opt out of the class-action proceedings 
and pursue their own causes of action against manufacturers. 
The District Court ordered that portions of the immunized 
government interview and grand-jury testimony of certain 
witnesses, including that of Conboy, be made available to 
lawyers for the class and opt-outs. 1 
Pursuant to a subpoena issued by the District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois, Conboy appeared in Chicago for 
a deposition at which he, his counsel, and petitioners' counsel 
had copies of his immunized testimony. The transcripts 
were marked as deposition exhibits so that all could follow 
the intended examination. The questioning fell into the fol-
lowing pattern: a question was read from the transcript; it 
then was rephrased to include the transcript answer (i. e., 
"Is it not the fact that. . . . "); finally, Conboy was asked if 
he had "so testified" in his immunized interview and grand-
jury examination. z Conboy refused to answer each ques 
tion, asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. · 
The District Court granted petitioners' motion to compel 
1 The propriety of the District Court's release of grand jury materials to 
the civil parties is not before the Court. 
1 An example of this three-question pattern is as follows: 
Q. "Who did you have price communications with at Alton Box Board?" 
Q. Is it not the fact that you had price communications with Fred 
Renshaw and Dick Hennan ... ·? · 
Q. Did you not so testify in your government interview of January 10, 
1978? 
Joint Appendix 29--81. 
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Conboy to answer the questions. 1 When Conboy continued 
to claim his privilege, the District Court held him in con-
tempt, but stayed its order pending appeal. A panel of the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the con-
tempt order, holding that, "[b]ecause the questions asked in 
this deposition were taken verbatim from or closely tracked 
the transcript of Conboy's grand jury testimony, we believe 
that his answers at the deposition would be 'derived from' the 
prior immunized [testimony] and therefore unavailable for 
use in any subsequent criminal prosecution." In re Corru-
gated Conf,ainer Antitrust Litigation, Appeal of John 
Conboy, 655 F. 2d 748, 751 (CA7), rev'd en bane, 661 F. 2d 
1145 (1981). 
On rehearing en bane, the Court of Appeals reversed the 
District Court. It first determined that Conboy's alleged 
fear of prosecution was more than ''fanciful," 661 F. 2d, at 
1152, and that Conboy therefore was entitled to assert his 
Fifth Amendment privilege unless his deposition testimony 
could not be used against him in a subsequent criminal action, 
see id., at 1153.' The court then held that under § 6002, ab-
sent a separate and independent grant of .immunity,5 a depo-
nent's civil deposition testimony that repeats verbatim or 
closely tracks his prior immunized testimony is not protected. 
While acknowledging that verbatim questions "of course 
[would be] derived" from the immunized testimony., the court 
reasoned that the answers to such questions "are derived 
from the deponent's current, independent memory of events" 
1 Chief Judge John V. Singleton, Jr. of the District Court for the South-
ern District of Texas expressly exercised the powers of the District Court 
for the Northern District oflllinois pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1407(b). The 
contempt hearing was conducted by telephone with his chambers in 
Houston. 
'The correctness of the Court of Appeals' conclusion that Conboy could 
assert a Fifth Amendment privilege, absent some immunity, is not before 
us. 
'A United States Attorney declined to authorize immunity grants in 
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and thus "necessarily create a new source of evidence" that 
could be used in a subsequent criminal prosecution against 
Conboy. Id., at 1155 (emphasis in original). 
We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict in the Courts 
of Appeals,• and now affirm. 
II 
It is settled that government must have the power to com-
pel testimony ''to secure information necessary for effective 
law enforcement." Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 
U. S. 52, 79 (1964). 7 For many years, however, a person 
who was compelled to testify under a grant of governmental 
immunity could not be prosecuted for any conduct about 
which he had testified. See New Jersey v: Port.ash, 440 
U. S. 450, 457 (1979). Prosecutors therefore were reluctant 
to grant such "transactional" immunity to potential targets 
of criminal investigations. See S. Rep. No. 91-617, p. 53 
(1969). 
The "major purpose" of the Organized Crime Control Act 
of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 927, of which § 6002 was 
a key provision, was ''to provide the criminal justice system 
with the necessary legal tools to . . . strengthe[n] the evi-
dence gathering process and insur[e] that the evidence will 
then be available and admissible at trial." 116 Cong. Rec. 
35,200 (1970) (statement of Rep. St. Germain). Congress 
• Compare In re Corrugat,ed, Container Antitrust Litigation, Appeal of 
Fleischacker, 644 F. 2d 70, 75 (CA2 1981) (deposition answers immunized), 
and Little Rock School District v. Borden, Inc., 632 F. 2d 700, 705 (CA8 
1980) (same), with In re Corrugated Container Anti-Trust Litigation, Ap-
peal of Franey, 620 F. 2d 1086, 1095 (CA5 1980) (answers not immunized), 
cert. denied, 449 U. S. 1102 (1981). 
1 See Unit,ed, States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 345 (1974); Unit,ed, States 
v. Mara, 410 U. S. 19, 41 (1973) (MARsHALL, J., dissenting); Ka8ti.gar v. 
Unit,ed, States, 406 U. S. 441, 443-444 (1973); Murphy, 378 U. S., at 93-94 
(WmTE, J., concurring); Blackmer v. Unit,ed, States, 284 U. S. 421, 438 
(1932); Blair v. Unit,ed, States, 250 U. S. 273, 281 (1919); Brown v. Walker, 
161 u. s. 591, 600 (1896). 
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sought to make the grant of immunity more useful for law en-
forcement officers through two specific changes. First, Con-
gress made the grant of immunity less expansive 8 by re-
pealing the authority for transactional immunity and provid-
ing for the less comprehensive use immunity authorized in 
§ 6002. • Second, Congress gave certain officials in the 
Department of Justice 10 exclusive authority to grant 
immunities. 11 
• In Murphy, JUSTICE WHITE stated that "[i]mmunity must be as broad 
as, but not hannfully and wastefully broader than, the privilege against 
self-incrimination." 378 U. S., at 107 (concurring opinion) (quoted with 
approval in 116 Cong. Rec. 35,291 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff)). In its 
committee report, the House explained that § 6002 was not to provide an 
"immunity bath," but was to be "no broader than" the Fifth Amendment 
privilege. H.R. No. 91-1549, p. 5 (1970). 
'Section 6002 provides: 
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-
incrimination, to testify or provide other i:nformation in a proceeding be-
fore or ancillary to-
(1) a court or grand jury of the United States, 
(2) an agency of the United States, or 
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses, or a 
committee or a subcommittee of either House 
and the person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the witness 
· an order issued under this part, the witness may not refuse to comply with 
the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but notes-
timony or other information compelled under the order (or any information 
directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) 
may be used against the witness in any criminal ease, except a prosecution 
for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with 
the order. 
Section 6001(2) defines "other information" to include "any book, paper, 
document, record, recording, or other material." 
11 Section 6003 states: 
(a) In the ease of any individual who has been or may be called to testify 
or provide other information at any proceeding before or ancillary to a 
court of the United States or a grand jury of the United States, the United 
States district court for the judicial district in which the proceeding is or 
may be held shall issue, in accordance with subsection (b) of this section, 
[Footnote 11 continues on 1)Qf}e 6] 
6 
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The Court upheld the constitutionality of the use immunity 
statute in Kasti.gar v. United States, 406 U. S. 441 (1972). 
The power to compel testimony is limited by the Fifth 
Amendment, and we held that any grant of immunity must 
be co-extensive with the privilege. We were satisfied, how-
ever, that § 6002 provided this measure of protection and 
thus ''removed the dangers against which the privilege pro-
tects." Id., at 449. In rejecting the argument that use and 
derivative-use immunity would not adequately protect a wit-
ness from various incriminating uses of the . compelled testi-
mony, we emphasized that "[t]he statute provides a sweeping 
proscription of any use, direct or indirect, of the compelled 
testimony and any information derived therefrom. . . . " Id., 
at 460. We added that once a defendant establishes that he 
has testified under a grant of immunity, ''the prosecution 
[has] the affirmative duty to prove that the evidence it pro-
poses to use is derived from a legitimate source wholly inde-
pendent of the compelled testimony." llrid. Thus, ''immu-
nity from use and derivative use 'leaves the witness and the 
Federal Government in substantially the same position as if 
the witness had claimed his privilege' in the absence of a 
grant of immunity." Kasti.gar, 406 U. S., at 458-459 (quot-
ing Murphy, 378 U. S., at 79). 
upon the request of the United States attorney for such district, an order 
requiring such individual to give testimony or provide other infonnation 
which he refuses to give or provide on the basis of his privilege against self-
incrimination, such order to become effective as provided in section 6002 of 
this part. 
(b) A United States attorney may, with the approval of the Attorney 
General, the Deputy Attorney General, or any designated Assistant Attor-
ney General, request an order under subsection (a) of this section when in 
his judgment-
(1) the testimony or other infonnation from such individual may be nec-
essary to the public interest; and 
(2) such individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide 
other infonnation on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination. 
u Congress foresaw the courts as playing only a minor role in the immu-
nizing process: "The court's role in granting the order is merely to find the 
-·--- ---- _ _..·- •- -·~-·- • - -- - --· ·--· ·- ·---- - - - -·--· -·-· -··----··-•· . --- ----~- ----- --
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7 
With the foregoing statutory history and relevant princi-
ples in mind, we turn now to this case. It is not disputed 
that the questions asked of Conboy were directly or indi-
rectly derived from his immunized testimony. The issue is 
whether the causal connection between the questions and the 
answers is so direct that the answers also are derived from 
that testimony and therefore should be excluded under the 
grant of immunity. 
Petitioners' argument is based on the language of § 6002 
and on a common understanding of the words "derived from." 
The questions formulated on the basis of immunized testi-
mony are clearly "derived from" the prior testimony. Thus, 
the answers that repeat verbatim or closely track a depo-
nent's testimony are necessarily also "derived from" and 
''tainted by" such testimony. Petitioners therefore find no 
basis for the distinction made by the Court of Appeals be-
tween questions and answers responsive to those same ques-
tions. An answer by its very nature is evoked by and re-
sponds to information contained in a question. 
Conboy's position is also straightforward: Questions do not 
incriminate; answers do. Unlike the questions, answers are 
not directly or indirectly derived from the immunized grand 
. jury or interview transcripts, but from the deponent's cur-
rent, independent memory of events. Even when a depo-
nent's deposition answers are identical to those he gave to 
the grand jury, he is under oath to tell the truth, not neces-
sarily as he told it before the grand jury, but as he knows it 
now. Each new statement of the deponent creates a new 
facts on which the order is predicated." H.R. Rep. No. 91-1549, BUpra 
note 8, at 43; H.R. Rep. No. 91-1188, p. 13 (1970). See 116 Cong. Rec. 
35,291 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff). Cf. President's Commission on 
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime 
in a Free Society 141 (1967) (recommending that "[i]mmunity should be 
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"source." In sum, the initial grant of immunity does not pre-
vent the prosecutor from prosecuting; it merely limits his 
sources of evidence. 
Before accepting either party's argument, we think it nec-
essary to consider which of the contending views more sat-
isfactorily protects both the Government's need for admissi-
ble evidence and the individual's interest in avoiding self 
incrimination. In this case there also is the interest-recog-
nized as important-in obtaining admissible evidence in a 
civil antitrust suit. We note at the outset that although 
there may be practical reasons for not testifying, I! as far as 
the deponent's Fifth Amendment · right is concerned he 
should be indifferent between the protection afforded by si-
lence and that afforded by immunity. A deponent's primary 
interest is that the protection be certain. The Government's 
interest, however, may be affected seriously by whether the 
deponent relies at the civil deposition on his Fifth Amend-
ment privilege or on his prior grant of immunity. With due 
recognition of petitioners' need for admissible evidence, our 
inquiry then is whether this need can be met without threat-
ening the Government's interest in limiting the scope of an 
immunity grant or encroaching upon the deponent's certainty 
of protection. 
A 
Questions taken verbatim from a transcript of immunized 
testimony could evoke one of several responses from a depo-
1 nent: (i) he could . repeat or adopt his immunized answer; 13 
(ii) he could affirm· that the transcript of his immunized an-
swers accurately reflects his prior testimony; (iii) he could re 
11 Besides the costs of testifying against close associates, any witness in-
creases the risk of committing perjury the more he talks. Cf. 18 U. S. C. 
§ 6002 (perjured testimony not immunized). 
11 The extreme case would be where petitioners read the entire immu-
ni?.ed grand-jury transcript; then ask the witness if that is his testimony; 
and he answers simply "Yes." 
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call additional information responsive to the question but not 
disclosed in his immune testimony; or (iv) he could disclose 
information that is not responsive to the question. Petition-
ers do not contend, nor could they, that the prior grant of use 
immunity affords protection for all self-incriminating in-
formation disclosed by the immunized witness on any occa-
sion after the giving of the immunized testimony. Rather, 
petitioners argue that only the first three responses would be 
"derived from" his immune testimony and therefore would be 
unavailable for use against the deponent in any subsequent 
criminal prosecution. 
Petitioners' premise is that the deposition of Conboy is de-
I signed not to discover new information, 14 but to obtain evi-
dence that simply repeats the statements in the immunized 
I transcript. 16 Because there will be little opportunity for the 
grant of immunity to sweep in statements on direct examina 
I w Direct examination may not be as limited as petitioners assume. The 
District Court's civil contempt order stated that the questions asked in the 
deposition "were taken directly" from the immunized transcripts, but did 
not define exactly what deposition questions petitioners could ask. Other 
Courts of Appeals have permitted direct questioning to go beyond mere 
restatements of the prior testimony. See In re Corrugat,ed Container 
Antitru8t Litigation, Appeal of Fleischacker, 644 F. 2d 70, 79 (CA2 1981) 
(compelling answers to questions "concerning specific subjects that actu-
ally were touched upon by questions appearing in the transcript of the im-
munized testimony"); Little Rock School Di8trict v. Borden, Inc., 632 F. 2d 
700, 705 (CA8 1980) (compelling answers as long as deposition questions 
confined to "'the same time, geographical and substantive frame work as 
the [witness' immunized] grand jury testimony'") (quoting Appeal of 
Starkey, 600 F. 2d 1043, 1048 (CA8 1979)). 
) 
11 For purposes of this case, we assume that the grand jury transcripts 
are inadmissible as evidence in a civil trial because the testimony is not 
subject to Cl'08S examination. Cf. Fed. R. Evid. 803(8) (hearsay exception 
for certain public records); Fed. R. Evid. 804(a)(l) (witness unavailable 
when exempted from testifying on ground of privilege); Fed. R. Evid. 
804(b)(l) (former testimony admissible when witness unavailable and the 
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tion that the Government did not intend to immunize, or for 
the deponent to give responses that may fall outside of the 
grant of immunity and later be used against him in a subse-
quent criminal prosecution, petitioners argue that Conboy's 
deposition will yield only a carbon copy of the grand-jury 
transcript. In such a situation, it would be desirable for civil 
plaintiffs, particularly those bringing private suits that sup-
plement the criminal enforcement of the federal antitrust 
laws, to have access to the available, probative information. 
But even if the direct examination is limited to the ques-
tions and answers in the immunized transcript, there remains 
I the right of cross examination, 11 a right traditionally relied 
upon expansively to test credibility as well as to seek the 
truth. Petitioners recognize this problem, but maintain that 
the antitrust defendants ''would be entitled to test the accu-
racy and truthfulness of Conboy's repeated immunized testi-
mony without going beyond the confines of that testimony." 
Regardless of any limitations that may be imposed on its 
I scope, 17 however, cross examination is intended to and 'Often 
will produce information not elicited on direct. We must as-
sume that, to produce admissible evidence, the scope of cross 
examination at the deposition cannot easily be limited to the 
I 11 Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(l) (stating that depositions may be taken "if 
the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discov-
ery of admissible evidence"); Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(c) (allowing cross examina-
tion at depositions); Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a) (deposition "admissible under the 
rules of evidence applied as though the witness were then present and tes-
tifying"); Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(l) (deposition admissible if the party against 
whom the testimony is now offered in a civil action had an opportunity to 
develop testimony by cross examination). 
I "See United St,ates v. Cardillo, 316 F. 2d 606, 611 (CA21963) (in deter-
mining whether testimony of a witness who invokes the privilege during 
cross examination may be used against defendant, court draws a distinc-
tion between cases in which the assertion of the privilege merely precludes 
inquiry into collateral matters that bear on credibility of witnesses and 
those in which assertion prevents inquiry into matters about which witness 
testified on direct). 
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immunized testimony. This assumption implicates both the 
Government's and the individual's interests embodied in 
§6002. 
B 
Use immunity was intended to immwrize and exclude from 
a subsequent criminal trial only that information to which the 
Government expressly has surrendered future use. If the 
Government is engaged in an ongoing investigation of the 
particular activity at issue, immunizing new information 
(e.g., the answers to questions in a case like this one) may 
make it more difficult to show in a subsequent prosecution 
that similar information was obtained from wholly independ- • ,. 
ent sources. If a District CourtG were to conclude in a sub-
sequent civil proceeding that the scope of the prior grant of 
immunity included civil deposition testimony closely tracking 
immunized testimony, it in effect could invest the deponent 
with transactional immunity on matters about which he testi-
fied at the immunized proceedings. This is precisely the 
kind of immunity Congress intended to prohibit. The pur-
pose of § 6002 was to limit the scope of immunity to the level 
that is constitutionally required, as well as to limit the use of 
. immunity to those cases in which the Attorney General, or 
officials designated by him, determine that gaining the 
witness's testimony outweighs the loss of the opportunity for 
I criminal prosecution of "that witness. 18 
I 11 We need not decide whether United States Attorneys, when desig-
nated by the Attorney General, presently have authority to immunize the 
testimony of a witness in a civil proceeding when the Government deter-
mines that the public interest would be served. Cf. 18 U. S. C. § 6002 
(can compel testimony "[w]henever a witness refuses" to testify "in a pro-
ceeding before or ancillary to ... a court ... of the United State,"); id., 
§ 6003 (may compel testimony Government believes "may be necessary to 
the public interest"); 116 Cong. Rec. 36,293 (1970) (statement of Sen. 
Hruska) (reading § 6002 as "enabl[ing] the Government in any court . . . 
proceeding" to compel testimony) (emphasis added); 116 Cong. Rec. 853 
(1970) (statement of Sen. Young) ("[T]he power of the district attorney to 
12 
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C 
Petitioners' interpretation of § 6002 also places substantial 
risks on the deponent. Unless the grant of immunity as-
sures a witness that his incriminating testimony will not be 
used against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution, the 
witness has not received the certain protection of his Fifth 
Amendment privilege that he has been forced to exchange. 
No court has authority to immunize a witness. That respon-
sibility, as we have noted, is peculiarly an executive one, and 
only the Attorney General or a designated officer of the De-
partment of Justice has authority to grant use immunity. I See 18 U.S. C. §§6002, 6003. Nor should a court, at the 
time of the civil testimony, pre-determine the decision of the 
court in a subsequent criminal prosecution on the question 
whether the Government has met its burden of proving ''that 
the evidence it proposes to use i;B derived from a legitimate 
source wholly independent of the compelled testimony." 
Kastigar, 406 U. S., at 460. Yet in holding Conboy in con-
tempt for his Fifth Amendment silence, the District Court 
below essentially predicted that a court in any future criminal 
prosecution of Conboy will be obligated to protect against 
evidentiary use of the deposition testimony petitioners seek. I We do not think such a predictive judgment is enough. 19 As 
the Court stated in Maness v. Meyers, 419 U. S. 449 (1975), 
compel a witness to testify is. . . . apparently available in any case in a fed-
eral court, including civil actions between private parties.") (quoting from 
a memorandum prepared by the American Civil Liberties Union). If this 
authority exists, it could resolve the problem here presented in many civil 
cases in which the immunity issue is raised. 
19 It is unnecessary to speculate whether wrongfully compelled evidence 
might be excluded in a subsequent criminal trial of the deponent. Cf. 
Manus v. Myers, 419 U. S. 449, 474-475 (1975) (WHITE, J., concurring in 
the result). We refer to the use of an exclusionary rule in such a trial only 
to make clear that the District Court's compulsion order in this case cannot 
be justified retroactively by the subsequent exclusion of the compelled 
testimony. 
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compelling a witness to testify in "reliance upon a later 
!
objection or motion to suppress would 'let the cat out' with no 
assurance whatever of putting it back." Id., at 463. We be-
lieve Conboy acted properly in maintaining his silence in the 
l
face of the District Court's compulsion order and by testing 
the validity of his privilege on appeal . ., 
IV 
This Court has emphasized the importance of the private 
action as a means of furthering the policy goals of certain fed-
eral regulatory statutes, including the federal antitrust laws. 
See, e.g., Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parls 
Corp., 392 U. S. 134, 139 (1968); United States v. Borden 
Co., 347 U. S. 514, 518-519 (1954). But private civil actions 
• JUSTICE BLACKMUN's opinion concurring in the judgment applies the 
"fruits" doctrine "to the facts of this case" and concludes that, if Conboy 
had testified, his deposition would be "an independent act of free will." 
Post, at 7, 8. We do not think that this analysis adequately explains the 
holding in this case: that courts may not compel testimony over the asser-
tion of a valid Fifth Amendment privilege, in the absence of an operative 
grant of immunity under § 6002. The issue presented is whether the prior 
grant of immunity would have immunized Conboy's deposition answers. 
If it would not, Conboy could not properly be compelled to speak; if, how-
ever, the original immunity continued to be effective, Conboy had a duty to 
testify. JUSTICE BLACKMUN's analysis appears to assume that Conboy 
had a right to remain silent at the deposition, see post, at 7, which by defi-
nition assumes that there is no immunity. This assumption would make it 
unnecessary to address petitioners' principal argument that the prior grant 
of immunity already had supplanted Conboy's Fifth Amendment privilege. 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN's opinion in fact addresses a situation not present in 
this case: He discusses the "fruits" doctrine where a witness's testimony at 
a deposition is "an independent act of free will", i.e., is knowingly and vol-
untarily given in the absence of any compulsion by the court. Justice 
Blackmun concludes that "had Conboy answered the deposition questions 
[as 'an independent act of free will'), his testimony would not have been 
protected by the original immunity grant ... ". Post, at 8. Although 
there may be no reason to disagree with this hypothetical, it is not pre-
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can only supplement, not supplant, the primary responsibil-
ity of Government. Petitioners' proposed construction of 
§ 6002 sweeps further than Congress intended and could hin-
der governmental enforcement of its criminal laws by turning 
use immunity into a form of transactional immunity for sub-
jects examined in the immunized proceeding. It also puts 
the deponent in some danger of criminal prosecution unless 
he receives an assurance of immunity or exclusion that the 
courts cannot properly give. Silence, on the other hand, 
preserves the deponent's rights and the Government's inter-
ests, as well as the judicial resources that otherwise would be 
required to make the many difficult judgments that petition- . 
ers' interpretation of § 6002 would require. 
V 
We hold that a deponent's civil deposition testimony, 
closely tracking his prior immunized testimony, is not, with-
out duly authorized assurance of immunity at the time, im-
mUlll;Zed testimony within the meaning of § 6002, and there-
fore may not be compelled over a valid assertion of his Fifth 
Amendment privilege. The judgment of the Court of Ap-
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Pursuant to the federal use immunity provisions, 18 
U. S. C. §§ 6001--6005 (1976), a United States Attorney may 
request an order from a federal court compelling a witness to 
testify even though he has asserted his privilege against self-
incrimination. Section 6002 provides, however, that "notes-
timony or other infonnation compelled under the order (or 
any information directly or indirectly derived from such testi-
mony or other infonnation) may be used against the witness 
in any criminal case .... " The issue presented in this case is 
whether a deponent's civil deposition testimony, repeating 
verbatim or closely tracking his prior immunized testimony, 
is immunized "information" that can be compelled over the 
valid assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege. 
I 
Respondent John Conboy is a former executive of a def end-
ant in the In re Corrugated Container AntitTIU3t Litigation, 
M.D.L. 310 (S.D. Tex.). 1n January 1978, United States · 
Department of Justice attorneys interviewed Conboy follow-
ing a promise of use immunity. Conboy subsequently ap-
peared before a grand jury investigating price-fixing activi-
ties and, pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 6002, was granted formal 
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. Following the criminal indictment of several companies, 
numerous civil antitrust actions were filed in various United 
States district courts. Those actions were consolidated for 
discovery in the District Court for the Southern District of 
Texas. Petitioners here are purchasers of corrugated con-
tainers who elected to opt out of the class-action proceedings 
and pursue their own causes of action against manufacturers. 
The District Court ordered that portions of the immunized 
government interview and grand-jury testimony of certain 
witnesses, including that of Conboy, be made available to 
lawyers for the class and opt-outs. 1 
Pursuant to a subpoena issued by the District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois, Conboy appeared in Chicago for 
a deposition at which he, his counsel, and petitioners' counsel 
had copies of his immunized testimony. The transcripts 
were marked as deposition exhibits so that all could follow 
the intended examination. The questioning fell into the fol-
lowing pattern: a question was read from the transcript; it 
then was rephrased to include the transcript answer (i. e., 
"Is it not the fact that .... "); finally, Conboy was asked if u 
he had "so testified" in his immunized interview and grand- .,.. 
jury examination. 1 Conboy refused to answer each que~ 
tion, asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege against ;, j 
incrimination. · ~
The District Court granted petitioners' motion to compeQ . 
1 The propriety of the District Court's release of grand jury materials to 
the civil parties is not before the Court. 
~ xample of this three-question pattern is as follows: 
" Q. t;who did you have price communications with at Alton Box Board?" 
~ - ---.... r0,: - · • 
c' . Q.\Js it not the fact that you had price communications with Fred 
Renshaw and Dick Herman ... ·? · 
Q.(J>id you not so testify in your government interview of January 10, 
1978 
Joint Appendix 29-31. 
.r 
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Conboy to answer the questions.• When Conboy continued 
to claim his privilege, the District Court held him in con-
tempt, but stayed its order pending appeal. A panel of. the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the con-
tempt order, holding that, "[b]ecause the questions asked in 
this deposition were taken verbatim from or closely tracked 
the transcript of Conboy's grand jury testimony, we believe 
that his answers at the deposition would be 'de'rived from' the 
prior immunized [testimony] and therefore unavailable for 
use in any subsequent criminal prosecution." In re Corru- , 
gated / C oni,ainer / Antitrust / Litigation, / Appeal I of /,f ohn S 
Conboy, 655 F. 2d 748, 751 (CA7), rev'd en bane, 661 F. 2d 
1145 (1981). 
On rehearing en bane, the Court of Appeals reversed the 
District Court. It first determined that Conboy's alleged 
fear of prosecution was more than ''fanciful," 661 F. 2d, at 
1152, and that Conboy therefore was entitled to assert his 
Fifth Amendment privilege unless his deposition testimony 
could not be used against him in a subsequent criminal action, 
see id., at 1153.' The court then held that under § 6002, ab-
sent a separate and independent grant of immu.nity,6 a depo-
. nent's civil deposition testimony that repeats verbatim or 
closely tracks his prior immunized testimony is not protected. 
While aclmowledging that verbatim questions "of course 
[would be] derived" from the immunized testimony, the court 
reasoned that the answers to such questions "are derived 
from the deponent's current, independent memory of events" 
1 Chief Judge John V. Singleton, Jr. of the District Court for the South-
ern District of Texas expressly exercised the powers of the District Court 
for the Northern District of Illinois pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1407(b). The 
contempt bearing was conducted by telephone with his chambers in 
Houston. 
'The correctness of the Court of Appeal.s' conclusion that Conboy could 
assert a Fifth Amendment privilege, absent some immunity, is not before 
UB. 
'A United States Attorney declined to authorize immunity grants in 
connection with the civil depositions here. 
4 
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and thus "necessarily create a new source of evidence" that 
could be used in a subsequent criminal prosecution against 
Conboy. Id., at 1155 (emphasis in original). 
We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict in the Courts 
of Appeals,' and now affirm. 
II 
It is settled that government must have the power to com-
pel testimony "to secure inf onnation necessary for effective 
law enforcement." Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 
U. S. 52, 79 (1964).7 For many years, however, a person 
who was compelled to testify under a grant of governmental 
immunity could not be prosecuted for any conduct about 
which he had testified. See New Jersey v: Portash, 440 
U. S. 450,457 (1979). Prosecutors therefore were reluctant 
to grant such 'transactional" immunity to potential targets 
of criminal investigations. See S. Rep. No. 91-617, p. 53 
(1969). 
The ''major purpose" of the Organized Crime Control Act 
of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 927, of which§ 6002 was 
a key provision, was "to provide the criminal justice system 
with the necessary legal tools to ... strengthe[n] the evi-
dence gathering process and insur[e] that the evidence will ~ 
then be available and admissible at trial." 116 Cong. Rec. ~ 1-
35,200 (1970) (statement of Rep. St. Germain). Congress J 
• Compare In re Corrugate,d Container Antitrust Litigation, Appeal of 
FleuJchacker, 644 F. 2d 70, 75 (CA2 1981) (deposition answers immunized), 
and Little Rock School District v. Borden, Inc., 632 F. 2d 700, 705 (CAB 
1980) (same), with In re Corrugated Container Anti-Trust Litigation, Ap-
peal of Franey, 620 F. 2d 1086, 1095 (CA5 1980) (answers not immunized), 
cert. denied, 449 U. S. 1102 (1981). 
'See United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 345 (1974); United States 
v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 41 (1973) (MARsHALL, J., dissenting); Kastigar v. 
United States, 406 U. S. 441, 443--444 (1973); Murphy, 378 U. S., at 93-94 
(WHITE, J., concurring); Bl,ackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421, 438 
(1932); Blair v. United States, 250 U. S. 273, 281 (1919); Brown v. Walker, 
161 u. s. 591, 600 (1896). 
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sought to make the grant of immunity more useful for law en-
forcement officers through two specific changes. First, Con-
gress made the grant of immunity less expansive 8 by re-
pealing the authority for transactional immunity and provid-
ing for the less comprehensive use immunity authoriz~ d in 
§ 6002. • / Second, 1Congress ,, gave -certain /4f:ficials/ in the 
Department / Of I.Justice 10 ;exclusive / authority / to grant 
immunities. 11 
'In Murphy, JUSTICE WHITE s·tated that "[i}mmunity mUBt be as broad 
as, but not harmfully and wastefully broader than, the privilege against 
self-incrimination." 378 U. S., at 107 (concurring opinion) (quoted with 
approval in 116 Cong. Rec. 35,291 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff)). In its 
committee report, the HoUBe explained that § 6002 was not to provide an 
"immunity bath," but was to be "no broader than" the Fifth Amendment 
privilege. ·H.R. No. 91-1549, p. 5 (1970). 
• Section 6002 provides: 
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-
incrimin.ation, to testify or provide other i;nformation in a proceeding be-
fore or ancillary to-
(1) a court or grand jury of the United States, 
(2) an agency of the United States, or 
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses, or a 
committee or a subcommittee of either House 
and the person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the witness 
an order issued under this part, the witness may not refuse to comply with 
the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but notes-
timony or other infonnation compelled under the order (or any infonnation 
directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) 
may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution 
for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with 
the order. 
Section 6001(2) defines "other information" to include "any book, paper, 
document, record, recording, or other material." 
1
• Section 6003 states: 
(a) In the case of any individual who has been or may be called to testify 
or provide other information at any proceeding before or ancillary to a 
court of the United States or a grand jury of the United States, the United 
States district court for the judicial district in which the proceeding is or 
may be held shall issue, in accordance with subsection (b) of this section, 
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The Court upheld the constitutionality of the use immunity 
statute in Kastigar v. United States, 406 U. S. 441 (1972). 
The power to compel testimony is limited by the Fifth 
Amendment, and we held that any grant of immunity must 
be co-extensive with the privilege. We were satisfied, how-
ever, that § 6002 provided this measure of protection and 
thus "removed the dangers against which the privilege pro-
tects." Id., at 449. In rejecting the argument that use and 
derivative-use immunity would not adequately protect a wit-
ness from various incriminating uses of the .compelled t esti-
mony, we emphasized that "[t]he statute provides a sweeping 
proscription of any use, direct or indirect, of the compelled 
testimony and any information derived therefrom ... }'. Id., 
at 460. We added that once a defendant establishes that he 
has testified under a grant of immunity, "the prosecution 
[has] the affinnative duty to prove that the evidence it pro-
poses to use is derived from a legitimate source wholly inde-
pendent of the compelled testimony." lbui. Thus, "immu-
nity from use and derivative use 'leaves the witness and the 
Federal Government in substantially the same position as if 
the witness had claimed his privilege' in the absence of a 
grant of immunity." Kastigar, 406 U. S. , at 458-459 (quot-
ing Murphy, 378 U. S., at 79). 
upon the request of the United States attorney for such district, an order 
requiring such individual to give testimony or provide other information 
which he refuses to give or provide on the basis of his privilege against self-
incrimination, such order to become effective as provided in section 6002 of 
this part. 
(b) A United States attorney may, with the approval of the Attorney 
G€neral, the Deputy Attorney G€neral, or any designated Assistant Attor-
ney General, request an order under subsection (a) of this section when in 
his judgment-
(!) the testimony or other information from such individual may be nec-
essary to the public interest; and 
(2) such individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide 
other information on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination. 
11 Congress foresaw the courts as playing only a minor role in the immu-
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III 
7 
With the foregoing statutory history and relevant princi- / 
ples in mind, we turn now to this case. It is not disputed V 
that the qv.estions asked of Conboy were directly or in~ ·-
rectly derived from his immunized testimony. The issue 18 
whether the causal connection between the questions and lie 
answers is so direct that the answers also are derived from 
that testimony and therefore should be excluded under the 
grant of immunity. 
Petitioners' argument is based on the language of § 6002 
and on a common understanding of the words "derived from." 
The questions formulated on the basis of immunized testi-
mony are clearly "derived from" the prior testimony. Thus, 
the answers that repeat verbatim or closely track a depo-
nent's testimony are necessarily also "derived from" and 
"tainted by'' such testimony. Petitioners therefore find no 
basis for the distinction made by the Court of Appeals be-
tween questions and answers responsive to those same ques-
tions. An answer by its very nature is evoked by and re-
sponds t o information contained in a que~tion. 
Conboy's position is also straightforward: Questions do not 
incriminate; answers do. Unlike the questions, answers are 
not directly or indirectly der ived from the immunized grand 
. jury or interview transcripts, but from the deponent's cur-
rent, independent memory of events. E ven when a depo-
nent's deposition answers are identical to those he gave to '!L.. 
the grand jury, he is under oath to tell the truth, not neces- ~ r-
sarily as he told it before the grand jury, but as he lmows it ~ 
now. Each new statement of the deponent creates a new l -
facts on which the order is predicated." H.R. Rep. No. 91-1549, supra 
note 8, at 43; H.R. Rep. No. 91-1188, p. 13 (1970). See 116 Cong. Rec. 
35,291 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff). Cf. President's Commission on 
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime 
in a Free Society 141 (1967) (recommending that "[i]mmunity should be 
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"source." In sum, the initial grant of immunity does not pre-
vent the prosecutor from prosecuting; it merely J.imjts his 
sources of evid 
Before accepting either party's argument, we think it nec-
'essary to consider which of the contending views more sat-
isfactorily protects both the Government's need for admissi-
ble evidence and the individual's interest in avoiding self 
incrintlnation. In this case there also is the interest-recog-
~A 
/ 
nized as important-in obtainin admissible evidence in a 
civil antitrust suit. AWe note at t e outset that although 141 W 
t ere may be practical reasons for not testifying,;t' as far as I\ A 
the deponent's Fifth Amendment · right is concerned he 
should be indifferent between the protection afforded by si-
lence and that afforded by immunity. A deponent's primary 
interest is that the protection be certain. The Government's 
interest, however, may be affected seriously by whether the 
✓ 
✓ 
deponent relies at the civil deposition on his Fifth Amend-
ment privilege or on his prior grant of immunity. With due ✓ 
recognition of petitioners' need for admissible evidence, our . . . 
inquiry then is whether this need can be met withou~~oat o.. -Jc.ovoX.½W"CO{ 
~ efl:i:n~ the Government's interest in limiting the scope of an /\ ' \ 
✓ 
J 
immunity grant or encroaching upon the deponent's certainty 
of protection. 
A 
Questions taken verbatim from a transcript of immunized 
testimony could evoke one of several responses from a depo- •~ 
nent: (i) he could repeat or adopt his immunized answer; ~ /\ 
(ii) he could affirni · that the transcript of his immunized an-
swers accurately reflects his prior testimony; (iii) he could reA 
'4- !"Besides the costs of testifying against close associates, any witness in-
creases the risk of committing perjury the more he talks. Cf. 18 U. S. C. 
§ 6002 (perjiµ-ed testimony not immunized). 
15 ;IToe extreme case would be where petitioners read the entire immu-
nized grand-jury trarulcript; then ask the witness if that is his testimony; 
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call additional information responsive to the question but not 
disclosed in his immune testimony; or (iv) he could disclose 
information that is not responsive to the question. Petition-
ers do not contend, nor could they, that the prior grant of use 
immunity affords protection for all self-incriminating in-
formation disclosed by the immunized witness on any occa-
sion after the giving of the immunized testimony. Rather, 
petitioners argue that only the first three responses would be 
"derived from" his immune testimony and therefore would be 
unavailable for use against the deponent in any subsequent 
criminal prosecution. ✓ 
Petitioners' premise is that the deposition of Conboy is de-
signed not t o discover new information, -,t but to obtain evi- ~ 
dence that simply repeats the statements in the immunized 
transcript.Jid' Because there will be little opportunity for the 1 
grant of immunity to sweep in statements on direct exa~ 
J t -"'Direct examination may not be as limited as petitioners assume. The 
District Court's civil contempt order stated that the questions asked in the 
deposition "were taken directly" from the immunized transcripts , but did 
not define exactly what deposition questions petitioners could ask. Other 
Courts of Appeals have permitted direct questioning to go beyond mere 
restatements of the prior testimony. See In re Corrugated Container 
Antitrust Litigati.on, A ppeal of Flei.schacker, 644 F. 2d 70, 79 (CA2 1981) 
(compelling answers to questions "concerning specific subj ects that actu-
ally were touched upon by questions appearing in the transcript of the im- , / 
munized testimony"); Little Rock S chool District v. Barden, Inc., 632 F. 2d V 
700, 705 (CAB 1980) (compelling answers as long as deposition questions 
confined to • ihe same time, g,ographical and substantive frame work as ~~~ 
the [witness' immunized) grand jury testimoni, ") (guotin~ Appeaf ff ~ (' • ~~nlS 
Starkey, 600 F. 2d 1043, 1048 (CAB 1979)). Jk ~ ey. ea op~ °t c::,l. l ~ c ..n n• '/For purposes of this case, we assume that the grand Jury transcripts ma~ ~ uicL 
are inadmissible as evidence in a civil trial because the testimony is not -W ~ 
subject to cross examination. Cf. Fed. R. Evid. 803(8) (hearsay exception ~
for certain public records); Fed. R. Evid. 804(a)(l) (witness unavailable ~ ' 
when exempted from testifying on ground of privilege); Fed. R. Evid. 
804(b)(l) (former testimony admissible when v.itness unavailable and the ~ ~ 
party against whom the testimony is now offered had an opportunity for t\ • • .L_ II 
cross examination). ~~ .:JJltt.JR) . 
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tion that the Government did not' intend to immunize, or for 
the deponent to give responses that may fall outside of the 
grant of immunity and later be used against him in a subse-
quent criminal prosecution, petitioners argue that Conboy's 
deposition will yield only a carbon copy of the grand-jury 
transcript. In such a situation, it would be desirable for civil 
plaintiffs, particularly those bringing private suits that sup-
plement the criminal enforcement of the federal antitrust ~ 
laws, to have access to the available, probative information.] 
But even if the direct examination is limited to the ques- / 
tions and answers in the immunized transcript, there remains 
8 the right of cross examination,>< a right traditionally relied 1 
upon expansively to test credibility as well as to seek the 
truth. Petitioners recognize this problem, but maintain that 
the antitrust defendants "would be entitled to test the accu-
racy and truthfulness of Conboy's repeated immunized testi-
J 
mony without going beyond the confines of that testimony." 
Regardless of any limitations that may be imposed on its 
'' scope;~' however, cross examination is intended to and -often 
will produce information not elicited on direct. We must as-
sume that, to produce admissible evidence, the scope of cross 
examination at the deposition cannot easily be limited to the 
I~ / Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(l) (stating that depositions may be taken "if 
the infonnation sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discov-
ery of admissible evidence"); Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(c) (allowing cross examina-
tion at depositions); Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a) (deposition "admissible under the 
rules of evidence applied as though the witness were then present and tes-
tifying"); Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(l) (deposition admissible if the party against 
whom the testimony is now offered in a civil action had an opportunity to 
develop testimony by cross examination). 
19 ~ See United States v. Cardillo, 316 F. 2d 606, 611(CA21%3) (in deter-
mining whether testimony of a witness who invokes the privilege during 
cross examination may be used against defendant, court draws a distinc-
tion between cases in which the assertion of the privilege merely precludes 
inquiry into collateral matters that bear on credibility of witnesses and 
those in which assertion prevents inquiry into matters about which witness 
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immunized testimony. This assumption implicates both the 
Government's and the individual's interests embodied in 
§ 6002. 
B 
Use immunity was intended to immunize and exclude from 
a subsequent criminal trial only that information to which the 
Government expressly has surrendered future use. If the 
Government is engaged in an ongoing investigation of the 
particular activity at issue, immunizing new information 
(e.g., the answers to questions in a case like this one) may / 
make it more difficult to show in a subsequent prosecution 
that similar information was obtained from wholly independ- ,, , 
· ent sources. If a District CourtG were to conclude in a sub-
sequent civil proceeding that the scope of the prior grant of 
immunity included civil deposition testimony closely tracking 
immunized testimony, it in effect could invest the deponent 
with transactional immunity on matters about which he testi-
fied at the immunized proceedings. This is precisely the 
kind of immunity Congress intended to prohibit. The pur-
pose of § 6002 was to limit the scope of immunity to the level 
that is constitutionally required, as well as to limit the use of 
immunity to those cases in which the Attorney General, or / 
officials designated by him, determine that gaLning the 
witness's testimony outweighs the loss of the opportunity for 
criininal prosecution of ·that 'Witness.a 2.o 
ao J'We need not decide whether United States Attorneys, when desig-
nated by the Attorney General, presently have authority to immunize the 
testimony of a witness in a civil proceeding when the Governm -
mines that the public interest would be served. Cf. 18 U. S. C. § 6002 
(can compe s unony "[w]henever a witness r efuses" to testify "in a pro-
ceeding before or ancillary to ... a court ... of the United State,"); i.d., 
§ 6003 (may compel testimony Government believee "may be necessary to 
the public interest"); 116 Cong. Rec. 36,293 (1970) (statement of Sen. 
Hruska) (reading § 6002 as "enabl[ing) the Government in any court ... 
proceeding" to compel testimony) (emphasis added); 116 Cong. Rec. 853 
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C 
Petitioners' interpretation of § 6002 also places substantial 
risks on the deponent. Unless the grant of immunity as-
sures a witness that his incr iminating testimony will not be 
used against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution, the 
witness has not received the certain protection of his Fifth 
Amendment privilege that he has been force~ to exchange. 
No court has authority to immunize a witness. That respon-
sibility, as we have noted, is peculiarly an executive one, and 
only the Attorney General or a designated officer of the De-
partment of J ustice has authority to grant use immunity. 
See 18 U.S. C. §§6002, 6003. Nor should a court, at the 
time of the civil testimony, pre-determine the decision of the 
court in a subsequent criminal prosecution on the question 
whether the Government has met its burden of proving "that 
the evidence it proposes to use i:8 derived from a legitimate 
source wholly independent of the compelled testimony." 
Kastigar, 406 U. S., at 460. Yet in holding Conboy in con-
tempt for his Fifth Amendment silence, the District Court 
below essentially predicted that a court in any future criminal 
prosecution of Conboy will be obligated to protect against / 
evidentiary use of the deposition t estimony petitioners seek. 
We do not think such a predictive judgment is enough:' As .a.I ~ 
the Court stated in .Maness v. Meyers, 419 U. S. 449 (1975)0 ......--- ( -
(2__ ✓ compel a witness to testify is . •.• apparently available in any case in a fed-
eral court, including civil actions between private parties.") (quoting from 
a memorandum prepared by the American Civil Liberties Union). If this 
author ity exists, it could resolve the problem here presented in many civil 
cases in which the immuni issue is raised. 
al is un."lecessary to spe 1 te w e r 'iTTDngfully compelled e\idence 
" might be excluded in a subsequent criminal trial of the deponent . Cf. 
Maness v. Myers, 419 U. S. 449, 474--475 (1975) (WHITE, J., concurring in 
the result). We refer to the use of an exclusionary rule in such a trial only 
to make clear that the District Court's compulsion order in this case cannot 
be justified retroactively by the subsequent exclusion of the compelled 
testimony. 
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compelling a witness to testify in "reliance upon a later 
objection or motion to suppress would 'let the cat out' with no 
assurance whatever of putting it back." Id., at 463. We be-
lieve Conboy acted properly in maintaining his silence in the 
!
face of the District Court's compulsion order and by testing 
the validity of his pr ivilege on appeal.f911:' 
IV 
This Court has emphasized the importance of the private 
action as a means of furthering the policy goals of certain fed-
eral regulatory statutes, including the federal antitrust laws. 
See, e.g., Penna Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts 
Corp., 392 U. S. 134, 139 (1968); United States v. Borden 
Co., 347 U. S. 514, 518-519 (1954). But private civil actions 
~ USTICE BLACKMUN's opinion concurring in the judgment applies the 
"fruits" doctrine "to the facts of this case" and concludes that, if Conboy 
had testified, his deposition would be "an independent act of free will." 
Post, at 7, 8. We do not think that this analysis adequately explains the 
holding in this case: that courts may not compel testimony over the asser-
. tion of a valid Fifth Amendment privilege, in the absence of an operative 
grant of immunity under § 6002. The issue presented is whether the prior 
grant of immunity would have immunized Conboy's deposition answers. 
If it would not, Conboy could not properly be compelled to speak; if, how-
ever, the original immunity continued to be effective, Conboy had a duty to 
testify. JUSTICE BLACKMUN's analysis appears to assume that Conboy 
had a right to remain silent at the deposition, see post, at 7, which by defi-
nition assumes that there is no immunity. This assumption would make it 
unnecessary to address petitioners' principal argument that the prior grant 
of immunity already had supplanted Conboy's Fifth Amendment privilege. 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN's opinion in fact addresses a situation not present in 
this case: He discusses the "fruits" doctrine where a witness's testimony at 
a deposition is "an independent act of free will", i. e., is knowingly and vol-
untarily given in the absence of any compulsion by the court. Justice 
Blackmun concludes that "had Conboy answered the deposition questions 
[as 'an independent act of free will'], his testimony would not have been 
protected by the original immunity grant ... ". Post, at 8. Although 
there may be no reason to disagree with this hypothetical, it is not pre-
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can only supplement, not supplant, the primary responsibil-
ity of Government. Petitioners' proposed construction of 
§ 6002 sweeps further than Congress intended and could hin-
der governmental enforcement of its criminal laws by turning 
_ use immunity into a form of transactional immunity for sub-
jects examined in the immunized proceeding. It also puts 
the deponent in some danger of criminal prosecution unless 
he receives an assurance of immunity or exclusion that the 
courts cannot properly give. Silence, on the other hand, 
preserves the deponent's rights and the Government's inter-
ests, as well as the judicial resources that otherwise would be 
required to make the many difficult judgments that petition- . 
ers' interpretation of § 6002 would require. ~~ 
V 
I We hold that a deponent's civil deposition testimony, 
1 closely tracking his prior immunized testimony, is not, with-
1 out duly authorized assurance of immunity at the time, im-
1 mlllll;Zed testimony within the meaning of § 6002, and there-
fore may not be compelled over a valid assertion of his Fifth 
Amendment privilege. The judgment of the Court of Ap-
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Pursuant to the federal use immunity provisions, 18 
U. S. C. §§ 6001-6005 (1976), a United States Attorney may 
request an order from a federal court compelling a witness to 
testify even though he has asserted his privilege against self-
incrimination. Section 6002 provides, however, that "notes-
timony or other information compelled under the order ( or 
any information directly or indirectly derived from such testi-
mony or other information) may be used against the witness 
in any criminal case. . . . " The issue presented in this case is 
whether a deponent's civil deposition testimony, repeating 
verbatim or closely tracking his prior immunized testimony, 
is immunized "information" that can be compelled over the 
valid assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege. 
I 
Respondent John Conboy is a former executive of a defend-
ant in the In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 
M.D.L. 310 (S.D. Tex.). In January 1978, United States 
Department of Justice attorneys interviewed Conboy follow-
ing a promise of use immunity. Conboy subsequently ap-
peared before a grand jury investigating price-fixing activi-
ties and, pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 6002, was granted formal 
use immunity for his testimony. 
2 
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Following the criminal indictment of several companies, 
numerous civil antitrust actions were filed in various United 
States district courts. Those actions were consolidated for 
discovery in the District Court for the Southern District of 
Texas. Petitioners here are purchasers of corrugated c_on-
tainers who elected to opt out of the class-action proceedings 
and pursue their own causes of action against manufacturers. 
The District Court ordered that portions of the immunized 
government interview and grand-jury testimony of certain 
witnesses, including that of Conboy, be made available to 
lawyers for the class and opt-outs. 1 
Pursuant to a subpoena issued by the District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois, Conboy appeared in Chicago for 
a deposition at which he, his counsel, and petitioners' counsel 
had copies of his immunized testimony. The transcripts 
were marked as deposition exhibits so that all could follow 
the intended examination. The questioning fell into the fol-
lowing pattern: a question was read from the transcript; it 
then was rephrased to include the transcript answer (i. e., 
"Is it not the fact that .... "); finally, Conboy was asked if 
he had "so testified" in his immunized interview and grand-
jury examination. 2 Conboy refused to answer each ques-
tion, asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. 
The District Court granted petitioners' motion to compel 
1 The propriety of the District Court's release of grand jury materials to 
the civil parties is not before the Court. 
2 An example of this three-question pattern is as follows: 
Q. ''Who did you have price communications with at Alton Box Board?" 
Q. Is it not the fact that you had price communications with Fred 
Renshaw and Dick Herman ... ? 
Q. Did you not so testify in your government interview of January 10, 
1978? 
Joint Appendix 29-31. 
----- --- ------
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Conboy to answer the questions. 3 When Conboy continued 
to claim his privilege, the District Court held him in con-
tempt, but stayed its order pending appeal. A panel of the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed .the con-
tempt order, holding that, "[b ]ecause the questions asked in 
this deposition were taken verbatim from or closely tracked 
the transcript of Conboy's grand jury testimony, we believe 
that his answers at the deposition would be 'derived from' the 
prior immunized [testimony] and therefore unavailable for 
use in any subsequent criminal prosecution." In re C orru-
gated Container Antitrust Litigation, Appeal of John Con-
boy, 655 F. 2d 748, 751 (CA7), rev'd en bane, 661 F. 2d 1145 
(1981). 
On rehearing en bane, the Court of Appeals reversed the 
District Court. It first determined that Conboy's alleged 
fear of prosecution was more than "fanciful," 661 F. 2d, at 
1152, and that Conboy therefore was entitled to assert his 
Fifth Amendment privilege unless his deposition testim9ny 
could not be used against him in a subsequent criminal action, 
see id., at 1153. 4 The court then held that under § 6002, ab-
sent a separate and independent grant of immunity, 5 a depo-
nent's civil deposition testimony that repeats verbatim or 
closely tracks his prior immunized testimony is not protected. 
While acknowledging that verbatim questions "of course 
[would be] derived" from the immunized testimony, the court 
reasoned that the answers to such questions "are derived 
• Chief Judge John V. Singleton, Jr. of the District Court for the South-
ern District of Texas expressly exercised the powers of the District Court 
for the Northern District of Illinois pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1407(b). The 
contempt hearing was conducted by telephone with his chambers in 
Houston. 
• The correctness of the Court of Appeals' conclusion that Conboy could 
assert a Fifth Amendment privilege, absent some immunity, is not before· 
us. 
5 A United States Attorney declined to authorize immunity grants in 
connection with the civil depositions here. 
4 
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from the deponent's current, independent memory of events" 
and thus "necessarily create a new source of evidence" that 
could be used in a subsequent criminal prosecution against 
Conboy. Id. , at 1155 (emphasis in original). 
We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict in the Courts 
of Appeals,6 and now affirm. 
II 
It is settled that government must have the power to com-
pel testimony "to secure information necessary for effective 
law enforcement." Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 
U. S. 52, 79 (1964). 7 For many years, however, a person 
. who was compelled to testify under a grant of governmental 
immunity could not be prosecuted for any conduct about 
which he had testified. See New Jersey v. Portash, 440 
U. S. 450, 457 (1979). Prosecutors therefore were reluctant 
to grant such "transactional" immunity to potential targets 
of criminal investigations. See S. Rep. No. 91-617, p. 53 
(1969). 
The "major purpose" of the Organized Crime Control Act 
of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 927, of which §6002 was 
a key provision, was "to provide the criminal justice system 
with the necessary legal tools to . . . strengthe[n] the evi-
dence gathering process and insur[e] that the evidence will 
then be available and admissible at trial." 116 Cong. Rec. 
35,200 (1970) (statement of Rep. St. Germain). Congress 
6 Compare In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, Aweal of 
Fleischacker, 644 F. 2d 70, 75 (CA21981) (deposition answers immunized), 
and Little Rock School District v. Borden , Inc. , 632 F. 2d 700, 705 (CA8 
1980) (same), with In re Corrugated Container Anti-Trust Litigation, Ap-
peal of Franey, 620 F. 2d 1086, 1095 (CA51980) (answers not immunized), 
cert. denied, 449 U. S. 1102 (1981). 
1 See United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 345 (1974); United 
States v. Mara, 410 U. S. 19, 41 (1973) (MARSHALL, J. , dissenting); Kasti-
gar v. United States, 406 U. S. 441, 443--444 (1973); Murphy, 378 U. S. , at 
93-94 (WHITE, J ., concurring); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421, 
438 (1932); Blair v. United States, 250 U. S. 273, 281 (1919); Brown v. 
Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 600 (1896). 
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sought to make the grant of immunity more useful for law en-
forcement officers through two specific changes. First, Con-
gress made the grant of immunity less expansive 8 by re-
pealing the authority for transactional immunity and provid-
ing for the less comprehensive use immunity authorized 
in § 6002. 9 Second, Congress gave certain officials in 
the Department of Justice 10 exclusive authority to grant 
immunities. 11 
8 In Murphy, JUSTICE WmTE stated that "[i]mmunity must be as broad 
as, but not harmfully and wastefully broader than, the privilege against 
self-incrimination." 378 U. S., at 107 (concurring opinion) (quoted with 
approval in 116 Cong. Rec. 35,291 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff)). In its 
committee report, the House explained that § 6002 was not to provide an 
''immunity bath," but was to be "no broader than" the Fifth Amendment 
privilege. H.R. No. 91-1549, p. 5 (1970). 
9 Section 6002 provides: 
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-
incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding be-
fore or ancillary to--
(1) a court or grand jury of the United States, 
(2) an agency of the United States, or 
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses, or a 
committee or a subcommittee of either House 
and the person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the witness 
an order issued under this part, the witness may not refuse to comply with 
the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but notes-
timony or other information compelled under the order (or any information 
directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) 
may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution 
for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with 
the order. 
Section 6001(2) defines "other information" to include "any book, paper, 
document, record, recording, or other material." 
10 Section 6003 states: 
(a) In the case of any individual who has been or may be called to testify 
or provide other information at any proceeding before or ancillary to a 
court of the United States or a grand jury of the United States, the United 
States district court for the judicial district in which the proceeding is or 
may be held shall issue, in accordance with subsection (b) of this section, 
upon the request of the United States attorney for such district, an order 
[Footnote 11 continues on page 6] 
6 
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The Court upheld the constitutionality of the use immunity 
statute in Kastigar v. United States, 406 U. S. 441 (1972). 
The power to compel testimony is limited by the Fifth 
Amendment, and we held that any grant of immunity must 
be co-extensive with the privilege. We were satisfied, how-
ever, that § 6002 provided this measure of protection and 
thus "removed the dangers against which the privilege pro-
tects." Id., at 449. In rejecting the argument that use and 
derivative-use immunity would not adequately protect a wit-
ness from various incriminating uses of the compelled testi-
mony, we emphasized that "[t]he statute provides a sweeping 
proscription of any use, direct or indirect, of the compelled 
testimony and any information derived therefrom .... " Id., 
at 460. We added that once a defendant establishes that he 
has testified under a grant of immunity, "the prosecution 
[has] the affirmative duty to prove that the evidence it pro-
poses to use is derived from a legitimate source wholly inde-
pendent of the compelled testimony." Ibid. Thus, "immu-
nity from use and derivative use 'leaves the witness and the 
Federal Government in substantially the same position as if 
the witness had claimed his privilege' in the absence of a 
grant of immunity." Kastigar, 406 U. S., at 458--459 (quot-
ing Murphy, 378 U. S., at 79). 
requiring such individual to give testimony or provide other information 
which he refuses to give or provide on the basis of his privilege against self-
incrimination, such order to become effective as provided in section 6002 of 
this part. 
(b) A United States attorney may, with the approval of the Attorney 
General, the Deputy Attorney General, or any designated Assistant Attor-
ney General, request an order under subsection (a) of this section when in 
his judgment-
(!) the testimony or other information from such individual may be nec-
essary to the public interest; and 
(2) such individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide 
other information on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination. 
11 Congress foresaw the courts as playing only a minor role in the immu-
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7 
With the foregoing statutory history and relevant princi-
ples in mind, we turn now to this case. It is not disputed 
that the questions asked of Conboy were directly or indi-
rectly derived from his immunized testimony. The issue 
presented is whether the causal connection between the 
questions and the answers is so direct that the answers also 
are derived from that testimony and therefore should be ex-
cluded under the grant of immunity. 
Petitioners' argument is based on the language of § 6002 
and on a common understanding of the words "derived from." 
The questions formulated on the basis of immunized testi-
mony are clearly "derived from" the prior testimony. Thus, 
the answers that repeat verbatim or closely track a depo-
nent' s testimony are necessarily also "derived from" and 
"tainted by" such testimony. Petitioners therefore find no 
basis for the distinction made by the Court of Appeals be-
tween questions and answers responsive to those same ques-
tions. An answer by its very nature is evoked by and re-
sponds to information contained in a question. 
Conboy's position is also straightforward: Questions do not 
incriminate; answers do. Unlike the questions, answers are 
not directly or indirectly derived from tl~e immunized grand 
jury or interview transcripts, but from the deponent's cur-
rent, independent memory of events. Even when a depo-
nent's deposition answers are identical to those he gave to 
the grand jury, he is under oath to tell the truth, not neces-
nizing process: "The court's role in granting the order is merely to find the 
facts on which the order is predicated." H.R. Rep. No. 91-1549, supra 
note 8, at 43; H.R. Rep. No. 91-1188, p. 13 (1970). See 116 Cong. Rec. 
35,291 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff). Cf. President's Commission on 
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime 
in a Free Society 141 (1967) (recommending that "[i]mmunity should be 
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sarily as he told it before the grand jury, but as he knows it 
now. Each new statement of the deponent creates a new 
"source." In sum, the initial grant of immunity does not pre-
vent the prosecutor from prosecuting; it merely limits his 
sources of evidence. 
Although the parties make their arguments in terms track-
ing those of the statute-whether the deposition testimony is 
"derived from" the prior testimony-it is clear that the crux 
of their dispute is whether the earlier grant of immunity it-
self compelled Conboy to talk. 12 Petitioners contend that the 
prior grant of immunity already had supplanted Conboy's 
Fifth Amendment privilege at the time of the civil deposition. 
Petitioners would limit this immunity, of course, to testimony 
that "closely tracks" his prior immunized testimony. It is 
argued that this would not threaten the Government's need 
for admissible evidence or the individual's interest in avoid-
ing self-incrimination. In the absence of such a threat, ad-
missible evidence should be available to civil· antitrust plain-
tiffs. But we cannot accept the assumptions upon which 
petitioners' conclusion rests. In our view, a District Court 
cannot compel Conboy to answer deposition questions, over a 
valid assertion of his Fifth Amendment right, absent a duly 
authorized assurance of immunity at the time. 13 
We note at the outset that although there may be practical 
12 See Brief for Petitioners 19 ("Conboy had no Fifth Amendment privi-
lege to assert because of the coextensive protection provided by the immu-
nity statute."); Reply Brief for Petitioners 12 ("[R]equiring a witness to an-
swer questions a second time that were previously answered under a grant 
of immunity does not result in an expansion of the original immunity 
grant."). 
13 JuSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring in the Court's judgment, assumes 
that Conboy had a right to remain silent at the deposition, which by defini-
tion assumes the immunity order itself does not compel a witness to testify 
at a civil deposition. He discusses the "fruits" doctrine where a witness's 
testimony at a deposition is "an independent act of free will" and concludes 
that "had Conboy answered the deposition questions, his testimony would 
not have been protected by the original immunity grant .... " Post, at 8. 
Although there may well be no reason to disagree with this hypothetical, it 
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I reasons for not testifying, 14 as far as the deponent's Fifth 
Amendment right is concerned he should be indifferent be-
tween the protection afforded by silence and that afforded by 
immunity. A deponent's primary interest is that the protec-
tion be certain. The Government's interest, however, may 
be affected seriously by whether the deponent relies at the 
civil deposition on his Fifth Amendment privilege or on his 
prior grant of immunity. With due recognition of petition-
ers' need for admissible evidence, our inquiry then is whether 
I this need can be met without jeopardizing the Government's 
interest in limiting the scope of an immunity grant or en-
croaching upon the deponent's certainty of protection. 
A 
Questions taken verbatim from a transcript of immunized 
testimony could evoke one of several responses from a depo-
nent: (i) he could repeat or adopt his immunized answer; 15 
(ii) he could affirm that the transcript of his immunized an-
swers accurately reflects his prior testimony; (iii) he could re-
is not presented in this case. The issue is whether Conboy can be com-
pelled to testify-i. e., whether the immunity order itself compels him to 
track his prior testimony at the civil deposition-over the assertion of his 
Fifth Amendment rights. We therefore need not address situations 
where a witness mistakenly believes he is compelled to do so or does so for 
some other reason. 
As JUSTICE BLACKMUN's opinion makes a factual analysis under the 
fruits doctrine, it appears to leave open the possibility that the outcome in 
a subsequent criminal prosecution of the deponent may be different in a 
future case because of differences in the factual record. He nevertheless 
concludes, as do we, that District Courts are without power to compel a 
civil deponent to testify over a valid assertion of his Fifth Amendment 
right, absent a separate grant of immunity pursuant to § 6002. 
1
• Besides the costs of testifying against close associates, any witness in-
creases the risk of committing perjury the more he talks. Cf. 18 U. S. C. 
§ 6002 (perjured testimony not immunized). 
15 The extreme case would be where petitioners read the entire immu-
nized grand-jury transcript; then ask the witness if that is his testimony; 
and he answers simply "Yes." 
10 
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call additional information responsive to the question but not 
disclosed in his immune testimony; or (iv) he could disclose 
information that is not responsive to the question. Petition-
ers do not contend, nor could they, that the prior grant of use 
immunity affords protection for all self-incriminating in-
formation disclosed by the immunized witness on any occa-
sion after the giving of the immunized testimony. Rather, 
petitioners argue that only the first three responses would be 
"derived from" his immune testimony and therefore would be 
unavailable for use against the deponent in any subsequent 
criminal prosecution. 
Petitioners' premise is that the deposition of Conboy is de-
I signed not to discover new information, 16 but to obtain evi-
dence that simply repeats the statements in the immunized 
I transcript. 17 Because there will be little opportunity for the 
I 16 Direct examination may not be as limited as petitioners assume. The 
District Court's civil contempt order stated that the questions asked in the 
deposition "were taken directly" from the immunized transcripts, but did 
not define exactly what deposition questions petitioners could ask. Other 
Courts of Appeals have permitted direct questioning to go beyond mere 
restatements of the prior testimony. See In re Corrugated Container 
Antitrust Litigation, Appeal of Fleischacker, 644 F. 2d 70, 79 (CA2 1981) 
(compelling answers to questions "concerning specific subjects that actu-
ally were touched upon by questions appearing in the transcript of the im-
munized testimony''); Little Rock School District v. Borden, Inc., 632 F . 2d 
700, 705 (CA8 1980) (compelling answers as long as deposition questions 
confined to "'the same time, geographical and substantive frame work as 
the [ witness' immunized] grand jury testimony'") (quoting Appeal of 
I 
Starkey, 600 F. 2d 1043, 1048 (CA81979)). The dissenting opinion of JUS-
TICE STEVENS apparently would permit questioning until "the inquiry 
threatened to exceed proper limits." Post, at 7. 
11 For purposes of this case, we assume that the grand jury transcripts 
are inadmissible as evidence in a civil trial because the testimony is not 
subject to cross examination. Cf. Fed. R. Evid. 803(8) (hearsay exception 
for certain public records); Fed. R. Evid. 804(a)(l) (witness unavailable 
when exempted from testifying on ground of privilege); Fed. R. Evid. 
804(b)(l) (former testimony admissible when witness unavailable and the 
party against whom the testimony is now offered had an opportunity for 
cross examination). 
81-825--OPINION 
PILLSBURY CO. v. CONBOY 11 
grant of immunity to sweep in statements on direct examina-
tion that the Government did not intend to immunize, or for 
the deponent to give responses that may fall outside of the 
grant of immunity and later be used against him in a subse-
quent criminal prosecution, petitioners argue that Conboy's 
deposition will yield only a carbon copy of the grand-jury 
transcript. In such a situation, it would be desirable for civil 
plaintiffs, particularly those bringing private suits that sup-
plement the criminal enforcement of the federal antitrust 
laws, to have access to the available, probative information. 
But even if the direct examination is limited to the ques-
tions and answers in the immunized transcript, there remains 
I the right of cross examination, 18 a right traditionally relied 
upon expansively to test credibility as well as to seek the 
truth. Petitioners recognize this problem, but maintain that 
the antitrust defendants "would be entitled to test the accu-
racy and truthfulness of Conboy's repeated immunized testi-
mony without going beyond the confines of that testimony." 
Regardless of any limitations that may be imposed on its 
I scope, 19 however, cross examination is intended to and often 
will produce information not elicited on direct. We must as-
sume that, to produce admissible evidence, the scope of cross 
18 Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(l) (stating that depositions may be taken "if 
the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discov-
ery of admissible evidence"); Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(c) (allowing cross examina-
tion at depositions); Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a) (deposition "admissible under the 
rules of evidence applied as though the witness were then present and tes-
tifying"); Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(l) (deposition admissible if the party against 
whom the testimony is now offered in a civil action had an opportunity to 
develop testimony by cross examination). 
19 See United States v. Cardillo, 316 F. 2d 606, 611(CA21963) (in deter-
mining whether testimony of a witness who invokes the privilege during 
cross examination may be used against defendant, court draws a distinc-
tion between cases in which the assertion of the privilege merely precludes 
inquiry into collateral matters that bear on credibility of witnesses and 
those in which assertion prevents inquiry into matters about which witness 
testified on direct). 
12 
81-825---OPINION 
PILLSBURY CO. v. CONBOY 
examination at the deposition cannot easily be limited to the 
immunized testimony. This assumption implicates both the 
Government's and the individual's interests embodied in 
§6002. 
B 
Use immunity was intended to immunize and exclude from 
a subsequent criminal trial only that information to which the 
Government expressly has surrendered future use. If the 
Government is engaged in an ongoing investigation of the 
particular activity at issue, immunizing new information 
(e.g., the answers to questions in a case like this one) may 
make it more difficult to show in a subsequent prosecution 
that similar information was obtained from wholly independ-
ent sources. If a District Court were to conclude in a subse-
quent civil proceeding that the scope of the prior grant of im-
munity included civil deposition testimony closely tracking 
immunized testimony, it in effect could invest the deponent 
with transactional immunity on matters about which he testi-
fied at the immunized proceedings. This is precisely the 
kind of immunity Congress intended to prohibit. The pur-
pose of § 6002 was to limit the scope of immunity to the level 
that is constitutionally required, as well as to limit the use of 
immunity to those cases in which the Attorney General, or 
officials designated by him, determine that gaining the 
witness's testimony outweighs the loss of the opportunity for 
I criminal prosecution of that witness. 20 
C 
Petitioners' interpretation of § 6002 also places substantial 
risks on the deponent. Unless the grant of immunity as-
sures a witness that his incriminating testimony will not be 
used against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution, the 
I '}JJ We need not decide whether United States Attorneys, when desig-
nated by the Attorney General, presently have authority to immunize the 
testimony of a witness in a civil proceeding when the Government deter-I mines that the public interest would be served. 
I 
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witness has not received the certain protection of his Fifth 
Amendment privilege that he has been forced to exchange. 
No court has authority to immunize a witness. That respon-
sibility, as we have noted, is peculiarly an executive one, and 
only the Attorney General or a designated officer of the De-
partment of Justice has authority to grant use immunity. 
See 18 U. S. C. §§ 6002, 6003. Nor should a court, at the 
time of the civil testimony, pre-determine the decision of the 
court in a subsequent criminal prosecution on the question 
whether the Government has met its burden of proving "that 
the evidence it proposes to use is derived from a legitimate 
source wholly independent of the compelled testimony." 
Kasti,gar, 406 U. S., at 460. Yet in holding Conboy in con-
tempt for his Fifth Amendment silence, the District Court 
below essentially predicted that a court in any future criminal 
prosecution of Conboy will be obligated to protect against 
evidentiary use of the deposition testimony petitioners seek. 
I We do not think such a predictive judgment is enough. 21 As 
the Court stated in Maness v. Meyers, 419 U. S. 449 (1975), 
compelling a witness to testify in "reliance upon a later 
objection or motion to suppress would 'let the cat out' with no 
assurance whatever of putting it back." Id., at 463. We be-
lieve Conboy acted properly in maintaining his silence in the 
face of the District Court's compulsion order and by testing 
I the validity of his privilege on appeal. 
IV 
This Court has emphasized the importance of the private 
action as a means of furthering the policy goals of certain fed-
eral regulatory statutes, including the federal antitrust laws. 
I 21 It is unnecessary to speculate whether wrongfully comp~lled evidence 
might be excluded in a subsequent criminal trial of the deponent. Cf. 
Maness v. Myers , 419 U. S. 449, 474-475 (1975) (WHITE, J., concurring in 
the result). We refer to the use of an exclusionary rule in such a trial only 
to make clear that the District Court's compulsion order in this case cannot 





PILLSBURY CO. v. CONBOY 
See, e.g., Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts 
Corp., 392 U. S. 134, 139 (1968); United States v. Borden 
Co., 347 U. S. 514, 518-519 (1954). But private civil actions 
can only supplement, not supplant, the primary responsibil-
ity of Government. Petitioners' proposed construction of 
§ 6002 sweeps further than Congress intended and could hin-
der governmental enforcement of its criminal laws by turning 
use immunity into a form of transactional immunity for sub-
jects examined in the immunized proceeding. It also puts 
the deponent in some danger of criminal prosecution unless 
he receives an assurance of immunity or exclusion that the 
courts cannot properly give. Silence, on the other hand, 
preserves the deponent's rights and the Government's inter-
ests, as well as the judicial resources that otherwise would be 
required to make the many difficult judgments that petition-
ers' interpretation of § 6002 would require. 22 
V 
We hold that a deponent's civil deposition testimony, 
closely tracking his prior immunized testimony, is not, with-
out duly authorized assurance of immunity at the time, im-
munized testimony within the meaning of § 6002, and there-
fore may not be compelled over a valid assertion of his Fifth 
Amendment privilege. The judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals accordingly is 
Affirmed. 
22 The dissent minimizes the enforcement interest that our construction 
of§ 6002 protects, post, at 10, 11, 13, contending that we "rel[y] on a highly 
theoretical and hypothetical prosecutorial interest," id., at 13. We note, 
however, that by conceding that there is some "slight risk'' that the depo-
nent's testimony may hamper a prosecution, id., at 13, the dissent con-
cedes that its interpretation of § 6002 provides at least somewhat broader 
immunity than Congress intended. Also, in the dissent's "judgment[,] the 
enforcement interest in gaining access to such details at a deposition far 
outweighs th[at] risk. ... " Id., at 13. See also id., at 9. This, however, 
is a judgment reserved for officials of the Department of Justice, not the 
federal courts, to make on a case-by-case basis. 
~·. 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Pursuant to the federal use immunity provisions, 18 
U. S. C. §§6001-6005 (1976), a United States Attorney may 
request an order from a federal court compelling a witness to 
testify even though he has asserted his privilege against self-
incrimination. Section 6002 provides, however, that ''notes-
timony or other information compelled under the order (or 
any information directly or indirectly derived from such testi-
mony or other information) may be used against the witness 
in any criminal case. . . . " The issue presented in this case is 
whether a deponent's civil deposition testimony, repeating 
verbatim or closely tracking his prior immunized testimony, 
is immunized ''information" that can be compelled over the 
valid assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege. 
I 
Respondent John Conboy is a former executive of a defend-
ant in the In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 
M.D.L. 310 (S.D. Tex.). In January 1978, United States 
Department of Justice attorneys interviewed Conboy follow-
ing a promise of use immunity. Conboy subsequently ap-
peared before a grand jury investigating price-fixing activi-
ties and, pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 6002, was granted formal 
use immunity for his testimony. 
2 
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Following the criminal indictment of several companies, 
numerous civil antitrust actions were filed in various United 
States district courts. Those actions were consolidated for 
discovery in the District Court for the Southern District of 
Texas. Petitioners here are purchasers of corrugated c_on-
tainers who elected to opt out of the class-action proceedings 
and pursue their own causes of action against manufacturers. 
The District Court ordered that portions of the immunized 
government interview and grand-jury testimony of certain 
witnesses, including that of Conboy, be made available to 
lawyers for the class and opt-outs. 1 
Pursuant to a subpoena issued by the District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois, Conboy appeared in Chicago for 
a deposition at which he, his counsel, and petitioners' counsel 
had copies of his immunized testimony. The transcripts 
were marked as deposition exhibits so that all could follow 
the intended examination. The questioning fell into the fol-
lowing pattern: a question was read from the transcript; it 
then was rephrased to include the transcript answer (i. e., 
"Is it not the fact that .... "); finally, Conboy was asked if 
he had "so testified" in his immunized interview and grand-
jury examination. 2 Conboy refused to answer each ques-
tion, asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. 
The District Court granted petitioners' motion to compel 
1 The propriety of the District Court's release of grand jury materials to 
the civil parties is not before the Court. 
\ ____:___A:n example of this three-question pattern is as follows: __e_ 
~ o did you have price communications with at Alton Box Board~ 
Q. Is it not the fact that you had price communications with Fred 
Renshaw and Dick Herman ... ? 
Q. Did you not so testify in your government interview of January 10, 
1978? 
Joint Appendix 29--31. 
--- -· --~- - ---- ._._.._ __ ____ _ _ 
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Conboy to answer the questions. a When Conboy continued 
to claim his privilege, the District Court held him in con-
tempt, but stayed its order pending appeal. A panel of the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed .the con-
tempt order, holding that, "[b]ecause the questions asked in 
this deposition were taken verbatim from or closely tracked 
the transcript of Conboy's grand jury testimony, we believe 
that his answers at the deposition would be 'derived from' the 
prior immunized [testimony] and therefore unavailable for 
use in any subsequent criminal prosecution." In re Corru-
gated Container Antitrust Litigation, Appeal of John Con-
boy, 655 F. 2d 748, 751 (CA7), rev'd en bane, 661 F. 2d 1145 
(1981). 
On rehearing en bane, the Court of Appeals reversed the 
District Court. It first determined that Conboy's alleged 
fear of prosecution was more than "fanciful," 661 F. 2d, at 
1152, and that Conboy therefore was entitled to assert his 
Fifth Amendment privilege unless his deposition testim~ny 
could not be used against him in a subsequent criminal action, 
see id., at 1153.' The court then held that under § 6002, ab-
sent a separate and independent grant of immunity, 5 a depo-
nent's civil deposition testimony that repeats verbatim or 
closely tracks his prior immunized testimony is not protected. 
While acknowledging that verbatim questions "of course 
[would be] derived" from the immunized testimony, the court 
reasoned that the answers to such questions "are derived 
1 Chief Judge John V. Singleton, Jr. of the District Court for the South-
ern District of Texas expressly exercised the powers of the District Court 
for the Northern District of Illinois pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1407(b). The 
contempt hearing was conducted by telephone with his chambers in 
Houston. 
4 The correctness of the Court of Appeals' conclusion that Conboy could 
assert a Fifth Amendment privilege, absent some immunity, is not before• 
us. 
1 A United States Attorney declined to authorize immunity grants in 
connection with the civil depositions here. 
4 
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from the deponent's current, independent memory of events" 
and thus "necessarily create a new source of evidence" that 
could be used in a subsequent criminal prosecution against 
Conboy. Id., at 1155 (emphasis in original). 
We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict in the Courts 
of Appeals,& and now affirm. 
II 
It is settled that government must have the power to com-
pel testimony ''to secure information necessary for effective 
law enforcement." Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 
U. S. 52, 79 (1964). 7 For many years, however, a person 
. who was compelled to testify under a grant of governmental 
immunity could not be prosecuted for any conduct about 
which he had testified. See New Jersey v. Port,ash, 440 
U. S. 450, 457 (1979). Prosecutors therefore were reluctant 
to grant such ''transactional" immunity to potential targets 
of criminal investigations. See S. Rep. No. 91-617, p. 53 
(1969). 
The ''major purpose" of the Organized Crime Control Act 
of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 927, of which § 6002 was 
a key provision, was ''to provide the criminal justice system 
with the necessary legal tools to . . . strengthe[n] the evi-
dence gathering process and insur[e] that the evidence will 
then be available and admissible at trial." 116 Cong. Rec. 
35,200 (1970) (statement of Rep. St. Germain). Congress 
• Compare In re Carrugated Container Antitrust Litigatwn, Appeal of 
Fleischacker, 644 F. 2d 70, 75 (CA21981) (deposition answers immunized), 
and Little Rock School District v. Borden, Inc., 632 F. 2d 700, 705 (CA8 
1980) (same), with In re Carrugated Container Anti-Trust Litigation, Ap-
peal of Franey, 620 F. 2d 1086, 1095 (CA5 1980) (answers not immunized), 
cert. denied, 449 U. S. 1102 (1981). 
1 See United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 345 (1974); United 
States v. Mara, 410 U. S. 19, 41 (1973) (Ml.RsHALL, J., dissenting); Kasti-
garv. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 443-444 (1973); Murphy, 378 U.S., at 
93-94 (WHITE, J., concurring); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421, 
438 (1932); Blair v. United States, 250 U. S. 273, 281 (1919); Brown v. 
Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 600 (1896). 
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sought to make the grant of immunity more useful for law en-
forcement officers through two specific changes. First, Con-
gress made the grant of immunity less expansive 8 by re-
pealing the authority for transactional immunity and provid-
ing for the less comprehensive use immunity authorized 
in § 6002.' Second, Congress gave certain officials in 
the Department of Justice 10 exclusive authority to grant 
immunities. 11 
• In Murphy, JUSTICE WHITE stated that "[i)mmunity must be as broad 
as, but not harmfully and wastefully broader than, the privilege against 
self-incrimination." 378 U. S., at 107 (concurring opinion) (quoted with 
approval in 116 Cong. Rec. 35,291 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff)). In its 
committee report, the House explained that § 6002 was not to provide an 
"immunity bath," but was to be "no broader than" the Fifth Amendment 
privilege. H.R. No. 91-1549, p. 5 (1970). 
• Section 6002 provides: 
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-
incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding be-
fore or ancillary ~ 
(1) a court or grand jury of the United States, 
(2) an agency of the United States, or 
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses, or a 
committee or a subcommittee of either House 
and the person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the witness 
an order issued under this part, the witness may not refuse to comply with 
the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but notes-
timony or other information compelled under the order (or any information 
directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) 
may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution 
for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with 
the order. 
Section 6001(2) defines "other information" to include "any book, paper, 
document, record, recording, or other material." 
10 Section 6003 states: 
(a) In the case of any individual who has been or may be called to testify 
or provide other information at any proceeding before or ancillary to a 
court of the United States or a grand jury of the United States, the United 
States district court for the judicial district in which the proceeding is or 
may be held shall issue, in accordance with subsection (b) of this section, 
upon the request of the United States attorney for such district, an order 
[Footnote 11 continues on 'J)O,{le 6] 
6 
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The Court upheld the constitutionality of the use immunity 
statute in Kasti,gar v. United States, 406 U. S. 441 (1972). 
The power to compel testimony is limited by the Fifth 
Amendment, and we held that any grant of immunity must 
be co-extensive with the privilege. We were satisfied, how-
ever, that § 6002 provided this measure of protection and 
thus "removed the dangers against which the privilege pro-
tects." Id., at 449. In rejecting the argument that use and 
derivative-use immunity would not adequately protect a wit-
ness from various incriminating uses of the compelled testi-
mony, we emphasized that "[t]he statute provides a sweeping 
proscription of any use, direct or indirect, of the compelled 
testimony and any information derived therefrom. . . . " Id., 
at 460. We added that once a defendant establishes that he 
has testified under a grant of immunity, ''the prosecution 
[has] the affirmative duty to prove that the evidence it pro-
poses to use is derived from a legitimate source wholly inde-
pendent of the compelled testimony." Ibid. Thus, ''immu-
nity from use and derivative use 'leaves the witness and the 
Federal Government in substantially the same position as if 
the witness had claimed his privilege' in the absence of a 
grant of immunity." Kasti,gar, 406 U. S., at 458-459 (quot-
ing Murphy, 378 U. S., at 79). 
requiring such individual to give testimony or provide other information 
which he refuses to give or provide on the basis of his privilege against self-
incrimination, such order to become effective as provided in section 6002 of 
this part. 
(b) A United States attorney may, with the approval of the Attorney 
General, the Deputy Attorney General, or any designated Assistant Attor-
ney General, request an order under subsection (a) of this section when in 
his judgment-
(1) the testimony or other information from such individual may be nec-
essary to the public interest; and 
(2) such individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide 
other information on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination. 
11 Congress foresaw the courts as playing only a minor role in the immu-
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7 
With the foregoing statutory history and relevant princi-
ples in mind, we turn now to this case. It is not disputed 
that the questions asked of Conboy were directly or indi-
rectly derived from his immunized testimony. The issue 
I presented is whether the causal connection between the 
questions and the answers is so direct that the answers also 
are derived from that testimony and therefore should be ex-
cluded under the grant of immunity. 
Petitioners' argument is based on the language of § 6002 
and on a common understanding of the words "derived from." 
The questions formulated on the basis of immunized testi-
mony are clearly "derived from" the prior testimony. Thus, 
the answers that repeat verbatim or closely track a depo-
nent's testimony are necessarily also "derived from" and 
"tainted by'' such testimony. Petitioners therefore find no 
basis for the distinction made by the Court of Appeals be-
tween questions and answers responsive to those same ques-
tions. An answer by its very nature is evoked by and re-
sponds to information contained in a question. 
Conboy's position is also straightforward: Questions do not 
incriminate; answers do. Unlike the questions, answers are 
not directly or indirectly derived from t~e immunized grand 
jury or interview transcripts, but from the deponent's cur-
rent, independent memory of events. Even when a depo-
nent's deposition answers are identical to those he gave to 
the grand jury, he is under oath to tell the truth, not neces-
nizing process: "The court's role in granting the order is merely to find the 
facts on which the order is predicated." H.R. Rep. No. 91-1549, supra 
note 8, at 43; H.R. Rep. No. 91-1188, p. 13 (1970). See 116 Cong. Rec. 
35,291 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff). Cf. President's Commission on 
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime 
in a Free Society 141 (1967) (recommending that "[i]mmunity should be 
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sarily as he told it before the grand jury, but as he knows it 
now. Each new statement of the deponent creates a new 
"source." In sum, the initial grant of immunity does not pre-
vent the prosecutor from prosecuting; it merely limits his 
sources of evidence. 
Although the parties make their arguments in terms track-
ing those of the statute-whether the deposition testimony is 
"derived from" the prior testimony-it is clear that the crux 
of their dispute is whether the earlier grant of immunity it-
self compelled Conboy to talk. 12 Petitioners contend that the 
prior grant of immunity already had supplanted Conboy's 
Fifth Amendment privilege at the time of the civil deposition. 
Petitioners would limit this immunity, of course, to testimony 
that "closely tracks" his prior immunized testimony. It is 
argued that this would not threaten the Government's need 
for admissible evidence or the individual's interest in avoid-
ing self-incrimination. In the absence of such a threat, ad-
missible evidence should be available to civil· antitrust plain-
tiffs. But we cannot accept the assumptions upon which 
petitioners' conclusion rests. In our view, a District Court 
cannot compel Conboy to answer deposition questions, over a 
valid assertion of his Fifth Amendment right, absent a duly 
authorized assurance of immunity at the time. 13 
We note at the outset that although there may be practical 
11 See Brief for Petitioners 19 ("Conboy had no Fifth Amendment privi-
lege to assert because of the coextensive protection provided by the immu-
nity statute."); Reply Brieffor Petitioners 12 ("[R]equiring a witness to an-
swer questions a second time that were previously answered under a grant 
of immunity does not result in an expansion of the original immunity 
grant.''). 
11 JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring in the Court's judgment, assumes 
that Conboy had a right to remain silent at the deposition, which by defini-
tion assumes the immunity order itself does not compel a witness to testify 
at a civil deposition. He discusses the ''fruits" doctrine where a witness's 
testimony at a deposition is "an independent act of free will" and concludes 
that "had Conboy answered the deposition questions, his testimony would 
not have been protected by the original immunity gl"&!!t .. . .'' Post._at 8. 
Although there may well be no reason to disagree with this hypothetical, l 
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I reasons for not testifying," as far as the deponent's Fifth 
Amendment right is concerned he should be indifferent be-
tween the protection afforded by silence and that afforded by 
immunity. A deponent's primary interest is that the protec-
tion be certain. The Government's interest, however, may 
be affected seriously by whether the deponent relies at the 
civil deposition on his Fifth Amendment privilege or on his 
prior grant of immunity. With due recognition of petition-
ers' need for admissible evidence, our inquiry then is whether 
I this need can be met without jeopardizing the Government's 
interest in limiting the scope of an immunity grant or en-
croaching upon the deponent's certainty of protection. 
A 
Questions taken verbatim from a transcript of immunized 
testimony could evoke one of several responses from a depo-
nent: (i) he could repeat or adopt his immunized answer; 15 
(ii) he could affirm that the transcript of his immunized an-
swers accurately reflects his prior testimony; (iii) he could re-
18 not presented in this case. The issue is whether Conboy can be com-
pelled to testify-i. e. , whether the immunity order itself compels him to 
track his prior testimony at the civil deposition-over the assertion of his 
Fifth Amendment rights. We therefore need not address situations 
where a witness mistakenly believes he is compelled to do so or does so t1 
some other reason. 
As USTICE LACKMUN'S opinion makes a factual analysis under the 
fruits doctrine, it appears to leave open the possibility that the outcome in 
a subsequent criminal prosecution of the deponent may be different in a 
future case because of differences in the factual record. He nevertheless 
concludes, as do we, that District Courts are without power to compel a 
civil deponent to testify over a valid assertion of his Fifth Amendment 
r ight, absent a separate grant of immunity pursuant to § 6002. 
"Besides the costs of t estifying against close associates, any witness in-
creases the risk of committing perjury the more he talks. Cf. 18 U. S. C. 
§ 6002 (perjured testimony not immunized). 
16 The extreme case would be where petitioners read the entire immu-
nized grand-jury transcript; then ask the witness if that is his testimony; 
and he answers simply "Yes." 




PILLSBURY CO. v. CONBOY 
call additional information responsive to the question but not 
disclosed in his immune testimony; or (iv) he could disclose 
information that is not responsive to the question. Petition-
ers do not contend, nor could they, that the prior grant of use 
immunity affords protection for all self-incriminating in-
formation disclosed by the immunized witness on any occa-
sion after the giving of the immunized testimony. Rather, 
petitioners argue that only the first three responses would be 
"derived from" his immune testimony and therefore would be 
unavailable for use against the deponent in any subsequent 
criminal prosecution. 
Petitioners' premise is that the deposition of Conboy is de-
I signed not to discover new information, 11 but to obtain evi-
dence that simply repeats the statements in the immunized 
I transcript. 17 Because there will be little opportunity for the 
I II Direct examination may not be as limited as petitioners assume. The 
District Court's civil contempt order stated that the questions asked in the 
deposition "were taken directly" from the immunized transcripts, but did 
not define exactly what deposition questions petitioners could ask. Other 
Courts of Appeals have permitted direct questioning to go beyond mere 
restatements of the prior testimony. See In re Corrugated Container 
Antitrust Liti,gation, Aweal of Fleischacker, 644 F. 2d 70, 79 (CA2 1981) 
(compelling answers to questions "concerning specific subjects that actu-
ally were touched upon by questions appearing in the transcript of the im-
munized testimony''); Little Rock School District v. Borden, Inc., 632 F. 2d 
700, 705 (CAB 1980) (compelling answers as long as deposition questions 
confined to " 'the same time, geographical and substantive frame work as 
the [witness' immunized] grand jury testimony'") (quoting Aweal of 
I 
Starkey, 600 F. 2d 1043, 1048 (CAB 1979)). The dissenting opinion of JUS-
TICE STEVENS apparently would permit questioning until "the inquiry 
threatened to exceed proper limits." Post, at 7. 
11 For purposes of this case, we assume that the grand jury transcripts 
are inadmissible as evidence in a civil trial because the testimony is not 
subject to cross examination. Cf. Fed. R. Evid. 803(8) (hearsay exception 
for certain public records); Fed. R. Evid. 804(a)(l) (witness unavailable 
when exempted from testifying on ground of privilege); Fed. R. Evid. 
804(b)(l) (former testimony admissible when witness unavailable and the 
party against whom the testimony is now offered had an opportunity for 
cross examination). 
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grant of immunity to sweep in statements on direct examina-
tion that the Government did not intend to immunize, or for 
the deponent to give responses that may fall outside of the 
grant of immunity and later be used against him in a subse-
quent criminal prosecution, petitioners argue that Conboy's 
deposition will yield only a carbon copy of the grand-jury 
transcript. In such a situation, it would be desirable for civil 
plaintiffs, particularly those bringing private suits that sup-
plement the criminal enforcement of the federal antitrust 
laws, to have access to the available, probative information. 
But even if the direct examination is limited to the ques-
tions and answers in the immunized transcript, there remains 
I the right of cross examination, 18 a right traditionally relied 
upon expansively to test credibility as well as to seek the 
truth. Petitioners recognize this problem, but maintain that 
the antitrust defendants ''would be entitled to test the accu-
racy and truthfulness of Conboy's repeated immunized testi-
mony without going beyond the confines of that testimony." 
Regardless of any limitations that may be imposed on its 
I scope, 19 however, cross examination is intended to and often 
will produce information not elicited on direct. We must as-
sume that, to produce admissible evidence, the scope of cross 
18 Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(l) (stating that depositions may be taken "if 
the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discov-
ery of admissible evidence"); Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(c) (allowing cross examina-
tion at depositions); Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a) (deposition "admissible under the 
rules of evidence applied as though the witness were then present and tes-
tifying"); Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(l) (deposition admissible if the party against 
whom the testimony is now offered in a civil action had an opportunity to 
develop testimony by cross examination). 
18 See United States v. Cardillo, 316 F. 2d 606, 611 (CA2 1963) (in deter-
mining whether testimony of a witness who invokes the privilege during 
cross examination may be used against defendant, court draws a distinc-
tion between cases in which the assertion of the privilege merely precludes 
inquiry into collateral matters that bear on credibility of witnesses and 
those in which assertion prevents inquiry into matters about which witness 
testified on direct). 
J z.l /\ 
12 
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examination at the deposition cannot easily be limited to the 
immunized testimony. This assumption implicates both the 
Government's and the individual's interests embodied in 
§6002. 
B 
Use immunity was intended to immunize and exclude from 
a subsequent criminal trial only that information to which the 
Government expressly has surrendered future use. If the 
Government is engaged in an ongoing investigation of the 
particular activity at issue, immunizing new information 
(e. g., the answers to questions in a case like this one) may 
make it more difficult to show in a subsequent prosecution 
that similar information was obtained from wholl independ-
ent sources. If a District Court were to conclude in a su se-
quent civil proceeding that the scope of the prior grant of im-
munity included civil deposition testimony closely tracking 
immunized testimony, it in effect could invest the deponent 
with transactional immunity on matters about which he testi-
fied at the immunized proceedings. 1s precise y the 
d o immuru y ongress m en e to prohibit. The pur-
pose of § 6002 was to limit the scope of immunity to the level 
that is constitutionally required, as well as to limit the use of 
immunity to those cases in which the Attorney General, or 
officials designated by him, determine that gaining the 
witness's testimony outweighs the loss of the opportunity for 
I criminal prosecution of that witness. 20 
C 
Petitioners' interpretation of § 6002 also places substantial 
risks on the deponent.',t Unless the grant of immunity as-
sures a witness that his incriminating testimony will not be 
used against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution, the 
I "'We need not decide whether United States Attorneys, when desig-
nated by the Attorney General, presently have authority to immunize the 
testimony of a witness in a civil proceeding when the Government deter-
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witness has not received the certain protection of his Fifth 
Amendment privilege that he has been forced to exchange. 
No court has authority to immunize a witness. That respon-
sibility, as we have noted, is peculiarly an executive one, and 
only the Attorney General or a designated officer of the De-
partment of Justice has authority to grant use immunity. 
See 18 U. S. C. §§ 6002, 6003. Nor should a court, at the 
time of the civil testimony, pre-determine the decision of the 
court in a subsequent criminal prosecution on the question 
whether the Government has met its burden of proving ''that 
the evidence it proposes to use is derived from a legitimate 
source wholly independent of the compelled testimony." 
Kastigar, 406 U. S., at 460. Yet in holding Conboy in con- / 
tempt for his Fifth Amendment silence, the District Court ✓ 
below essentially predicted that a court in any future criminal 
prosecution of Conboy will be obligated to protect against 'ID 
evidentiary use of the deposition testimony petitioners se~ r IT 
I We do not think such a predictive judgment is enough. 
the Court stated in Maness v. Meyers, 419 U. S. 449 (19 , ~---:-,--
compelling a witness to testify in ''reliance upon a later ~ l'I\ ~ 
objection or motion to suppress would 'let the cat out' with no ~ ~ 
assurance whatever of putting it back." Id., at 463. We be-
lieve Conboy acted properly in maintaining his silence in the 
face of the District Court's compulsion order and by testing 
I the validity of his privilege on appeal. 
IV 
This Court has emphasized the importance of the private 
action as a means of furthering the policy goals of certain fed-
eral regulatory statutes, including the federal antitrust laws. 
n It is unnecessary to speculate whether wrongfully compelled evidence 
might be excluded in a subsequent criminal trial of the deponent. Cf. 
Maness v. Myers, 419 U. S. 449, 474-475 (1975) (WlllTE, J., concurring in 
the result). We refer to the use of an exclusionary rule in such a trial only 
to make clear that the District Court's compulsion order in this case cannot 
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See, e.g., Perrna Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Paris 
Corp., 392 U. S. 134, 139 (1968); United States v. Borden 
Co., 347 U. S. 514, 518--519 (1954). But private civil actions 
can only supplement, not supplant, the primary responsibil-
ity of Government. Petitioners' proposed construction of 
§ 6002 sweeps further than Congress intended and could hin-
der governmental enforcement of its criminal laws by turning 
use immunity into a form of transactional immunity for sub-
jects examined in the immunized proceeding. It also puts 
the deponent in some danger of criminal prosecution unless 
he receives an assurance of immunity or exclusion that the 
courts cannot properly give. Silence, on the other hand, 
preserves the deponent's rights and the Government's inter-
ests, as well as the judicial resources that otherwise would be 
required to make the many difficult judgments that petition-
1 ers' interpretation of § 6002 would require~ 
V 
We hold that a deponent's civil deposition testimony, 
closely tracking his prior immunized testimony, is not, with-
out duly authorized assurance of immunity at the time, im-
munized testimony within the meaning of § 6002, and there-
fore may not be compelled over a valid assertion of his Fifth 
Amendment privilege. The judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals accordingly is 
Affirmed. 
iA I /2e dissent minimizes the enforcement interest that our construction 
/\ of§ 6002 protects, 'J)OBt, at 10, 11, 13, contending that we "rel[y] on a highly 
theoretical and hypothetical prosecutorial interest," id., at 13. We note, 
however, that by conceding that there is some "slight risk'' that the depo-
nent's testimony may hamper a prosecution, id., at 13, the dissent con-
cedes that its interpretation of § 6002 rovides at least somewhat broader 
immunity than Congress intended. m the dissent's' 'ud ent[,] the 
enforcement interest in gaining access o such details at a depos1 10n 
outweighs th[at] risk .... " Id. , at 13. See also id., at 9. This, however, 
is a judgment reserved for officials of the Department of Justice, not the 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Pursuant to the federal use immunity provisions, 18 
U. S. C. §§ 6001-6005 (1976), a United States Attorney may 
request an order from a federal court compelling a witness to 
testify even though he has asserted his privilege against self-
incrimination. Section 6002 provides, however, that "notes-
timony or other information compelled under the order (or 
any information directly or indirectly derived from such testi-
mony or other information) may be used against the witness 
in any criminal case. . . . " The issue presented in this case is 
whether a deponent's civil deposition testimony, repeating 
verbatim closely tracking his prior immunized testimony, 
1s immunized 'inf6ffll:tttioni that can be compelled over the 
valid assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege. 
I 
Respondent John Conboy is a former executive of a defen-
dant in the In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 
M.D.L. 310 (S.D. Tex.). In January 1978, United States 
Department of Justice attorneys interviewed Conboy follow-
ing a promise of use immunity. Conboy subsequently ap-
peared before a grand jury investigating price-fixing activi-
ties and, pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 6002, was granted formal 
use immunity for his testimony. 
2 
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Following the criminal indictment of several companies, 
numerous civil antitrust actions were filed in various United 
States district courts. Those actions were consolidated for 
discovery in the District Court for the Southern District of 
Texas. Petitioners here are purchasers of corrugated con-
tainers who elected to opt out of the class-action proceedings 
and pursue their own causes of action against manufacturers. 
The District Court ordered that portions of the immunized 
government interview and grand-jury testimony of certain 
witnesses, including .that of Conboy, be made available to 
lawyers for the class and opt-outs. 1 
Pursuant to a subpoena issued by the District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois, Conboy appeared in Chicago for 
a deposition at which he, his counsel, and petitioners' counsel 
had copies of his immunized testimony. The transcripts 
were marked as deposition exhibits so that all could follow 
the intended examination. The questioning fell into the fol-
lowing pattern: a question was read from the transcript; it 
then was rephrased to include the transcript answer (i. e., 
"Is it not the fact that .... "); finally, Conboy was asked if 
he had "so testified" in his immunized interview and grand-
jury examination. 2 Conboy refused to answer each ques-
tion, asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. 
The District Court granted petitioners' motion to compel 
1 The propriety of the District Court's release of grand jury materials to 
the civil parties is not before the Court. 
2 An example of this three-question pattern is as follows: 
Q. Who did you have price communications with at Alton Box Board? 
Q. Is it not the fact that you had price communications with Fred 
Renshaw and Dick Herman . .. ? 
Q. Did you not so testify in your government interview of January 10, 
1978? 
Joint Appendix 29-31. 
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Conboy to answer the questions. 3 When Conboy continued 
to claim his privilege, the District Court held him in con-
tempt, but stayed its order pending appeal. A panel of the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the con-
tempt order, holding that, "[b]ecause the questions asked in 
this deposition were taken verbatim from or closely tracked 
the transcript of Conboy's grand jury testimony, we believe 
that his answers at the deposition would be 'derived from' the 
prior immunized [testimony] and therefore unavailable for 
use in any subsequent criminal prosecution." In re Corru-
gated Container Antitrust Liti,gation, Appeal of John Con-
boy, 655 F. 2d 748, 751 (CA7), rev'd en bane, 661 F. 2d 1145 
(1981). 
On rehearing en bane, the Court of Appeals reversed the 
District Court. It first determined that Conboy's alleged 
fear of prosecution was more than "fanciful," 661 F. 2d, at 
1152, and that Conboy therefore was entitled to assert his 
Fifth Amendment privilege unless his deposition testimony 
could not be used against him in a subsequent criminal action, 
see id., at 1153. 4 The court then held that under § 6002, ab-
sent a separate and independent grant of immunity,5 a depo-
nent's civil deposition testimony that repeats verbatim or 
closely tracks his prior immunized testimony is not protected. 
While acknowledging that verbatim questions "of course 
[ would be] derived" from the immunized testimony, the court 
reasoned that the answers to such questions "are derived 
3 Chief Judge John V. Singleton, Jr. of the District Court for the South-
ern District of Texas expressly exercised the powers of the District Court 
for the Northern District of Illinois pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1407(b). The 
contempt hearing was conducted by telephone with his chambers in 
Houston. 
• The correctness of the Court of Appeals' conclusion that Conboy could 
assert a Fifth Amendment privilege, absent some immunity, is not before 
us. 
5 A United States Attorney declined to authorize immunity grants in 
connection with the civil depositions here. 
4 
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from the deponent's current, independent memory of events" 
and thus "necessarily create a new source of evidence" that 
could be used in a subsequent criminal prosecution against 
Conboy. Id., at 1155 (emphasis in original). 
We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict in the Courts 
of Appeals, 6 and now affirm. 
II 
It is settled that government must have the power to com-
pel testimony "to secure information necessary for effective 
law enforcement." Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 
U. S. 52, 79 (1964). 7 For many years, however, a person 
who was compelled to testify under a grant of governmental 
immunity could not be prosecuted for any conduct about 
which he had testified. See New Jersey v. Portash, 440 
U. S. 450, 457 (1979). Prosecutors therefore were reluctant 
to grant such "transactional" immunity to potential targets 
of criminal investigations. See S. Rep. No. 91-617, p. 53 
(1969). 
The "major purpose" of the Organized Crime Control Act 
of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 927, of which§ 6002 was 
a key provision, was "to provide the criminal justice system 
with the necessary legal tools to . . . strengthe[n] the evi-
dence gathering process and insur[e] that the evidence will 
then be available and admissible at trial." 116 Cong. Rec. 
35,200 (1970) (statement of Rep. St. Germain). Congress 
6 Compare In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, Appeal of 
Fleischacker, 644 F. 2d 70, 75 (CA2 1981) (deposition answers immunized), 
and Little Rock School District v. Borden, Inc., 632 F. 2d 700, 705 (CA8 
1980) (same), with In re Corrugated Container Anti-Trust Litigation, Ap-
peal of Franey, 620 F. 2d 1086, 1095 (CA5 1980) (answers not immunized), 
cert. denied, 449 U. S. 1102 (1981). 
1 See United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 345 (1974); United 
States v. Mara, 410 U. S. 19, 41 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting); Kasti-
gar v. United States, 406 U. S. 441, 443-444 (1973); Murphy, 378 U. S., at 
93-94 (WHITE, J ., concurring); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421, 
438 (1932); Blair v. United States, 250 U. S. 273, 281 (1919); Brown v. 
Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 600 (1896). 
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sought to make the grant of immunity more useful for law en-
forcement officers through two specific changes. First, Con-
gress made the grant of immunity less expansive 8 by re-
pealing the authority for transactional immunity and provid-
ing for the less comprehensive use immunity authorized 
in § 6002. 9 Second, Congress gave certain officials in 
the Department of Justice 10 exclusive authority to grant 
immunities. 11 
8 In Murphy, JUSTICE WHITE stated that "[i]mmunity must be as broad 
as, but not harmfully and wastefully broader than, the privilege against 
self-incrimination." 378 U. S., at 107 (concurring opinion) (quoted with 
approval in 116 Cong. Rec. 35,291 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff)). In its 
committee report, the House explained that § 6002 was not to provide an 
"immunity bath," but was to be "no broader than" the Fifth Amendment 
privilege. H.R. No. 91-1549, p. 5 (1970). 
9 Section 6002 provides: 
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-
incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding be-
fore or ancillary to-
(1) a court or grand jury of the United States, 
(2) an agency of the United States, or 
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses, or a 
committee or a subcommittee of either House 
and the person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the witness 
an order issued under this part, the witness may not refuse to comply with 
the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but notes-
timony or other information compelled under the order (or any information 
directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) 
may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution 
for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with 
the order. 
Section 6001(2) defines "other information" to include "any book, paper, 
document, record, recording, or other material." 
10 Section 6003 states: 
(a) In the case of any individual who has been or may be called to testify 
or provide other information at any proceeding before or ancillary to a 
court of the United States or a grand jury of the United States, the United 
States district court for the judicial district in which the proceeding is or 
may be held shall issue, in accordance with subsection (b) of this section, 
upon the request of the United States attorney for such district, an order 
[Footnotes 10 and 11 continue on page 6] 
6 
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The Court upheld the constitutionality of the use immunity 
statute in Kastigar v. United States, 406 U. S. 441 (1972). 
The power to compel testimony is limited by the Fifth 
Amendment, and we held that any grant of immunity must 
be co-extensive with the privilege. We were satisfied, how-
ever, that § 6002 provided this measure of protection and 
thus "removed the dangers against which the privilege pro-
tects." Id., at 449. In rejecting the argument that use and 
derivative-use immunity would not adequately protect a wit-
ness from various incriminating uses of the compelled testi-
mony, we emphasized that "[t]he statute provides a sweeping 
proscription of any use, direct or indirect, of the compelled 
testimony and any information derived therefrom .... " Id., 
at 460. We added that once a defendant establishes that he 
has testified under a grant of immunity, "the prosecution 
[has] the affirmative duty to prove that the evidence it pro-
poses to use is derived from a legitimate source wholly inde-
pendent of the compelled testimony." Ibid. Thus, "immu-
nity from use and derivative use 'leaves the witness and the 
Federal Government in substantially the same position as if 
the witness had claimed his privilege' in the absence of a 
grant of immunity." Kastigar, 406 U. S., at 458--459 (quot-
ing Murphy, 378 U. S., at 79). 
requiring such individual to give testimony or provide other information 
which he refuses to give or provide on the basis of his privilege against self-
incrimination, such order to become effective as provided in section 6002 of 
this part. 
(b) A United States attorney may, with the approval of the Attorney 
General, the Deputy Attorney General, or any designated Assistant Attor-
ney General, request an order under subsection (a) of this section when in 
his judgment-
(1) the testimony or other information from such individual may be nec-
essary to the public interest; and 
(2) such individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide 
other information on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination. 
11 Congress foresaw the courts as playing only a minor role in the immu-
,~'"~ 
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III 
7 
With the foregoing statutory history and relevant princi-
ples in mind, we turn now to this case. It is not disputed 
that the questions asked of Conboy were directly or indi-
rectly derived from his immunized testimony. The issue,.°'-~ 
~is whether the causal connection between the 
questions and the answers is so direct that the answers also 
are derived from that testimony and therefore should be ex-
cluded under the grant of immunity. 
Petitioners' argument is based on the language of § 6002 
and on a common understanding of the words "derived from." 
The questions formulated on the basis of immunized testi-
mony are clearly "derived from" the prior testimony. Thus, 
the answers that repeat verbatim or closely track a depo-
nent's testimony are necessarily also "derived from" and 
"tainted by" such testimony. Petitioners therefore find no 
basis for the distinction made by the Court of Appeals be-
tween questions and answers responsive to those same ques-
tions. An answer by its very nature is evoked by and re-
sponds to information contained in a question. 
Conboy's position is also straightforward: Questions do not 
incriminate; answers do. Unlike the questions, answers are 
not directly or indirectly derived from the immunized grand 
jury or interview transcripts, but from the deponent's cur-
rent, independent memory of events. Even when a depo-
nent's deposition answers are identical to those he gave to 
the grand jury, he is under oath to tell the truth, not neces-
nizing process: "The court's role in granting the order is merely to find the 
facts on which the order is predicated." H.R. Rep. No. 91-1549, supa 
note 8, at 43; H.R. Rep. No. 91-1188, p. 13 (1970). See 116 Cong. Rec. 
35,291 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff). Cf. President's Commission on 
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime 
in a Free Society 141 (1967) (recommending that "[i]mmunity should be 
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sarily as he told it before the grand jury, but as he knows it 
now. Each new statement of the deponent creates a new 
"source." In sum, the initial grant of immunity does not pre-
vent the prosecutor from prosecuting; it merely limits his 
sources of evidence. 
Although the parties make their arguments in terms track-
ing those of the statute-whether the deposition testimony is 
"derived from" the prior testimony-it is clear that the crux 
of their dispute is whether the earlier grant of immunity it-
self compelled Conboy to talk. 12 Petitioners contend that the 
prior grant of immunity already had supplanted Conboy's 
Fifth Amendment privilege at the time of the civil deposition. 
Petitioners would limit this immunity, of course, to testimony 
that "closely tracks" his prior immunized testimony. It is 
argued that this would not threaten the Government's need 
for admissible evidence or the individual's interest in avoid-
ing self-incrimination. In the absence of such a threat, ad-
missible evidence should be available to civil antitrust plain-
tiffs. But we cannot accept the assumptions upon which 
petitioners' conclusion rests. In our view, a District Court 
cannot compel Conboy to answer deposition questions, over a 
valid assertion of his Fifth Amendment right, absent a duly 
authorized assurance of immunity at the time. 13 
12 See Brief for Petitioners 19 ("Conboy had no Fifth Amendment privi-
lege to assert because of the coextensive protection provided by the immu-
nity statute."); Reply Brief for Petitioners 12 ("[R]equiring a witness to an-
swer questions a second time that were previously answered under a grant 
of immunity does not result in an expansion of the original immunity 
grant."). 
13 JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring in the Court's judgment, assumes 
that Conboy had a right to remain silent at the deposition, which by defini-
tion assumes the immunity order itself does not compel a witness to testify 
at a civil deposition. He discusses the "fruits" doctrine where a witness's 
testimony at a deposition is "an independent act of free will" and concludes 
that "had Conboy answered the deposition questions, his testimony would 
not have been protected by the original immunity grant .. .. " Post, at 8. 
I We have no occasion to address this hypothetical. The issue is whether Conboy can be compelled to testify-i. e., whether the immunity order 
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We note at the outset that although there may be practical 
reasons for not testifying, 14 as far as the deponent's Fifth 
Amendment right is concerned he should be indifferent be-
tween the protection afforded by silence and that afforded by 
immunity. A deponent's primary interest is that the protec-
tion be certain. The Government's interest, however, may 
be affected seriously by whether the deponent relies at the 
civil deposition on his Fifth Amendment privilege or on his 
prior grant of immunity. With due recognition of petition-
ers' need for admissible evidence, our inquiry then is whether 
this need can be met without jeopardizing the Government's 
interest in limiting the scope of an immunity grant or en-
croaching upon the deponent's certainty of protection. 
A 
Questions taken verbatim from a transcript of immunized 
testimony could evoke one of several responses from a depo-
nent: (i) he could repeat or adopt his immunized answer; 15 
compels him to track his prior testimony at the civil deposition-over the 
assertion of his Fifth Amendment rights. If, as we conclude, the original 
grant of immunity does not extend to the subsequent civil proceeding, then 
the trial judge lacks authority to compel Conboy to testify over the asser-
tion of his Fifth Amendment privilege. This is so irrespective of whether, 
had he testified at the deposition rather than asserting the privilege, his 
answers could have been admitted against him at a criminal trial. We 
therefore need not now decide the extent to which civil deposition testi-
mony, freely given by a witness in Conboy's position, is "directly or indi-
rectly derived" from prior grand jury testimony. 
As JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S opinion makes a factual analysis under the 
fruits doctrine, it appears to leave open the possibility that the outcome in 
a subsequent criminal prosecution of the deponent may be different in a 
future case because of differences in the factual record. He nevertheless 
concludes, as do we, that District Courts are without power to compel a 
civil deponent to testify over a valid assertion of his Fifth Amendment 
right, absent a separate grant of immunity pursuant to § 6002. 
14 Besides the costs of testifying against close associates, any witness in-
creases the risk of committing perjury the more he talks. Cf. 18 U. S. C. 
§ 6002 (perjured testimony not immunized). 
15 The extreme case would be where petitioners read the entire immu-
10 
81-S25-OPINION 
PILLSBURY CO. v. CONBOY 
(ii) he could affirm that the transcript of his immunized an-
swers accurately reflects his prior testimony; (iii) he could re-
call additional information responsive to the question but not 
disclosed in his immune testimony; or (iv) he could disclose 
information that is not responsive to the question. Petition-
ers do not contend, nor could they, that the prior grant of use 
immunity affords protection for all self-incriminating in-
formation disclosed by the immunized witness on any occa-
sion after the giving of the immunized testimony. Rather, 
petitioners argue that only the first three responses would be 
"derived from" his immune testimony and therefore would be 
unavailable for use against the deponent in any subsequent 
criminal prosecution. 
Petitioners' premise is that the deposition of Conboy is de-
signed not to discover new information, 16 but to obtain evi-
dence that simply repeats the statements in the immunized 
transcript. 11 Because there will be little opportunity for the 
nized grand-jury transcript; then ask the witness if that is his testimony; 
and he answers simply "Yes." 
1
• Direct examination may not be as limited as petitioners assume. The 
District Court's civil contempt order stated that the questions asked in the 
deposition "were taken directly'' from the immunized transcripts, but did 
not define exactly what deposition questions petitioners could ask. Other 
Courts of Appeals have permitted direct questioning to go beyond mere 
restatements of the prior testimony. See In re Corrugated Container 
Antitrust Litigation, Appeal of Fleischacker, 644 F. 2d 70, 79 (CA2 1981) 
(compelling answers to questions "concerning specific subjects that actu-
ally were touched upon by questions appearing in the transcript of the im-
munized testimony"); Little Rock School District v. Borden, Inc., 632 F. 2d 
700, 705 (CA8 1980) (compelling answers as long as deposition questions 
confined to "'the same time, geographical and substantive frame work as 
the [witness' immunized] grand jury testimony"') (quoting Appeal of 
Starkey, 600 F. 2d 1043, 1048 (CA8 1979)). The dissenting opinion of JUS-
TICE STEVENS apparently would permit questioning until "the inquiry 
threatened to exceed proper limits." Post, at 7. 
17 For purposes of this case, we assume that the grand jury transcripts 
are inadmissible as evidence in a civil trial because the testimony is not 
subject to cross examination. Cf. Fed. R. Evid. 803(8) (hearsay exception 
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grant of immunity to sweep in statements on direct examina-
tion that the Government did not intend to immunize, or for 
the deponent to give responses that may fall outside of the 
grant of immunity and later be used against him in a subse-
quent criminal prosecution, petitioners argue that Conboy's 
deposition will yield only a carbon copy of the grand-jury 
transcript. In such a situation, it would be desirable for civil 
plaintiffs, particularly those bringing private suits that sup-
plement the criminal enforcement of the federal antitrust 
laws, to have access to the available, probative information. 
But even if the direct examination is limited to the ques-
tions and answers in the immunized transcript, there remains 
the right of cross examination, 18 a right traditionally relied 
upon expansively to test credibility as well as to seek the 
truth. Petitioners recognize this problem, but maintain that 
the antitrust defendants "would be entitled to test the accu-
racy and truthfulness of Conboy's repeated immunized testi-
mony without going beyond the confines of that testimony." 
Regardless of any limitations that may be imposed on its 
scope, 19 however, cross examination is intended to and often 
for certain public records); Fed. R. Evid. 804(a)(l) (witness unavailable 
when exempted from testifying on ground of privilege); Fed. R. Evid. 
804(b)(l) (former testimony admissible when witness unavailable and the 
party against whom the testimony is now offered had an opportunity for 
cross examination). 
18 Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(l) (stating that depositions may be taken "if 
the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discov-
ery of admissible evidence"); Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(c) (allowing cross examina-
tion at depositions); Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a) (deposition "admissible under the 
rules of evidence applied as though the witness were then present and tes-
tifying"); Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(l) (deposition admissible if the party against 
whom the testimony is now offered in a civil action had an opportunity to 
develop testimony by cross examination). 
1
• See United States v. Cardillo, 316 F. 2d 606, 611 (CA2 1963) (in deter-
mining whether testimony of a witness who invokes the privilege during 
cross examination may be used against defendant, court draws a distinc-
tion between cases in which the assertion of the privilege merely precludes 
12 
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will produce information not elicited on direct. We must as-
sume that, to produce admissible evidence, the scope of cross 
examination at the deposition cannot easily be limited to the 
immunized testimony. This assumption implicates both the 
Government's and the individual's interests embodied in 
§6002. 
B 
Use immunity was intended to immunize and exclude from 
a subsequent criminal trial only that information to which the 
Government expressly has surrendered future use. If the 
Government is engaged in an ongoing investigation of the 
particular activity at issue, immunizing new information 
(e. g., the answers to questions in a case like this one) may 
make it more difficult to show in a subsequent prosecution 
that similar information was obtained from wholly indepen-
dent sources. If a District Court were to conclude in a sub-
sequent civil proceeding that the prior immunity order ex-
tended to civil deposition testimony closely tracking the 
immunized testimony, it in effect could invest the deponent 
with transactional immunity on matters about which he testi-
fied at the immunized proceedings. This is precisely the 
kind of immunity Congress intended to prohibit. The pur-
pose of § 6002 was to limit the scope of immunity to the level 
that is constitutionally required, as well as to limit the use of 
immunity to those cases in which the Attorney General, or 
officials designated by him, determine that gaining the 
witness's testimony outweighs the loss of the opportunity for 
criminal prosecution of that witness. 20 
inquiry into collateral matters that bear on credibility of witnesses and 
those in which assertion prevents inquiry into matters about which witness 
testified on direct). 
2f) We need not decide whether United States Attorneys, when desig-
nated by the Attorney General, presently have authority to immunize the 
testimony of a witness in a civil proceeding when the Government deter-
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Petitioners' interpretation of § 6002 also places substantial 
risks on the deponent. 21 Unless the grant of immunity as-
sures a witness that his incriminating testimony will not be 
used against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution, the 
witness has not received the certain protection of his Fifth 
Amendment privilege that he has been forced to exchange. 
No court has authority to immunize a witness. That respon-
sibility, as we have noted, is peculiarly an executive one, and 
only the Attorney General or a designated officer of the De-
partment of Justice has authority to grant use immunity. 
See 18 U. S. C. §§ 6002, 6003. Nor should a court, at the 
time of the civil testimony, pre-determine the decision of the 
court in a subsequent criminal prosecution on the question 
whether the Government has met its burden of proving "that 
the evidence it proposes to use is derived from a legitimate 
source wholly independent of the compelled testimony." 
Kastigar, 406 U. S., at 460. Yet in holding Conboy in con-
tempt for his Fifth Amendment silence, the District Court 
below essentially predicted that a court in any future criminal 
prosecution of Conboy will be obligated to protect against 
evidentiary use of the deposition testimony petitioners seek. 
We do not think such a predictive judgment is enough. 
Petitioners' interpretation of § 6002 imposes risks on the 
deponent whether or not the deposition testimony properly 
can be used against him in a subsequent criminal prosecu-
tion. 2'2 -ft- is tl"Ue that ·.-vere he eomoeHea to testtn over his-
21 None of the tests set forth by the Courts of Appeals , or by the dissent, 
that have adopted petitioners' interpretation of § 6002 provides deponents 
with certain guidance as to when they must talk and when they must not. 
See note 16, supra. 
'!/Jur holding is limited to precluding District Courts from compelling 
testimony in a civil deposition over a valid assertion of the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege, absent a specific assurance of immunity for such testimony. 
It is clear this holding does not depend on the assumption that the deposi-
tion answers could be used against a civil deponent in a subsequent crimi-
~.:li 
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assertton- oH he-Fifth-A·mendrtrenrprivileg~~~ 
be protected by "a constitutionally i~_ose ~mmunity ' 
even if the trial judge had be_en-wrorig in his prediction tha 
§ 6002 would r_S-.uire-e~ on of Conboy's answers. Cf. 
Ma~--.-Myers, 419 U. S. 449 "Pl 
currin · t . Bu e 1strict Court's compul-
sion order in this case, in the absence of statutory authority 
or a new grant of immunity by the United States Attorney, 
cannot be justified retroaetivelyoy the subsequent exclusion 
of the compelled testimony.~ As JUSTICE MARSHALL notes 
in his concurring opinion: "Whatever justification there may 
be for requiring a witness to give incriminating testimony in 
aid of a criminal investigation after the government has 
granted use immunity, there is no similar justification for 
compelling a witness to give incriminating testimony for the 
benefit of a private litigant when the government has not 
chosen to grant immunity." Post , at 4. 
The result of compelling testimony-whether it is immu-
nized or excluded-is that the Government's interests, as 
well as the witness's, suffer. Reliance on judicial exclusion 
of nonimmunized testimony would be inconsistent with the 
congressional policy of leaving the granting of immunity to 
the Executive Branch. 
As the Court stated in Maness v. Meyers, 419 U. S. 449 
(1975), compelling a witness to testify in "reliance upon a 
later objection or motion to suppress would 'let the cat out' 
with no assurance whatever of putting it back." Id. , at 463. 
We believe Conboy acted properly in maintaining his silence 
nal trial. Yet the dissenting opinion states, and much of its analysis de] 
pends, on the erroneous conclusion that "[t]he Court today holds that 
[Conboy's] answers could be used, even if he did nothing more than ac-
knowledge the truth of his prior testimony." Post, at 3. 
Cf. post , at 4 (MARSHALL, J. , concurring) ("Further incriminating evi- \ 
oence that is derived from compelled testimony cannot always be traced 
back to its source[. ]"); note 14, supra (increasing risk of harm and perjury); 
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in the face of the District Court's compulsion order and by 
testing the validity of his privilege on appeal. 
IV 
This Court has emphasized the importance of the private 
action as a means of furthering the policy goals of certain fed-
eral regulatory statutes, including the federal antitrust laws. 
See, e.g., Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts 
Corp., 392 U. S. 134, 139 (1968); United States v. Borden 
Co., 347 U. S. 514, 518-519 (1954). But private civil actions 
can only supplement, not supplant, the primary responsibil-
ity of Government. Petitioners' proposed construction of 
§ 6002 sweeps further than Congress intended and could hin-
der governmental enforcement of its criminal laws by turning 
use immunity into a form of transactional immunity for sub-
jects examined in the immunized proceeding. It also puts 
the deponent in some danger of criminal prosecution unless 
he receives an assurance of immunity or exclusion that the 
courts cannot properly give. Silence, on the other hand, 
preserves the deponent's rights and the Government's inter-
ests, as well as the judicial resources that otherwise would be 
required to make the many difficult judgments that petition-I ers' interpretation of § 6002 would require.~ z3, 
r::r' _p,,The dissent minimizes the enforcement interest that our construction 
of§ 6002 protects, post, at 10, 11, 13, contending that we "rel[y] on a highly 
theoretical and hypothetical prosecutorial interest," id., at 13. We note, 
however, that by conceding that there is some "slight risk" that the depo-
nent's testimony may hamper a prosecution, id. , at 13, the dissent con-
cedes that its interpretation of § 6002 provides at least somewhat broader 
immunity than Congress intended. Moreover, the dissent overlooks the 
possible difficulty of securing the cooperation of individuals such as Conboy 
who may be more reluctant to testify in the immunized proceedings if they 
know that later deposition testimony may increase their exposure to civil 
liability. Finally, in the dissent's "judgment[,] the enforcement interest in 
gaining access to such details at a deposition far outweighs th[at] risk .... " 
Id., at 13. See also id. , at 9. · This, however, is a judgment reserved for 
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V 
We hold that a deponent's civil deposition testimony, 
closely tracking his prior immunized testimony, is not, with-
out duly authorized assurance of immunity at the time, im-
munized testimony within the meaning of§ 6002, and there-
fore may not be compelled over a valid assertion of his Fifth 
Amendment privilege_:z.i The judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals accordingly is · 
\\ ,, ~ l. 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
_ Pursuant to the federal use immunity provisions, 18 
_.U.S. C. §§6001-6005 (1976), a United States Attorney may · 
· request an order from a federal court compelling a witness to 
testify even though he has asserted his privilege against self-
incrimination. Section 6002 provides, however, that "notes-
timony or other information compelled under the order ( or 
any information directly or indirectly derived from such testi-
mony or other information) may be used against the witness 
in any criminal case. . . . " The issue presented in this case is 
whether a deponent's civil deposition testimony, repeating 
verbatim or closely tracking his prior immunized testimony, 
I is immunized "testimony" that can be compelled over the 
valid assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege. 
I 
Respondent John Conboy is a former executive of a defen-
dant in the In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 
M.D.L. 310 (S.D. Tex.). In January 1978, United States 
Department of Justice attorneys interviewed Conboy follow-
ing a promise of use immunity. Conboy subsequently ap-
peared before a grand jury investigating price-fixing activi-
ties and, pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 6002, was granted formal _ 
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Following the criminal indictment of several companies, 
numerous civil antitrust actions were filed in various United 
States district courts. Those actions were consolidated for 
discovery in the District Court for the Southern District of 
Texas. Petitioners here are purchasers of corrugated con-
tainers who elected to opt out of the class-action proceedings 
and pursue their own causes of action against manufacturers. 
The District Court ordered that portions of the immunized 
government interview and grand-jury testimony of certain 
witnesses, including that of Conboy, be made available to 
lawyers for the class and opt-outs. 1 
Pursuant to a subpoena issued by the District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois, Conboy appeared in Chicago for 
a deposition at which he, his counsel, and petitioners' counsel 
had copies of his immunized testimony. The transcripts 
were marked as deposition exhibits so that all could follow 
the intended examination. The questioning fell into the fol-
lowing pattern: a question was read from the transcript; it 
then was rephrased to include the transcript answer (i. e., 
"Is it not the fact that .... "); finally, Conboy was asked if 
he had "so testified" in his immunized interview and grand-
jury examination. 2 Conboy refused to answer each ques-
tion, asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. 
The District Court granted petitioners' motion to compel 
1 The propriety of the District Court's release of grand jury materials to 
the civil parties is not before the Court. 
2 An example of this three-question pattern is as follows: 
Q. Who did you have price communications with at Alton Box Board? 
Q. Is it not the fact that you had price communications with Fred 
Renshaw and Dick Herman . . . ? 
Q. Did you not so testify in your government interview of January 10, 
1978? 
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Conboy to answer the questions. 3 When Conboy continued 
to claim his privilege, the District Court held him in con-
tempt, but stayed its order pending appeal. A panel of the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the con-
tempt order, holding that, "[b]ecause the questions asked in 
this deposition were taken verbatim from or closely tracked 
the transcript of Conboy's grand jury testimony, we believe 
that his answers at the deposition would be 'derived from' the 
prior immunized [testimony] and therefore unavailable for 
use in any subsequent criminal prosecution." In re Corro,-
gated Container Antitrust Litigation, Appeal of John Con-
boy, 655 F. 2d 748, 751 (CA7), rev'd en bane, 661 F. 2d 1145 
(1981). 
On rehearing en bane, the Court of Appeals reversed the 
District Court. It first determined that Conboy's alleged 
fear of prosecution was more than "fanciful," 661 F. 2d, at 
1152, and that Conboy therefore was entitled to assert his 
Fifth Amendment privilege unless his deposition testimony 
could not be used against him in a subsequent criminal action, 
see id., · at 1153. 4 The court then held that under § 6002, ab-
sent a separate and independent grant of immunity, 5 a depo-
nent's civil deposition testimony that repeats verbatim or 
closely tracks his prior immunized testimony is not protected. 
While acknowledging that verbatim questions "of course 
[would be] derived" from the immunized testimony, the court 
reasoned that the answers to such questions "are derived 
3 Chief Judge John V. Singleton, Jr. of the District Court for the South-
ern District of Texas expressly exercised the powers of the District Court 
for the Northern District of Illinois pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1407(b). The 
contempt hearing was conducted by telephone with his chambers in 
Houston. 
• The correctness of the Court of Appeals' conclusion that Conboy could 
assert a Fifth Amendment privilege, absent some immunity, is not before 
us. 
• A United States Attorney declined to authorize immunity grants in 
connection with the civil depositions here. 
4 
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from the deponent's current, independent memory of events" 
and thus "necessarily create a new source of evidence" that 
could be used in a subsequent criminal prosecution against 
Conboy. Id., at 1155 (emphasis in original). 
We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict in the Courts 
of Appeals, 6 and now affirm. 
II 
It is settled that government must have the power to com-
pel testimony "to secure information necessary for effective 
law enforcement." Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 
U. S. 52, 79 (1964). 7 For many years, however, a person 
who was compelled to testify under a grant of governmental 
immunity could not be prosecuted for any conduct about 
which he had testified. See New Jersey v. Portash, 440 
U. S. 450, 457 (1979). Prosecutors therefore were reluctant 
to grant such "transactional" immunity to potential targets 
of criminal investigations. See S. Rep. No. 91-617, p. 53 
(1969). 
The "major purpose" of the Organized Crime Control Act 
of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 927, of which§ 6002 was 
a key provision, was "to provide the criminal justice system 
with the necessary legal tools to . . . strengthe[n] the evi-
dence gathering process and insur[e] that the evidence will 
then be available and admissible at trial." 116 Cong. Rec. 
35,200 (1970) (statement of Rep. St. Germain). Congress 
1 Compare In re Carrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, Appeal of 
Fleischacker, 644 F. 2d 70, 75 (CA2 1981) (deposition answers immunized), 
and Little Rock Sclwol District v. Borden, Inc., 632 F. 2d 700, 705 (CAB 
1980) (same), with In re Carrugated Container Anti-Trust Litigation, Ap-
peal of Franey, 620 F. 2d 1086, 1095 (CA5 1980) (answers not immunized), 
cert. denied, 449 U. S. 1102 (1981). 
1 See United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 345 (1974); United 
States v. Mara, 410 U. S. 19, 41 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting); Kasti-
gar v. United States, 406 U. S. 441, 443-444 (1973); Murphy, 378 U. S., at 
93-94 (WHITE, J., concurring); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421, 
438 (1932); Blair v. United States, 250 U. S. 273, 281 (1919); Brown v. 
Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 600 (1896). 
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sought to make the grant of immunity more useful for law en-
forcement officers through two specific changes. First, Con-
gress made the grant of immunity less expansive 8 by re-
pealing the authority for transactional immunity and provid-
ing for the less comprehensive use immunity authorized 
in § 6002. 9 Second, Congress gave certain officials in 
the Department of Justice 10 exclusive authority to grant 
immunities. 11 
8 In Murphy, JUSTICE WHITE stated that "[i]mmunity must be as broad 
as, but not harmfully and wastefully broader than, the privilege against 
self-incrimination." 378 U. S., at 107 (concurring opinion) (quoted with 
approval in 116 Cong. Rec. 35,291 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff)). In its 
committee report, the House explained that § 6002 was not to provide an 
"immunity bath," but was to be "no broader than" the Fifth Amendment 
privilege. H.R. No. 91-1549, p. 5 (1970). 
• Section 6002 provides: 
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-
incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding be-
fore or ancillary to-
(1) a court or grand jury of the United States, 
(2) an agency of the United States, or 
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses, or a 
committee or a subcommittee of either House 
and the person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the witness 
an order issued under this part, the witness may not refuse to comply with 
the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but no tes-
timony or other information compelled under the order (or any information 
directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) 
may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution 
for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with 
the order. 
Section 6001(2) defines "other information" to include "any book, paper, 
document, record, recording, or other material." 
10 Section 6003 states: 
(a) In the case of any individual who has been or may be called to testify 
or provide other information at any proceeding before or ancillary to a 
court of the United States or a grand jury of the United States, the United 
States district court for the judicial district in which the proceeding is or 
may be held shall issue, in accordance with subsection (b) of this section, 
upon the request of the United States attorney for such district, an order 
[Footnotes 10 and 11 continue on page 6] 
6 
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The Court upheld the constitutionality of the use immunity 
statute in Kastigar v. United States, 406 U. S. 441 (1972). 
The power to compel testimony is limited by the Fifth 
Amendment, and we held that any grant of immunity must 
be co-extensive with the privilege. We were satisfied, how-
ever, that § 6002 provided this measure of protection and 
thus "removed the dangers against which the privilege pro-
tects." Id., at 449. In rejecting the argument that use and 
derivative-use immunity would not adequately protect a wit-
ness from various incriminating uses of the compelled testi-
mony, we emphasized that "[t]he statute provides a sweeping 
proscription of any use, direct or indirect, of the compelled 
testimony and any information derived therefrom .... " Id., 
at 460. We added that once a defendant establishes that he 
has testified under a grant of immunity, "the prosecution 
[has] the affirmative duty to prove that the evidence it pro-
poses to use is derived from a legitimate source wholly inde-
pendent of the compelled testimony." Ibid. Thus, "immu-
nity from use and derivative use 'leaves the witness and the 
Federal Government in substantially the same position as if 
the witness had claimed his privilege' in the absence of a 
grant of immunity." Kastigar, 406 U. S., at 458--459 (quot-
ing Murphy, 378 U. S., at 79). 
requiring such individual to give testimony or provide other information 
which he refuses to give or provide on the basis of his privilege against self-
incrimination, such order to become effective as provided in section 6002 of 
this part. 
(b) A United States attorney may, with the approval of the Attorney 
General, the Deputy Attorney General, or any designated Assistant Attor-
ney General, request an order under subsection (a) of this section when in 
his judgment-
(!) the testimony or other information from such individual may be nec-
essary to the public interest; and 
(2) such individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide 
other information on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination. 
11 Congress foresaw the courts as playing only a minor role in the immu-
,,_..-
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III 
7 
With the foregoing statutory history and relevant princi-
ples in mind, we turn now to this case. It is not disputed 
that the questions asked of Conboy were directly or indi-
1 
rectly derived from his immunized testimony. The issue as 
presented to us is whether the causal connection between the 
questions and the answers is so direct that the answers also 
are derived from that testimony and therefore should be ex-
cluded under the grant of immunity. 
Petitioners' argument is based on the language of § 6002 
and on a common understanding of the words "derived from." 
The questions formulated on the basis of immunized testi-
mony are clearly "derived from" the prior testimony. Thus, 
the answers that repeat verbatim or closely track a depo-
nent' s testimony are necessarily also "derived from" and 
"tainted by" such testimony. Petitioners therefore find no 
basis for the distinction made by the Court of Appeals be-
tween questions and answers responsive to those same ques-
tions. An answer by its very nature is evoked by and re-
_:sponds to information contained in a question. 
Conboy's position is also straightforward: Questions do not 
incriminate; answers do. Unlike the questions, answers are 
not directly or indirectly derived from the immunized grand 
jury or interview transcripts, but from the deponent's cur-
rent, independent memory of events. Even when a depo-
nent's deposition answers are identical to those he gave to 
the grand jury, he is under oath to tell the truth, not neces-
nizing process: "The court's role in granting the order is merely to find the 
facts on which the order is predicated." H.R. Rep. No. 91-1549, supra 
note 8, at 43; H.R. Rep. No. 91-1188, p. 13 (1970). See 116 Cong. Rec. 
35,291 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff). Cf. President's Commission on 
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime 
in a Free Society 141 (1967) (recommending that "[i]mmunity should be 
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sarily as he told it before the grand jury, but as he knows it 
now. Each new statement of the deponent creates a new 
"source." In sum, the initial grant of immunity does not pre-
vent the prosecutor from prosecuting; it merely limits his 
sources of evidence. 
Although the parties make their arguments in terms track-
ing those of the statute-whether the deposition testimony is 
"derived from" the prior testimony-it is clear that the crux 
of their dispute is whether the earlier grant of immunity it-
self compelled Conboy to talk. 12 Petitioners contend that the 
prior grant of immunity already had supplanted Conboy's 
Fifth Amendment privilege at the time of the civil deposition. 
Petitioners would limit this immunity, of course, to testimony 
that "closely tracks" his prior immunized testimony. It is 
argued that this would not threaten the Government's need 
for admissible evidence or the individual's interest in avoid-
ing self-incrimination. In the absence of such a threat, ad-
missible evidence should be available to civil antitrust plain-
tiffs. But we cannot accept the assumptions upon which 
petitioners' conclusion rests. In our view, a District Court 
cannot compel Conboy to answer deposition questions, over a 
valid assertion of his Fifth Amendment right, absent a duly 
authorized assurance of immunity at the time. 13 
a See Brief for Petitioners 19 ("Conboy had no Fifth Amendment privi-
lege to assert because of the coextensive protection provided by the immu-
nity statute."); Reply Brief for Petitioners 12 ("[R]equiring a witness to an-
swer questions a second time that were previously answered under a grant 
of immunity does not result in an expansion of the original immunity 
grant."). 
18 JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring in the Court's judgment, assumes 
that Conboy had a right to remain silent at the deposition, which by defini-
tion assumes the immunity order itself does not compel a witness to testify 
at a civil deposition. He discusses the "fruits" doctrine where a witness's 
testimony at a deposition is "an independent act of free will" and concludes 
that "had Conboy answered the deposition questions, his testimony would 
not have been protected by the original immunity grant .... " Post, at 8. 
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We note at the outset that although there may be practical 
reasons for not testifying, 14 as far as the deponent's Fifth 
Amendment right is concerned he should be indifferent be-
tween the protection afforded by silence and that afforded by 
immunity. A deponent's primary interest is that the protec-
tion be certain. The Government's interest, however, may 
be affected seriously by whether the deponent relies at the 
civil deposition on his Fifth Amendment privilege or on his 
prior grant of immunity. With due recognition of petition-
ers' need for admissible evidence, our inquiry then is whether 
this need can be met without jeopardizing the Government's 
interest in limiting the scope of an immunity grant or en-
croaching upon the deponent's certainty of protection. 
A 
Questions taken verbatim from a transcript of immunized 
testimony could evoke one of several responses from a depo-
nent: (i) he could repeat or adopt his immunized answer; 15 
compels him to track his prior testimony at the civil deposition-<>ver the 
assertion of his Fifth Amendment rights. If, as we conclude, the original 
grant of immunity does not extend to the subsequent civil proceeding, then 
the trial judge lacks authority to compel Conboy to testify over the asser-
tion of his Fifth Amendment privilege. This is so irrespective of whether, 
had he testified at the deposition rather than asserting the privilege, his 
answers could have been admitted against him at a criminal trial. We 
therefore need not now decide the extent to which civil deposition testi-
mony, freely given by a witness in Conboy's position, is "directly or indi-
rectly derived" from prior grand jury testimony. 
As JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S opinion makes a factual analysis under the 
fruits doctrine, it appears to leave open the possibility that the outcome in 
a subsequent criminal prosecution of the deponent may be different in a 
future case because of differences in the factual record. He nevertheless 
concludes, as do we, that District Courts are without power to compel a 
civil deponent to testify over a valid assertion of his Fifth Amendment 
right, absent a separate grant of immunity pursuant to § 6002. 
"Besides the costs of testifying against close associates, any witness in-
creases the risk of committing perjury the more he talks. Cf. 18 U. S. C. 
§ 6002 (perjured testimony not immunized). 
16 The extreme case would be where petitioners read the entire immu-
10 
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(ii) he could affirm that the transcript of his immunized an-
swers accurately reflects his prior testimony; (iii) he could re-
call additional information responsive to the question but not 
disclosed in his immune testimony; or (iv) he could disclose 
information that is not responsive to the question. Petition-
ers do not contend, nor could they, that the prior grant of use 
immunity affords protection for all self-incriminating in-
formation disclosed by the immunized witness on any occa-
sion after the giving of the immunized testimony. Rather, 
petitioners argue that only the first three responses would be 
"derived from" his immune testimony and therefore would be 
unavailable for use against the deponent in any subsequent 
criminal prosecution. 
Petitioners' premise is that the deposition of Conboy is de-
signed not to discover new information, 16 but to obtain evi-
dence that simply repeats the statements in the immunized 
transcript. 11 Because there will be little opportunity for the 
nized grand-jury transcript; then ask the witness if that is his testimony; 
and he answers simply "Yes." 
16 Direct examination may not be as limited as petitioners assume. The 
District Court's civil contempt order stated that the questions asked in the 
deposition ''were taken directly'' from the immunized transcripts, but did 
not define exactly what deposition questions petitioners could ask. Other 
Courts of Appeals have permitted direct questioning to go beyond mere 
restatements of the prior testimony. See In re Corrugated Container 
Antitrust Litigation, Appeal of Fleischacker, 644 F. 2d 70, 79 (CA2 1981) 
(compelling answers to questions "concerning specific subjects that actu-
ally were touched upon by questions appearing in the transcript of the im-
munized testimony''); Little Rock School District v. Borden, Inc., 632 F. 2d 
700, 705 (CAB 1980) (compelling answers as long as deposition questions 
confined to " 'the same time, geographical and substantive frame work as 
the [ witness' immunized] grand jury testimony'") (quoting Appeal of 
Starkey, 600 F. 2d 1043, 1048 (CAS 1979)). The dissenting opinion of JUS-
TICE STEVENS apparently would permit questioning until "the inquiry 
threatened to exceed proper limits." Post, at 7. 
17 For purposes of this case, we assume that the grand jury transcripts 
are inadmissible as evidence in a civil trial because the testimony is not 
subject to cross examination. Cf. Fed. R. Evid. 803(8) (hearsay exception 
81-8~PINION 
PILLSBURY CO. v. CONBOY 11 
grant of immunity to sweep in statements on direct examina-
tion that the Government did not intend to immunize, or for 
the deponent to give responses that may fall outside of the 
grant of immunity and later be used against him in a subse-
quent criminal prosecution, petitioners argue that Conboy's 
deposition will yield only a carbon copy of the grand-jury 
transcript. In such a situation, it would be desirable for civil 
plaintiffs, particularly those bringing private suits that sup-
plement the criminal enforcement of the federal antitrust 
laws, to have access to the available, probative information. 
But even if the direct examination is limited to the ques-
tions and answers in the immunized transcript, there remains 
the right of cross examination, 18 a right traditionally relied 
upon expansively to test credibility as well as to seek the 
truth. Petitioners recognize this problem, but maintain that 
the antitrust defendants "would be entitled to test the accu-
racy and truthfulness of Conboy's repeated immunized testi-
mony without going beyond the confines of that testimony." 
Regardless of any limitations that may be imposed on its 
scope, 19 however, cross examination is intended to and often 
for certain public records); Fed. R. Evid. 804(a)(l) (witness unavailable 
when exempted from testifying on ground of privilege); Fed. R. Evid. 
804(b)(l) (former testimony admissible when witness unavailable and the 
party against whom the testimony is now offered had an opportunity for 
cross examination). 
18 Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(l) (stating that depositions may be taken ''if 
the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discov-
ery of admissible evidence"); Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(c) (allowing cross examina-
tion at depositions); Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a) (deposition "admissible under the 
rules of evidence applied as though the witness were then present and tes-
tifying"); Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(l) (deposition admissible if the party against 
whom the testimony is now offered in a civil action had an opportunity to 
develop testimony by cross examination). 
1
' See United States v. Cardillo, 316 F. 2d 606, 611 (CA2 1963) (in deter-
mining whether testimony of a witness who invokes the privilege during 
cross examination may be used against defendant, court draws a distinc-
tion between cases in which the assertion of the privilege merely precludes 
12 
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will produce information not elicited on direct. We must as-
sume that, to produce admissible evidence, the scope of cross 
examination at the deposition cannot easily be limited to the 
immunized testimony. This assumption implicates both the 
Government's and the individual's interests embodied in 
§6002. 
B 
Use immunity was intended to immunize and exclude from 
a subsequent-criminal trial only that information to which the 
Government expressly has surrendered future use. If the 
Government is engaged in an ongoing investigation of the 
particular activity at issue, immunizing new information 
(e. g., the answers to questions in a case like this one) may 
make it more difficult to show in a subsequent prosecution 
that similar information was obtained from wholly indepen-
dent sources. If a District Court were to conclude in a sub-
sequent civil proceeding that the prior immunity order ex-
tended to civil deposition testimony closely tracking the 
immunized testimony, it in effect could invest the deponent 
with transactional immunity on matters about which he testi-
fied at the immunized proceedings. This is precisely the 
kind of immunity Congress intended to prohibit. The pur-
pose of § 6002 was to limit the scope of immunity to the level 
that is constitutionally required, as well as to limit the use of 
immunity to those cases in which the Attorney General, or 
officials designated by him, determine that gaining the 
witness's testimony outweighs the loss of the opportunity for 
criminal prosecution of that witness.~ 
inquiry into collateral matters that bear on credibility of witnesses and 
those in which assertion prevents inquiry into matters about which witness 
testified on direct). 
"'We need not decide whether United States Attorneys, when desig-
nated by the Attorney General, presently have authority to immunize the 
testimony of a witness in a civil proceeding when the Government deter-
mines that the public interest would be served. 
,....... 
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Petitioners' interpretation of § 6002 also places substantial 
risks on the deponent. 21 Unless the grant of immunity as-
sures a witness that his incriminating testimony will not be 
used against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution, the 
witness has not received the certain protection of his Fifth 
Amendment privilege that he has been forced to exchange. 
No court has authority to immunize a witness. That respon-
sibility, as we have noted, is peculiarly an executive one, and 
only the Attorney General or a designated officer of the De-
partment of Justice has authority to grant use immunity. 
See 18 U. S. C. §§ 6002, 6003. Nor should a court, at the 
time of the civil testimony, pre-determine the decision of the 
court in a subsequent criminal prosecution on the question 
whether the Government has met its burden of proving "that 
the evidence it proposes to use is derived from a legitimate 
source wholly independent of the compelled testimony." 
Kasti,gar, 406 U. S., at 460. Yet in holding Conboy in con-
t~mpt for his Fifth Amendment silence, the District Court 
_.below essentially predicted that a court in any future criminal 
· prosecution of Conboy will be obligated to protect against 
evidentiary use of the deposition testimony petitioners seek. 
We do not think such a predictive judgment is enough. 
Petitioners' interpretation of § 6002 imposes risks on the 
deponent whether or not the deposition testimony properly 
can be used against him in a subsequent criminal prosecu-
tion. 22 Accordingly, the District Court's compulsion order in 
this case, in the absence of statutory authority or a new grant 
n None of the tests set forth by the Courts of Appeals, or by the dissent, ,, 
that have adopted petitioners' interpretation of § 6002 provides deponents 
with certain guidance as to when they must talk and when they must not. 
See note 16, supra. 
22 Cf. post, at 4 (MARSHALL, J., concurring) ("Further incriminating evi-
dence that is derived from compelled testimony cannot always be traced 
back to its source[.]"); note 14, supra (increasing risk of harm and perjury); 
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of immunity by the United States Attorney, cannot be justi-
fied by the subsequent exclusion of the compelled testimony. 
As JUSTICE MARSHALL notes in his concurring opinion: 
''Whatever justification there may be for requiring a witness 
to give incriminating testimony in aid of a criminal investiga-
tion after the government has granted use immunity, there is 
no similar justification for compelling a witness to give in-
criminating testimony for the benefit of a private litigant 
when the government has not chosen to grant immunity." 
Post, at 4. 
The result of compelling testimony-whether it is immu-
nized or excluded-is that the Government's interests, as 
well as the witness's, suffer. Reliance on judicial exclusion 
of nonimmunized testimony would be inconsistent with the 
congressional policy of leaving the granting of immunity to 
the Executive Branch. 
As the Court stated in Maness v. Meyers, 419 U. S. 449 
(1975), compelling a witness to testify in "reliance upon a 
later objection or motion to suppress would 'let the cat out' 
with no assurance whatever of putting it back." / d., at 463. 
We believe Conboy acted properly in maintaining his silence 
in the face of the District Court's compulsion order and by 
testing the validity of his privilege on appeal. 
IV 
This Court has emphasized the importance of the private 
action as a means of furthering the policy goals of certain fed-
eral regulatory statutes, including the federal antitrust laws. 
See, e.g., Perrna Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts 
Corp., 392 U. S. 134, 139 (1968); United States v. Borden 
Co., 347 U. S. 514, 518-519 (1954). But private civil actions 
can only supplement, not supplant, the primary responsibil-
ity of Government. Petitioners' proposed construction of 
§ 6002 sweeps further than Congress intended and could hin-
der governmental enforcement of its criminal laws by turning 
J 
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use immunity into a form of transactional immunity for sub-
jects examined in the immunized proceeding . . It also puts 
the deponent in some danger of criminal prosecution unless 
he receives an assurance of immunity or exclusion that the 
courts cannot properly give. Silence, on the other hand, 
preserves the deponent's rights and the Government's inter-
ests, as well as the judicial resources that otherwise would be 
required to make the many difficult judgments that petition-
I ers' interpretation of § 6002 would require. 23 
V 
We hold that a deponent's civil deposition testimony, 
closely tracking his prior immunized testimony, is not, with-
out duly authorized assurance of immunity at the time, im-
munized testimony within the meaning of § 6002, and there-
fore maYt not be compelled over a valid assertion of his Fifth 
I Amendment privilege. 24 The judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals accordingly is 
Affirmed. 
I r:s The dissent minimizes the enforcement interest that our construction 
of§ 6002 protects, post, at 10, 11, 13, contending that we "rel[y] on a highly 
theoretical and hypothetical prosecutorial interest," id., at 13. We note, 
however, that by conceding that there is some "slight risk'' that the depo-
nent's testimony may hamper a prosecution, id., at 13, the dissent con-
cedes that its interpretation of § 6002 provides at least somewhat broader 
immunity than Congress intended. Moreover, the dissent overlooks the 
possible difficulty of securing the cooperation of individuals such as Conboy 
who may be more reluctant to testify in the immunized proceedings if they 
know that later deposition testimony may increase their exposure to civil 
liability. Finally, in the dissent's "judgment[,] the enforcement interest in 
gaining access to such details at a deposition far outweighs th[at] risk. ... " 
Id., at 13. See also id., at 9. This, however, is a judgment reserved for 
officials of the Department of Justice, not the federal courts, to make on a 
case-by-case basis. 
I 
24 Our holding is limited to precluding District Courts from compelling 
testimony in a civil deposition over a valid assertion of the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege, absent a specific assurance of immunity for such testimony. 
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tion answers could be used against a civil deponent in a subsequent crimi-
nal trial. Yet the dissenting opinion states, and much of its analysis de-
pends, on the erroneous conclusion that "[t]he Court today holds that 
[Conboy's] answers could be used, even if he did nothing more than ac-
knowledge the truth of his prior testimony." Post, at 3. 
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,, Pursuant to the federal use immunity provisions, 18 
iWfsll.,..,...,,~ U. S. C. §§ 6001-6005 (1976), a United States Attorney may 
request an order from a federal court compelling a witness to 
~ testify even though he has asserted his privilege against self-
/-
'-/-#~  incrimination. Section 6002 provides, however, that "notes-
, · - ~ ~~ -~ ~ ony or other information compelled under the order (or 
~--~- . · any information directly or indirectly derived from such testi-
l• ~ .. ~:..~ mony or other information) may be used against the witness 
~~~ in any criminal case .... " The issue presented in this case is 
,l/J,,,, ,t::..- / - - whether a deponent's civil deposition testimony, repeating 
verbatim or closely tracking his prior immunized testimony, 
~ • is immunized "information" that can be compelled over the 
valid assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege. 
I 
Respondent John Conboy is a former executive of a defen-
dant in the In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 
M.D.L. 310 (S.D. Tex.). In January 1978, United States 
Department of Justice attorneys interviewed Conboy follow-
ing a promise of use immunity. Conboy subsequently ap-
peared before a grand jury investigating price-fixing activi-
ties and, pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 6002, was granted formal 
use immunity for his testimony. 
2 
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Following the criminal indictment of several companies, 
numerous civil antitrust actions were filed in various United 
States district courts. Those actions were consolidated for 
discovery in the District Court for the Southern District of 
Texas. Petitioners here are purchasers of corrugated con-
tainers who elected to opt out of the class-action proceedings 
and pursue their own causes of action against manufacturers. 
The District Court ordered that portions of the immunized 
government interview and grand-jury testimony of certain 
witnesses, including that of Conboy, be made available to 
lawyers for the class and opt-outs. 1 
Pursuant to a subpoena issued by the District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois, Conboy appeared in Chicago for 
a deposition at which he, his counsel, and petitioners' counsel 
had copies of his immunized testimony. The transcripts 
were marked as deposition exhibits so that all could follow 
the intended examination. The questioning fell into the fol-
lowing pattern: a question was read from the transcript; it 
then was rephrased to include the transcript answer (i. e., 
"Is it not the fact that .... "); finally, Conboy was asked if 
he had "so testified" in his immunized interview and grand-
jury examination. 2 Conboy refused to answer each ques-
tion, asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. 
The District Court granted petitioners' motion to compel 
1 The propriety of the District Court's release of grand jury materials to 
the civil parties is not before the Court. 
2 An example of this three-question pattern is as follows: 
Q. Who did you have price communications with at Alton Box Board? 
Q. Is it not the fact that you had price communications with Fred 
Renshaw and Dick Herman ... ? 
Q. Did you not so testify in your government interview of January 10, 
1978? 
Joint Appendix 29--31. 
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Conboy to answer the questions. 3 When Conboy continued 
to claim his privilege, the District Court held him in con-
tempt, but stayed its order pending appeal. A panel of the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the con-
tempt order, holding that, "[b]ecause the questions asked in 
this deposition were taken verbatim from or closely tracked 
the transcript of Conboy's grand jury testimony, we believe 
that his answers at the deposition would be 'derived from' the 
prior immunized [testimony] and therefore unavailable for 
use in any subsequent criminal prosecution." In re Corru-
gated Container Antitrust Litigation, Appeal of John Con-
boy, 655 F. 2d 748, 751 (CA7), rev'd en bane, 661 F. 2d 1145 
(1981). 
On rehearing en bane, the Court of Appeals reversed the 
District Court. It first determined that Conboy's alleged 
fear of prosecution was more than "fanciful," 661 F. 2d, at 
1152, and that Conboy therefore was entitled to assert his 
Fifth Amendment privilege unless his deposition testimony 
could not be used against him in a subsequent criminal action, 
see id., at 1153. 4 The court then held that under § 6002, ab-
sent a separate and independent grant of immunity, 5 a depo-
nent's civil deposition testimony that repeats verbatim or 
closely tracks his prior immunized testimony is not protected. 
While acknowledging that verbatim questions "of course 
[would be] derived" from the immunized testimony, the court 
reasoned that the answers to such questions "are derived 
8 Chief Judge John V. Singleton, Jr. of the District Court for the South-
ern District of Texas expressly exercised the powers of the District Court 
for the Northern District of Illinois pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1407(b). The 
contempt hearing was conducted by telephone with his chambers in 
Houston. 
4 The correctness of the Court of Appeals' conclusion that Conboy could 
assert a Fifth Amendment privilege, absent some immunity, is not before 
us. 
5 A United States Attorney declined to authorize immunity grants in 
connection with the civil depositions here. 
4 
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from the deponent's current, independent memory of events" 
and thus "necessarily create a new source of evidence" that 
could be used in a subsequent criminal prosecution against 
Conboy. Id., at 1155 (emphasis in original). 
We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict in the Courts 
of Appeals,6 and now affirm. 
II 
It is settled that government must have the power to com-
pel testimony "to secure information necessary for effective 
law enforcement." Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 
U. S. 52, 79 (1964). 7 For many years, however, a person 
who was compelled to testify under a grant of governmental 
immunity could not be prosecuted for any conduct about 
which he had testified. See New Jersey v. Portash, 440 
U. S. 450, 457 (1979). Prosecutors therefore were reluctant 
to grant such "transactional" immunity to potential targets 
of criminal investigations. See S. Rep. No. 91-617, p. 53 
(1969). 
The "major purpose" of the Organized Crime Control Act 
of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 927, of which§ 6002 was 
a key provision, was "to provide the criminal justice system 
with the necessary legal tools to . . . strengthe[n] the evi-
dence gathering process and insur[e] that the evidence will 
then be available and admissible at trial." 116 Cong. Rec. 
35,200 (1970) (statement of Rep. St. Germain). Congress 
6 Compare In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, Appeal of 
Fleischacker, 644 F. 2d 70, 75 (CA2 1981) (deposition answers immunized), 
and Little Rock School District v. Borden, Inc., 632 F. 2d 700, 705 (CA8 
1980) (same), with In re Corrugated Container Anti-Trust Litigation, Ap-
peal of Franey , 620 F. 2d 1086, 1095 (CA5 1980) (answers not immunized), 
cert. denied, 449 U. S. 1102 (1981). 
1 See United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 345 (1974); United 
States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 41 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting); Kasti-
garv. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 443-444 (1973); Murphy, 378 U. S., at 
93-94 (WHITE, J., concurring); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421, 
438 (1932); Blair v. United States, 250 U. S. 273, 281 (1919); Brown v. 
Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 600 (1896). 
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sought to make the grant of immunity more useful for law en-
forcement officers through two specific changes. First, Con-
gress made the grant of immunity less expansive 8 by re-
pealing the authority for transactional immunity and provid-
ing for the less comprehensive use immunity authorized 
in § 6002. 9 Second, Congress gave certain officials in 
the Department of Justice 10 exclusive authority to grant 
immunities. 11 
8 In Murphy, JUSTICE WHITE stated that "[i]mmunity must be as broad 
as, but not harmfully and wastefully broader than, the privilege against 
self-incrimination." 378 U. S., at 107 (concurring opinion) (quoted with 
approval in 116 Cong. Rec. 35,291 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff)). In its 
committee report, the House explained that § 6002 was not to provide an 
"immunity bath," but was to be "no broader than" the Fifth Amendment 
privilege. H.R. No. 91-1549, p. 5 (1970). 
• Section 6002 provides: 
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-
incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding be-
fore or ancillary to-
( 1) a court or grand jury of the United States, 
(2) an agency of the United States, or 
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses, or a 
committee or a subcommittee of either House 
and the person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the witness 
an order issued under this part, the witness may not refuse to comply with 
the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but no tes-
timony or other information compelled under the order (or any information 
directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) 
may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution 
for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with 
the order. 
Section 6001(2) defines "other information" to include "any book, paper, 
document, record, recording, or other material." 
10 Section 6003 states: 
(a) In the case of any individual who has been or may be called to testify 
or provide other information at any proceeding before or ancillary to a 
court of the United States or a grand jury of the United States, the United 
States district court for the judicial district in which the proceeding is or 
may be held shall issue, in accordance with subsection (b) of this section, 
upon the request of the United States attorney for such district, an order 
[Footnotes 10 and 11 continue on page 6] 
6 
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The Court upheld the constitutionality of the use immunity 
statute in Kastigar v. United States, 406 U. S. 441 (1972). 
The power to compel testimony is limited by the Fifth 
Amendment, and we held that any grant of immunity must 
be co-extensive with the privilege. We were satisfied, how-
ever, that § 6002 provided this measure of protection and 
thus "removed the dangers against which the privilege pro-
tects." Id., at 449. In rejecting the argument that use and 
derivative-use immunity would not adequately protect a wit-
ness from various incriminating uses of the compelled testi-
mony, we emphasized that "[t]he statute provides a sweeping 
proscription of any use, direct or indirect, of the compelled 
testimony and any information derived therefrom .... " Id., 
at 460. We added that once a defendant establishes that he 
has testified un.der a grant of immunity, "the prosecution 
[has] the affirmative duty to prove that the evidence it pro-
poses to use is derived from a legitimate source wholly inde-
pendent of the compelled testimony." Ibid. Thus, "immu-
nity from use and derivative use 'leaves the witness and the 
Federal Government in substantially the same position as if 
the witness had claimed his privilege' in the absence of a 
grant of immunity." Kastigar, 406 U. S., at 458-459 (quot-
ing Murphy, 378 U. S., at 79). 
requiring such individual to give testimony or provide other information 
which he refuses to give or provide on the basis of his privilege against self-
incrimination, such order to become effective as provided in section 6002 of 
this part. 
(b) A United States attorney may, with the approval of the Attorney 
General, the Deputy Attorney General, or any designated Assistant Attor-
ney General, request an order under subsection (a) of this section when in 
his judgment-
(1) the testimony or other information from such individual may be nec-
essary to the public interest; and 
(2) such individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide 
other information on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination. 
11 Congress foresaw the courts as playing only a minor role in the immu-
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7 
With the foregoing statutory history and relevant princi-
ples in mind, we turn now to this case. It is not disputed 
that the questions asked of Conboy were directly or indi-
rectly derived from his immunized testimony. The issue 
presented is whether the causal connection between the 
questions and the answers is so direct that the answers also 
are derived from that testimony and therefore should be ex-
cluded under the grant of immunity. 
Petitioners' argument is based on the language of § 6002 
and on a common understanding of the words "derived from." 
The questions formulated on the basis of immunized testi-
mony are clearly "derived from" the prior testimony. Thus, 
the answers that repeat verbatim or closely track a depo-
nent's testimony are necessarily also "derived from" and 
"tainted by" such testimony. Petitioners therefore find no 
basis for the distinction made by the Court of Appeals be-
tween questions and answers responsive to those same ques-
tions. An answer by its very nature is evoked by and re-
sponds to information contained in a question. 
Conboy's position is also straightforward: Questions do not 
incriminate; answers do. Unlike the questions, answers are 
not directly or indirectly derived from the immunized grand 
jury or interview transcripts, but from the deponent's cur-
rent, independent memory of events. Even when a depo-
nent's deposition answers are identical to those he gave to 
the grand jury, he is under oath to tell the truth, not neces-
nizing process: "The court's role in granting the order is merely to find the 
facts on which the order is predicated." H.R. Rep. No. 91-1549, supra 
note 8, at 43; H.R. Rep. No. 91-1188, p. 13 (1970). See 116 Cong. Rec. 
35,291 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff). Cf. President's Commission on 
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime 
in a Free Society 141 (1967) (recommending that "[i]mmunity should be 
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sarily as he told it before the grand jury, but as he knows it 
now. Each new statement of the deponent creates a new 
"source." In sum, the initial grant of immunity does not pre-
vent the prosecutor from prosecuting; it merely limits his 
sources of evidence. 
Although the parties make their arguments in terms track-
ing those of the statute-whether the deposition testimony is 
"derived from" the prior testimony-it is clear that the crux 
of their dispute is whether the earlier grant of immunity it-
self compelled Conboy to talk. 12 Petitioners contend that the 
prior grant of immunity already had supplanted Conboy's 
Fifth Amendment privilege at the time of the civil deposition. 
Petitioners would limit this immunity, of course, to testimony 
that "closely tracks" his prior immunized testimony. It is 
argued that this would not threaten the Government's need 
for admissible evidence or the individual's interest in avoid-
ing self-incrimination. In the absence of such a threat, ad-
missible evidence should be available to civil antitrust plain-
tiffs. But we cannot accejt the assumptions upon which 
petitioners' conclusion rests. "' In our view, a District Court 
cannot compel Conboy to answer deposition questions, over a 
valid assertion of his Fifth •Amendment right, absent a duly 
authorized assurance of immunity at the time. 13 
12 See Brief for Petitioners 19 ("Conboy had no Fifth Amendment privi-
lege to assert because of the coextensive protection provided by the immu-
nity statute."); Reply Brief for Petitioners 12 ("[R]equiring a witness to an-
swer questions a second time that were previously answered under a grant 
of immunity does not result in an expansion of the original immunity 
~ ant."). 
13 JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring in the Court's judgment, assumes 
that Conboy had a right to remain silent at the deposition, which by defini-
tion assumes the immunity order itself does not compel a witness to testify 
at a civil deposition. He discusses the "fruits" doctrine where a witness's 
testimony at a deposition is "an independent act of free will" and concludes 
that "had Conboy answered the deposition questions, his testimony would 
not have been protected by the original immunity grant . .. . " Post, at 8. 
We have no occasion to address this hypothetical. The issue is whether 
Conboy can be compelled to testify-i. e., whether the immunity order 
FN ~ ~ --e 
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We note at the outset that although there may be practical 
reasons for not testifying, 14 as far as the deponent's Fifth 
Amendment right is concerned he should be indifferent be-
tween the protection afforded by silence and that afforded by 
immunity. A deponent's primary interest is that the protec-
tion be certain. The Government's interest, however, may 
be affected seriously by whether the deponent relies at the 
civil deposition on his Fifth Amendment privilege or on his 
prior grant of immunity. With due recognition of petition-
ers' need for admissible evidence, our inquiry then is whether 
this need can be met without jeopardizing the Government's 
interest in limiting the scope of an immunity grant or en-
croaching upon the deponent's certainty of protection. 
A 
Questions taken verbatim from a transcript of immunized 
testimony could evoke one of several responses from a depo-
nent: (i) he could repeat or adopt his immunized answer; 15 
compels him to track his prior testimony at the civil deposition--0ver the 
assertion of his Fifth Amendment rights. If, as we conclude, the original 
grant of immunity does not extend to the subsequent civil proceeding, then 
the trial judge lacks authority to compel Conboy to testify over the asser-
tion of his Fifth Amendment privilege. This is so irrespective of whether, 
had he testified at the deposition rather than asserting the privilege, his 
answers could have been admitted against him at a criminal trial. We 
therefore need not now decide the extent to which civil deposition testi-
mony, freely given by a witness in Conboy's position, is "directly or indi-
rectly derived" from prior grand jury testimony. 
As JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S opinion makes a factual analysis under the 
fruits doctrine, it appears to leave open the possibility that the outcome in 
a subsequent criminal prosecution of the deponent may be different in a 
future case because of differences in the factual record. He nevertheless 
concludes, as do we, that District Courts are without power to compel a 
civil deponent to testify over a valid assertion of his Fifth Amendment 
right, absent a separate grant of immunity pursuant to § 6002. 
1
• Besides the costs of testifying against close associates, any witness in-
creases the risk of committing perjury the more he talks. Cf. 18 U. S. C. 
§ 6002 (perjured testimony not immunized). 
15 The extreme case would be where petitioners read the entire immu-
10 
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(ii) he could affirm that the transcript of his immunized an-
swers accurately reflects his prior testimony; (iii) he could re-
call additional information responsive to the question but not 
disclosed in his immune testimony; or (iv) he could disclose 
information that is not responsive to the question. Petition-
ers do not contend, nor could they, that the prior grant of use 
immunity affords protection for all self-incriminating in-
formation disclosed by the immunized witness on any occa-
sion after the giving of the immunized testimony. Rather, 
petitioners argue that only the first three responses would be 
"derived from" his immune testimony and therefore would be 
unavailable for use against the deponent in any subsequent 
criminal prosecution. 
Petitioners' premise is that the deposition of Conboy is de-
signed not to discover new information, 16 but to obtain evi-
dence that simply repeats the statements in the immunized 
transcript. 11 Because there will be little opportunity for the 
nized grand-jury transcript; then ask the witness if that is his testimony; 
and he answers simply "Yes." 
1
• Direct examination may not be as limited as petitioners assume. The 
District Court's civil contempt order stated that the questions asked in the 
deposition "were taken directly'' from the immunized transcripts, but did 
not define exactly what deposition questions petitioners could ask. Other 
Courts of Appeals have permitted direct questioning to go beyond mere 
restatements of the prior testimony. See In re Corrugated Container 
Antitrust Litigation, Appeal of Fleischacker, 644 F. 2d 70, 79 (CA2 1981) 
(compelling answers to questions "concerning specific subjects that actu-
ally were touched upon by questions appearing in the transcript of the im-
munized testimony"); Little Rock School District v. Borden , Inc. , 632 F. 2d 
700, 705 (CA8 1980) (compelling answers as long as deposition questions 
confined to " 'the same time, geographical and substantive frame work as 
the [witness' immunized] grand jury testimony"') (quoting Appeal of 
Starkey , 600 F. 2d 1043, 1048 (CA8 1979)). The dissenting opinion of Jus-
TICE STEVENS apparently would permit questioning until "the inquiry 
threatened to exceed proper limits." Post, at 7. 
11 For purposes of this case, we assume that the grand jury transcripts 
are inadmissible as evidence in a civil trial because the testimony is not 
subject to cross examination. Cf. Fed. R. Evid. 803(8) (hearsay exception 
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grant of immunity to sweep in statements on direct examina-
tion that the Government did not intend to immunize, or for 
the deponent to give responses that may fall outside of the 
grant of immunity and later be used against him in a subse-
quent criminal prosecution, petitioners argue that Conboy's 
deposition will yield only a carbon copy of the grand-jury 
transcript. In such a situation, it would be desirable for civil 
plaintiffs, particularly those bringing private suits that sup-
plement the criminal enforcement of the federal antitrust 
laws, to have access to the available, probative information. 
But even if the direct examination is limited to the ques-
tions and answers in the immunized transcript, there remains 
the right of cross examination, 18 a right traditionally relied 
upon expansively to test credibility as well as to seek the 
truth. Petitioners recognize this problem, but maintain that 
the antitrust defendants "would be entitled to test the accu-
racy and truthfulness of Conboy's repeated immunized testi-
mony without going beyond the confines of that testimony." 
Regardless of any limitations that may be imposed on its 
scope, 19 however, cross examination is intended to and often 
for certain public records); Fed. R. Evid. 804(a)(l) (witness unavailable 
when exempted from testifying on ground of privilege); Fed. R. Evid. 
804(b)(l) (former testimony admissible when witness unavailable and the 
party against whom the testimony is now offered had an opportunity for 
cross examination). 
18 Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(l) (stating that depositions may be taken "if 
the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discov-
ery of admissible evidence"); Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(c) (allowing cross examina-
tion at depositions); Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a) (deposition "admissible under the 
rules of evidence applied as though the witness were then present and tes-
tifying"); Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(l) (deposition admissible if the party against 
whom the testimony is now offered in a civil action had an opportunity to 
develop testimony by cross examination). 
19 See United States v. Cardillo, 316 F . 2d 606, 611 (CA21963) (in deter-
mining whether testimony of a witness who invokes the privilege during 
cross examination may be used against defendant, court draws a distinc-
tion between cases in which the assertion of the privilege merely precludes 
12 
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will produce information not elicited on direct. We must as-
sume that, to produce admissible evidence, the scope of cross 
examination at the deposition cannot easily be limited to the 
immunized testimony. This assumption implicates both the 
Government's and the individual's interests embodied in 
§6002. 
B 
Use immunity was intended to immunize and exclude from 
a subsequent criminal trial only that information to which the 
Government expressly has surrendered future use. If the 
Government is engaged in an ongoing investigation of the 
particular activity at issue, immunizing new information 
(e. g., the answers to questions in a case like this one) may 
make it more difficult to show in a subsequent prosecution 
that similar information was obtained from wholly indepen-
dent sources. If a District Court were to conclude in a sub-
sequent civil proceeding that the prior immunity order ex-
tended to civil deposition testimony closely tracking the 
immunized testimony, it in effect could invest the deponent 
with transactional immunity on matters about which he testi-
fied at the immunized proceedings. This is precisely the 
kind of immunity Congress intended to prohibit. The pur-
pose of § 6002 was to limit the scope of immunity to the level 
that is constitutionally required, as well as to limit the use of 
immunity to those cases in which the Attorney General, or 
officials designated by him, determine that gaining the 
witness's testimony outweighs the loss of the opportunity for 
criminal prosecution of that witness. 20 
inquiry into collateral matters that bear on credibility of witnesses and 
those in which assertion prevents inquiry into matters about which witness 
testified on direct). 
'!{) We need not decide whether United States Attorneys, when desig-
nated by the Attorney General, presently have authority to immunize the 
testimony of a witness in a civil proceeding when the Government deter-
mines that the public interest would be served. 
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Petitioners' interpretation of § 6002 also places substantial 
risks on the deponent. 21 Unless the grant of immunity as-
sures a witness that his incriminating testimony will not be 
used against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution, the 
witness has not received the certain protection of his Fifth 
Amendment privilege that he has been forced to exchange. 
No court has authority to immunize a witness. That respon-
sibility, as we have noted, is peculiarly an executive one, and 
only the Attorney General or a designated officer of the De-
partment of Justice has authority to grant use immunity. 
See 18 U. S. C. §§ 6002, 6003. Nor should a court, at the 
time of the civil testimony, pre-determine the decision of the 
court in a subsequent criminal prosecution on the question 
whether the Government has met its burden of proving "that 
the evidence it proposes to use is derived from a legitimate 
source wholly independent of the compelled testimony." 
Kastigar, 406 U. S., at 460. Yet in holding Conboy in con-
tempt for his Fifth Amendment silence, the District Court 
below essentially predicted that a court in any future criminal 
prosecution of Conboy will be obligated to protect against 
evidentiary use of the deposition testimony petitioners seek. 
We do not think such a predictive judgment is enough. 
Petitioners' interpretation of § 6002 imposes risks on the 
deponent whether or not the deposition testimony properly 
can be used against him in a subsequent criminal prosecu-
tion. 22 It is true that were he compelled to testify over his 
21 None of the tests set forth by the Courts of Appeals, or by the dissent, 
that have adopted petitioners' interpretation of § 6002 provides deponents 
with certain guidance as to when they must talk and when they must not. 
See note 16, supra. 
22 Our holding is limited to precluding District Courts from compelling 
testimony in a civil deposition over a valid assertion of the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege, absent a specific assurance of immunity for such testimony. 
It is clear this holding does not depend on the assumption that the deposi-
tion answers could be used against a civil deponent in a subsequent crimi-
14 
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assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege, Conboy might 
be protected by "a constitutionally imposed use immunity" 
even if the trial judge had been wrong in his prediction that 
§ 6002 would require exclusion of Conboy's answers. Cf. 
Maness v. Myers, 419 U. S. 449, 474-475 (1975) (WHITE, J., 
concurring in the result). But the District Court's compul-
sion order in this case, in the absence of statutory authority 
or a new grant of immunity by the United States Attorney, 
cannot be justified retroactively by the subsequent exclusion 
of the compelled testimony. 23 As JUSTICE MARSHALL notes 
in his concurring opinion: "Whatever justification there may 
be for requiring a witness to give incriminating testimony in 
aid of a criminal investigation after the government has 
granted use immunity, there is no similar justification for 
compelling a witness to give incriminating testimony for the 
benefit of a private litigant when the government has not 
chosen to grant immunity." Post, at 4. 
The result of compelling testimony-whether it is immu-
nized or excluded-is that the Government's interests, as 
well as the witness's, suffer. Reliance on judicial exclusion 
of nonimmunized testimony would be inconsistent with the 
congressional policy of leaving the granting of immunity to 
the Executive Branch. 
As the Court stated in Maness v. Meyers, 419 U. S. 449 
(1975), compelling a witness to testify in "reliance upon a 
later objection or motion to suppress would 'let the cat out' 
with no assurance whatever of putting it back." Id., at 463. 
We believe Conboy acted properly in maintaining his silence 
nal trial. Yet the dissenting opinion states, and much of its analysis de-
pends, on the erroneous conclusion that "[t]he Court today holds that 
[Conboy's] answers could be used, even if he did nothing more than ac-
lmowledge the truth of his prior testimony." Post, at 3. 
23Cf. post, at 4 (MARSHALL, J. , concurring) ("Further incriminating evi-
dence that is derived from compelled testimony cannot always be traced 
back to its source[.]"); note 14, supra (increasing risk of harm and perjury); 
note 22, supra (increasing exposure to civil liability). 
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in the face of the District Court's compulsion order and by 
testing the validity of his privilege on appeal. 
IV 
This Court has emphasized the importance of the private 
action as a means of furthering the policy goals of certain fed-
eral regulatory statutes, including the federal antitrust laws. 
See, e.g., Perrna Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts 
Corp., 392 U. S. 134; 139 (1968); United States v. Borden 
Co., 347 U. S. 514, 518-519 (1954). But private civil actions 
can only supplement, not supplant, the primary responsibil-
ity of Government. Petitioners' proposed construction of 
§ 6002 sweeps further than Congress intended and could hin-
der governmental enforcement of its criminal laws by turning 
use immunity into a form of transactional immunity for sub-
jects examined in the immunized proceeding. It also puts 
the deponent in some danger of criminal prosecution unless 
he receives an assurance of immunity or exclusion that the 
courts cannot properly give. Silence, on the other hand, 
preserves the deponent's rights and the Government's inter-
ests, as well as the judicial resources that otherwise would be 
required to make the many difficult judgments that petition-
ers' interpretation of § 6002 would require. 24 
24 The dissent minimizes the enforcement interest that our construction 
of§ 6002 protects, post, at 10, 11, 13, contending that we "rel[y] on a highly 
theoretical and hypothetical prosecutorial interest," id. , at 13. We note, 
however, that by conceding that there is some "slight risk" that the depo-
nent's testimony may hamper a prosecution, id., at 13, the dissent con-
cedes that its interpretation of § 6002 provides at least somewhat broader 
immunity than Congress intended. Moreover, the dissent overlooks the 
possible difficulty of securing the cooperation of individuals such as Conboy 
who may be more reluctant to testify in the immunized proceedings if they 
know that later deposition testimony may increase their exposure to civil 
liability. Finally, in the dissent's "judgment[,] the enforcement interest in 
gaining access to such details at a deposition far outweighs th[at] risk .... " 
Id., at 13. See also id., at 9. · This, however, is a judgment reserved for 
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We hold that a deponent's civil deposition testimony, 
closely tracking his prior immunized testimony, is not, with-
out duly authorized assurance of immunity at the time, im-
munized testimony within the meaning of§ 6002, and there-
fore may not be compelled over a valid assertion of his Fifth 
Amendment privilege. The judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals accordingly is 
Affirmed. 
Rider C 
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The dissent seems to concede that, if the qut 
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addressed in another case on a different record. Post, at 13. The 
dissent assumes "the fact that truthful answers to [the deposition] 
questions would merely have confirmed information that was already 
recorded in the grand jury transcript." Id., at 3. Because the 
issue here is whether Conboy may be compelled merely to ratify his 
prior immunity, it is relevant to determine whether the deposition 
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Rider A 
The dissent states that it does "not understand why such cross-
examination would not be allowed." Post, at 12 n. 17. In light of 
our assumption, the dissent's statement is puzzling. It fails to 
explain how, under its interpretation of §6002, cross examination 
will be limited to protect, if at all, the government and deponent's 







The dissent criticizes our limited analogy to transactional 
immunity. Post, at 10. The dissent does not explain, however, how 
transactional immunity significantly would differ in effect from 
immunity for all deposition answers given on direct and cross 
examination "on matters about which he testified at the immunized 
proceedings." 
~A 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN, in his opinion concurring in the result, 
criticizes this formulation of the issue, stating that it "begs the 
question now before us. The earlier grant of immunity, by itself, 
obviously does not compel Conboy to testify at a later deposition." 
Post, at 2. JUSTICE BLACKMUN rejects petitioners' view that 
"deposition testimony involving the same subject matter as prior 
immunized testimony would be protected by the prior grant of use 
immunity," only because Conboy's interpretation is "narrower." Id., 
at 7. It is clear that JUSTICE BLACKMON is willing to assume more 
than are we. As the dissent notes, "since [Conboy] is under 
subpoena, he must speak unless he has a valid Fifth Amendment 
privilege ••.• " Post, at 7. To assume that the earlier grant of 
immunity has not supplanted Conboy's Fifth Amendment privilege 
assumes the answer to the very question we must answer: if his 
deposition testimony is covered by the prior grant of immunity, he 
may be compelled to testifyi if it is not covered, he may not be so 
compelled. Moreover, JUSTICE BLACKMON clearly assumes that the 
deposition testimony produces something that is different from the 
prior compelled testimony and necessarily not covered by the prior 
grant of immunity. Because petitioners contest whether tracking the 
prior deposition testimony would produce anything really new, it is 
far from obvious that Conboy's interpretation of §6002 is narrower. 
Indeed, we agree with Conboy that the deposition testimony is not 
covered by the prior grant of immunity, and thus may not be 
compelled over a valid assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege, 
precisely because we do not think that petitioners could produce a 
transcript that only tracked the prior testimony. 
~1 ... -
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Pursuant to the federal use immunity provisions, 18 
U. S. C. §§ 6001-6005 (1976), a United States Attorney may 
request an order from a federal court compelling a witness to 
testify even though he has asserted his privilege against self-
incrimination. Section 6002 provides, however, that "notes-
timony or other information compelled under the order (or 
any information directly or indirectly derived from such testi-
mony or other information) may be used against the witness 
in any criminal case. . . . " The issue presented in this case is 
whether a deponent's civil deposition testimony, repeating 
verbatim or closely tracking his prior immunized testimony, 
is immunized "testimony" that can be compelled over the 
valid assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege. 
I 
Respondent John Conboy is a former executive of a defend-
ant in the In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Liti,gation, 
M.D.L. 310 (S.D. Tex.). In January 1978, United States 
Department of Justice attorneys interviewed Conboy 
following a promise of use immunity. Conboy subsequently 
appeared before a grand jury investigating price-fixing activ-
ities and, pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 6002, was granted formal 
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PILLSBURY CO. v. CONBOY 
Following the criminal indictment of several companies, 
numerous civil antitrust actions were filed in various United 
States district courts. Those actions were consolidated for 
discovery in the District Court for the Southern District of 
Texas. Petitioners here are purchase:rs of corrugated con-
tainers who elected to opt out of the class-action proceedings 
and pursue their own causes of action against manufacturers. 
The District Court ordered that portions of the immunized 
government interview and grand-jury testimony of certain 
witnesses, including that of Conboy, be made available to 
lawyers for the class and opt-outs. 1 
Pursuant to a subpoena issued by the District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois, Conboy appeared in Chicago for 
a deposition at which he, his counsel, and petitioners' counsel 
had copies of his immunized testimony. The transcripts 
were marked as deposition exhibits so that all could follow 
the intended examination. The questioning fell into the 
following pattern: a question was read from the transcript; it 
then was rephrased to include the transcript answer (i. e., 
"Is it not the fact that .... "); finally, Conboy was asked if 
he had "so testified" in his immunized interview and grand-
jury examination. 2 Conboy refused to answer each ques-
tion, asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. 
The District Court granted petitioners' motion to compel 
1 The propriety of the District Court's release of grand jury materials to 
the civil parties is not before the Court. 
z An example of this three-question pattern is as follows: 
Q. Who did you have price communications with at Alton Box Board? 
Q. Is it not the fact that you had price communications with Fred 
Renshaw and Dick Herman ... ? 
Q. Did you not so testify in your government interview of January 10, 
1978? 
Joint Appendix 29--31. 
t 
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Conboy to answer the questions. s When Conboy continued 
to claim his privilege, the District Court held him in con-
tempt, but stayed its order pending appeal. A panel of the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the con-
tempt order, .holding that, "[b ]ecause the questions asked in 
this deposition were taken verbatim from or closely tracked 
the transcript of Conboy's grand jury testimony, we believe 
that his answers at the deposition would be 'derived from' the 
prior immunized [testimony] and therefore unavailable for 
use in any subsequent criminal prosecution." In re Corru-
gated Container Antitrust Litigation, Appeal of John Con-
boy, 655 F. 2d 748, 751 (CA7), rev'd en bane, 661 F. 2d 1145 
(1981). 
On rehearing en bane, the Court of Appeals reversed the 
District Court. It first determined that Conboy's alleged 
fear of prosecution was more than "fanciful," 661 F. 2d, at 
1152, and that Conboy therefore was entitled to assert his 
Fifth Amendment privilege unless his deposition testimony 
could not be used against him in a subsequent criminal action, 
see id., at 1153. 4 The court then held that under § 6002, ab-
sent a separate and independent grant of immunity, 5 a depo-
nent's civil deposition testimony that repeats verbatim or 
closely tracks his prior immunized testimony is not protected. 
While acknowledging that verbatim questions "of course 
[would be] derived" from the immunized testimony, the court 
reasoned that the answers to such questions "are derived 
3 Chief Judge John V. Singleton, Jr. of the District Court for the South-
ern District of Texas expressly exercised the powers of the District Court 
for the Northern District oflllinois pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1407(b). The 
contempt hearing was conducted by telephone with his chambers in 
Houston. 
• The correctness of the Court of Appeals' conclusion that Conboy could 
assert a Fifth Amendment privilege, absent some immunity, is not before 
us. 
5 A United States Attorney declined to authorize immunity grants in 
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from the deponent's current, independent memory of events" 
and thus "necessarily create a new source of evidence" that 
could be used in a subsequent criminal prosecution against 
Conboy. Id., at 1155 (emphasis in original). 
We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict in the Courts 
of Appeals, 6 and now affirm. 
II 
It is settled that government must have the power to com-
pel testimony "to secure information necessary for effective 
law enforcement." Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 
U. S. 52, 79 (1964). 7 For many years, however, a person 
who was compelled to testify under a grant of governmental 
immunity could not be prosecuted for any conduct about 
which he had testified. See New Jersey v. Portash, 440 
U. S. 450, 457 (1979). Prosecutors therefore were reluctant 
to grant such "transactional" immunity to potential targets 
of criminal investigations. See S. Rep. No. 91-617, p. 53 
(1969). 
The "major purpose" of the Organized Crime Control Act 
of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 927, of which§ 6002 was 
a key provision, was "to provide the criminal justice system 
with the necessary legal tools to . . . strengthe[n] the evi-
dence gathering process and insur[e] that the evidence will 
then be available and admissible at trial." 116 Cong. Rec. 
35,200 (1970) (statement of Rep. St. Germain). Congress 
6 Compare In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, Appeal of 
Fleischacker, 644 F. 2d 70, 75 (CA2 1981) (deposition answers immunized), 
and Little Rock School District v. Borden, Inc., 632 F. 2d 700, 705 (CAB 
1980) (same), with In re Corrugated Container Anti.Trust Litigation, Ap-
peal of Franey, 620 F. 2d 1086, 1095 (CA5 1980) (answers not immunized), 
cert. denied, 449 U. S. 1102 (1981). 
1 See United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 345 (1974); United 
States v. Mara, 410 U. S. 19, 41 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting); Kasti-
garv. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 443-444 (1973); Murphy, 378 U.S., at 
9~94 (WHITE, J., concurring); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421, 
438 (1932); Blair v. United States, 250 U. S. 273, 281 (1919); Brown v. 
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sought to make the grant of immunity more useful for law en-
forcement officers through two specific changes. First, Con-
gress made the grant of immunity less expansive 8 by re-
pealing the authority for transactional immunity and provid-
ing for the less comprehensive use immunity authorized 
in § 6002. 9 Second, Congress gave certain officials in 
the Department of Justice 10 exclusive authority to grant 
immunities. 11 
8 In Murphy, JUSTICE WHITE stated that "[i]mrnunity must be as broad 
as, but not hannfully and wastefully broader than, the privilege against 
self-incrimination." 378 U. S., at 107 (concurring opinion) (quoted with 
approval in 116 Cong. Rec. 35,291 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff)). In its 
committee report, the House explained that § 6002 was not to provide an 
''immunity bath," but was to be "no broader than" the Fifth Amendment 
privilege. H.R. No. 91-1549, p. 5 (1970). 
' Section 6002 provides: 
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-
incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding be-
fore or ancillary to-
(1) a court or grand jury of the United States, 
(2) an agency of the United States, or 
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses, or a 
committee or a subcommittee of either House 
and the person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the witness 
an order issued under this part, the witness may not refuse to comply with 
the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but no tes-
timony or other information compelled under the order (or any information 
directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) 
may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution 
for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with 
the order. 
Section 6001(2) defines "other information" to include "any book, paper, 
document, record, recording, or other material." 
10 Section 6003 states: 
(a) In the case of any individual who has been or may be called to testify 
or provide other information at any proceeding before or ancillary to a 
court of the United States or a grand jury of the United States, the United 
States district court for the judicial district in _which the proceeding is or 
may be held shall issue, in accordance with subsection (b) of this section, 
upon the request of the United States attorney for such district, an order 
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The Court upheld the constitutionality of the use immunity 
statute in Kastigar v. United States, 406 U. S. 441 (1972). 
The power to compel testimony is limited by the Fifth 
Amendment, and we held that any grant of immunity must 
be co-extensive with the privilege. We were satisfied, how-
ever, that § 6002 provided this measure of protection and 
thus "removed the dangers against which the privilege pro-
tects." / d., at 449. In rejecting the argument that use and 
derivative-use immunity would not adequately protect a wit-
ness from various incriminating uses of the compelled testi-
mony, we emphasized that "[t]he statute provides a sweeping 
proscription of any use, direct or indirect, of the compelled 
testimony and any information derived therefrom .... " Id., 
at 460. We added that once a defendant establishes that he 
has testified under a grant of immunity, "the prosecution 
[has]the affirmative duty to prove that the evidence it pro-
poses to use is derived from a legitimate source wholly inde-
pendent of the compelled testimony." Ibid. Thus, "immu-
nity from use and derivative use 'leaves the witness and the 
Federal Government in substantially the same position as if 
the witness had claimed his privilege' in the absence of a 
grant of immunity." Kastigar, 406 U. S., at 458-459 (quot-
ing Murphy, 378 U. S., at 79). 
requiring such individual to give testimony or provide other information 
which he refuses to give or provide on the basis of his privilege against self-
incrimination, such order to become effective as provided in section 6002 of 
this part. 
(b) A United States attorney may, with the approval of the Attorney 
General, the Deputy Attorney General, or any designated Assistant Attor-
ney General, request an order under subsection (a) of this section when in 
his judgment-
(!) the testimony or other information from such individual may be nec-
essary to the public interest; and 
(2) such individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide 
other information on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination. 
11 Congress foresaw the courts as playing only a minor role in the immu-
t 
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7 
With the foregoing statutory history and relevant princi-
ples in mind, we turn now to this case. It is not disputed 
that the questions asked of Conboy were directly or indi-
rectly derived from his immunized testimony. The issue as 
presented to us is whether the causal connection between the 
questions and the answers is so direct that the answers also 
are derived from that testimony and therefore should be ex-
cluded under the grant of immunity. 
Petitioners' argument is based on the language of § 6002 
and on a common understanding of the words "derived from." 
The questions formulated on the basis of immunized testi-
mony are clearly "derived from" the prior testimony. Thus, 
the answers that repeat verbatim or closely track a depo-
nent's testimony are necessarily also "derived from" and 
"tainted by" such testimony. Petitioners therefore find no 
basis for the distinction made by the Court of Appeals be-
tween questions and answers responsive to those same ques-
tions. An answer by its very nature is evoked by and re-
sponds to information contained in a question. 
Conboy's position is also straightforward: Questions do not 
incriminate; answers do. Unlike the questions, answers are 
not directly or indirectly derived from the immunized grand 
jury or interview transcripts, but from the deponent's cur-
rent, independent memory of events. Even when a depo-
nent's deposition answers are identical to those he gave to 
the grand jury, he is under oath to tell the truth, not neces-
nizing process: "The court's role in granting the order is merely to find the 
facts on which the order is predicated." H.R. Rep. No. 91-1549, supra 
note 8, at 43; H.R. Rep. No. 91-1188, p. 13 (1970). See 116 Cong. Rec. 
35,291 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff). Cf. President's Commission on 
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime 
in a Free Society 141 (1967) (recommending that "[i]mmunity should be 
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sarily as he told it before the grand jury, but as he knows it 
now. Each new statement of the deponent creates a new 
"source." In sum, the initial grant of immunity does not pre-
vent the prosecutor from prosecuting; it merely limits his 
sources of evidence. 
Although the parties make their arguments in terms track-
ing those of the statute-whether the deposition testimony is 
"derived from" the prior testimony-it is clear that the crux 
of their dispute is whether the earlier grant of immunity it-
self compelled Conboy to talk. 12 Petitioners contend that the 
prior grant of immunity already had supplanted Conboy's 
Fifth Amendment privilege at the time of the civil deposition. 
Petitioners would limit this immunity, of course, to testimony 
that "closely tracks" his prior immunized testimony. It is 
argued that this would not threaten the Government's need 
for admissible evidence or the individual's interest in avoid-
ing self-incrimination. In the absence of such a threat, ad-
missible evidence should be available to civil antitrust plain-
tiffs. But we cannot accept the assumptions upon which 
petitioners' conclusion rests. In our view, a District Court 
cannot compel Conboy to answer deposition questions, over a 
valid assertion of his Fifth Amendment right, absent a duly 
authorized assurance of immunity at the time. 13 
12 See Brief for Petitioners 19 ("Conboy had no Fifth Amendment privi-
lege to assert because of the coextensive protection provided by the immu-
nity statute."); Reply Brief for Petitioners 12 ("[R)equiring a witness to an-
swer questions a second time that were previously answered under a grant 
of immunity does not result in an expansion of the original immunity 
grant."). 
11JusTICE BLACKMUN, concurring in the Court's judgment, assumes 
that Conboy had a right to remain silent at the deposition, which by defini-
tion assumes the immunity order itself does not compel a witness to testify 
at a civil deposition. He discusses the "fruits" doctrine where a witness's 
testimony at a deposition is "an independent act of free will" and concludes 
that ''had Conboy answered the deposition questions, his testimony would 
not have been protected by the original immunity grant .... " Post, at$. q 
We have no occasion to address this hypothetical. The issue is whether 
Conboy can be compelled to testify-i. e., whether the immunity order 
,. 
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We note at the outset that although there may be practical 
reasons for not testifying, 14 as far as the deponent's Fifth 
Amendment right is concerned he should be indifferent be-
tween the protection afforded by silence and that afforded by 
immunity. A deponent's primary interest is that the protec-
tion be certain. The Government's interest, however, may 
be affected seriously by whether the deponent relies at the 
civil deposition on his Fifth Amendment privilege or on his 
prior grant of immunity. With due recognition of petition-
ers' need for admissible evidence, our inquiry then is whether 
this need can be met without jeopardizing the Government's 
interest in limiting the scope of an immunity grant or en-
. croaching upon the deponent's certainty of protection. 
A 
Questions taken verbatim from a transcript of immunized 
testimony could evoke one of several responses from a depo-
nent: (i) he could repeat or adopt his immunized answer; 15 
compels him to track his prior testimony at the civil deposition-over the 
assertion of his Fifth Amendment rights. If, as we conclude, the original 
grant of immunity does not extend to the subsequent civil proceeding, then 
the trial judge lacks authority to compel Conboy to testify over the asser-
tion of his Fifth Amendment privilege. This is so irrespective of whether, 
had he testified at the deposition rather than asserting the privilege, his 
answers could have been admitted against him at a criminal trial. We 
therefore need no\ now decide the extent to which civil deposition testi-
mony, freely given by a witness in Conboy's position, is "directly or indi-
rectly derived" from prior grand jury testimony. 
As JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S opinion makes a factual analysis under the 
fruits doctrine, it appears to leave open the possibility that the outcome in 
a subsequent criminal prosecution of the deponent may be different in a 
future case because of differences in the factual record. He nevertheless 
concludes, as do we, that District Courts are without power to compel a 
civil deponent to testify over a valid assertion of his Fifth Amendment 
right, absent a separate grant of immunity pursuant to § 6002. 
"Besides the costs of testifying against close associates, any witness in-
creases the risk of committing perjury the more he talks. Cf. 18 U. S. C. 
§ 6002 (perjured testimony not immunized). 
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(ii) he could affirm that the transcript of his immunized an-
swers accurately reflects his prior testimony; (iii) he could re-
call additional information responsive to the question but not 
disclosed in his immune testimony; or (iv) he could disclose 
information that is not responsive to the question. Petition-
ers do not contend, nor could they, that the prior grant of use 
immunity affords protection for all self-incriminating in-
formation disclosed by the immunized witness on any occa-
sion after the giving of the immunized testimony. Rather, 
petitioners argue that only the first three responses would be 
"derived from" his immune testimony and therefore would be 
unavailable for use against the deponent in any subsequent 
criminal prosecution. 
Petitioners' premise is that the deposition of Conboy is de-
signed not to discover new information, 16 but to obtain evi-
dence that simply repeats the statements in the immunized 
transcript. 17 Because there will be little opportunity for the 
nized grand-jury transcript; then ask the witness if that is his testimony; 
and he answers simply "Yes." 
15 Direct examination may not be as limited as petitioners assume. The 
District Court's civil contempt order stated that the questions asked in the 
deposition ''were taken directly'' from the immunized transcripts, but did 
not define exactly what deposition questions petitioners could ask. Other 
Courts of Appeals have permitted direct questioning to go beyond mere 
restatements of the prior testimony. See In re Corrugated Container 
Antitrust Litigation, Appeal of Fleischacker, 644 F. 2d 70, 79 (CA2 1981) 
(compelling answers to questions "concerning specific subjects that actu-
ally were touched upon by questions appearing in the transcript of the im-
munized testimony"); Little Rock School District v. Borden, Inc., 632 F. 2d 
700, 705 (CA8 1980) (compelling answers as long as deposition questions 
confined to "'the same time, geographical and substantive frame work as 
the [witness' immunized] grand jury testimony'") (quoting Appeal of 
Starkey, 600 F. 2d 1043, 1048 (CA8 1979)). The dissenting opinion of Jus-1 
TICE STEVENS apparent!)' does not attempt to indicate when questioning 
will exceed proper limits.~ 
11 For purposes of this case, we assume that the grand jury transcripts 
are inadmissible as evidence in a civil trial because the testimony is not 
subject to cross examination. Cf. Fed. R. Evid. 803(8) (hearsay exception 
~ 
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grant of immunity to sweep in statements on direct examina-
tion that the Government did not intend to immunize, or for 
the deponent to give responses that may fall outside of the 
grant of immunity and later be used against him in a subse-
quent criminal prosecution, petitioners argue that Conboy's 
deposition will yield only a carbon copy of the grand-jury 
transcript. In such a situation, it would be desirable for civil 
plaintiffs, particularly those bringing private suits that sup-
plement the criminal enforcement of the federal antitrust 
laws, to have access to the available, probative information. 
But even if the direct examination is limited to the ques-
tions and answers in the immunized transcript, there remains 
the right of cross examination, 18 a right traditionally relied 
upon expansively to test credibility as well as to seek the 
truth. Petitioners recognize this problem, but maintain that 
the antitrust defendants "would be entitled to test the accu-
racy and truthfulness of Conboy's repeated immunized testi-
mony without going beyond the confines of that testimony." 
Regardless of any limitations that may be imposed on its 
scope, 19 however, cross examination is intended to and often 
for certain public records); Fed. R. Evid. 804(a)(l) (witness unavailable 
when exempted from testifying on ground of privilege); Fed. R. Evid. 
804(b)(l) (former testimony admissible when witness unavailable and the 
party against whom the testimony is now offered had an opportunity for 
cross examination). 
18 Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(l) (stating that depositions may be taken ''if 
the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discov-
ery of admissible evidence"); Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(c) (allowing cross examina-
tion at depositions); Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a) (deposition "admissible under the 
rules of evidence applied as though the witness were then present and tes-
tifying"); Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(l) (deposition admissible if the party against 
whom the testimony is now offered in a civil action had an opportunity to 
develop testimony by cross examination). 
"See United States v. Cardillo, 316 F. 2d 606, 611 (CA21963) (in deter-
mining whether testimony of a witness who invokes the privilege during 
cross examination may be used against defendant, court draws a distinc-
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will produce information not elicited on direct. We must as-
sume that, to produce admissible evidence, the scope of cross 
examination at the deposition cannot easily be limited to the 
immunized testimony. This assumption implicates both the 
Government's and the individual's interests embodied in 
§6002. 
B 
Use immunity was intended to immunize and exclude from 
a subsequent criminal trial only that information to which the 
Government expressly has surrendered future use. If the 
Government is engaged in an ongoing investigation of the 
particular activity at issue, immunizing new information 
(e.g., the answers to questions in a case like this one) may 
make it more difficult to show in a subsequent prosecution 
that similar information was obtained from wholly independ-
ent sources. If a District Court were to conclude in a subse-
quent civil proceeding that the prior immunity order ex-
tended to civil deposition testimony closely tracking the 
immunized testimony, it in effect could invest the deponent 
with transactional immunity on matters about which he testi-
fied at the immunized proceedings. This is precisely the 
kind of immunity Congress intended to prohibit. The pur-
pose of § 6002 was to limit the scope of immunity to the level 
that is constitutionally required, as well as to limit the use of 
immunity to those cases in which the Attorney General, or 
officials designated by him, determine that gaining the 
witness's testimony outweighs the loss of the opportunity for 
criminal prosecution of that witness. 20 
inquiry into collateral matters that bear on credibility of witnesses and 
those in which assertion prevents inquiry into matters about which witness 
testified on direct). 
2J)We need not decide whether United States Attorneys, when desig-
nated by the Attorney General, presently have authority to immunize the 
testimony of a witness in a civil proceeding when the Government deter-
mines that the public interest would be served. 
~ 
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Petitioners' interpretation of § 6002 also places substantial 
risks on the deponent. 21 Unless the grant of immunity as-
sures a witness that his incriminating testimony will not be 
used against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution, the 
witness has not received the certain protection of his Fifth 
Amendment privilege that he has been forced to exchange. 
No court has authority to immunize a witness. That respon-
sibility, as we have noted, is peculiarly an executive one, and 
only the Attorney General or a designated officer of the De-
partment of Justice has authority to grant use immunity. 
See 18 U. S. C. §§ 6002, 6003. Nor should a court, at the 
time of the civil testimony, pre-determine the decision of the 
court in a subsequent criminal prosecution on the question 
whether the Government has met its burden of proving "that 
the evidence it proposes to use is derived from a legitimate 
source wholly independent of the compelled testimony." 
Kastigar, 406 U. S., at 460. Yet in holding Conboy in con-
tempt for his Fifth Amepdment silence, the District Court 
below essentially predicted that a court in any future criminal 
prosecution of Conboy will be obligated to protect against 
evidentiary use of the deposition testimony petitioners seek. 
We do not think such a predictive judgment is enough. 
Petitioners' interpretation of § 6002 imposes risks on the 
deponent whether or not the deposition testimony properly 
can be used against him in a subsequent criminal prosecu-
tion. 22 Accordingly, the District Court's compulsion order in 
this case, in the absence of statutory authority or a new grant 
21 None of the tests set forth by Courts of Appeals that have adopted I 
petitioners' interpretation of § 6002, provides deponents with certain guid-
ance as to when they must talk and when they must not. See note 16, 
supra. 
= Cf. post, at 4 (MARSHALL, J., concurring) ("Further incriminating evi-
dence that is derived from compelled testimony cannot always be traced 
back to its source[.]"); note 14, supra (increasing risk of harm and perjury); 






PILLSBURY CO. v. CONBOY 
of immunity by the United States Attorney, cannot be justi-
fied by the subsequent exclusion of the compelled testimony. 
As JUSTICE MARSHALL notes in his concUITing opinion: 
''Whatever justification there may be for requiring a witness 
to give incriminating testimony in aid of a criminal investiga-
tion after the government has granted use immunity, there is 
no similar justification for compelling a witness to give in-
criminating testimony for the benefit of a private litigant 
when the government has not chosen to grant immunity." 
Post, at 4. 
The result of compelling testimony-whether it is immu-
nized or excluded-is that the Government's interests, as 
well as the witness's, suffer. Reliance on judicial exclusion 
of nonimmunized testimony would be inconsistent with the 
congressional policy of leaving the granting of immunity to 
the Executive Branch. 
As the Court stated in Maness v. Meyers, 419 U. S. 449 
(1975), compelling a witness to testify in "reliance upon a 
later objection or motion to suppress would 'let the cat out' 
with no assurance whatever of putting it back." Id., at 463. 
We believe Conboy acted properly in maintaining his silence 
in the face of the District Court's compulsion order and by 
testing the validity of his privilege on appeal. 
IV 
This Court has emphasized the importance of the private 
action as a means of furthering the policy goals of certain fed-
eral regulatory statutes, including the federal antitrust laws. 
See, e. g., Perrna Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts 
Corp., 392 U. S. 134, 139 (1968); United States v. Borden 
Co., 347 U. S. 514, 518-519 (1954). But private civil actions 
can only supplement, not supplant, the primary responsibil-
ity of Government. Petitioners' proposed construction of 
§ 6002 sweeps further than Congress intended and could hin-
der governmental enforcement of its criminal laws by turning 
,. 
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use immunity into a form of transactional immunity for sub-
jects examined in the immunized proceeding. It also puts 
the deponent in some danger of criminal prosecution unless 
he receives an assurance of immunity or exclusion that the 
courts cannot properly give. Silence, on the other hand, 
preserves the deponent's rights and the Government's inter-
ests, as well as the judicial resources that otherwise would be 
required to make the many difficult judgments that petition-
ers' interpretation of § 6002 would require. 23 
V 
We hold that a deponent's civil deposition testimony, 
closely tracking his prior immunized testimony, is not, with-
out duly authorized assurance of immunity at the time, im-
munized testimony within the meaning of § 6002, and there-
fore may not be compelled over a valid assertion of his Fifth 
Amendment privilege. 24 The judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals accordingly is 
Affirmed. 
29 The dissent minimizes the enforcement interest that our construction 
of § 6002 protects, post, 7-9, contending that we ''misunderstood the I 
prosecutorial interest," id., at 7. We note, however, that by conceding 
that there is some ''risk" that the deponent's testimony may hamper a pros-
ecution, id., at 13, the dissent concedes that its interpretation of § 6002 
provides at least somewhat broader immunity than Congress intended. 
Moreover, the dissent overlooks the possible difficulty of securing the co-
operation of individuals such as Conboy who may be more reluctant to 
testify in the immunized proceedings if they know that later deposition tes-
timony may increase their exposure to civil liability. Finally, in the dis-
sent's judgment, ''the theoretical risk that compelled testimony could ham-
per a potential prosecution [is] plainly outweighed by the enforcement 
interest in allowing the deposition to go forward." Id., at 13. See also 
id., at 9. This, however, is a judgment reserved for officials of the De-
partment of Justice, not the federal courts, to make on a case-by-case 
basis. 
:u Our holding is limited to precluding District Courts from compelling 
testimony in a civil deposition over a valid assertion of the Fifth Amend-
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Title 18 U. S. C. § 6002 provides that "no testimony or other information 
compelled under the order [of a federal court] (or any information di-
rectly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) 
may be used against the witness in any criminal case." When respond-
ent appeared before a grand jury investigating price-fixing activities in 
the corrugated container industry, he was granted use immunity pursu-
ant to § 6002 for his testimony. Subsequently, in civil antitrust actions 
brought in Federal District Court by petitioner purchasers of corrugated 
containers, respondent appeared, pursuant to a subpoena, for a deposi-
tion. At the deposition, questions were read from the transcript of his 
immunized grand jury testimony and rephrased to include the transcript 
answer, and then respondent was asked if he had "so testified" before 
the grand jury. He refused to answer each question, asserting his Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Granting petitioners' 
motion to compel respondent to answer, the District Court held him in 
contempt when he continued to claim his privilege. The Court of Ap-
peals reversed, holding that respondent was entitled to assert his Fifth 
Amendment privilege, since his deposition testimony was not protected 
under § 6002 but could be used against him in a subsequent criminal 
action. 
Held: A deponent's civil deposition testimony, such as that in question in 
this case, repeating verbatim or closely tracking his prior immunized tes-
timony, is not, without duly authorized assurance of immunity at the 
time, immunized testimony within the meaning of § 6002, and therefore 
may not be compelled over a valid assertion of his Fifth Amendment 
privilege. Pp. 4-16. 
(a) To construe § 6002, as petitioners urge, so as to hold that the grant 
of immunity compelled respondent to give testimony at the civil deposi-
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tion that repeats verbatim or closely tracks his prior testimony sweeps 
further than Congress intended and could hinder the Government's en-
forcement of its criminal laws by turning use immunity into a form of 
transactional immunity for subjects examined in the immunized proceed-
ing. Use immunity is intended to immunize and exclude from a subse-
quent criminal trial only that information to which the Government ex-
pressly has surrendered future use. The purpose of§ 6002 is to limit the 
scope of immunity to a constitutionally required level, as well as to limit 
the use of immunity to those cases in which the Government determines 
that gaining the witness' testimony outweighs the loss of the opportunity 
for criminal prosecution of that witness. Pp. 7-12. 
(b) Petitioners' proposed construction of§ 6002 also could put the de-
ponent to some risk unless he receives an assurance of immunity or ex-
clusion that the courts cannot properly give. Silence, on the other hand, 
preserves the deponent's rights and the Government's interests, as well 
as the judicial resources that otherwise would be required to make the 
many difficult judgments that petitioners' interpretation of § 6002 would 
require. Pp. 13-16. 
661 F. 2d 1145, affirmed. 
POWELL, J ., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J. , 
and WHITE, MARSHALL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. MARSHALL, J., 
filed a concurring opinion. BRENNAN and BLACKMON, JJ., filed opinions 
concurring in the result. STEVENS, J. , filed a dissenting opinion, in which 
O'CONNOR, J ., joined. 
